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This dissertation traces five early modern English dramatic characters through their crises 
of identity. The reader will follow the very different ways these characters respond to the demand 
that they represent themselves in the respective social worlds they inhabit. The protagonist in each 
of the plays, in Gammer Gurton’s Needle, in Shakespeare’s The Comedy of Errors, in Christopher 
Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, in Arden of Faversham, and in Shakespeare’s Othello, uses rhetorical 
skills, the impression he makes on the senses of other characters, and action to embody the 
function the fictional world prescribes for them. It will appear that the three corresponding media, 
that is, language, perception, and action, do not only give characters an opportunity to manifest 
aspects of their public persona; but these media also represent that dramatic world, its social 
conditions, and the identity of others to the characters I examine. Besides building a complex image 
of who they are, each character negotiates his or her relationships to others through these three 
media. Are characters content with the social identity they build in the process, or are they aware of 
who they are in some way other than what they show? Is there a part of who they are that eludes 
representation? When they fail to comply with the requirements of a social identity, or when they 
decide to withdraw from it, characters testify to a degree of consciousness that they possess, or 
wish they possessed, an interior space, a sense of self, as a part of their identity. The self is elusive; 
it resists a simple definition, but the chapters that follow point out hints and signs that the 
characters are aware of their precious inwardness, often in the moment when they are losing it. 
The analyses take advantage of the critical literature on the early modern individual both 
before and after Stephen Greenblatt’s groundbreaking work. Reflections on a range of 
contemporary written discourse support the study of the characters’ success and failures in their 
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In his essay “Of the inconstancie of our actions,” Michel de Montaigne questioned the 
assumption of the divine serenity of the immortal soul in contrast to the ephemeral existence of the 
body as only “the soul’s conveyance” in Christian theological convention.1 He did so by transposing 
the static Platonic dichotomy of body and soul into the dynamic terms of the private “selfe” and its 
public appearance, a “maske,” lending also a dramatic aspect to his discussion of how a human 
being acts in the world. In his introspective mode of observation, Montaigne characterized what he 
called “my soule” or “my selfe”2 as the seat of “our appetite” that pulls our actions in every which 
way “according as the winde of occasions doth transport us” (184). Correspondingly, the label he 
attaches to this inner core of the personality is “inconstancy” (183) and the name of its 
characteristic act is “Distinguo” (185). A dramatic sense of the core of the human personality arises 
in these words, the source of a will to action, which is clearly directed toward the outside world as 
it appears to the senses, the instruments of distinction. In discussing aspects of early modern 
dramatic identity in this dissertation, I am going to refer to this putative inner aspect of characters 
as the self. 
I have to make a distinction here between the meaning of “self” as I use it in this dissertation 
and that of “inwardness.” “Inwardness” is a general term for the phenomenon Katharine Eisaman 
Maus defines as “an unexpressed interior” in contradistinction to “a theatricalized exterior.”3 Her 
study on inwardness focuses on the difference between “interior and exterior” (3), on the problem 
of how what cannot be seen can be known, and on the social and political consequences of this 
“gap” (2). My work, however, explores the structure of identity and its manifestations in discourse, 
                                                     
1 According to Adolar Zumkeller, St Augustine used “Platonic images of ‘the soul’s clothing’ […] and ‘the soul’s 
conveyance’ […] to describe the body.” Augustine’s Ideal of the Religious Life, trans. Edmund Colledge (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 1986) 218. 
2 Michael De Montaigne, “Of the inconstancie of our actions,” The Essays or, Morall, Politike, and Militarie 
Discovrses, II, 1, trans. Iohn Florio (London: 1632) 183–87. 185. Early English Books Online 28 July, 2014. 
3 Katharine Eisaman Maus, Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1995) 2. 
2 
perception, and action. I am interested in how individual characters experience their inwardness 
and how they protect it by building a front to the outside world around it. In this approach, 
therefore, inwardness becomes personal,4 individual, and unique. I hope that the word “self” will 
help me contain the unstructured and often chaotic sense of this interiority in the private domain. 
Montaigne also defined the relationship between the self and its outward appearance that 
he called a “maske.” According to him, the “selfe” emerges prior to its public image, in which it 
strives to realize itself to the world. While he acknowledged the passions of the heart, Montaigne 
pointed out that one cannot let such a sense of “confusion, disorder, blending, mingling” (185), etc., 
show in social situations. In an attempt to assume a semblance of the “virtue” (186) of “constancie” 
(183), he argued, “wee borrow” her image as a disguise (186). This way, we follow the prescript we 
receive “even [from] good Authors” who, Montaigne claimed, often frame in their written work “a 
constant and solide contexture of us” (183). Such a reliable public image, Montaigne suggests, is a 
mere discursive construct. To designate the front that characters often build around their putative 
selves to protect it and to create a socially acceptable space to satisfy its desires, I will use the term 
persona. 
Montaigne believed that a polished public appearance lends itself to an “easie” formulation 
in “discourse” (184). Spoken words, and their written form that represents them, are indeed the 
most prominent, and to us the only directly accessible, medium of early modern drama. Here I draw 
on the insight of a philosopher who criticized St Augustine’s nominal account of signification, the 
view that all that language does is mere reference, and called attention to the potential in language 
to perform action and to shape our perception: “the speaking of language,” Wittgenstein argues, “is 
part of an activity, or of a form of life.”5 In his wake, linguists have made more specific statements 
                                                     
4 Eisaman Maus does use the term “personal inwardness” (13). 
5 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, German–
English edition (1953; Oxford: Blackwell, 1958) 23, p. 11. 
3 
concerning the pervasive power of language to define for us, its users, what reality is. For example, 
Paula A. Treichler and Francine Wattman Frank claim that 
language constructs as well as reflects culture. Language thus no longer serves as 
the transparent vehicle of content or as the simple reflection of reality but itself 
participates in how that content and reality are formed, apprehended, expressed, 
and transformed.6 
Language thus appears to be a universal and pervasive system of meaning making. The narrower 
term discourse, however, refers to its ongoing use in social situations. Since it is my aim in this 
dissertation to find out how main characters in English drama form a notion of who they are in 
their relations to other characters, I will have to observe not only the abstract properties of the 
language they use but the ways it shapes situations and precipitates specific outcomes in the plot. 
Therefore, Deborah Schiffrin’s definition of discourse as not merely a component in constructing 
the social world but being a part of that “social world under construction”7 will be a useful 
reminder that discourse plays a decisive role in shaping the action and the characters’ idea of where 
they stand in the drift of that action. 
Apart from living in words, characters also make their presence felt to others and to 
themselves through the senses, most of all through vision. Sheer sensory data not being available, 
the reader will, again, have to observe the ways characters respond to what they can see, hear, 
touch, smell, or taste, and sometimes even feel in the interior of their bodies. Instead of only 
mapping the senses of the body, my purpose in paying attention to the diverse stimuli that affect 
characters is always to find out how sensations and their meaning, as it is reflected and 
contextualized in their awareness, help them define who they are in the social world of the play. To 
                                                     
6 Paula A. Treichler and Francine Wattman Frank, “Introduction: Scholarship, feminism, and language 
change,” Language, Gender, and Professional Writing: Theoretical Approaches and Guidelines for Nonsexist 
Usage, eds. Frank and Treichler (New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 1989) 1–34. 3. 
7 Deborah Schiffrin, Discourse Markers (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 2. 
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give such an integrated account of perception, it is inevitable to consider how expectations 
influence it. The cognitive approach to perception called “New Look” supports this endeavor by 
encouraging the reader to conceptualize perception in terms of a “top-down processing.” According 
to this view, which became popular in the second half of the twentieth century, the subject arrives 
at the meaning of sensory data by embedding them in “higher-level information,” such as his or her 
“prior knowledge […] or the meaningful context in which a stimulus is seen.”8 Only to the extent a 
character consciously reflects on his or her being in the dramatic world can we speak of a sense of 
identity. Therefore, the term “identity” in this dissertation refers to the more or less conscious 
reflection of a character on his or her changing position with respect to others in the fictional world. 
The notion of identity includes clues not merely to the sensual, perceptible, and discursive shape of 
a character’s public image, the persona, but to the invisible self as well, even though its essence can 
be hardly grasped in words. In bringing the aspects of language and perception together in a focus 
on the dynamic relationship between self and persona in a specific identity, I hope, consists a main 
part of the original contribution of this dissertation to previous early modern identity studies. 
Characters’ awareness of their identity in a social context and of the importance to shape 
their image, their persona, in the eyes of others makes it inevitable that we conceptualize 
perception in reflexive terms. However strong the sense of its presence was in early modern 
consciousness, as it certainly was in Montaigne,9 the self is not palpable to the senses, and the 
French philosopher was aware of its elusiveness in self-observation. The perceptive thinker can see 
a “supple variation, and easie yielding contradiction” in him- or herself, he wrote, and added that 
this “volubility and discordance” resulted, at least in part, from the inevitable subjectivity of the 
                                                     
8 E. Bruce Goldstein, Sensation and Perception (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole; London: International 
Thomson, 1996) 24f. 
9 Montaigne declares that “Every man beareth the whole stampe of humane condition,” and so he presents 
himself as a valid example of this generality when he writes, “Authors communicate themselves unto the 
world by some speciall and strange marke; I the first, by my generall disposition; as Michael de Montaigne; not 
as a Grammarian, or a Poet, or a Lawyer.” Montaigne, “Of Repenting,” III, 2, 451–58. 451. Montaigne “claims 
that his own self is the main subject matter of his philosophy.” Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and 
its Sources, ed. Michael Mooney (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979) 30. 
5 
observer’s eye: “If I speake diversly of my selfe,” he admits, “it is because I looke diversly upon my 
selfe” (185). Since characters cannot observe their inner being directly, they rely on the 
manifestations of their identity in the eyes of others. As a result, they either hide their inner selves 
or try to make them explicit—and at that moment they are already shaping their persona, not only 
their selves. As soon as the self comes to light, it is not private anymore, its previously felt 
inwardness is lost, which renders the notion of self truly elusive. When they rise above the chaos of 
the self by joining the ongoing social discourse, relying exclusively on what is visible, and 
embracing its “assured policies,”10 characters often leave us with a sense that something has been 
“destroyed”11 in the process. 
However important language and perception appear to be to an understanding of dramatic 
forms of identity, the picture would be incomplete without considering the third medium, namely 
action, in which dramatic identity inevitably expresses itself. According to Aristotle, in the fictional 
world of drama “the Plot is the imitation of the action,” and it is “the first principle” and “the soul of 
a tragedy.”12 Furthermore, beside language and perception, action is the third component of what 
Robin Allott sums up in the weighty phrase “total human behavior.”13 The analyses of drama that 
will follow, therefore, examine identity in its manifestations in three media: in language, in 
perception, and in action. I consider identity a composite of a sense of interiority and of a front 
which the presumptive self builds around itself. As far as I can show how the relative weight and 
delicate equilibrium of these two components, self and persona, determine identity, my approach to 
                                                     
10 Montaigne, “Of the inconstancie” 184. 
11 Lynda E. Boose points out that the dissolution of the obscure mythical significance of the handkerchief in 
“Iago’s pornographic literalism” makes us “understand what is ultimately destroyed.” “Othello’s 
Handkerchief: ‘The Recognizance and Pledge of Love’,” English Literary Renaissance 5.3 (Autumn 1975): 360–
74. 367. 
12 Aristotle, Poetics, transl. S. H. Butcher, Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Arts by S. H. Butcher, 4th ed. (New 
York: Dover Publications, 1951) VI. 6, 14, pp. 25–29. 
13 In his study of language in the context of human behavior, Allott claims that “words, the fabric of language, 
are not arbitrary […] but derive directly from […], and are integrated with, perception and action, the other 
main components of total human behavior.” Robin Allott, The Natural Origin of Language. The Structural 
Inter-relation of Language, Visual Perception and Action (Knebworth, Hertfordshire: Able Publishing, 2001) i. 
6 
identity is dynamic. The balance between the two, the dominance of one or the other in the sense of 
identity, might change in the course of the plot even in one character, as we will see most 
prominently in Othello. Based on the foregoing, the topic of this dissertation is the manifestations of 
identity in early modern English drama. Apart from the question of how identity is structured, it 
remains to be determined which of the three media, language, perception, or action, dominates 
identity in the drama I examine. 
 
In his seminal work which, as A. J. Piesse formulates, “sidelined” earlier approaches to the 
problem of identity and began “a continual redefinition of what constitutes the individual,”14 
Stephen Greenblatt delineates the result of “self-fashioning” as the “achievement” of a “shape: a 
distinctive personality, a characteristic address to the world, a consistent mode of perceiving and 
behaving.”15 With this, he names all three of Allott’s main components of “total human behavior,” as 
I quoted them above, that is, “language, perception, and action.”16 In my choice of plays to analyze, I 
primarily paid attention to the balance among these three factors, but mostly to the prominence of 
language and perception. Othello’s persistent demand for “ocular proof” and Iago’s dexterity in 
weaving the plot in words have intrigued me ever since my undergraduate encounter with the play, 
and it made me question to what extent Othello is conscious of his own motives and their origin. 
The experience of this tragedy then prompted me to look for other, earlier plays that problematize 
the connection between perception and the use of language and might prepare this culmination in 
Othello of the intensity in the way language shapes the protagonist’s sense of who he is and 
determines his course of action. There is a nightmarish, dreamlike quality to Othello’s perception of 
his narrowing world, and this goes along with a limited sense of his freedom in action. 
                                                     
14 A. J. Piesse, “Identity,” A Companion to English Renaissance Literature and Culture, ed. Michael Hattaway, 
Blackwell Companions to Literature and Culture Ser. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000) 634–43. 634. 
15 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1980) 2. (Emphasis added.) 
16 Allott i. 
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In the course of my readings I was struck again and again by the power of language to skew 
perception and to restrict main characters’ freedom of choices in action in other early modern plays 
as well and its force to control them rather than to empower them. Nonetheless, I found significant 
differences in the degree of this control. The increasing importance of textuality in humanism and 
in post-Reformation England seems more and more to affect the dramatic view of the autonomy of 
perception and action: characters seem to be more and more dominated by discourse as we 
approach the end of the Elizabethan era. Are they aware of what drives them in their action, I asked 
myself in the analyses. Do they know who they are? Can they rely on their sense perception when 
assessing their position in their dramatic social worlds, or does the ongoing discourse they 
participate in shape this perception in ways unbeknownst to them? For the purpose of exploring 
what Greenblatt calls the “experience” in characters “of being molded by forces outside one’s 
control” and “the attempt to fashion other selves” (3), Othello seemed to provide the most fertile 
ground and an end point at the same time to which I could compare earlier plays. 
In addition to “an increased self-consciousness about the fashioning of human identity as a 
manipulable, artful process”17 Greenblatt observes in fictional and historical personages in the 
sixteenth century, earlier Tudor drama seems more optimistic in terms of the characters’ 
operational distance to non-discursive, sensual experience and in terms of the freedom of “self-
fashioning” language affords them. The comic ending of Gammer Gurton’s Needle, my first play, is 
liberating even in contrast to the denouement of my next example, Shakespeare’s early comedy, The 
Comedy of Errors. Hodge suffers from a bout of perceptual delusions on his way to presenting 
himself as an eligible youth, and he finds support in his endeavor in the use of sophisticated 
rhetorical devices. In contrast, Antipholus of Syracuse struggles to define who he is with respect to 
his family and the larger community of Ephesus, in which his brother grew up. The fact that he is 
condemned to act under a false name calls attention to the limiting function of language. While it is 
                                                     
17 Greenblatt 2. 
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a liberating force for Hodge, language restricts Antipholus’ perception and action. The sharp 
contrast in the role language plays in these two comedies urged me to analyze them next to each 
other. 
From the moment he appears onstage, Doctor Faustus is preoccupied with the question of 
who he is. He conducts an experiment in which he strives to answer it in an alienating theological 
framework. How does this framework limit his attempted self-determination, and to what extent is 
he aware of its effect on his undertaking, I tried to find out. I selected this tragedy for analysis 
because it presents a hero with exceptional poetic skills and an urge to express himself in 
opposition to a language that is more suitable for the shaping of a corporate identity as foreseen in 
theological statements outlining the plan of salvation. An inevitable condition for coming to terms 
with the uniform identity the salvation plan imposes on him would be, it seems, that Faustus accept 
the impersonal power contemporary Protestantism attributed to God. The theological context in 
which Faustus is entangled hardly allows for an experience of inwardness. 
The severe limitation on Arden’s perception in Arden of Faversham, a wilful blindness that 
persists in him throughout the plot until his death, requires an explanation. Moreover, the play 
exerts considerable power on the student because it dramatizes a historical event, a murder that 
took place during Edward VI’s reign. Since the victim of this murder was a beneficiary of Henry 
VIII’s massive church and land reform, the economic and religious policies of Henry VIII 
reverberate in every emotion that stirs in the play. My chapter on this play is an exception in this 
study, because it presents the full-blown sense of identity the historic figure Henry VIII built for 
himself. I use it as an example and measure the balance between self and persona in main 
characters of the play against it. In this sense, the play deals with the effort in some, like in Black 
Will, to emulate Henry’s powerful combination of self and persona and with the refusal in others, 
for example, in Arden, to yield to its force. 
9 
From this follows one of the four overall arguments of this dissertation: dramatic heroes 
reach fulfilment only if they maintain their desire through periodic delays and abnegation, and if 
they manage to build a strong persona, as a front, by weaving textual and oral discourse, visual 
display, and occasional aggressive action around their selves to protect and hide it, instead of trying 
to explicate it, communicate it, or give it away. The second argument ranks the relative weight of 
the media in which identity expresses itself: oral and textual discourse dominates dramatic identity 
in the Renaissance English plays I examine; discourse also restricts and shapes perception and 
determines its meaning for characters; and, finally, action, “the soul of a tragedy” for Aristotle, is 
generally the least powerful or decisive factor in the shaping of identity. 
The third argument concerns the development of the shape of dramatic identity over the 
period of the fifty years through which the range of plays in this dissertation is spread: it seems to 
move from a balanced whole of self and persona into an increasing sense of fragmentation. One 
single character is less capable of uniting these two vital aspects in a full-fledged sense of identity as 
we progress in time. As a result, pairs of seemingly inseparable characters emerge who 
complement each other and each of whom represents only one of the two components: the self or 
the persona. The fourth and final argument names the contents of the self in general terms: the 
“invisible personal interior”18 of characters consists of heterogeneous elements, many of which we 
might call “residual”19 in post-Reformation England, but all of which appear alien and reactionary in 
contrast to the primarily transparent, discursive appearance of the “dominant” (121-27) kind of 
persona. Catholic idolatry, witchcraft, sorcery, Egyptian magic, emotional and sexual attachment, 
female sexual attractiveness, maternal dependence, and uncontrollable passions appear as the 
unspeakable substance of the unstructured self, lumped together often indiscriminately, based on 
an undefined affinity between these matters. In its own way, each of the individual chapters 
                                                     
18 Eisaman Maus 12. 
19 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature, Marxist Introductions Ser. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977) 121–27. 
10 
supports the above arguments which, in combination, strengthen the focus on the manifestations of 
identity. This focus gives the reader an insight into the characters’ personal experience of who they 
are; it layers this experience, contextualizes, and historicizes it. To my knowledge, a similarly 
complex case study of the sense of identity in individual characters has not appeared before. 
 
Gammer Gurton’s Needle is the first play in chronology. It presents the way Hodge, a 
domestic servant and the protagonist of the comedy, builds his identity starting from an implicit 
desire and anxiety, through becoming aware of them, and finally in mounting a public persona to 
elude the control of his mistress, Gammer Gurton, and to impress his beloved, Kirstian Clack. He 
fortifies this persona with a masculine visual appearance and sophisticated rhetorical skills. Until 
he succeeds in this with the help of a father figure, Diccon, he outwardly complies with the 
requirements of the identity Gammer imposes on him as a subordinate in the household. This is the 
only play in the series that creates a strong sense of the presence of bodies, and it foregrounds 
farcical physical action as a foil to the final triumph of a superior discourse that creates the space 
for the socially legitimate fulfilment of Hodge’s desire in the prospect of marriage. When he builds 
his identity by following the desire of his self and creating favorable conditions for them in a 
powerful persona, Hodge follows a pattern in miniature similar to the one the historic Henry VIII 
shaped on an extravagant scale—I will outline his exemplary achievement in this respect in Chapter 
Four. Hodge reaches a full-blown sense of identity which none of my later dramatic characters 
would be able to reproduce. While Hodge overcomes the force of Catholic idolatry and witchcraft in 
Gammer Gurton, a sense of which partially he and Diccon construct, he persists in his desire for 
Kirstian Clack without a compromise. 
In contrast to the remarkable integrity we see in Hodge, Shakespeare’s The Comedy of Errors 
takes a step toward a disintegration of the sense of identity. Antipholus of Syracuse’s notion of who 
he is is damaged, in the first place, by an originary loss of his name. Instead of maintaining his 
11 
desire to find his brother, he denies himself the opportunity for a discovery when it offers itself 
upon his arrival in Ephesus. While he retreats to an implicit self with a stifled wish to be reunited 
with his family, his twin brother acts out all the functions of a public persona. Moreover, an 
unfounded fear of witchcraft and sorcery makes Antipholus of Syracuse unable to establish a 
meaningful relationship to either of the female characters who temporarily attract him: Adriana 
and Luciana. This aversion to the matter of the self and his urge to escape it render him incapable of 
representing his own desire in the given social situation and vulnerable to being incorporated in 
what Montaigne called the “assured policies” and “certaine Lawes,”20 that is, in the discursively 
controlled commercial mechanism of the Ephesian society. As a result, the traveling brother loses 
his freedom of action, and the discursive order he would like to join severely restricts his 
perception. Finally, he will be reunited with his family at the price of losing his say in determining 
who he is. 
The written language of the Scripture is so powerfully present from the beginning in 
Christopher Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus that it is hardly possible for the protagonist to establish a 
foothold from where he could resist the way it defines his corporate identity. The context of 
contemporary Protestant theology does not afford Faustus an opportunity to fulfill his longing for a 
sense of interiority, to possess his own soul. Therefore, his self remains present largely in his vain 
search for it, in its painful absence. What is more, Faustus’ attempted escape to magic and sorcery is 
a false promise. In his deed, he gives away what no “Lines, circles, seals, letters and characters” can 
restore to him: his personal participation in the salvation of his soul. Therefore, Faustus’ 
subjectivity remains illusory, and the notion of the eternity of his soul oppresses him as a tragic 
burden. His words quote and misquote the New Testament, Homer, Lucretius, and “necromantic 
books;” his perception exhibits a trite literalism; and his action shows no sign of an authentic 
                                                     
20 Montaigne, “Of the inconstancie” 184. 
12 
purpose. Faustus cannot attain a genuine sense of identity or show empathy with Mephastophilis, 
who, similarly to him, is locked up in a displaced subject position. 
Nonetheless, not all of the main characters in these plays strive to achieve a full sense of 
identity in which self and persona complement and mutually support each other. However 
favorable it is for him economically and politically, Thomas Arden is reluctant to acknowledge the 
textual definition of who he is in the dramatic world of the anonymous Arden of Faversham. He 
withdraws into the isolation of a constructed sense of essentialism, the nobility of his “blood,” and 
thus he forgoes the discursive support the royal deed would lend to his station. As a result, without 
a strong public persona to hold onto, he cannot enjoy the benefits of, or even uphold his claim to, 
the enormous wealth he has received in the wake of the dissolution of the monasteries under Henry 
VIII’s reign. Eventually, he succumbs to the ravenous local network of the discontented, the 
reactionary forces of idolatry, magical causations, and a pagan worship of fertility. Even Black Will 
rises above him in terms of a sustained passion for wealth and power: the ruffian relies on a 
chivalric fictional tradition to create a narrative space for his desire and to act it out. However, his 
insistence on an imaginary self makes Arden blind to his wife’s obvious murderous intent; it 
exposes him to the power of her verbal assault, and paralyzes him in his need of active self-defense. 
The power of narrative achieves its apotheosis in Shakespeare’s Othello. However, 
Shakespeare makes sure to embed the division of labor between Iago and Othello, the 
representatives of the power of sheer discourse and of the vulnerability of a self in need of 
discursive protection and vindication respectively, in a dynamic plot. Before the Moor gives up his 
self entirely to the narrative Iago offers him to construct a new sense of his identity, he makes a 
desperate attempt to regain it. However, once he has yielded up his inner being in exchange for the 
hope of social advancement and thus betrayed its “vessel,” Desdemona, Othello cannot help but act 
out to its conclusion the fiction he authored in a concerted effort with his ancient. Beside 
prescribing what he has to do, the lie Othello accepts about his wife takes control of his perception: 
13 
for him, the handkerchief loses its magical power woven into its fabric to bind the inner selves of 
husband and wife together and turns into a mere object for the eye to register its presence or 
absence. Thus, a positive, absolute value changes into a surface phenomenon of visibility, and the 
“deep play” of personal attachment is lost. The tragedy was first performed by Shakespeare’s newly 
renamed company, the King’s Men,21 and it conveys a sense that, by the end of the period of 
Elizabethan drama the fragmentation of identity is irreversible. 
 
While historians and critics have never questioned the growing significance of the public, 
social, and political aspect of the individual in Renaissance Humanism, the scholarly opinion of the 
past half century fluctuated concerning the reality of an inward self and ran into contradictions. 
Studies in the 1960s and 70s emphasized the sense of freedom and the subjectivity the newly 
emerging individual, the citizen, enjoyed in public life from the end of the Middle Ages, but at the 
same time they acknowledged the equalizing power of the written word in Humanism and of the 
Roman law in public life in regulating and controlling the functions individuals could play in 
Renaissance society. From the 1980s on, new-historicist and cultural materialist approaches to 
early modern English drama, as Eisaman Maus argues, questioned the notion that inwardness had 
an independent existence prior to its social context.22 In her Inwardness and the Theater in the 
English Renaissance, nonetheless, Eisaman Maus herself reaffirms the distinction between what she 
calls “external show” and the “inner man” (28). 
In The Shape of Medieval History, William J. Brandt contrasts the clerical and the aristocratic 
view of human nature in reading chronicles from the period between 1100 and 1400. The clerical 
perception posited an imperiled internal core in human beings within an inconstant and fallible 
human body, while the aristocratic chroniclers focused on codified outward gestures that 
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constituted moral behavior with no regard for interiority. Neither of them, however, attributed any 
significance to individual character, motive, or identity. The English clerical chronicle, Brandt 
argues, enumerated “characterizing adjectives” of a personage without connecting them either to 
each other or to their bearer23 as a “total” individual (157) or an agent of human action (150). 
Except for Geoffrey Chaucer, Brandt cannot discover “a sense of human identity” in medieval 
literature, because, he asserts, “there is no suggestion of complex human purposes underlying 
either the character or the action” (156).24 Instead of shaping his or her identity, for the clerical 
chronicler, human experience corrupted from the outside the impersonal core, the soul of a being, 
the “good” that had been “given in the sacrament of baptism prior to the self and to all experience in 
the world” (166). Passions and desire did not originate in the soul or self, as Montaigne accounted 
for them during the Renaissance,25 but they affected it through “one’s dealings with the world.”26 
The appearance of the dramatic sense of inwardness in early modern drama, therefore, required a 
turn from the outside world toward the inner man in the search of an independent origin and 
driving force of human action. 
However, the dramatic view of identity and inwardness I am concerned with in this 
dissertation seems to have been influenced also by a formalized aristocratic approach to outward 
behavior, and it might have evolved as a reaction against the perceived emptiness of this rigid code 
of conduct. Feudal chivalry, Brandt explains, “dictated” a respect not to the other person but “to a 
situation whose proper behavior was prescribed.” This ethical code of honor was, as a result, “very 
impersonal” (109). Brandt sums up “the aristocratic conception of good” in the word “stance.” This 
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notion is inherently theatrical as Brandt defines it: the “aristocrat found his summum bonum in a 
kind of public posture taken with regard to his own class; he was an actor inventing a script which 
he hoped would turn out to be heroic” (114). Chivalry was, Brandt confirms, “more than a code of 
behavior; it was also a kind of perceptual organization giving shape and meaning to the world in 
which the knight lived” (140). 
In contrast to Brandt, who describes the way the medieval chronicler interpreted 
“somebody else’s drama” (xvii), Walter Ullmann takes a more direct view of the forces that helped 
the concept of “the individual as a mere subject”27 evolve, as he argues, into that of the citizen as a 
“full, autonomous, and constituent member” (3) of society. As an effect of his or her baptism, the 
medieval Christian adherent was “a member of the all-embracing, comprehensive corporation, the 
Church” (7), Ullmann claims. Following this act of elevation (8), the believer rose above his or her 
carnality, in the language of St. Paul, the “animalic man,” the “man of nature” (7), and “emerged as a 
nova creatura: he was renatus, he was reborn” (8). Since he or she was now “on a level quite 
different from that of a mere man,” the Christian no longer was expected to rely on his or her 
“natural, human insight” or “autonomous, indigenous functions” in the “management of public 
affairs” (9). This subjection of the individual “to higher authority” (10), resulting from his faith, his 
“fidelitas” (9), Ullmann points out, was codified in the letters of St. Paul (10) and, following this, in 
medieval canon law (13). 
Ullmann defines the Renaissance in terms of a reversal of the Christian rebirth in baptism, 
which allowed natural human beings to take an active part in shaping their social environment. At 
the same time, he admits that the written law structured this seeming autonomy of the individual. 
Contrary to the “abstract thesis” (2–50) of spiritual man in a “descending theme of government” 
(30f), he argues, individual rights (55) and autonomy (58) began to assert themselves from below, 
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based on a network of horizontal relations, self-government (56–59), and on “common consent” 
(59). Lay individuals began to participate in public affairs, creating a “subterranean, invisible 
platform” to precipitate “the process of emancipating the individual” from being a “mere subject” to 
“doctrine” (62). However, the evidence Ullmann himself presents proves that not only the Pauline 
notion of baptism, but also the alleged independence and autonomy (3) of the “liberated,” 
“emancipated” (6), and “full-fledged” (54) citizen derived its power from the written word, for 
example the thirty-ninth article of Magna Carta (71) and the vernacular Mirror of the Saxons (108). 
The “legal security of at least the freeman” and “the elimination of arbitrariness in government” 
(76) was founded in the “equalizing effects” (85) of texts, of the written law, and did not inhere in 
some particular attribute or property of being a baron, let alone in individual barons themselves. 
This fact questions notions of the origin of individuality independent of texts that organized and 
codified social behavior. 
While he quotes the sources of such abstract thinking in St Paul and medieval canon law, 
Ullmann does not reflect on the question in what form “natural reality” survived for the law-givers 
to perceive and encode it in texts. However, he points to “thirteenth-century […] naturalism” (104) 
in the visual arts (105) and to a growing attention to “human feelings, passions, and motives” in 
writing (107) as examples of “purely secular values” that emerged in opposition to Christian 
spiritual virtue (109). These changes in approach, Ullmann claims, led to “the rebirth of the 
individual as a natural man” that had been “wiped out by his baptism” and “had been 
overshadowed” “for virtually a millenium” (116). 
The distinction within the natural order “between the individual as man and the individual 
as citizen,” as Aristotle formulated and Thomas Aquinas confirmed it (126), attains primary 
importance for the study of identity in early modern drama. The individual character acts in the 
field of state ideology and politics, and he or she has to cope with the residual content of his or her 
own consciousness in this discursive context. While Ullmann argues that the new citizen becomes 
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“the judge and master of his own social and political life,” he himself points out that “the descending 
thesis of government and law, prevalent and virtually undisputed as it was in the high Middle Ages 
[…], transmitted to later generations one very precious legacy, and that is the idea of the supremacy 
of law, the idea of the rule of law” (146). Besides being a reaction to the rigid aristocratic code of 
medieval chivalric conduct, the sense of individual autonomy, the notion of the inward self, as an 
aspect of the identity distinct from the text of the law, might as well have emerged in response to 
the pressure of law and state control. 
While Ullmann uses the term “individualism” to refer to the status of the citizen who was 
already incorporated in the legislative procedure of the state, Colin Morris gives the word a more 
emphatic sense of inwardness. For him, individualism in the West “is far from expressing the 
common experience of humanity.”28 Instead of a political meaning, he gives it “a more directly 
personal” (3) significance. Individualism was a challenge to the “uniformity dictated by authority” 
(5). In terms of “the development of self-awareness and self-expression [and] the freedom of a man 
to declare himself without paying excessive attention to demands of convention or the dictates of 
authority,” Morris argues, “the twelfth century was […] a peculiarly creative age” (7). Importantly, 
Morris distinguishes individualism from humanism (3). The latter presupposes an ease in the 
reading and elegance and coherence in the writing of Latin and in the sensitive use of literary 
genres (8). The avenue to the discovery of the individual, he argues, led through a “mastery of Latin 
composition” which endowed writers with “a naturalness and immediacy of observation, and a 
subtlety of reflection” (9). Thus, humanism appears here as a third force that contributed to the 
emergence of the sense of self in individuals. 
According to Morris, the interest in the individual originated under the pressure of 
Christianity and the classical tradition (10). Similar to the reactions to traditional institutions of the 
Ancient World in ancient mysticism and world-renunciation (14), a tendency occurred in eleventh 
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century “monastic reformers” (36) against aristocratic constraints on individual endeavor (33) “to 
know oneself in one’s own true being” (31) and, as Peter Damiani formulated, to discover “the 
splendour of the inner country” (31f). Proof for a genuine interest in the self or in “the inner man,” 
the “inner mystery,” as eleventh-century Benedictine scholars called it, is the importance they 
assigned to “intention” in the judgment of behavior (73–75). 
“God’s saving act in Christ,” Morris points out, “has always had a corporate and an 
individual aspect” (139) to it, but the day of the Last Judgment was usually understood, following 
Saint Augustine, as the final point in human history more than a change for an individual believer 
(139, 144). Nonetheless, in the period between 1050 and 1200, a movement Morris calls 
“spiritualism” challenged this “traditional eschatology:” an “original vitality flowed into the 
relationship between God and the individual” (145). Orthodox writers of the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries began to focus “less on the destiny of the church than on the destiny of each believer.”29 It 
appears that almost four and a half centuries before the appearance of Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, 
theologians began to pay attention to the “answer which the individual must make” to the 
“objective reality” of the Last Judgment.30 In this new approach, Morris adds, the focus is on “one’s 
personal answer and personal hope of heaven” (147), “on the encounter of God with the human 
soul” (148) that Faustus, we must add, longs desperately to experience. 
In his 1977 book on the evolution of identity titled Medieval Foundations of Renaissance 
Humanism, Ullmann discusses the emergence of the movement Devotio moderna,31 “an individually 
oriented appeal to the religious sentiments” in opposition to “the external ecclesiastical structure 
and organization and its adjuncts of power of enforcement through a hierarchically ordered 
machinery and above all the mechanics of law” (189). The “totality point of view” of the Church that 
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ensured the seeming unity “of government, of life and the purpose of life” was, Ullmann claims, still 
asserted “with exactly the same meaning” a thousand years later, at the turn of the fifteenth century 
(18). Ullmann here emphasizes the role language played in shaping and expressing self-awareness 
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (3–5). He underlines that the humanist renaissance made 
its first impact in the political and governmental sphere of life (9). Renaissance humanism, Ullmann 
makes it clear, “found its first and perhaps most important manifestation in a political context” 
(102). According to St Thomas, “political science was the most fundamental (principalissima) of all 
human sciences” (122). The institutions (112) and the Latin of ancient Roman law continued to 
determine the political science and practice of humanism (111). If the truth of the self appears 
“unspeakable”32 in early modern drama, as Eisaman Maus argues, and if “the individual has an 
authentic interest in protecting” (20) it, historical developments suggest that he or she has a good 
reason to defend it against the pervasive influence of political discourse. 
Nonetheless, education and the spread of reading and writing attempted to appropriate this 
private realm of the individual. With Renaissance humanism becoming an end in itself from the 
early fifteenth century, Ullman continues,33 a “heightened literary sense” began to emerge (171), 
and this resulted in a concentration on language in “the studia humanitatis” (173), which, in turn, 
allowed “the literati of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries” to “depict the very essence of the 
personality.” This elaboration on the self took place, again, “under the spell of the ancients” (177), 
which makes what Ullmann calls “a realistic portraiture of man’s natural personality” (179), that is, 
the “substance of humanity itself” (180), appear for present-day readers a rather textual construct. 
 
                                                     
32 Eisaman Maus 1. 
33 Ullmann, Medieval Foundations 169f. 
20 
The work of Brandt, Ullmann, and Morris I reviewed above, together with that of Robert W. 
Hanning,34 became, as A. J. Piesse formulates, “sidelined by a continual redefinition of what 
constitutes the individual” with Stephen Greenblatt, Jonathan Dollimore, and Catherine Belsey 
supplanting those earlier approaches35 based on essentialist36 and liberal humanist37 assumptions. 
Piesse sums up the common assumption underlying Greenblatt’s and Belsey’s arguments saying 
that “any formulation of individuality” has to be examined “in the light of cultural context” and “any 
exposition of self” has to be considered as only one of “a series of options” instead of being 
“intrinsically different” from something else that has preceded it.38 In opposition to Ullmann’s 
argument in both of his books I discussed above, Greenblatt denies the centrality of the issue of 
“autonomy” in the evaluation of what constituted identity in Renaissance England and argues that 
what he terms “self-fashioning,” that is, “the power to impose a shape upon oneself” is “an aspect of 
the more general power to control identity.”39 This power to generate identities, he argues, 
originated “in the intellectual, social, psychological, and aesthetic structures” of the early modern 
period (1). The new-historicist statement, it seems, does away with the assumption that the self has 
an autonomous origin and a foundation independent of the political and discursive spheres. While 
the plays I have selected for analysis in this dissertation all testify to Greenblatt’s claim that “in the 
sixteenth century there appears to be an increased self-consciousness about the fashioning of 
human identity as a manipulable, artful process” (2), the examination of characters’ sense of 
identity suggests that they often struggle painfully to escape from this immanent force of control. 
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The range of the context in which I situate the formation of identity is narrower than the 
one Greenblatt uses. He takes into account “the cultural system of meanings that creates specific 
individuals” (3): dramatic characters, contemporary authors, and political figures alike. In contrast, 
except for a brief discussion of Henry VIII’s sense of identity in Chapter Four, I limit my scope to 
characters in their respective dramatic worlds and attempt to embed those worlds, the dramatic 
texts, within other kinds of discourse, highlighting aspects of the “systems of public signification” 
(5) that seem likely to have influenced the relative and changing dominance of action, perception, 
and language in the plays themselves. My interest lies in “how literary […] identities were formed in 
this culture,” not “social” (6) ones. 
Greenblatt points out that all the figures he concentrates on exhibit a “profound […] social 
and economic” “mobility” (7) by which he clearly means a readiness for upward movement. This is 
true of most, but not all, of the main characters in the plays I analyze. Doctor Faustus and Thomas 
Arden, for example, enter the action of their respective plays already at a high social status: Faustus 
with well-developed ambitions and Arden with a large portion of pretense. Although Othello’s case 
is the most complicated of all the characters, similarly to Hodge and Antipholus of Syracuse, he 
corroborates Greenblatt’s “governing condition[…]” that “Self-fashioning is achieved in relation to 
something perceived as alien, strange, or hostile” (9). 
In his analysis of Renaissance tragedy, Jonathan Dollimore attacks, more radically than 
Greenblatt, the notion of the “autonomy” of the individual and of the humanist ideal of the essential 
nature of the subject. He subscribes to Greenblatt’s view of the role of “intellectual, social, 
psychological, and aesthetic structures” in the shaping of identity, claiming that materialist 
criticism, in general, “relates both the literary canon and changing interpretations of it to the 
cultural formations which produce(d) them”40 and, more particularly, in reference to J. W. Lever,41 
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that “suffering and conflict” in the tragedies he discusses are “the effect of social and historical 
forces focussed in state power.”42 The emphasis on the oppressive nature of the establishment 
explains, in part, his difference from Greenblatt’s position: following a somewhat simplifying 
division, American new historicists believe, he says, that Renaissance drama “reinforce[d] the 
dominant order,” while cultural materialists of the United Kingdom, like Dollimore himself, tend to 
think that it “interrogate[d] it to the point of subversion” (l). However, in line with his opposition to 
humanism, Dollimore denies the essence of the subject and its separate existence from public life. 
Materialist theory rejects, in particular, he points out, “the humanist belief in a unified, autonomous 
self” (lvii). 
In my own analysis of four Tudor plays and an early Stuart one, I rely more on what main 
characters seem to believe about the nature of their own selves in the context of a more or less 
dominant dramatic discourse than on critical schools or ideological convictions. The chronological 
sequence of these plays testifies to an increasing sensitivity to the loss of self. What Dollimore 
refuses to believe in makes itself felt for these characters more and more in its absence. While 
Renaissance drama subverts “the idea of a divinely ordered universe” and what Dollimore calls “its 
corollary: the unified human subject” (lx), main characters seem to be anxious to maintain a part of 
their identity that cannot be summed up in their public persona. Apparently influenced by the 
dramatic sense of a loss of self, “a form of modern criticism,” Dollimore writes, is “inexhaustibly 
preoccupied with the supposed non-existence of the essential unified self” (lxii). One aim of this 
dissertation is to do justice to this preoccupation by turning directly to the characters of early 
modern drama. 
Continuing the new effort to redefine, in Piesse’s words, “what constitutes the individual,” 
Catherine Belsey asserts the power of “the meanings in circulation” and of the “signifying practice” 
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of a period to determine “what it is to be a person.”43 Ullmann’s idea of the autonomy of the 
individual and of the control of the citizen as lawgiver over public discourse has now been replaced 
by the assumption that, instead, it is the subject who is “held in place in a specific discourse, a 
specific knowledge, by the meanings available there.” Now it appears that the “signifying practice 
always precedes the individual” and the subject is merely “an effect of the meanings it seems to 
possess.” (5). Belsey takes a step further than Greenblatt or Dollimore did before her: while the 
latter two conceived of the subject as dependent on the “intellectual, social, psychological, and 
aesthetic structures” and on the realm of the “political, historical and social” respectively, for 
Belsey, subjectivity appears to be “discursively produced” (5), and subject positions are created in a 
“contest for meaning” within the field of the signifying practice (6). With this, Belsey does not 
merely repudiate the liberal humanist notion of the essential freedom of “man” and of the birth of 
the “unconstrained expression of human nature” in the seventeenth-century English revolutions (8) 
and earlier, but she also relegates “the social and political” to a rank below that of language (54). As 
a consequence, Renaissance drama emerges in her view as a ground where “rival discourses” 
intersect (10). 
When they do converge, parallel discourses define the subject in incongruent ways, which 
reveals its constructed and fragmented nature. The subject’s imaginary interiority is thus a mirage 
(54); in the theater, it is a product of the contradictory functions of the character’s speech (48–52). 
But what causes this lack of integrity in a character? What makes him or her powerless to distance 
and protect him- or herself from the power of discourse? What causes his or her helplessness 
against being incorporated in it? The general and simple answer that the participation in organized 
social activity has survival value for the individual cannot satisfy the student of literature. So, I will 
seek specific answers in the plays and start a new quest in every chapter. Every “specific text,” 
Belsey argues, “proffers a specific subject-position from which it is most readily intelligible” (6). 
                                                     
43 Belsey 5. 
24 
However, there is always “a truth, a meaning,” she concedes, which language cannot quite absorb or 
sum up succinctly. This truth is “unconscious,” “always familial,” always hidden “in the past” (53), 
she says, and, I might add, it is not discursive. 
Beside her valuable insight into the sociohistorical context of Arden of Faversham, of which I 
take advantage in my fourth chapter, I found Belsey’s analogy of the textually determined subject 
position in the realm of vision useful. A reference to Brunelleschi’s invention of “monocular 
perspective” (24) helps us understand the power of Iago’s imagery to control Othello’s perception 
of “an internally coherent and unified spectacle” (25) from an arbitrarily chosen but then privileged 
point of view. The same concept might affect the way we conceptualize Faustus attaining an 
imaginary mastery of the world in a spectacle of “absolute (and illusory) transcendence” (26) to 
emulate God’s perspective. Faustus’ rise above his own self in visual terms corresponds to his 
frequent address to himself in the second and third persons. “Who, then, is speaking, when Faustus 
speaks of – or to, or about – himself?” (46), Belsey asks. The “subject of the enunciation,” that is, the 
speaker, she explains, “exceeds the subject of the utterance” (50, 52). Belsey presents this as an 
example of the sense of interiority effected by a “juggling with […] significances,”44 which prompts 
her to give room for the self in her account of identity. The “self is always ultimately un-speakable, 
unuttered,” she declares and concludes that “the unified and unique subject of liberal humanism is 
forever tragically locked within its own silence, uncommunicating” (52). This concession indicates 
that, after all, it is the “project” not only of an antiquated “humanist criticism,” as Belsey still 
contends it is, “to fill [the] gap” of “a silent self anterior to the utterance, ‘that within which passes 
show’” (49). The self might seem a gap, in terms of its linguistic, textual intelligibility,45 but it is one 
that dramatic characters do reckon with. 
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The Western sense of identity seems inescapably, and still never completely, textualized. 
Dramatic characters, for example Faustus, as we saw in Belsey above, suffer from a pressure to 
verbalize it fully, and they resist the pressure by withholding at least a part of who they are from 
being available in language and by protecting it from being absorbed in an all-pervasive discourse.46 
This elusive but “meaningful[ly]” “discoherent”47 part of identity is what I call the self. It is this 
division in identity, the non-coincidence of the subject with the self48 that Dollimore calls the 
decenteredness of subjectivity.49 To see the historical origins of this de- or off-centeredness, we 
have to turn to Charles Taylor’s account of how the notion of identity evolved in western thought. St 
Augustine’s function as a link between Plato and Descartes50 in developing the perception of the 
individual who stands in relation “both to context and to interior self”51 makes the philosopher of 
Hippo particularly relevant to Renaissance studies. 
According to Taylor, St Augustine fused the Platonic distinction between “the bodily and the 
non-bodily” with the notion of “creation through the Word,” as John formulates it in the opening 
words of his Gospel, to arrive at the “key principle of […] Participation or Likeness” which 
determines the quality and relative position of everything in the world.52 Things in the universe are 
the “external expressions of God’s thoughts,” the “external realization” of a “meaningful,” “rational 
order.” With this comes an injunction against being immersed in the sensual world and the 
expectation that the “inner man” (129), the soul, directs its attention and love toward “the higher 
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reality” (128), toward “God” above, who is himself “Truth” and truth that “dwells within” (132). To 
achieve this upward gaze, however, and this is where Augustine departs from Plato, one has to look 
inward first (129). With this idea, Augustine creates a “language of inwardness,” that is, he 
empowers language to effect and, in the same move, appropriate the inner being that thus becomes, 
more than the abstract soul, a constituent and integral part of identity. From now on, this language 
of inwardness will prescribe how to take care of “the health of one’s own soul” (130), of one’s inner 
self. 
As a consequence of this discursive creation and objectification of the “inner man,” we make 
it “our object of attention” and “become aware of our awareness” in a relationship to ourselves that 
Taylor calls “radical reflexivity” (130). This “makes me,” Taylor says, “a being that can speak of itself 
in the first person” (131), or at least, I would add, a being that is expected to be able to speak of 
itself that way and, through the language of inwardness, to reveal and sanitize his or her “inner 
man.” This compulsion to render the self explicit is one aspect of “the inwardness of radical 
reflexivity” Taylor does not emphasize but which Augustine also “bequeathed […] to the Western 
tradition of thought” (131). Moreover, William Perkins’s writing on the conscience53 and Michel 
Foucault’s work on the consequences of this discursive generation and invasion of inwardness in 
Discipline and Punish54 throw this aspect into striking relief. 
                                                     
53 When God created man, Perkins declares, “he gave him conscience to be his keeper, to follow him alwaies at 
his heels, and to dogge him (as we say) and to prie into his actions, and to beare witnesse of them all.” In 
determining the righteousness of individual actions, “conscience is like to a judge that holdeth and assise, & 
takes notice of inditements, and causeth the most notorious malefactor that is, to hold up his hand at the 
barre of his judgment.” William Perkins 1558–1602 English Puritanist: His Pioneer Works on Casuistry: “A 
Discourse of Conscience” and “The Whole Treatise of Cases of Conscience,” ed. Thomas F. Merrill (Nieuwkoop: B. 
de Graaf, 1966) 9. 
54 Foucault describes a turn in disciplinary theory that took place around 1760 from the objective to punish 
the body in expiation to “a punishment that acts in depth on the heart, the thoughts, the will, the inclinations.” 
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (1977; New York: Vintage 
Books, 1995) 16. Dollimore comments on this saying that, although “the idea of a punishment working 
internally, on and in the very terms of subjectivity itself, is new in penal theory, […] it is not new as a 
disciplinary strategy” (lxxvi). 
27 
Taylor makes a connection to Renaissance perspectival painting that allows the beholder to 
experience “a new distance” between him- or herself and the object. “In the new art,” he explains, 
“space becomes important, and position in space” (201). When Taylor formulates the availability of 
“‘inner’ objects” from a special “standpoint” in visual terms, we cannot help remembering the 
pleasing narrative Iago offers Othello about him, with a “vantage point”—the vanishing point, in 
terms of Renaissance painting—, almost “outside the world of things” (131) as Othello experiences 
them. This helps us understand the irresistible power Othello might hope to enjoy “directly” at “the 
door of truth”55 where Iago promises to lead him. The “painted surface,” Taylor writes in reference 
to Leon Battista Alberti, “becomes like a window through which we see reality as it appears from 
that perspective.”56 From the prospect of casting a voyeuristic glance at Desdemona’s body in an 
illicit act, Othello might hope to turn her into an object in such a perspective and to enjoy the thrill 
of this “new distance and separation” that frees him from “being englobed by what is depicted” 
(202). Shakespeare exploits the erotic potential in the power of appropriation the decentered 
subject gains over the world from rising above him- or herself in the Augustinian reflexivity. 
This certainly adds an extra portion of significance to Taylor’s ironic remark that “Augustine 
has a lot to answer for” (131). As a result of the Augustinian architecture of identity, the 
discursively controlled suprapersonal point of view appears authentic and authoritative, whether it 
is a Diccon the Bedlam, an Egeon, or a Franklin, who assumes it. Although a higher point of view on 
“the image” of our own inwardness is “compelling” (131), it is alienating at the same time. When we 
assume it, we have to realize that “there is something higher than our reason, […] a truth which is 
criterial for it, […] a standard […] which is not its own making, but beyond it and common to all” 
(132). In other words, our first-person standpoint is, paradoxically, not our own after all. The 
humanist achievement of the “autonomous” citizen, as Ullman put it, did not do away with this 
                                                     
55 William Shakespeare, Othello, ed. Kim F. Hall (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007) 3.3.424. 
56 Taylor 201. 
28 
alienation; it only began to secularize it and to give it a stronger legal and political hue. In the drama 
I examine in this dissertation, the higher point of view in visual terms often corresponds to the 
political and discursive fixation of individual identity. Partly due to the medium of the dramatic 
genre, the plays foreground the verbal aspect of those “principles of the intelligible order […] which 
are somehow within us, which we are,” as Taylor says, “capable of formulating” (135). Characters 
are, I contend, like mouthpieces of a truth from above, often even compelled to formulate it, to make 
it, in Taylor’s words, “explicit and full knowledge” (136). 
In contrast to the main thrust of the foregoing criticism that refuses to give the self an 
independent status, Katharine Eisaman Maus opens and explores the “hiatus”57 between the aspect 
of identity that is outwardly defined and an “unexpressed” (2) portion of it. This “gap,” she argues, 
generates “epistemological anxieties” and requires “social practices […] to manage it” (2). She calls 
it an early modern rhetorical tactic to privilege this interior and to brand the “exterior” as “partial, 
misleading, falsifiable, unsubstantial” (4) in a theatrical metaphor, as Hamlet does.58 Eisaman Maus 
seeks to resolve the problems of the “intersubjective” understanding of the invisible self in paying 
close attention to “the conditions of the performance”59 and to “extraliterary cultural phenomena” 
(32). My focus, in contrast, is not on the cognitive aspect of the self but rather on the way individual 
characters experience a sense of their identity of which the self is a hardly knowable but often 
keenly felt component. 
The studies that follow do not argue for a material existence of the self. In fact, the persona 
is also a construct parts of which are, as Jacques Lacan claims, of no more than a “fictional”60 
character. However, in contrast to the vague but inescapable sense of self, the persona does not just 
                                                     
57 Eisaman Maus 1. 
58 “I have that within which passeth show,” Hamlet says. Shakespeare, Hamlet, The Norton Shakespeare. Based 
on the Oxford Edition, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York, London: W W Norton, 1997) 1668–1756. 
1.2.85. 
59 Eisaman Maus 31. 
60 Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic 
Experience,” trans. Alan Sheridan, Contemporary Literary Criticism: Literary and Cultural Studies, eds. Robert 
Con Davis and Ronald Schleifer (New York, London: Longman, 1994) 382–86. 383. 
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happen to emerge. Characters have to build it up in a sustained effort the success of which often 
determines the denouement of the plot. Therefore, the study of the changing sense of identity and 
of its manifestations that make it present for characters is essential to the understanding of early 
modern English drama and of the notion it helps us create of the individual. For dramatic 
characters, identity is a site of struggle. In tragedies, its outcome is a matter of life and death; in 




Early Tudor Self-Fashioning: Coming of Age in Gammer Gurton’s Needle 
 
1. Introduction 
Gammer Gurton’s Needle is an early Tudor university comedy from the period of Edward VI 
or the first years of Elizabeth I.1 It is a Humanistic text (xxv), a comedy written, on the one hand, in 
response to contemporary popular belief in witchcraft and demonic forces, and, on the other, in 
celebration of a youth’s successful struggle for an independent sense of identity. Henry Bradley, the 
play’s “first modern editor” (xxi), praises it for its “real wit […] and the clever portraiture of 
character.” At the same time, he atrributes the low esteem of the play to an excess of the “very 
rudimentary kind of humor which turns on physically disgusting suggestions” and which is, he says, 
“no longer amusing to educated people.”2 Characters are lifelike, Bradley admits, but he asserts 
confidently that the play as a whole “does not, of course, rise above the level of farce” (203). Charles 
Whitworth calls this kind of criticism “patronizing” (xxi), and audience responses to the first 
American production of the play in 1917 proved, according to Grace Humphrey, that “what may 
seem in the reading rather vulgar and common seems all right in the acted play.”3 
Gail Kern Paster points out that, in freeing himself from the domination of his mistress, 
Hodge reaches a state of “bodily autonomy and self-mastery” in an act of “engenderment.”4 Wendy 
Wall claims that Hodge transfers his allegiance from Gammer Gurton to Diccon in the course of the 
                                                     
1 A play titled Dyccon of Bedlam was entered in the register of the Company of Stationers for license to print 
“in the year ending 22 July, 1563.” If it is identical with what we know by title as Gammer Gurton’s Needle, our 
play must have been performed at Christ’s College “before that date.” Henry Bradley, “William Stevenson: 
Critical Essay,” Representative English Comedies, Charles Mills Gayley ed., vol. 1 (New York, London: 
Macmillan, 1903) 197–204. 197f. Gammer Gurton’s Needle was first printed in 1575. Charles Whitworth, 
“Introduction,” Gammer Gurton’s Needle, ed. Charles Whitworth (London: A & C Black; New York: W W 
Norton, 1997) ix–xxvi. xi. 
2 Bradley 202. 
3 Grace Humphrey, “Gammer Gurton’s Needle,” The English Journal 7.1 (Jan. 1918): 24–28. 24. JSTOR 23 June 
2014. 
4 Gail Kern Paster, The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Discipline of Shame in Early Modern England (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1993) 116. 
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action and that his “new master”5 enlarges on the “folly” of the two main female characters (10). 
Frank Ardolino emphasizes, as Wall does (6), that audiences are informed, already in the Prologue, 
where the needle is to be found. As a result, Ardolino claims, the play does not focus on the 
“whodunit puzzle” of how to find the tiny but symbolic object but on “the sociological, religious, and 
metaphysical structure of the world presented.”6 More specifically, he says, it foregrounds “the 
labyrinth of erroneous perceptions created by Diccon and the villagers, who cannot see beyond 
their narrow and circumscribed minds” (18). 
My aim in this chapter is to show that in the character of Hodge Gammer Gurton’s Needle 
presents the audience with a fresh example of the evolution of a well-rounded character. From the 
beginning of the third Act, when Hodge emerges triumphantly, he presents in his persona a 
conscious perception of his bodily existence together with a superior rhetoric. He rises above the 
chaotic power of occult beliefs in a single gesture as if it had not touched his self. Language and 
perception are fundamental aspects of a character’s being in his or her dramatic world, and the 
meanings they generate come together to strengthen Hodge’s sense of identity. The plot of Gammer 
Gurton’s Needle represents the progress of this young domestic servant from childish dependence 
to self-assertion. In the course of the action, sexual desire propels Hodge’s journey and enables him 
to turn obedience into mockery. 
The stakes for Hodge are high: he has to prepare himself for a meeting with his future wife, 
Kirstian Clack, Tom Simon’s maid, who “comes hither tomorrow.”7 Hodge is full of uncertainty 
concerning the prospects of his planned courtship, but the maid has already given him an 
encouraging sign of affection: “She smiled on me the last Sunday, when ich put off my cap” (2.1.64). 
                                                     
5 Wendy Wall, “‘Household Stuff’: The Sexual Politics of Domesticity and the Advent of English Comedy,” 
English Literary History (ELH) 65.1 (Spring 1998): 1–45. 9. 
6 Frank Ardolino, “Misperception and Protestant Reading in Gammer Gurton’s Needle,” Studies in English 
Literature 1500–1900 50.1 (Winter 2010): 17–34. 19. Project Muse, 4 Aug. 2014. 
7 Mr. S., Gammer Gurton’s Needle, ed. Charles Whitworth, The New Mermaids Ser. (London: A & Century Black; 
New York: W W Norton, 1997) 2.1.62. All references are to this edition unless otherwise noted. 
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Hodge has to give way to his burgeoning sexual desire, but he has to do it in a socially acceptable 
way: he has to learn how to fashion himself. His way from dependence to an active creation of his 
male identity also takes him through a period of defiant behavior and an experiment with 
obsession. However, Hodge’s delusional perception ultimately leads him to a holistic experience of 
himself: he finds himself again in his body once he has risen above perceptual delusion, in a 
superiority of wit and a gendered male identity. At the moment of real physical pain, he recognizes 
that he regained the sense of himself that he once had. For him, finding is a re-cognition. 
 
2. The Source of Gammer Gurton’s Power 
With “all things […] tumbled and clean out of fashion” (15), the folks in the house seem even 
to Diccon the Bedlam to be “not well in their wits” (1.1.18). This is Gammer Gurton’s house: a house 
of temporary misrule with its inhabitants wailing, “Alack and wellaway!” (1.1.20). They do not even 
seem to notice Diccon’s arrival, who can thus filch “a slip of bacon” (1.1.22) unobserved. Tib, 
Gammer Gurton’s maid, complains of being maltreated and dressed merely in “a few rotten rags” 
(1.3.8). Her mistress, she says, has been possessed by a sudden frenzy, so that she and Cock, 
Gammer Gurton’s boy, as she says, “have felt it on our bones” (14). The reason for her violent 
outburst is, Tib informs Hodge, no bigger matter than the loss of “her nee’le” (24–26). Spotting Gib, 
the cat, “in the milk pan” (33), Gammer Gurton acts on the spur of a sudden anger with a staff in her 
hand and “swapped the breeches down” (34) with a histrionic gesture. Thus she creates an excuse 
to declare that the needle is lost and an explanation why she leaves the “breeches lie for all this 
never the near” (39) completion. 
In Gammer Gurton’s exalting language, the needle assumes a symbolic significance. She 
comes onstage “crawling” (42) and blaming “Gib and the milk pan […] and ill luck together” for the 
loss of her “dear” and “fair long straight nee’le,” of her “joy,” and her “only treasure” (1.4.2–5). This 
lament suggests that she might be actually bewailing the imminent loss of her young, vigorous, and 
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hard-working servant, Hodge. “As God himself he knoweth,” she emphasizes, “ne’er one beside 
chave” (2.4.12). Gammer Gurton claims to have had one single needle only, although “needles were 
proverbially trivial in the sixteenth century.”8 
Hodge commits himself fully to the purpose. While Gammer Gurton seeks his favor and 
ingratiates herself with him, she orders her other two servants to submit themselves to his service. 
She controls Tib and Cock by associating them with moral depravity and the filth of the material 
world in and around the household. She calls Tib a “whore” and orders her to run “to th’end here of 
the town” (1.4.9) to rake through a “heap of dust” the maid carried out in her lap before. In doing so, 
Gammer Gurton insists, Tib must not leave a “straw unturned” (12). Moreover, she has to take in 
the reality of matter through her senses by stooping and looking “down to the ground – to it” and 
taking “some pain!” (14). She tells Cock, her boy, to “grope behind the old brass pan” to “find an old 
shoe” and to look in it “well” for “an inch of a white tallow candle” (1.4.40–42), so that Hodge can 
conduct the search by its light. 
The maid and the boy dutifully obey. “Chave tossed and tumbled yonder heap o’er and over 
again,” Tib reports to her mistress on the result, “And winnowed it through my fingers as men 
would winnow grain.” She seems to have followed Gammer Gurton’s instructions to the letter: “Not 
so much as a hen’s turd but in pieces I tare it,” she explains in detail, “Or whatsoever clod or clay I 
found, I did not spare it” (1.5.2–5). While he pokes fun at Hodge’s perceptual delusion, Cock also 
projects his desire on what he can see: “By my troth, Gammer,” he exclaims, “methought your nee’le 
here I saw, / But when my fingers touched it, I felt it was a straw” (48f). Tib identifies with Hodge’s 
interest to such an extent that she attempts to make even finer distinctions in her perception: “See, 
Hodge, what is this?,” she urges. “May it not be within it?” (50). Finding “cat’s turd” inside the straw 
gives Hodge an opportunity to rise above his fellow servants in imitation of the way Gammer 
                                                     
8 Curtis Perry, “Commodity and Commonwealth in Gammer Gurton’s Needle,” Studies in English Literature, 
1500–1900 42.2 (Spring 2002): 217–34. 221. Academic OneFile, 19 Feb. 2011. 
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Gurton humiliates them: “It were well done to make thee eat it” (54), he tells Tib, elaborating on the 
scatology she engaged in earlier. 
At the same time, Gammer Gurton depicts in elaborate images her eagerness to support 
Hodge in his endeavor to establish himself in the world. In her act of mending the breeches, she 
promises, she would use “full good double thread, / And set a patch on either knee”—if at all “ich 
could find my nee’le” (1.4.20f, 19), she adds. She describes herself in vivid pictures “looking a long 
hour” in “the house and at the door.” Regretfully, she says, “all was in vain” (35, 34, 36). 
In her effort to prove her dedication to Hodge’s success, Gammer Gurton often engages in 
Catholic practices. She swears upon the cross (“the reed,” 1.4.19) and calls upon Saint Sithe, “a 
seventh-century East Saxon queen” to “send” the needle “home again” (22 and n). “Down, Tib, on 
thy knees, I say! Down, Cock, to the ground!” (1.5.41), she commands to impress Hodge with 
enlisting the religious devotion of the entire household in the service of one single aim. When her 
boy and maid kneel, she makes a solemn oath: 
To God I make a vow, and so to good Saint Anne: 
A candle shall they have apiece, get it where I can, 
If I may my nee’le find in one place or in other. (42–44) 
The unnecessary search and the supplication and prayer it entails allow Gammer Gurton to elevate 
Hodge in importance within the household and thus create a hierarchy where Tib and Cock must 
submit to his interest. The Catholic practices Gammer administers serve the aim of binding Hodge 
in loyalty to the house. 
The fact that the prayer and the offered sacrifice purportedly aim at the recovery of a needle 
that Gammer Gurton has in fact deliberately hidden rather than lost compromises the represented 
Catholic practices as means to a questionable end. The song opening the second Act further 
undermines the authority of Catholic devotion when it mocks friars or monks by mentioning a man 
“that wears a hood” (line 8) as a suitable drinking fellow. 
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The mistress also poses in the role of a mother figure who orchestrates the search 
benevolently instructing and caring for her servants. She attempts to impress Hodge by appearing 
to be his nurturer. She excuses herself to him for allegedly losing the needle by claiming that it 
happened “what time ich me up hasted / To save the milk set up for thee” (1.4.29). When Hodge 
urges Cock to light the candle by threatening him to “catch thine ears,” she calls on him to moderate 
his anger: “Beat him not, Hodge,” she tells him, “but help the boy and come you two together” 
(1.4.47, 49). 
 
3. Diccon the Bedlam’s External Point of View 
Once Diccon wins Hodge’s trust by promising him external help in his search and scares him 
away with the prospect of conjuring the devil, he remains alone onstage and offers his comment on 
the action. Being a vagrant, he does not belong to the community; what is more, he is not only a 
character, but he also in part directs the action and observes it as if from an outside point of view. 
He calls the lesson he taught Hodge “a cleanly prank” (2.2.3), and he conceptualizes the loss of the 
needle as “a matter worthy glozing9” (7). He comments on it in a meta-theatrical sense saying, “A 
man […] might make a play” of it without adding a “word to this they say” (10f), meaning the 
dialogue he partly overhears, partly participates in. 
The success of his “prank” encourages Diccon to “take the charge / This matter further to 
enlarge” and “make […] good sport” (2.2.13f, 18) in doing so. In the second scene of the second Act, 
he becomes the “author” of a “tale” (52) about Gammer Gurton’s stolen cock and about the 
suspicion Tib raised in her that her neighbor, Dame Chat, stole it. When he divulges the details of 
his invention to Dame Chat, he orders her, too, to keep it secret, so that “Diccon bear no blame” 
(58). Warning Dame Chat that Gammer Gurton may call on her to “brawl” with her “about her cock” 
                                                     
9 “glossing, writing a scholarly commentary upon” (2.2.7n). 
35 
 
(63) is, as Diccon says, only “the one end tapped10 of this my short device” (2.3.1). He still needs to 
“broach t’other too” (2), to make his “play” work. His aim in fomenting discord is, he claims, to 
reveal “what lieth in both” of the “hearts” (4) of the women. 
When he goes about to trigger action at the other end of his “device,” that is, in Gammer 
Gurton, he addresses the audience directly and makes them complicit in his “sport:” “Be still awhile, 
and say nothing,” he directs them and requests that they “Make here a little roomth” (2.4.2). In his 
words, and possibly in his accompanying gesture, Diccon here oversteps the boundary of the 
imaginary “theatrical space [which] is created by the performance”11 and crosses into the 
architecturally given “theater space,” that is, the “physical space in which a performance takes 
place” (11). The theater space exists, Hanna Scolnicov asserts, “independently of, and prior to, any 
performance” (12). Whitworth names this space, in the case of Gammer Gurton’s Needle, as “the hall 
of Christ’s College” in Cambridge. From this instance, when Diccon addresses the spectators, and 
one in the third Act, when Hodge does the same, Whitworth infers that “Clearly some members of 
the audience were very near if not actually on the playing area; thus a large, elevated stage, 
separate from the spectator area, seems out of the question.”12 The physical conditions in the hall, 
therefore, facilitated such a crossing of a boundary. 
By involving them in his scheme, Diccon invites the audience to identify with his 
perspective, and he himself takes on their point of view. Diccon lives outside the social network and 
depends solely on his wits, but he has a function in the play more important than merely “to expose 
and comment on the follies of others,” as Douglas Duncan points out.13 Whitworth comments on 
                                                     
10 “opened” (2.3.1). 
11 Hanna Scolnicov, “Theater Space, Theatrical Space, and the Theatrical Space Without,” The Theatrical Space, 
Themes in Drama Ser. 9, ed. James Redmond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 11–26. 12. 
12 Charles Whitworth, “Introduction,” Gammer Gurton’s Needle, ed. Charles Whitworth (London: A & C Black; 
New York: W W Norton, 1997) ix–xxvi. xxiii. 
13 Douglas Duncan, “Gammer Gurton’s Needle and the Concept of Humanist Parody,” Studies in English 




this function, saying, he “straddles the boundary between play world and audience.”14 This creates 
the hybrid sense in the audience of a position from which, on the one hand, the action seems to take 
place in a “delimited space, a magic circle marked off from the mundane and ordinary,”15 and, on 
the other hand, it somehow still appears possible to interfere with it. This is Diccon the Bedlam’s 
ambiguous position within the play, and, in the course of the action, the audience’s perception 
inadvertently slides into it. 
To a certain extent, characters whom Diccon easily dupes appear like marionettes under his 
control—except for Hodge. The young servant, who is not comfortable with his status in Gammer 
Gurton’s household, has an inclination to perceive his own situation as if it were fictional, as if he 
were no longer constrained by its actual conditions. When he least controls his own reactions, he 
betrays a sense of being in the theater space of Christ’s College and thus he violates the precept 
that, as Scolnicov formulates, “the character has no existence outside the theatrical space.”16 Even 
though Diccon draws a “circle plat”17 (2.1.90) for protection against the “long paws” (93) of the 
devil before he purports to conjure the devil, Hodge cannot help fouling his trousers. At this 
moment, he is “put besides his part”18 and says, “ich must beray the hall!” (2.2.106). According to 
the editor, Hodge here “refers to the hall […] where the play was performed” (106n). Once he has 
“amend[ed]” his “breech” with a “thong” (3.1.10, 3) and is in full possession of his masculine 
identity, he transcends his role deliberately and, armed with a “staff” (3.3.34 SD), orders the 
audience to “Stand out one’s way, that ich kill none in the dark!” (36). Hodge reaches this level of 
confidence as Diccon’s student in how to master his own desire through discourse and make it 
work in a difficult social situation. 
                                                     
14 Whitworth xix. 
15 Scolnicov 14. 
16 Scolnicov 14. 
17 “flat, horizontal.” “Diccon presumably draws a circle on the ground” (2.1.90n, 89–90n). 
18 Shakespeare, “Sonnet 23,” The Norton Shakespeare. Based on the Oxford Edition, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et 
al. (New York, London: W W Norton, 1997) 1930f. l.2. 
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Diccon’s strength is in his ability to let characters speak, express their hearts’ desire, and to 
make them act upon it. In this sense, the vice figure of the play anticipates Iago’s technique of 
helping “events in the womb of time”19 unfold. As in Othello, so in Gammer Gurton’s Needle, the 
discursive control over fellow characters’ action entails, and corresponds to, a rise above them to a 
point of view, in the visual sense, which is still within the perceptual horizon of the play but at an 
extreme point of it, exactly like the vanishing point in Filippo Brunelleschi’s invention of, as 
Catherine Belsey calls it, “monocular perspective”20 in 1425.21 Sebastiano Serlio determined the 
privileged vantage point, “the seat of the monarch,” in his design of a Renaissance Italian theater 
later, in 1545, in terms of this mathematical perspective. Vincenzo Scamozzi would then realize this 
plan in his theater in Sabbioneta, Italy, in 1588.22 Serlio located the l’œil du prince, “the prince’s 
eye,” roughly opposite the vanishing point of the perspective scenery, which he carried behind the 
back wall of the stage. Similar to the nature of the vanishing point compared to that of other objects 
in perspective scenery, Diccon’s position with respect to the other characters of the play is 
ambiguous. He is the point of entry for the audience into the magic of the theater, our reference in 
placing other characters in his unifying perspective, and our vantage point in interpreting the 
characters’ limited field of vision. 
Although it provides vital support for Hodge at a critical moment in his effort to come of age, 
Diccon’s “cleanly prank” becomes an art for its own sake. His “gear” (2.4.1) emerges as a gratuitous 
“sport” for the sake of mere entertainment in the way he practices it on Gammer Gurton and Dame 
Chat. The emotions stirring in Hodge strike us as genuine, and they come to fruition in the promise 
of marrying the maid he has fallen in love with before the action begins. On the other hand, Gammer 
                                                     
19 William Shakespeare, Othello, ed. Kim F. Hall (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007) 1.3.355. 
20 Catherine Belsey, The Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in Renaissance Drama (London and New 
York: Methuen, 1985) 24. 
21 Samuel Y. Edgerton, The Mirror, the Window, and the Telescope: How Renaissance Linear Perspective 
Changed our Vision of the Universe, Cornell Paperbacks Ser. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009) 90. 
22 Oscar Gross Brockett, History of the Theater (Boston, London, Sydney, Toronto: Allyn and Bacon, 1987) 173. 
38 
 
Gurton cannot reveal her actual motive for lamenting the loss of the needle, which thus appears as a 
cover to displace her wish to bind Hodge to the household. However, to save face, she has to go 
along with, and fall victim to, Diccon’s provocation. Iago’s technique will be hauntingly similar to 
Diccon’s. As A. C. Bradley comments on the vice’s character in Othello, Iago is not a man of action 
but an “artist,” an “inarticulate poet”23 who creates a plot and imposes it on his immediate 
surroundings. However, while Iago “rehearses” his plot “in downright earnest” (198) and is 
eventually “caught in his own web” (199) in a “catastrophe” that comes out wrong (198), Diccon 
will be peacefully integrated in the community. 
As Iago will do to Othello, Diccon divulges part of a “tale” he himself “author[ed]” and makes 
Gammer Gurton ask for more in the hope that she can enter a coherent fiction that, as a result of the 
effort she invests in acting it out, would rise to the status of reality: 
GAMMER GURTON My goodly tossing spurrier’s24 nee’le chave lost ich wot not where. 
[…] 
DICCON If this be all, good Gammer, I warrant you all is save. 
GAMMER GURTON Why, know you any tidings which way my nee’le is gone? 
  (2.4.10, 13f) 
Once she becomes the questioner, Gammer Gurton has to maintain her initial lie and bear the 
unfolding consequences. She eagerly picks up the line Diccon offers her as an entry into the magic of 
a play within the play and connects it back to the key moment of departure, the actual event in her 
experience that sparked the original invention she would now enlarge on in concert with Diccon. 
When she hears that her “neighbour […] stooped me down and up she took a needle or a pin” (17f), 
Gammer Gurton cannot help exclaiming, 
It was my nee’le, Diccon, ich wot, for here, even by this post, 
                                                     
23 A. C. Bradley, Shakespearean Tragedy: Lectures on Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, Macbeth (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1992) 198. 
24 “spur-maker’s” (2.4.10n). 
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Ich sat what time as ich up start, and so my nee’le it lost. 
Who was it, life son? Speak, ich pray thee, and quickly tell me that. (20–22) 
The script is ready in Diccon’s head, and it will soon live its own life independently of the original 
pretext, the mending of the breeches, to which it has, by now, lost all connection. To this end, like to 
that of Dame Chat, the injunction applies: “Let not be know I told you of it, how well soever ye 
speed” (43), Diccon reminds Gammer Gurton, as he did Dame Chat before. “Here will the sport 
begin” (2.5.1), Diccon announces to the audience. In the farce that ensues, involving Gammer 
Gurton and Dame Chat, the neighbors are about to entertain the spectators with the rare spectacle 
of a fight where nothing of real value, except for the entertainment itself, is at stake. “He that may 
tarry by it awhile […], I warrant him […],” Diccon as the “author” is confident, “he shall see all the 
sport” (7f). 
 
4. Hodge Fashions Himself 
In spite of the respect Gammer Gurton commands the other two servants to pay him and the 
fervor the mistress herself shows in trying to further his aim, Hodge is increasingly unsatisfied with 
the conditions of his keeping. Initially, he is preoccupied only with his own unfavorable appearance. 
He refers to himself as “dressed” in “filthy clay” (1.2.4 and n) and complains about “a gash, a 
shameful hole” (7) in his breeches. His description of himself is in harsh contrast to the apparent 
wealth of his mistress,25 to whom he complains about his duty “to dig and delve in water, mire and 
clay, / Sossing and possing26 in the dirt still from day to day” (1.4.25f). 
In the second Act, Hodge reveals to Diccon that he does not even have enough to eat. After 
having worked in the field all day without provisions, he had “Neither butter, cheese, milk, onions, 
                                                     
25 Diccon mentions Gammer Gurton’s maid, Tib, and her boy, Cock (1.1.16f), characters in the play. Doctor Rat 
refers to her cow and sow (4.1.22). 
26 “splashing and tramping” (1.4.26n). 
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flesh nor fish, / Save this poor piece of barley bread,” he grumbles and calls it, with an edge of 
sarcasm, “a pleasant costly dish” (2.1.13f). He even suggests he is treated on a level with animals 
when he calls his dinner a “piece of dry horse-bread” (17). In his hunger, his senses focus on his 
own body in an intense interoception, that is, a sensation in interior organs: “My gusts they yawl, 
crawl and all my belly rumbleth,” he tells Diccon and adds, “The puddings27 cannot lie still, each one 
over other tumbleth” (19f). 
His mistress’s display of helpfulness does not lay Hodge’s suspicion to rest. His efforts to 
make the seemingly obtuse Diccon understand it helps him formulate his predicament clearly. The 
cat might have licked up the milk and eaten even the bacon,28 he ponders, but “there was a fouler 
fault,” he adds: “My Gammer ga’ me the dodge”29 (2.1.34). And again, he elaborates on the poor 
condition of his apparel as a result of his mistress’s neglect of him. “See’st not how cham rent and 
torn, my heels, my knees, and my breech?” (35), he laments and concludes, “My Gammer, cham 
ashamed to say, by God, served me not well” (39). By pretending to be dull or simply hard of 
hearing, Diccon forces Hodge to describe the needle in striking visual images: it is a “little thing with 
an hole in the end,” Hodge begins, but then makes it seem “as bright as any silver.” He calls it “Small, 
long, sharp at the point” first, but then magnifies it to appear “straight as any pillar” (43f). By 
promising to help and urging him to “keep counsel in this case” (53), Diccon directs Hodge’s 
attention to what he himself can do to extricate himself from the conundrum. The belief that Diccon 
can indeed lead him to the needle makes Hodge burst out in an enthusiastic six-line speech full of 
action verbs in the first person singular, starting like this: “Chill run, chill ride, chill dig, chill delve, 
chill toil, chill trudge, shalt see” (55). As a direct result of his interaction with the tramp, Hodge 
seems to have made a pledge. 
                                                     
27 “intestines” (2.1.20n) 
28 In fact, Diccon has stilled his hunger with it (1.1.22). 
29 “tricked me, let me down” (2.1.34n). 
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Diccon contrasts Gammer Gurton’s Catholic worship with his own profane ceremony. Hodge 
first has to answer the question of what makes his appearance so crucial to him. “Kirstian Clack, 
Tom Simson’s maid, by the mass, comes hither tomorrow,” he blurts it out at last and reveals his 
hope to win her affections: “Cham not able to say between us what may hap; / She smiled on me the 
last Sunday, when ich put off my cap” (2.1.62–64). Diccon acknowledges the “weight” (65) of the 
matter and orders secrecy. In the following thoroughly sacrilegious ritual that Diccon administers, 
Hodge lays his hand on Diccon’s buttocks, in lieu of the “book” (69), and swears allegiance to him. 
To Hodge, this appears more authentic and, therefore, more efficacious at recovering the needle 
than Gammer’s theatrical prayer, offering, and supplication. 
While Gammer Gurton values him above her other domestic servants, at least in words, 
Hodge now appears to be Diccon’s bondsman: he owes him obedience and trust. He submitted his 
labor to his mistress—his senses to the search; now he has to work for Diccon’s “pleasure” and 
keep his “counsel close” (2.1.76, 74). He could afford to be skeptical about the sincerity of Gammer 
Gurton’s intentions, but now he is obliged to believe in Diccon’s words and follow his advice. 
Therefore, when this bondage forces him to go beyond the limits of his hardiness, he does not have 
the freedom to argue with him. He reacts with immediate bodily symptoms to Diccon’s suggestion 
that he seek the help of the “great devil […] with some pretty charm” (83, 85) to find the needle. In 
his fear, he first begins to sweat (87), then he has to “make a curtsy of water” (100), and finally he 
defiles the hall (105f) and runs away. 
Since Hodge took an oath of trust, Diccon’s words have the force of authenticity on him. 
However, Diccon undermines his own credibility by deliberately confusing him. To Hodge’s eager 
questioning about the diabolical revelation concerning the whereabouts of the needle, he responds 
with three alternative directions: 
Between Chat and the rat and the cat the needle is hid. 
Now whether Gib our cat have eat it in her maw, 
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Or Doctor Rat our curate have found it in the straw, 
Or this Dame Chat your neighbour have stolen it, God he knoweth. 
 (2.3.24–27) 
As Gammer Gurton did before him by diverting the search away from where the needle is actually 
hidden, Diccon frustrates Hodge’s expectation of external guidance by deferring the point of its 
availability beyond the time when it could still be of use. “But by the morrow at this time, we shall 
learn how the matter goeth,” he declares and adds in an officious manner, “’Tis not possible to make 
it sooner appear” (28, 30). Diccon’s “great devil” (2.1.83) is just as unhelpful and misleading as 
Gammer Gurton was. 
The diffuse and delayed answer triggers in Hodge the urge to take matters into his own 
hands and determine who he is. Diccon has provoked him into formulating his own desire, then 
withdrew from helping him achieve its object. This leaves Hodge alone with a mixed sense of 
insufficiency and anticipation: he is aware of the goal he wishes to reach, but he knows he is not 
prepared—and the opportunity is rapidly approaching. At this moment, he comes up with a plan of 
action. He suggests, 
Alas, Diccon, then chave no shift, but, lest ich tarry too long, 
Hie me to Sim Glover’s shop, there to seek for a thong, 
Therewith this breech to tache and tie as ich may (2.3.31–33). 
He still includes Diccon as an external driving force in his design, but the vagrant is evasive. 
“Tomorrow, Hodge, if we chance to meet,” he responds hesitantly, “shalt see what I will say” (34). 
Hodge surpasses even Tib in her dedication to the stimuli from the material world. He is 
proud of the acute power of his senses and demands from his fellow servants a similar attention to 
sensual impulses. His eyes, he boasts, “see […] well” a “hundred things that be abroad” (1.4.27). He 
relies on his superior vision which, even by the mere light of a candle and with the help of his 
tactition, would locate the tiny object, while, he tells his mistress, “you know it not when you it see!” 
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(38). Then, when the boy fails to light the candle, Hodge turns to him in indignation: “Art deaf, thou 
whoreson boy? Cock, I say! Why canst not hear’s?” (48). 
Hodge devotes himself fully to the experience of the search, leaving no room for a critical 
evaluation of his sensations. According to Cock, he 
lieth tumbling and tossing amidst the floor, 
Raking there some fire to find among the ashes dead 
Where there is not one spark so big as a pin’s head. (1.5.11–13) 
Beyond what is actually there to perceive, Hodge even imagines he can see what should be there for 
the successful completion of the search. This way, like Tib, who refers to the location of the needle 
in a tautology without being able to specify it, Hodge also anticipates the moment of recognition 
when the needle will be present again to the senses and the multiple displacements will cease. To 
find it, however, he first has to light the candle Cock has produced. “At last, in a dark corner,” Cock 
continues his report on Hodge’s compulsive delusion, 
two sparks he thought he sees, 
Which were indeed nought else but Gib our cat’s two eyes. 
“Puff!” quoth Hodge, thinking thereby to have fire without doubt.  (14–16) 
Hodge is persistent in his misperception that what he blows is, in fact, glowing ember; he takes the 
repeated winks of the cat’s eyes for the sparkling of fire. He follows the cat up the stairs even at the 
price of breaking “both his shins” (25) in his fear that Gib would set the house on fire. 
Once he understands the “special cause” of his own “sorrow” (2.1.61) in the act of 
identifying the particular person, Kirstian Clack, for whom he undertook the vain search in a 
delusion, Hodge has half-way released himself from being Gammer Gurton’s possession and from 
expecting help from the saints she worships. Now, he changes masters and in a sacrilegious mock 
ritual swears allegiance to the vagrant Diccon, who pokes fun at his fear of the devil. Hodge does not 
have many choices left. He has to face Kirstian Clack without help from heaven or hell. He decides to 
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fashion himself with the material available for mending his breeches. He enters Sim Glover’s shop 
and transforms his appearance by turning what was the focus of his painful self-consciousness into 
a reason for pride, that is, changing a lack, “a shameful hole,” into a proud sign of masculinity, a 
conspicuous presence. Out of a “need to be so straight and hard” (3.1.5), he purchases “a thong” (3), 
and he borrows the Glover’s “nawl30 to set the jib31 forward” (6). With “these two,” he “amends” his 
“breech” (10). Emphasis here is on the physical durability of the material and on the conspicuous 
appearance of Hodge’s eligibility: “Tom Tankard’s great bald curtal32 […] could not break” (4) the 
thong. Hodge’s desire is visible in his appearance. 
An emphasis on display goes along with a skilled use of language in Hodge to establish an 
independent point of view and a critical distance to the authority of both Gammer Gurton and 
Diccon. To his mistress’s attempt to involve him in the fiction of Dame Chat as the thief of the needle 
Hodge responds by discrediting its author, Diccon. “It is a vengeable knave, Gammer, ’tis a bonable33 
whoreson” (3.2.10), he asserts in a new confidence. At the same time, Hodge’s language is not 
merely confident, but it acquires a new rhetorical power in its vivid imagery. In possession of the 
proper bodily contour—his “jib” set “forward,” as he formulated it, which fills him with 
anticipation—Hodge becomes especially skilful in the use of auditory and visual images. 
Instead of seeing things, some of which were there in front of him, but some he only wished 
to be there, as happened to him in the course of the vain search Gammer Gurton was conducting, 
now Hodge makes his mistress have frightening visions. His model is Diccon’s gesture of 
authorship, and his starting point is his own uncontrollable fear of the image the vagrant conjured 
up for him. By way of emulating the vagrant’s pose as entertainer, Hodge now hopes to induce a 
similar condition of helpless awe in Gammer to reverse his dependence on her in the hierarchical 
                                                     
30 “awl” (3.1.6n). 
31 “forward-most triangular sail in certain systems of ship’s rigging” (3.1.6n). 
32 “piebald horse with a docked tail” (3.1.4). 
33 “abominable” (3.2.10n). 
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relationship. Similar to the mixture of description and fantasy in his own compulsive delusions, the 
pictures he deliberately conjures use ekphrasis with poetic license. He reminds his mistress of the 
pictorial representation of a devil in continental tradition. 
Saw ye never Friar Rush 
Painted on a cloth, with a sidelong cow’s tale, 
And crooked cloven feet and many a hooked nail? (3.2.18–20), 
Hodge asks his mistress, adding that he himself saw “the devil” that had “such another” visage “even 
what face Friar Rush had” (22). 
In depicting an image to control his mistress’s perception, Hodge is tapping into a long oral 
tradition that became manifest in print in England around the time of the writing of Gammer 
Gurton’s Needle, possibly late in Edward VI’s reign or early in that of Elizabeth I. As George Lyman 
Kittredge explains in his comment on this passage of the play, the “diabolically entertaining 
exploits” of the “Continental Friar Rush […] became the subject of an English chapbook not later 
than 1569. […] Reginald Scot, in 1584, referred to Rush’s printed ‘storie,’ styled him ‘Rush of 
England,’ and compared him with the impish Hutgin (Hudgin) of Hildesheim, whose performances 
are assigned to the year 1132.”34 This indicates that Hodge’s power over Gammer Gurton’s 
perception derives partly from a theme in an ongoing popular discourse and text production. 
By fleshing out details of the devil’s appearance, Hodge spurs Gammer Gurton on to join him 
in completing a complex image under his guidance. “But Hodge,” she begins, “had he no horns to 
push?” “As long as your two arms!” (3.2.17f), the youth acknowledges his mistress’s effort to do her 
part. In this moment, the image even assumes a tactile quality. To further overwhelm her with the 
collaborative mental experience, Hodge also complements the picture with sound. “‘O!’ the knave 
cried,” Hodge now purports to impersonate Diccon, “‘Ho, ho!’ He roared and he thundered” (13), he 
                                                     




alleges. “Now Jesus mercy, Hodge!,” his mistress exclaims as a spectator who also shapes the 
performance, which is in fact a reprise of Diccon’s earlier show, “Did Diccon in him bring?” (23). 
While the vagrant frustrated Hodge’s reliance on him in his endeavor to become his own man and 
to have a family, Hodge, identifying with Diccon’s role and taking his position, now provides 
Gammer Gurton with specific information to support her fiction of the lost needle: “The devil, when 
Diccon bad him (ich heard him wondrous well) / Said plainly here before us, that Dame Chat had 
your nee’le” (25f). In saying this, Hodge in fact reaffirms Diccon’s invitation to Gammer to enlarge 
on and act out, with a specific direction, her search for the “lost” needle in her own story of 
displacement. Once he releases himself from her fiction with Diccon’s help, Hodge, by assuming the 
vagrant’s transcendental position in the play, manipulates Gammer Gurton’s perception to change 
places with her: he locks her up in the same virtual reality she wove around the tiny object to 
possess him. 
Gammer Gurton’s Needle gives the impression that fiction can be clearly separated from 
reality and that Hodge’s public persona is firmly based on the latter. He rises above the chaos of the 
self that contains elements of Catholic worship, superstition, subjection to female rule and 
witchcraft that ultimately all appear as dreamlike and nightmarish fantasies. Hodge’s struggle is 
driven by an urge similar to what Jacques Lacan calls the “insufficiency in [man’s] natural reality.”35 
Lacan terms the “drama” of this struggle for a unified sense of the self in a body image as the 
“mirror stage,” a crucial phase in the individual’s development toward sexual maturity. Although 
the “internal thrust” of this change “is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation,” “to a form of 
[…] totality” (384), Lacan argues, the “transformation that takes place in the subject when he 
assumes an image” (382) results merely in a visual construct that lends “the agency of the ego” a 
“fictional” (383) character. Nonetheless, the ending of the play creates the expectation that, based 
                                                     
35 Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic 
Experience,” trans. Alan Sheridan, Contemporary Literary Criticism: Literary and Cultural Studies, eds. Robert 
Con Davis and Ronald Schleifer (New York, London: Longman, 1994) 382–86. 384. 
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on his newly acquired body image and rhetorical skills, Hodge will be able to integrate successfully 
into his social reality. 
As Diccon had done earlier, Hodge directs Gammer Gurton to Dame Chat. His future does 
not depend on her prayer, her offerings, or her insincere “promise” to “sew thy breeches” (1.4.20) 
anymore, so he can safely say, “Bid her give you the nee’le; ’tis none of hers, but yours” (3.2.30). The 
irony of the two women’s farcical battle depends on the mismatch between the object coveted and 
the one allegedly withheld. Here, too, Dame Chat takes Gammer Gurton’s demand that she “give me 
mine own” (3.3.3) to mean the “goodly fair red cock” that was supposedly stolen from Hodge’s 
mistress “this last night” (2.2.38). The fight is thus not merely fought about one object that has, in 
fact, never been lost, but it unfolds around a separate false pretense that each contestant fiercely 
defends.36 According to Whitworth, throughout the scene that he calls “the play’s centrepiece,” the 
two women are at “utter cross-purposes” as a result of Diccon’s intrigue (3.3n). This renders the 
ideational background of Diccon’s “sport” not merely complex, elaborate, and gratuitous, but also 
entirely beside the point, that is, Hodge’s progress toward maturity and social integration. 
 
5. Gammer Gurton’s Identity 
The farcical “centrepiece” in the third scene of the third Act develops our sense of Gammer 
Gurton’s identity by adding a repeated accusation of witchcraft to her Catholic practices of worship. 
In the course of the physical encounter between the two women, Dame Chat calls her neighbor an 
“old witch” (3.3.15), an “old gib”37 (17), an “arrant witch” (22), and a “withered witch” (47). Instead 
of clearing her name of the association, Gammer characteristically responds to these defamations 
by calling Dame Chat licentious: a “ramp,” a “rig” (18), a “bawdy bitch” (22), etc. In addition, she 
                                                     
36 The dialogue consistently avoids making either of the pretenses explicit. Gammer Gurton vehemently 
asserts that “Mine own goods I will have;” Dame Chat retorts, “What, wilt thou make me a thief, and say I stole 
thy good?” (3.3.9, 12), etc. 
37 “cat (disparagingly, an old woman)” (3.3.17n). 
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curses her after Dame Chat denies having stolen her needle and defeats her in fight. In the presence 
of Doctor Rat, the curate, Gammer Gurton says to Master Bailey, “This drab, she keeps away my 
good, the devil he might her snare!” (5.2.116). Although Gammer Gurton might not be a witch, the 
play mingles her Catholic worship with a tinge of the occult. 
Accusations of witchcraft could be a means of undermining especially a woman’s 
reputation. Due to the clandestine nature of the activity it referred to, the label did not rest on clear 
criteria, and was thus difficult to refute. George Lyman Kittredge quotes G. L. Burr, saying, “Magic 
itself is actual and universal. But witchcraft never was. It was but a shadow, a nightmare: the 
nightmare of a religion, the shadow of a dogma.”38 Kittredge claims that “the essential element in 
black witchcraft is maleficium — the working of harm to the bodies and goods of one’s neighbors by 
means of evil spirits or of strange powers derived from intercourse with such spirits. […] Without 
this popular belief in maleficium, the initial suspicions and complaints which were the starting-
point of all prosecutions would have been impossible and inconceivable. With this popular belief, 
the rest was easy.”39 Diccon and Hodge humor Gammer Gurton to trick her into enlarging on a lie, 
and the fictional world she thus acts out isolates her in what seems to be a false consciousness. Her 
oddity is largely facilitated by Diccon, the confessed “author of this tale” (2.2.52), of a “play” which, 
he admits, even “half a clerk” “might make” (10, 12). Dame Chat labels this partly induced 
peculiarity in Gammer by repeatedly naming her a “witch” and, together with her Catholic worship, 
this takes on an added significance as a residual characteristic in Protestant England. Keith Thomas 
argues, “[l]earned authorities never had any doubt that the weaker sex was more vulnerable to the 
temptations of Satan.”40 According to statistics, in “Europe as a whole, something like 80 percent of 
those accused of witchcraft at the courts were women, while in England a figure nearer 90 percent 
                                                     
38 G. L. Burr, The Literature of Witchcraft (New York: 1890) 238. Qtd. in George Lyman Kittredge, Witchcraft in 
Old and New England (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929) 23f. 
39 Kittredge 24. Emphasis in the original. 
40 Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic. Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth and seventeenth 
century England (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971) 520. 
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was not uncommon in samples of cases tried at the assizes.”41 This would render Gammer Gurton a 
candidate for the role of a witch as likely as it would Dame Chat. 
However, Gammer Gurton’s relationship with her neighbor, Dame Chat, would more 
compellingly predispose her for an accusation of witchcraft. Usually, “the witch and her victim were 
two persons who ought to have been friendly towards each other, but were not,”42 Thomas sums 
up. Alan Macfarlane gives details of the social background of typical witchcraft accusations. 
According to him, “it was tensions between neighbors which led to acts of witchcraft. A person was 
refused some small object and in her anger retaliated by bewitching her refuser.”43 With respect to 
the audience’s judgment of Gammer Gurton’s identity as a witch, the trifling value of the needle as a 
motive for hostilities and fight between female neighbors is especially important. A further view 
casts an even worse light on Gammer Gurton: most often “it was the victim who had made an open 
breach in neighborly conducts, rather than the witch.” In the play, Gammer Gurton accuses Dame 
Chat of refusing to “give me mine own, and let me live beside thee” (3.3.3). Consequently, “it was the 
victim,” in our case Dame Chat, “who had reason to feel guilty and anxious at having turned away a 
neighbor, while the suspect might become hated as the agent who caused such a feeling.”44 
Following the typical scenario, then, Dame Chat has a compelling reason, namely guilt, arising from 
her neighbor’s accusation, to expect that Gammer Gurton will repay her lack of charity with an act 
of witchcraft. As Macfarlane makes clear, “[i]t was usually the person who had done the first wrong 
under the old ideals of charity who felt himself bewitched” (196). And so, Dame Chat, in the course 
of a neighborly falling-out, is likely to accuse Gammer Gurton, as she in fact does, of having 
                                                     
41 James Sharpe, Instruments of Darkness: Witchcraft in England 1550–1750 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1996) 
169. 
42 Thomas 560f. 
43 Alan Macfarlane, Witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart England: A Regional and comparative Study (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970) 174. 
44 Macfarlane 174. 
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bewitched her. In addition, she calls her an “old whore” (3.3.33)—an epithet that would also be 
attached to an actually suspected witch in Essex in 1581.45 
Critics rarely raise the issue of Gammer Gurton’s association with witchcraft, but if they do, 
like Diane Purkiss, they explicitly deny it. In her analysis of “Witches on Stage,” Purkiss cites Old 
Banks from The Witch of Edmonton, who, as she says, “miscalls her [i.e., Sawyer] Gammer Gurton, 
promising to ‘have at your needle of witchcraft’,46 referring to the 1557 comedy’s heroine.”47 
Purkiss remarks in parentheses that Gammer Gurton “was not a witch.”48 If we consider the play in 
isolation from its contemporary theological and social context, she might have good reason. But if 
we do not, and if we add to this that Hodge deceitfully corroborates Gammer Gurton’s suspicion 
that her neighbor “found” the needle “and took it up” (3.2.5) by reporting to her the devil’s alleged 
announcement and that he then even supports her loudly and gleefully in her fight with Dame 
Chat,49 it becomes apparent that Hodge emerges clear from a feared encounter and the possible 
blame that he “consults with the Deuill”50 by implicating Gammer Gurton in the same. 
What is more, Hodge intimates already in the first Act that Gib, Gammer Gurton’s cat, might 
be her familiar. He suspects witchcraft behind his own failure to light the fire he insists he can see in 
the cat’s eyes: “Hodge fell of swearing,” Cock reports, “The fire was sure bewitched and therefore 
would not burn” (1.5.22f). In the same scene, Hodge blames and curses Gib, the cat, then Gib’s 
mother, and “all the generation of cats” (1.5.46) for two reasons: for licking the milk pan clean and 
for eating a morsel of bacon. The cat disappears upstairs “among the old posts and pins” (1.5.24); 
                                                     
45 Macfarlane 159. 
46 William Rowley, Thomas Dekker, John Ford, The Witch of Edmonton, ed. Stephen Orgel (New York, London: 
Garland Publishing, 1980) 4.1.252. 
47 Whitworth (xvii) deems the period of “Mary’s reign (mid-1553–8) […] “less likely” as the date of 
composition for Gammer Gurton’s Needle “than the latter years of her half-brother Edward’s,” who ruled 
England between 1547 and 1553. 
48 Diane Purkiss, The Witch in History. Early Modern and Twentieth-Century Representations (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1996) 246. 
49 “Where be your nails?,” Hodge provokes Gammer Gurton. “Claw her by the jaws, pull me out both her 
eyen!” (3.3.30). 
50 James I, Daemonologie (Edinburgh, 1597) 29. Early English Books Online, 24 June 2014. 
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the latter are objects that obsessed children commonly vomited and that were also instruments of 
maleficent witchcraft, according to the records.51 A Diccon says, one of the three alternative 
interpretations of the devil’s alleged revelation is that Gib, the cat, has eaten the needle. As Sharpe 
explains, the idea of familiars originated in the practice of “élite magicians and sorcerers in the 
Middle Ages, [who] were frequently alleged to operate with the assistance of a demonic spirit.” As a 
result, “the idea that a witch was usually assisted by a familiar in the shape of an animal constantly 
recurred in pamphlet accounts.”52 These data originate from a time somewhat later than the writing 
of Gammer Gurton’s Needle, since the first witchcraft pamphlets were published only in 1566 (71). 
But, as on the basis of these documents Sharpe concludes, events at possession cases were, already 
at that time, “structured and culturally determined” (199). 
Finally, Hodge even suggests that Gib, the cat, might have eaten the needle itself. He tells 
Gammer Gurton, “there’s not within this land / A murrainer53 cat than Gib is, betwixt the Thames 
and Tyne” (3.4.6f), and he offers to cut its throat to recover the object. “Chill see,” he says in 
seeming determination, “what devil is in her guts” (18). His intention is clearly to intimidate his 
mistress, who protests, “What? Nay, Hodge, fie! Kill not our cat!” (15). Hodge drives the mockery 
even further adding, “ich care not what I kill, ma’54 God a vow! […] What, thinkst that cham not 
able?” (16, 19). Hodge’s threat is a sign of his confident use of the rhetorical device of irony to 
secure and relish his superiority to his mistress. 
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The witchcraft Hodge purports to fear appears to be closely related to the power of the 
“suffocating maternal matrix”55 against which he “must form his specifically masculine selfhood” 
according to the “[c]ulturally constructed” (7) assumptions of the period. As Janet Adelman 
formulates, “[c]ultural practice” in Tudor England “formalized” the need in a “boy-child” to leave the 
mother’s “femaleness behind in order to become a man, enforcing the equation of masculine 
identity with differentiation from the mother.” Importantly, the boy’s “passage to manhood was 
marked,” she adds, “by taking him out of the undifferentiated ‘female’ clothing of childhood,” that is, 
by “‘breeching’ him” (7). The first step, therefore, in Hodge’s maturation occurs when he realizes 
that he needs to be “breeched.” 
In the context of the Renaissance anxiety about the instability of gender distinctions, 
Hodge’s awareness of his torn clothes also indicates his urge to determine his gendered identity. 
According to Stephen Orgel, Renaissance fantasy about gender roles included 
the conviction that men can turn into – or be turned into – women; or 
perhaps more exactly, can be turned back into women, losing the strength 
that enabled the male potential to be realized in the first place. In this 
version of the medical literature we all start as women, and the culture 
confirmed this by dressing all children in skirts until the age of seven or so, 
when the boy […] was “breeched,” or put into pants, removed from the care 
of women, and began to be trained as a man.56 
                                                     
55 Janet Adelman, Suffocating Mothers: Fantasies of Maternal Origin in Shakespeare’s Plays, Hamlet to The 
Tempest (New York, London: Routledge, 1992) 3. 
56 Stephen Orgel, Impersonations: The Performance of Gender in Shakespeare’s England (Cambridge, New York: 
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The way Hodge comes of age in Gammer Gurton’s household shows that his efforts to reach a 
confidence in his masculine identity, in appearance and discourse, also require the creation and 
exclusion of his other: the feminine, the maternal, the Catholic, the idolatrous, and the witch. 
However, the theology and the jurisdiction in the early period of Protestantism in England 
did not encourage the belief in and the prosecution of witchcraft. Protestant theologians virtually 
withdrew from providing officially sanctioned, formal procedures to protect believers against the 
harm of witches. They “banned recourse to popular counter-magic,” played down “the importance 
of guardian angels,” and denied “the intercessionary powers of saints.” At the same time, however, 
they placed “an unprecedented stress upon the reality of the Devil and the extent of his earthly 
dominion.”57 Thus, with a strong sense of the reality of witchcraft, and in the absence of a 
“legitimate form of protection,” Thomas sums up, the victim, among a few other things, “could 
resort to prayer and supplication; he could search himself […]; he could reform himself and his 
household” (495). The Protestant clergy seems to leave the individual alone with his or her faith in 
the face of harmful magic. According to the Protestant position, the soul of a man “with Job-like faith 
[…] would emerge strengthened by the encounter” (496). It appears that the Reformation forced 
individuals to learn how to manage without external support in the face of perceived danger to 
their souls and to turn inward for help. 
This lack of established institutional procedures must have enlarged the scope of individual 
agency and put an emphasis on one’s power to save one’s own soul through “passive endurance”58 
and faith. More than thirty years after the appearance of the play, James I, who grouped together 
the practices of “Magicians, Diuines, Enchanters, Sorcerers, [and] Witches” on the grounds that they 
all “consult[…] with the Deuill,”59 who is “their master” (47), still upheld the same claim. In 
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Daemonologie he emphasized that “by the Deuils meanes, can neuer the Deuill be casten out.” 
Therefore, the “only […] lawfull way, but likewise the most sure” (49) to cure “the disease that is 
caste on” by witchcraft, he declared, was “by earnest prayer to GOD [and] by amendement of their 
liues” (48). Hodge seems to follow this latter avenue actively. 
In addition to the theological position, Thomas suggests that a process of secularization was 
taking place in the fight against witches, but this would only mean that people turned from one 
institution, the church, to another, that is, to the judicial power of the state. This in itself would not 
require a growing awareness of individual responsibility, and thus Thomas seems to overestimate 
the scope of a qualitative change in this direction. As he writes, since “[r]eligion offered no certain 
immunity” and “counter-magic was prohibited,” “the legal prosecution of the witch became the only 
sure way out of what was otherwise a total impasse.”60 Once “[e]cclesiastical magic crumbled,” he 
sums up, “society was forced to take legal action” (498). Thomas seems to base his conclusion on 
the assumption that “statutes against witchcraft were in operation between 1542 and 1572, and 
again between 1563 and 1736,” although he admits that “[v]irtually nothing is known about 
prosecutions during the first of these periods” (449f), that is, at the putative time of the writing and 
first production of Gammer Gurton’s Needle. James Sharpe, however, updates this information, 
adding that Henry VIII’s 1542 statute “was not much used” and Edward VI repealed it in 1547. 
Therefore, “[f]rom 1547 until the Elizabethan statute of 1563,” including the time when Mr. S. 
presumably wrote the play, “witchcraft was not a secular crime in England.”61 This means that 
Christians who felt that harmful magic imperiled the integrity of their souls could turn neither to 
the clergy nor to the law court for effective help. 
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While Hodge experiences an apotheosis in the last scene of the play, Diccon will be 
integrated into the community of the villagers,62 which finally eliminates the hierarchical 
relationship between the two male characters. Hodge, who implicates Gammer Gurton indirectly in 
witchcraft, will be the putative participant in another one of Diccon’s pranks when Dame Chat, 
believing it is he who crawled into her house at night, gives Doctor Rat a bad “turn” (4.3.41) instead. 
While Rat’s “scalp is cloven to the brain” (5.1.26), as the curate grumbles, Hodge’s head is, he 
proudly asserts, “neither scurvy63 nor scald”64 (5.2.102). To Gammer Gurton he admits, “chad been 
there, / Then chad been dressed, belike, as ill, by the mass, as the Gaffer Vicar” (194f). Instead, he is 
“meetly well sped already amongs65” (202), he says complacently, which gives him exceeding 
confidence in his own intelligence: “chad not had the better wit,” he boasts, “chad been made a dolt” 
(203). 
Only Diccon’s wit can Hodge not surpass. Diccon “has more wits,” Whitworth claims, “than 
anyone else except possibly master Bailey.”66 When Hodge insults the vagrant by calling him a “liar” 
and a “lickdish”67 for not recovering the needle as he promised, Diccon retorts reminding Hodge of 
his cowardice: “you were that time beshitten / For fear of Hobgobling” (5.2.251f). However, in 
symmetry with Hodge’s blasphemous oath of allegiance in Act two, scene one, Diccon now has to 
“kneel down” and “take an oath of Hodge’s leather breech” to act as a friendly companion to “Master 
Doctor,” to “Goodwife Chat,” to Gammer Gurton, to her “great cat,” and to Hodge (270–72, 276, 280, 
283f). 
In obeying master Bailey’s order to the letter, Diccon gives Hodge “a good blow on the 
buttock” (5.2.290 SD), which makes the youth feel as if Diccon had, he says, “thrust me into the 
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buttock with a bodkin or a pin” (293). Hodge finds the needle in his breeches and exclaims, “Ich 
knew that ich must find it, else chould68 a’ had it never!” (311). This is a recognition, or anagnorisis, 
in Terence Cave’s sense. As he explains, “‘Ana-gnorisis’, like ‘re-cognition’, in fact implies a recovery 
of something once known rather than merely a shift from ignorance to knowledge.”69 The needle 
was not lost, after all, and still, it is recovered: “here in my hand be it!,” Hodge calls out. With his 
“real,” physical pain, the final scene of the play does away with multiple displacements, bursts the 
bubble of false consciousness, of accusations and fears of witchcraft, and restores perception to 
direct bodily sensation. 
The “torch-lit hall at night” in “Christ’s College,”70 Cambridge, Whitworth says, “was dimly lit 
by modern standards,” and, he adds, “[i]n a play in which seeking for a minuscule lost object is a 
major part of the action, it is not surprising for characters to speak of needing more light” (xxiv). “In 
a humanistic text,” Whitworth concludes, “the darkness may also be metaphorical, with ignorant 
souls groping about blindly, believing any rumour that comes to their ears” (xxv). The actual 
darkness of the hall renders the stage darkness even more inescapable, and the metaphorical 
meaning of this darkness is in harmony with the complications of the action, the limitation and 
distortions of perception and with the false consciousness Diccon induces in Dame Chat and in 
Gammer Gurton. The end of confusion itself of what was mainly Diccon’s “game” (5.2.318) appears 
as a cognitive gain when Hodge tells Gammer meaningfully to “Go near the light” (306). 
 
7. Conclusion 
Hodge, the protagonist of this comedy, surmounts a considerable obstacle in the way that 
leads him to the fulfillment of his desire. He endures delay and exhibits stamina. The search for a 
minuscule object yields an unintended, more significant result: the youth’s identity unites in itself 
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the desire of his self with a powerful public image and a triumphant rhetoric. The early Tudor 
comedy of stamina and of the reward of coming into one’s own seems to have inherited its 
optimism from the historic example of Henry VIII’s success in defeating an enormous political 
resistance to marry the woman of his choice. In Hodge’s case, the obstacle is a conglomerate of 
Catholic idolatry, imputed witchcraft, and maternal dominance, all of which is embodied in the 
figure of Gammer Gurton. Through a deceptive discourse, she can control Hodge’s behavior and 
perception until the domestic servant himself takes action. From his action issues a new way of 
perceiving himself in the world, and this is followed, in turn, by his achievement of a superior 
rhetoric. The moment Hodge eventually lights upon the needle surprises the audience with the 
sudden end of a metaphoric “darkness” in the sense Whitworth uses the word.71 After a spell of 
separation, the hero will be reunited with the social world of the play, a village community, in full 
possession and knowledge of who he is: a servant who has liberated himself to be married and to 
establish himself in the world. 
                                                     




The Prodigal and his Brother: 
The Loss of Self in Shakespeare’s The Comedy of Errors 
 
The oft quoted account of the events at Gray’s Inn on December 28, 1594, emphasizes the 
“Tumult and Crowd upon the Stage” that “was able to disorder and confound any good Inventions 
whatsoever.”1 Since, according to the Gesta Grayorum, “there was no Opportunity to effect that 
which was intended,” it comes as a surprise that, in spite of the “Throngs and Tumults,” still “a 
Comedy of Errors (like to Plautus his Menechmus) was played by the Players” that night. What 
disturbed some of the guests and forced even the Ambassador of the Inner Temple to leave the 
room “discontended and displeased” even before the acting began, was, according to the chronicler, 
that “There came so great a number of worshipful Personages upon the Stage, that might not be 
displaced.” The boundary between players and “Beholders” (22) obviously crumbled, so that a 
visitor was not able to distinguish between who belonged rightfully to the action and who took the 
place of players without having a legitimate reason to do so. The fact that, according to the text, the 
“grand Night” of “Innocents-Day” (20) “was ever afterwards called, The Night of Errors” (22) 
indicates that the memory of the first recorded performance of Shakespeare’s early comedy 
blended in the participants’ minds with the “Confusion and Errors” (22) of the rest of the evening. 
One reason why it might have been so is that the theme of The Comedy of Errors itself is the 
confusion of identities:2 the Syracusan traveler’s diffuse self intrudes upon the more clearly 
delineated public persona of his brother in Ephesus. 
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As far as the question of identity is concerned, the outcome of Shakespeare’s comedy takes a 
step away from the optimism Gammer Gurton’s Needle represented: Antipholus of Syracuse does 
not reach a full-blown sense of who he is through rhetoric and the literal fashioning of his 
appearance. Compared to the level of integrity Hodge reaches when he emerges from a submission 
of his sensations to Gammer’s domestic authority, Antipholus of Syracuse’s sense of identity 
remains incomplete. Throughout the action, he seems to protect himself against the realization that 
he has reached his destination and found the place where he can meet his lost brother. As I will 
argue, he has reason to fear that the power of his Ephesian brother’s public persona, which is well 
integrated in the social, economic, and legal system of the city, might overwhelm his weak sense of 
self that lacks such outside support. Thus, the two brothers represent complementary halves of a 
fragmented identity, and the intention of the traveler brother, who lives under a false name, to 
reunite with his Ephesian counterpart does not yield the desired result: instead of gaining a sense 
of identity, he loses himself among the accoutrements and trappings of a life, the life of Antipholus 
of Ephesus, that remain alien to him. To use Jonathan Dollimore’s word, as a subject, the Syracusan 
brother remains “decentered,”3 while his brother exhibits traits of the inner emptiness of a well-
established citizen. 
 
1. Providentialism versus Crisis in the Criticism 
The way the denouement sorts out the confusion gave rise to two important trends in the 
criticism: one emphasizes the play’s Italian origins and the Plautine aspects of its structure, while 
the other focuses more on the references to St. Paul’s Ephesus and traces the theme of Christian 
providence back to the medieval English dramatic tradition. The first approach pays more attention 
to the mechanical aspects of the plot and is skeptical of the chances of characters to reach personal 
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fulfillment and inwardness, while the other produces optimistic interpretations about the final 
reunion and renewal of a family. This analysis of the play takes a closer look at the way the 
Syracusan brother conceptualizes his own identity, and it argues that he avoids meeting his 
Ephesian counterpart and thus effectively defers the unavoidable conclusion, which might 
otherwise take place in the second scene of the first Act, until the fifth Act. I seek to find an answer 
to the question of what might motivate the Syracusan visitor to Ephesus, who has been searching 
for his lost twin for five years, to suppress his own realization throughout the entire plot that he has 
reached his destination. 
Both critical traditions provide incentives to pursue such an inquiry. In contrast to the 
writer of the Gesta Grayorum, Charles Gildon, “author of the first extended critical commentary on 
all of the works of Shakespeare,”4 emphasizes the regularity in the comedy as far as it observes the 
three Aristotelian unities, and he praises Shakespeare’s improvement on Plautus in adding “two 
Servants as like as their Masters”5 to the dramatis personae. He thinks the action focuses on “the 
finding [of] the lost Brother” and deems “the Catastrophe very happy and strongly moving” (299).6 
George Steevens complains about the “intricacy of plot” which, he believes, outweighs the 
“distinction of character” in the play.7 When he argues that the play does not engage our attention 
strongly “because we can guess in great measure how the denouement will be brought about,”8 he 
seems to suggest, as Gildon did six decades earlier, that the play is about one brother finding the 
other, which is indeed a constant possibility beginning in Act 1, scene 2, when the Ephesian Dromio 
surprises in the street the Syracusan master at a moment when his own slave would be unlikely to 
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appear. Charlotte Lennox also objects to the excessive prominence of structure in the play, claiming 
that the manner of the separation of the brothers at sea, which is necessary “to create the incidents” 
of the plot, is “very curiously contrived by Shakespeare.”9 The “studied and forced arrangement” is 
inferior to Plautus, she argues, but the consequent “increase of business” in Shakespeare is more 
entertaining (284), she concludes. All three eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century critics notice 
the power of the plot as a grand mechanism moving inexorably toward a predictable end and 
somewhat limiting the freedom of choices characters can make in the process. None of them 
reflects, however, on the question of how the denouement will be deferred or whether the fact that 
the Syracusan brother gives up searching for his twin as soon as he receives signs of his presence in 
Ephesus has something to do with his character. 
Thomas Whitfield Baldwin’s mid-twentieth century study of Plautus’ influences on The 
Comedy of Errors through Amphitruo and Menaechmi10 has to be mentioned for its monumentality11 
and its relentless search for Shakespeare’s sources (7), while Cornelia C. Coulter places all the 
explicit elements of the plot, “the confusion resulting from the likeness between twin brothers,”12 
“the restoration of a long-lost son or daughter” (76), and the problem and “means of identification” 
(77) in the Greek and Roman dramatic tradition. However, Erma Gill is the first scholar who 
determines to engage with the characters of the play. She still criticizes Shakespeare, like Steevens 
and Lennox did, for having “the plot overshadow[…] the characters in interest,”13 but she admits 
that his characters are “more fully developed than those” of Plautus in Menaechmi. She emphasizes 
Antipholus of Ephesus’ social position: he is “a business man of sound reputation and a social 
favorite” (83). His brother, she remarks, is “mistaken for him” and is, as a consequence, “offered 
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credit, is affectionately greeted, is given invitations and thanked for kindnesses” (83). She even 
refers to the Syracusan’s own words at the opening of the third scene of the fourth Act summing up 
this experience, but she still does not ask, as a student of character probably should, what prevents 
a traveler in search of his twin from drawing the obvious conclusion from this experience, namely, 
that he is “mistaken for him.” Still, she thinks Antipholus of Syracuse is the more serious of the two 
brothers: Shakespeare has added “morality, and something of sentimentality” to his character, “so 
that he is a contrast to his impulsive, quick-tempered, and none too moral brother” (85). Gill 
attempts to see the brothers in comparison, “one character as a foil for another,” as she says (86); 
however, she does not raise the question if the Syracusan brother’s sudden loss of determination 
upon his arrival in Ephesus, after trying to trace his twin for five years, is merely a plot contrivance 
or has something to do with his character, the character of his brother, or the relationship between 
the two of them. 
In contrast to Madeleine Doran, who claims that The Comedy of Errors could not pose any 
trouble to Shakespeare in fitting character into the “pattern of romantic story,” since in this play 
“character is slight,”14 Northop Frye has a more sophisticated approach to the function of characters 
in a seemingly rigid plot design. He conceptualizes the structure of the play as “a metamorphosis 
structure, a descent into illusion and an emergence into recognition.”15 Most importantly, he sees 
the “main action” taking place “in a world of illusion and assumed madness” (107). On the one hand, 
Frye might be referring here to the insanity of the Ephesian brother in the fourth Act as partly a 
matter of the Courtesan’s, Adriana’s, and Luciana’s perception and partly feigned. When his wife 
orders him to be “safe conveyed / Home to my house,” his slave tellingly urges him, exclaiming, 
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“Will you be bound for nothing? Be mad, good master: cry, ‘The devil!’”16 On the other hand, 
however, Frye seems to encourage us to see Antipholus of Syracuse’s curious inability or 
reluctance, from Act 1, scene 2 on, to comprehend that his brother must be near him in Ephesus as a 
less overt aspect of the same temporary and self-imposed “illusion” or “assumed madness.” 
As an example of combining a perspicacious approach to the problem of the perception of 
identity, already present in Plautus, with Christian providentialism, Joel B. Altman describes the 
typical self-delusion in which dramatic characters often find themselves and even names the 
conceptual trap that holds Antipholus of Syracuse’s perception captive. Although the aspect that is 
available to characters within a dramatic world is necessarily limited, they are forced to make 
“conjectures […] about their situations in the light of [such] imperfect knowledge [to] construct a 
reasonable world for themselves.”17 These “conjectures” in The Comedy of Errors arise, Altman 
formulates succinctly, “from the single presupposition that there can be only one Antipholus and 
one Dromio in Ephesus” (165). To be more precise, this presupposition affects the Syracusan 
traveler most curiously, since he is the only character who has access to evidence to the contrary: 
he remarks that “I could not speak with Dromio since at first / I sent him from the mart” (2.2.6). 
Nonetheless, he still withholds this knowledge from himself, so to speak. Thus, from his perspective 
we might reformulate the above premise saying that “there should be only one Antipholus and one 
Dromio in Ephesus.” Although, in terms of dramatic irony, the audience can afford what the 
Syracusan cannot allow to happen, namely to realize that this is not the case, for some reason we 
still accept his persistent, sometimes even violent, avoidance of the fact and find it amusing. Altman 
assigns what he terms an “instinctual insularity” as a “recognizable character trait” (167) to the 
Syracusan brother and extends it even to his Pauline definition of the human condition, that is, “the 
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final inability of human wit to extricate itself from the condition of mystery in which it is implicated, 
and its need for some transcendent power to reveal the truth” (173). To crack the ideological bias in 
this interpretation and to avoid looking only “inward,” not “outward” (171), as Ephesians do, 
according to Altman, we have to ask why the Syracusan traveler imposes this limitation on himself 
in the first place. 
Instead of the deferral of the denouement that would result from the traveler Antipholus’ 
perceptual conundrum, Arthur F. Kinney emphasizes the way “the force of fate or providence”18 
drives the plot toward its conclusion. He finds that the idea of “reunion […] in a new life” (37, 39), 
central to the sixth chapter of Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians, defined the meaning of the play to 
Elizabethans, and that this relates the play more to the native medieval tradition of the mystery 
cycles (42) than to “secular influences” (40). The Syracusan brother, Kinney argues, consistently 
defies worldly temptations (44, 47) to make the Pauline philosophy he shares with his father (39) 
come true. The reunion does indeed take place, but it is more the product of an increasingly 
mechanistic plot device, namely the accelerating speed of the alternate appearances of the twins in 
the fourth Act, like two pictures taking shorter and shorter turns in front of the eye until they finally 
blend, than the result of a conscious search on the part of the Syracusan traveler. 
In contrast to Kinney’s native English and providentialist approach, Jonathan Hall explains 
Shakespeare’s treatment of the crisis of identity through comparison with its model in Plautus’ 
Menaechmi. He identifies the origin of the ambiguity in the Syracusan brother’s behavior in the self-
defeating nature of his mission: by separating him from his mother and “his mirror image” in his 
twin, the sea storm “has constituted him as a desiring subject.”19 Consequently, his search aims at 
“his own annihilation as separate individual” (47). Hall illustrates the paradox with the 
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contradictory meanings of the metaphor of the dissolution of the self in the maternal element of 
water: Adriana presents it to him as “completion,” while he himself experiences it as “the loss of 
isolated selfhood” (48). The Syracusan traveler’s “quest,” Hall writes, “is already aimed at a loss of 
selfhood, although at the same time that loss is what he fears” (48f). Hall sums up his own main 
argument by saying that in The Comedy of Errors, Shakespeare “reexplores the ancient topos of the 
loss of the self within a newly ‘monetarized’ world” (41). Antipholus of Ephesus represents a 
“socially guaranteed identity” that functions in his mercantile world as “credit.” This “precarious 
identity,” however, will be “disrupted” with the appearance of the alien other with the same name 
(42). Hall calls attention to the contradiction inherent in the Syracusan brother’s character, but his 
theory explains the Ephesian twin’s alienation through the “monetarization” (43) of identity in the 
mercantile circulation of goods, on the one hand, and the contradictory impulses in his Syracusan 
brother originating in the peculiar constitution of his self in a loss (47f), on the other, as two 
independent phenomena. To work out a satisfactory explanation for the motivation in the traveler 
twin, we need to reconstruct the way he perceives his identity in the context of that of his Ephesian 
counterpart. 
 
2. Naming and Fatherhood 
In his first words, Solinus, Duke of Ephesus, sets up a rich and tension-filled opposition 
between the living bodies of men and a relentless monetary and legal system. Although this 
opposition, I will argue, accounts for the “suffering, deprivation, and uncertainty” which, in turn, 
give rise to the “anxieties” that the play, according to Frances E. Dolan, “robustly explores,”20 Duke 
Solinus presents the convertibility of the value of sentient beings into money and the terms of law 
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Pelican Shakespeare Ser. (New York: Penguin Books, 1999) xxxi–xli. xxxi. 
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as a matter of political reality.21 Ephesian merchants who lacked “guilders to redeem their lives,” 
the duke claims to justify his own cruelty, had to seal the “rigorous statutes” of the Syracusan duke 
which banned them from trading there under the penalty of death “with their bloods” (1.1.8f). 
Syracuse seems to sacrifice Ephesians to the powerful abstraction of state legislation. Duke Solinus 
condemns the bloody practices of his Syracusan counterpart and thus elevates the antagonism 
between Ephesus and Syracuse to the level of governmental ideology. 
The symmetry between Ephesus and Syracuse eliminates a sense of history and supplants 
the freedom and responsibility of decisions by foregrounding the absurdity of synchronized actions. 
As the duke explains the inexorable evolution of conditions in parity, “It hath in solemn synods 
been decreed, / Both by the Syracusians and ourselves, / To admit no traffic to our adverse towns” 
(1.1.15). The two states exist in a sense of timelessness,22 and they do not justify their policies by 
referring to the inherent logic of their history. Instead, they imitate compulsively the outward 
gestures of their mirror image. By imitating each other, they form empty and meaningless 
structures which are blind to their own internal mechanisms and insensitive to the waste of the 
human life that they require to maintain them.23 The concept of State as an ideal in political 
humanism emerged around the turn of the thirteenth century with recourse to the Aristotelian 
                                                     
21 This is the first reference in the play to the sacrifice and transformation of human life into an abstract 
monetary or juridical system. Baldwin claims that Thomas Cranmer often called transubstantiation “juggling” 
and that he thought of Jack Juggler in C. M. Gayley’s terms of a “dramatic attack upon transubstantiation” 
(669). 
22 For Dolan, “Ephesus seems, in some ways, outside time and place” (xxxv). 
23 Prompted by the experience of a Shakespeare conference in Moscow in 1987, Jonathan Dollimore reflects 
on scholarly clichés about the alleged power of literature to “transcend[…] the merely political” and 
comments on his own indoctrination saying, “western cold-war propaganda displaced on to the USSR a 
political identity which it shared with it, not least in its use of such rhetoric to ‘persuade’ populations in the 
West to line up behind their own governments for protection against the Russian threat.” Half a year later, 
Dollimore visited the Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington and experienced, as he says, “a certain 
symmetry.” The political context Shakespeare creates for the evolution of the Syracusan brother’s identity 
compels us to respond to Dollimore’s question if Shakespeare could “figure in such a strategy” of war 
propaganda with “yes.” Jonathan Dollimore, “Introduction to the Second Edition,” Radical Tragedy: Religion, 
Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2004) xli–xcix. lxxix, lxxxi. 
67 
 
ideas about active participation in public life.24 The legalism in Solinus’ speech exemplifies this 
elevation of “the actual physical boundaries” of the territory of a kingdom to the abstract 
“boundaries of the enforceable law.” Territory in The Comedy of Errors acquires an independent 
“juristic personality” (119). Following from the experience of regional differences in Italy, Marsilius 
of Padua, a follower of Aristotle (124), abandoned the ideal of an “absolutist universality” of law 
and accepted the “relativity of institutions and constitutions” (125). From the fourteenth century 
onward, Ullmann writes, academic jurists discussed questions of citizenship in the Consilia (expert 
opinions), for example of “how far a citizen of one State was subjected to the laws of another” (136). 
However, both Solinus and his Syracusan counterpart seem to be determined to enforce their 
respective legislations to an absolute degree. 
Although Solinus pronounces a sentence over Egeon in the name of this absurd legislation 
in an abstract political system which not even he can control, Egeon’s seeming compliance in 
offering his life takes place on a different plane. “I am not partial to infringe our laws” (1.1.4), the 
duke washes his hands, and tells Egeon in the passive voice that “by law, thou art condemned to 
die” (25). In contrast, Egeon carries the burden of a whole life on his shoulders and has a lived 
history to tell, which he opposes conspicuously to the force of impersonal state legislation, to lend 
his death the status of the heroic “fall” of an innocent. By indicating that Solinus has the means to 
“procure” (1) that is, to “contrive or devise” and thus to “bring […] upon”25 him his “fall” (1.1.1) with 
some implied effort and force, he elevates his own stature above the state, as the embodiment of 
some intrinsic value that the state is about to take pains to destroy. 
To magnify the value of his lived experience in the context of a dehumanized state, Egeon 
locates his “griefs” outside the discourse of power, as “unspeakable” (1.1.32), and associates his 
                                                     
24 Walter Ullmann, Medieval Foundations of Renaissance Humanism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1977) 118. 




own conduct with the forces of “nature” (34). He claims never to have made arbitrary decisions but 
to have followed the often contradictory calls of the “kind embracements of my spouse” (43), the 
death of his “factor” (41) in business, and the “pleasing punishment” (46) of pregnancy that befell 
his wife. His act of adding to the perceptual enigma of having indistinguishable twins by buying 
another pair of the same age was also dictated partly by circumstance and partly by his fatherly 
care: the parents of the latter “were exceeding poor,” but they could “attend my sons” (56f). His 
wife then egged him on to embark on the portentous journey from Epidamnum home to Syracuse, 
and the rest was the making of “Fortune” (105) in the form of the “wind-obeying deep” (63), the 
“stream” (86) of the Mediterranean, and of “a mighty rock” (101). 
Egeon has lived his life in the shadow of death, beckoning and luring him with the “comfort” 
(1.1.26) of a relief from “woes” (2) and “griefs” (32). He “would gladly have embraced” an 
“immediate death” (69, 68) twenty-five years ago in shipwreck, if it hadn’t been for “the incessant 
weepings of my wife” and the “piteous plainings of the pretty babes” (70, 72). Onboard the sinking 
ship, with “not […] much hope” (65) left for survival, he let the sailors, whose duty it should have 
been to protect the passengers, take the only lifeboat and desert the family (76f). Still, the 
“merciless” (99) gods did not grant him the longed-for end, adding more “misfortunes” and 
“mishaps” about which to tell more “sad stories” (119f) now and thus to further prolong his life. 
The rest of Egeon’s story offers a subtle but significant change in his attitude toward life and 
in his sense of responsibility. While he first blamed the loss of the son he raised,26 together with 
that of his slave, on the will of that son, to which he merely acquiesced, he unexpectedly emerges in 
his own narrative as an agent. This son, he begins, “importuned me” (1.1.126) that he might set sail 
with his slave in quest of his twin brother. But then, in contrast to the passive voice that dominates 
his narrative, Egeon puts himself in an active structure as the subject of independent emotion and 
                                                     
26 First he says he is “the other” than “the latter-born” (82, 78), i.e., his first-born, but then he calls him “My 
youngest boy” (124). 
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action. “I labored of a love to see” the absent son, he admits, and, for the sake of this longing, he 
adds, “I hazarded the loss of whom I loved” (130f). This is the first moment we experience the 
stirring of heartfelt emotion in Egeon toward members of his own family. In the vague hope of 
recovering one, he might have lost both of his sons. Suddenly, in the poignant risk of all or nothing, 
a personal attachment toward the two young men seems to have emerged, the distinction between 
whom he himself was previously intent on obscuring. A few lines above this, he reported the loss of 
their unique names, the only key to their identity (“the one so like the other / As could not be 
distinguished but by names,” 51f), in a half-suppressed remark, as if it was the matter of an 
accident: his remaining son’s case, he formulates in a conspicuous evasion, was like that of the 
remaining slave: “Reft of his brother, but retained his name” (128). Egeon here suppresses his own 
role in the act of depriving his son of his identity, and he tries to disguise his decision as a deed of 
Fortune.27 However, when not the elements, but he himself, became the cause of a hazard either to 
regain the missing members of his family or to lose the last remaining ones, he seems to have 
entered his own story for the first time. At this moment, he took the place of those forces he had 
himself experienced previously as being helplessly exposed to, and this changed his viewpoint. 
The result of this change is palpable not only in the appearance of the active voice with 
Egeon in the first person in his narrative but also in the action he initiated next in the life story he is 
relating to Solinus. He went to extreme lengths in an effort to reunite the family he had previously 
perceived as a force on the same level as natural disasters, and a constraint that kept him from his 
wished-for liberation in death. “Five summers have I spent,” he explains, “in farthest Greece, / 
Roaming clean through the bounds of Asia” (1.1.132f). In the course of the search, his wish to free 
himself, through dying, from the burden of having a family has transformed into the “happy” 
                                                     
27 Lennox remarks that Shakespeare does not assign a reason for the change of names, while in Plautus “the 
grandfather, on losing the eldest boy, transferred his name to the youngest, in order to preserve the 
remembrance of him, which very naturally accounts for two brothers having the same name” (284). 
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acceptance of a “timely death,” in case his journey had granted him the certainty that “they live” 
(138f). 
Egeon developed a narcissistic self-pity vis-à-vis the forces of nature and the responsibility 
his family imposed on him, and finally he has transferred its cause to the uncontrollable and absurd 
political constellation of the twin cities Syracuse and Ephesus. To the power of this construct he 
now offers a life that has ever missed its point in the empty hull of family relations and then sought 
for it in vain for years in a willingly undertaken and desperate voyage “Roaming” (133) across the 
Mediterranean.28 Solinus justifies the blame Egeon puts on his regime by exhibiting a split 
consciousness. While he is aware that his “honor” and “dignity” are bound up with “our laws,” “my 
crown,” “my oath,” and the unalterable finality of a “passèd sentence” (148, 143, 142f, 147), at the 
peril of what he calls a “great disparagement,” he withdraws the commitment of his “soul” from the 
unreasonable reason of state and places it with Egeon’s “favor” (148, 145, 149). To do so, however, 
he only needs to offer a day’s extension, the running time of the action, on an existing legal 
provision which ensures that human life is convertible into money: “Beg thou, or borrow, to make 
up the sum [of “a thousand marks[’]” ransom], / And live; if no, then thou art doomed to die” (153f, 
21). The first scene leaves the questions open of what value will finally redeem Egeon’s life and to 
what extent a recovery of lost identities can counter the techniques of the “avoidance of love” in 
alienation in the state and in Egeon’s family. 
While Egeon has entered the play in consciousness of his history and presented himself to 
Solinus with a full identity that includes his sin, his tellingly suppressed guilt, and his futile efforts of 
recovery, his sons’ identities seem curiously mutilated and inauthentic. In their lives, Egeon’s 
lighthearted and irresponsible experimentation with “hap” (38), his helpless drift along a naturally-
seeming current of events, and his late awakening from adventure turn into deliberate calculation, 
                                                     
28 The adventure at sea leading ultimately to an unexpected reunion is one of the “various similarities” Dolan 
mentions that connect the early The Comedy of Errors to the late romance Pericles (xxxiii). 
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cautious planning, and forced dissimulation. In the first scene, Egeon’s life confronts the relentless 
murderous power of the state and barely escapes destruction; the middle part of the play, however, 
shows two Antipholuses and two Dromios who are, willy-nilly, members of the state and have to 
speak and behave so that they don’t risk their position in it. Egeon’s perception of who he has 
become as a result of his lived experience determines his precarious situation in opposition to the 
state; the Antipholuses’ sensitive position in the state, in contrast, produces what they perceive to 
be their own identity. 
Egeon has overwritten his Syracusan son’s identity with a name that stands for another 
character living at a location unknown to them. Since his name, now lost, was his only 
distinguishing feature according to Egeon (1.1.52), the Syracusan son has no other way to assume a 
socially verifiable persona than by finding that location and filling in for the character whose name 
he bears. He only needs to have a liquid self that takes whatever shape he pours it in. This 
predicament binds him to his slave of a similarly damaged identity—whose “case was like, / Reft of 
his brother, but retained his name” (1.1.127f)—with an invisible tie of a potential solidarity: both 
the Syracusan son and his slave can establish themselves in the world only as substitutes. In their 
every gesture they point to somebody who they are not, but this depersonalizing dependence on a 
double does not establish a common foundation, a subculture of the nameless, so to speak, on which 
their actual identity could evolve. This is a play where hierarchical relationships bear more 
potential of meaningful human content than the solidarity between characters and political entities 
that are affixed by illusory threads to their counterparts in an imaginary mirror. 
Nonetheless, once they had left their home and Egeon behind, the Syracusan son and his 
slave embarked on a voyage with their compass oriented toward the magnetic field of their 
Ephesian counterparts, eventually to enter the city, which does not hold a promise of redemption 
from their shared conundrum but rather locks them in an elusive sense of inauthenticity in a social 
system they do not understand. How does this experience influence the brothers’ and their slaves’ 
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perception of who they are? To what extent are they able to find relief from the social pressure on 
their identities in solidarity across the hierarchical boundary between master and slave? Do 
marriage and sexuality provide an escape from their alienation? These are the questions this 
analysis of the perception of identity in The Comedy of Errors will attempt to answers. 
In an effort to elude the annihilating paternal control over who he is, the Syracusan son 
eagerly enters a larger community and embraces whatever identity it offers him. Dolan sums up the 
phenomenon in general terms: “the choice to submit to rather than indignantly resist counterfeits, 
games, and illusions usually distinguishes the survivors and winners from the losers in 
Shakespeare’s comic worlds.”29 However, the Syracusan son’s willingness to go “at all adventures” 
(2.2.215) does not result from a mere spirit of taking chances to prevail. Rather than to be a 
“winner” in the play, to be recognized at all in his dramatic world as a character, he must leave his 
father’s home and put on the mask “his” name has predetermined for him and fill in the empty 
space inside the “real” Antipholus, who, in turn, emerges as a puppet with no freedom to shape his 
role in the democratic mercantile world of Ephesus. The kind of personal history and a self, 
authentic in spite (or because?) of its internal contradictions, as we saw it in Egeon, hardly has a 
chance to evolve in the middle part of the play. 
 
3. Antipholus of Syracuse: Losing His Self 
While Egeon enters the stage as a speaking character, his Syracusan son appears first as a 
listener. The Merchant advises him to lie about his origin: “give out you are of Epidamnum” (1.2.1), 
he says, because as a Syracusan he is entering a forbidden territory in Ephesus. When he receives 
the money he deposited with the Merchant, Antipholus of Syracuse has had to resign silently his 
claim on the first eighteen years of his life. What remains is the past (at least) five years he spent 
                                                     
29 Dolan xxxvii. 
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sailing across the Mediterranean in search of the legitimate bearer of the name he is forced to 
usurp, while the man who christened him twice (or rather un-christened him the second time, 
when he divested him of his real name) was likewise “Roaming” (1.1.133), trying to catch up with 
him and with the first Antipholus. Apart from having cash to rent a room in the Centaur and to buy 
dinner, the nameless son is now homeless as well. 
The way the Syracusan formulates his plan to make acquaintance with Ephesus expresses 
his status in it: “I will go lose myself,” he says to the Merchant, “And wander up and down to view 
the city” (1.2.30f). Ephesus is a place where, he knows, he “cannot get” his “own content” (34, 33), 
but where he may lend himself as the “content” of another identity that might be well integrated 
into the commercial and legal systems of Ephesus but that may never become his own. Antipholus 
of Syracuse is remarkably conscious of his own malleability and openness to impressions when he 
compares his being in the world to that of 
a drop of water 
That in the ocean seeks another drop, 
Who falling there to find his fellow forth, 
Unseen, inquisitive, confounds himself. (35–38) 
He sums up his chances of finding his own identity through meeting those he, as an infant, lost at 
sea adding, “So I, to find a mother and a brother, / In quest of them, unhappy, lose myself” (39f). The 
Syracusan brother enters a world knowing that he will not be able to act out his own character in it. 
The first opportunity to impersonate the “real” Antipholus meets the Syracusan brother in 
the form of a pleasing invitation addressed to his stomach, but he responds to it by calling to 
account the Ephesian Dromio, who lures him with the prospect of a savory “dinner” (1.2.89), about 
the whereabouts of his cash. We would think that this Dromio sufficiently indicates to Antipholus of 
Syracuse that he serves a different master, not him, but somehow we still accept that the traveler 
fails to draw the obvious conclusion: he has finally arrived at his destination and, in the Ephesian 
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Dromio, found the lead that could guide him to the brother “After” whom he “became inquisitive” 
(1.1.126, 125) more than five years earlier. But is he prepared to encounter himself in the eyes of 
his other who has apparently established himself successfully in the world? His twin apparently has 
a “wife” (1.2.88), whom this Dromio respects as his “mistress” (46) and who expects her husband, 
when the “clock” strikes “twelve upon the bell” (45), at “home to dinner” (89) with a “capon” 
burning and a pig falling “from the spit” (44). This Dromio has named the address of the brother’s 
“house” as “the Phoenix” (75) that clearly does not sound like “the Centaur” (9), where the 
Syracusan sent his slave a short while ago and from where, as he himself admits, his own Dromio is 
unlikely to have “returned so soon” (42). Is Antipholus of Syracuse ready to follow Dromio of 
Ephesus to the Phoenix and wait for his brother’s arrival there? How would he introduce himself to 
his Ephesian borther? What name would he say? How is he going to explain who he is without 
disparaging their father, who un-“distinguished” (1.1.52) him? How will he compare to his brother, 
whom their father “labored of a love to see” (130) and whose value he acknowledged as superior to 
his own by hazarding “the loss” (131) of him whom he never had to miss?30 
To emulate his Ephesian counterpart, the Syracusan son decided to do deliberately that 
which elevated his brother in their father’s eyes by accident: to fall in the ocean “like a drop of 
water” and “lose” himself (1.2.35, 40). Thus, his desire to find “a mother and a brother” (39) might 
be only an excuse to act out a covert wish and to be “carried” away from his father “before the 
wind” (1.1.109), sail eastward, as it happened to them almost eighteen years ago, and, perhaps, to 
show Egeon the way to follow him and eventually find them all in “Corinth, as we thought” (111), or 
somewhere in that direction, wherever they might have landed. If he can catch up with his brother 
before Egeon arrives there, the Syracusan brother might entice his father to act out a romance 
                                                     
30 In Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, Bassanio convinces Antonio to lend him more money to recover 
the amount he previously borrowed from Antonio and squandered. When I was a schoolboy, he explains, and 
lost an arrow, I shot another one after it, and by hazarding both I often found them. Shakespeare, The 
Merchant of Venice, The Norton Shakespeare. Based on the Oxford Edition, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New 
York, London: W W Norton, 1997) 1090–1144. 1.1.140–4. 
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version of Luke’s Prodigal Son story with a special twist that could restore the Syracusan son to the 
status he used to have in the family when his mother and brother were still with them. While the 
prodigal son has become “dead”31 to his father, Egeon has been “sever’d from [his] bliss” (1.1.118) 
when he lost Antipholus. However, like the prodigal son, with a little help, Antipholus may also 
come “aliue againe”32 for his father. Only the father has to find the son, not the way it happens in 
Luke. If he can make this happen, the Syracusan son will do better than the elder brother of the 
prodigal son who is “euer with” his father33 and is thus never seen, never praised. Instead, he will 
lead the way to the reunion, and his father might eventually recognize him as the cause behind the 
joyful outcome, hiding in the shadow of Antipholus, as his father seems to have wished, but holding 
such a place, Antipholus’ place in Ephesus, as is worthy of a man who can animate a social persona. 
Thus, the Syracusan son would give his father reason to “make mery, & be glad” (15:31) for his own 
sake, not only for that of the brother who left him, and thus he would have his father rewrite the 
Biblical parable and authorize a version he has invented and made happen. 
The success of the Syracusan son’s plan depends, on the one hand, on awakening the 
fatherly instinct in Egeon and having him act upon it; on the other hand, even the most benign 
intention of guiding other characters and connecting them through their hidden desire and their 
love cannot become operative in the rigid political conditions of Ephesus without being anchored in 
an explicit social function, and embedded in the commercial or legal system of exchanges. Not 
known to his son, the old man has now testified as to his commitment to the family in undertaking a 
five-year-long voyage as a penance and leaving not even Ephesus, the forbidden city, “unsought” 
(1.1.135), as we learned from his remorseful confession to Solinus, thus risking his life. What 
remains for the Syracusan son to do, as a result, is to act as the conscience, the human core, the 
                                                     
31 William Whittingham, The Bible and Holy Scriptures Conteyned in the Olde and Newe Testament (Geneva: 
Rouland Hall, 1560) Luke 15:31. Early English Books Online. June 19 2014. 
32 Luke 15:31. 
33 Luke 15:31. 
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feeling self behind the public persona of the Antipholus who bears the name, the fixed position in 
the mercantile world, and who has credit for financial and legal transactions, that is, everything the 
Syracusan does not. If they met in person, everything that would distinguish between them as 
mirror images of each other would detract from the Syracusan’s value in the eyes of the world. 
Therefore, he must remain unseen until Egeon arrives, he who took away his persona and is 
therefore the only character who can give it back to him. 
If the Syracusan son can hide behind Antipholus’ public image, they could complement each 
other and together form a whole that might even please their father who condemned the boy 
growing up beside him to be socially invisible. Moreover, this manner of a union between the twins 
would even surpass Egeon’s expectations, transcend his simplistic attempt to do away with the 
confusion by actually augmenting it, and prove the worth of a son who makes a virtue of necessity 
and remains in the background. Such a possibility might prevent the Syracusan from an 
understanding of what should be obvious. Is he capable of realizing such a dream? Or will he 
disappear behind his brother’s public image without earning credit for his merit in reuniting the 
family? What will happen to this unique human identity in the reunion? 
Instead of acknowledging that the Ephesian Dromio is not his slave, he hangs on to a detail 
that connects him, by association, to the impersonal circulation of money and its power to redeem 
life in Ephesus. He demands of the Ephesian Dromio the gold he gave his slave with a remarkable 
persistence: he asks for it six times (1.2.54, 59, 70, 73, 78, 81) and deals him some blows for 
emphasis, although he called his own slave a “trusty villain” (19) earlier in the same scene. The 
value of the money in question, a “thousand marks” (81), equals that of the ransom for a merchant’s 
life in Ephesus (1.1.21). This is the first sign to indicate that the Syracusan traveler is gradually and 
almost imperceptibly becoming entangled in the mercantile system of exchange in Ephesus that 
converts even life into cash. 
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To avoid recognizing a detail below the visible surface of appearances, the traveler extends 
the mystery to the whole city and discredits everything in it that is not immediately seen with the 
naked eye. In a “town […] full of cozenage” (1.2.97) even the slave he grew up with may have “o’er-
raught of all my money” (96), he speculates and removes the epithet “trusty” to call him a mere 
“villain” (1.2.96). Antipholus of Syracuse seems to be changing sides: now he worries only about the 
verifiable presence of his money like a merchant and suspects harmful magic behind the visible 
surface everywhere: he imagines Ephesus to be full of 
…nimble jugglers that deceive the eye, 
Dark-working sorcerers that change the mind, 
Soul-killing witches that deform the body, 
Disguisèd cheaters, prating mountebanks, 
And many suchlike liberties of sin (1.2.98–102). 
The unfounded idea of a network of conspiracy diverts attention in a paranoid explanation from a 
single fact that must not yet count as valid. Considering the assumption that he is now in a world of 
altered physical conditions that might have already affected his “mind” and “body,” the Syracusan 
needs to find an excuse to stay: and that is to make sure his money is “safe” (105). The non-existent 
magic protects him from believing his brother is near; and securing the cash, a truly Ephesian, 
mercantile concern, provides the excuse to endure and withstand the magic and to stay where his 
brother is likely to live. 
Although he suspects he must have beaten another Dromio at the mart in Ephesus, the 
Syracusan son carries on with his compulsive effort to unify the images of the two slaves in his 
perception. He did not even check the Phoenix, where that Dromio said he lived, so that he can 
maintain his belief that the two slaves are actually one. He found his gold “laid up / Safe at the 
Centaur,” and through his own “computation” and his “host’s report” he now realizes that “I could 
not speak with Dromio since at first / I sent him from the mart” (2.2.1f, 4–6). So, he must have 
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spoken to somebody else. And yet, when his own Dromio confirms this (15f), he beats him for it 
“again.” Upon the slave’s question “what bargain” (25) lies behind the beating, the Syracusan 
explains to him the difference between the time when he uses him “for my fool” and chats with him 
“familiarly,” on the one hand, and his more “serious hours” (27, 26, 29), on the other. His slave 
should follow the changes in the expression of his master’s face like “gnats” do follow the sun: 
“make sport” when it shines, but “creep in crannies when he hides his beams” (30f). The theory of 
eyebeams34 validates the master’s claim on the power of his eyes, not only to sense, but to control 
the reality they perceive.35 
The Syracusan Antipholus here demands not merely that Dromio reflects back to him his 
own mood, as Ferdinand does of courtiers in John Webster’s The Duchess of Malfi when he tells 
them to “be my touchwood: take fire when I give fire, that is, laugh when I laugh.”36 By trying to fix 
Dromio, he strives to make one out of the two of them, in a way similar to his father’s attempt to 
have both sets of twins merge into one master and one slave by manipulating their names and thus 
making a distinction in each pair “literally unthinkable.” Not only “thought is dependent on 
words,”37 as George Orwell argues in the “Appendix” to his Nineteen Eighty-Four, but perception is, 
as well. Not having a name to distinguish himself from his brother, the Syracusan cannot imagine 
his identity to be independent of that of his brother.38 Moreover, he compulsively forces the 
                                                     
34 According to “emission (or extramission) theories, […] light originated in the eye and was projected from it. 
[…] Empedocles […] believed that the eye consisted of an internal fire sending out light like a lantern.” St. 
Augustine added theological depth to the emission theory by arguing that “spiritual light was the internal 
illuminant of ideal forms, and physical light was […] analogous to this.” Nicholas J. Wade, Perception and 
Illusion: Historical Perspectives, Library of the History of Psychological Theories Ser. (New York: Springer 
Science, 2005) 51f, 57. 
35 Prince Harry hopes to command the eyes of his future subjects on a similar principle, by trying to “imitate 
the sun” in Shakespeare’s 1 Henry IV. The Norton Shakespeare. Based on the Oxford Edition, ed. Stephen 
Greenblatt et al. (New York, London: W W Norton, 1997) 1157–1222. 1.2.175. 
36 John Webster, The Duchess of Malfi, English Renaissance Drama: A Norton Anthology, ed. David Bevington et 
al. (New York, London: W. W. Norton, 2002) 1755–1830. 1.1.125f. 
37 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, Everyman’s Library Ser. 134 (1949; New York, Toronto: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1992) 312. 
38 In his discussion of how a writer’s awareness of himself within the universe rose during the late eleventh 
and early twelfth centuries, Colin Morris emphasizes the importance of a “skilful Latinity” saying that what 
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appearance of his slave to follow his perception of him, so that he can control him and carry out the 
merger of the two Dromios, as well, in his thinking, to obey his father. In order to carry out what he 
believes must have been his father’s wish, he has to maintain the identity of names and make, at the 
same time, any difference imperceptible. 
The Syracusan’s restrictive perception imposes a paralysis on Dromio and reduces him to a 
suffering body. However, all this originates in the namelessness of the merchant son and seems to 
fit its context in the mercantile economy of Ephesus. Thus, language controls perception, and both 
put a limit on action with the help of some added violence to ensure their effect. Robin Allott’s 
argument corroborates this hierarchy: according to him, language structures perception which, in 
turn, coordinates bodily action.39 The Comedy of Errors presents this hierarchy in its limiting effect 
as the Syracusan is shaping his identity, and that of Dromio, to satisfy the requirement of singularity 
he expects the social organization in Ephesus to impose on him. 
Adriana’s complaint to the Syracusan that her husband refused to comply with her 
invitation for dinner, the Syracusan realizes, squares with the dialogue he had with the Ephesian 
Dromio. “Villain, thou liest,” he accuses now (the wrong) Dromio, “for even her very words / Didst 
thou deliver to me on the mart” (2.2.162f). Moreover, Adriana calls him and his slave by “names” 
which they share with the rightful bearers of those names. The explanation for all this, however, 
must not be that another master and his slave, Antipholus and Dromio, in search of whom the 
Syracusans arrived just “two hours” (2.2.147) ago, are in fact in Ephesus. By accepting that this 
might be the case and attempting to verify it, the Syracusan might put his father in an untenable 
                                                                                                                                                                           
“cannot be verbalized can scarcely be thought.” The Discovery of the Individual 1050–1200, Church History 
Outlines Ser. (London: SPCK, 1972) 7f. 
39 According to Robin Allott, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Edward Sapir, and Benjamin Lee Whorf developed a 
theory saying that “the world we see is systematically distorted by the language we speak.” According to 
Hans-Lukas Teuber, Allott continues, “Language imposes order on events by permitting their classification.” 
Allott argues that in its internal structuring language follows patterns of perception and both of them derive 
their working mechanisms “from the physiological and neurological structures for the co-ordination of bodily 
action.” In their hierarchy, however, the more derivative system of language controls perception which, in 
turn, directs motion. The Natural Origin of Language: The Structural Inter-relation of Language, Visual 
Perception and Action (Knebworth, Hertfordshire: Able, 2001) 25, 27, 29. 
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position. If he made it explicit that he has actually found both the lost son and his slave, he would 
inevitably form the basis for a question about his own identity. In doing so, the Syracusan would 
undermine the false reality Egeon fed him for almost eighteen years. The reunion the traveler son is 
trying to effectuate would provide embarrassing evidence for Egeon’s unfair treatment of him. 
However, until he brings the difference between himself and his brother as a fact to light, he 
remains “estrangèd from thyself” (2.2.119), as Adriana says about her husband, not knowing how 
right she is, at the same time, in addressing this to her Syracusan brother-in-law. To lose his way in 
the labyrinth of social relations, a character has to forget first how to observe a sense of depth in his 
own personality and conceive of himself, instead, as one among other solid pieces on a board. To 
see himself as such a piece, a marble among other similar ones, in turn, he has to acknowledge the 
control of a higher, omnispective eye over himself and submit to its point of view. However she 
misidentifies him, Adriana recognizes with a clairvoyant’s perspicuity the Syracusan’s almost 
religious belief in authority and reminds him of the importance of a horizontal relationship of 
solidarity in love that might protect him against subjecting himself to a belief in such a power and 
against subjugating those for whom he is responsible to his own tyrannical rule. 
The Syracusan seems to conclude that complying with the dictates of appearances and 
giving in to the power of Adriana’s presence might save him the trouble of going against the 
training he has received at home and the conscience he has developed as a result. “To me she 
speaks” (2.2.180), he decides, and enters the virtual reality he revolted against five years ago when 
he left his father’s house: he is again Antipholus, and now he will be able to live the life of a hero of 
that name. Her “theme” (180) now seems a “dream” (181) he might have had before, but he 
knowingly follows the “error” of “eyes and ears” (183) to “entertain the offered fallacy” (185). To 
make it easier for himself to accept the lie, he blames it on external forces of a pagan world he must 
not resist: “This is the fairyland,” he says to his Dromio. “We talk with goblins, owls, and sprites! / If 
we obey them not, […] / They’ll suck our breath, or pinch us black and blue” (188–191). What is, in 
81 
 
fact, a conscious act of falling back on a pattern he grew up with, the Syracusan characterizes as an 
unanticipated transformation “in mind” (194f). 
In Allott’s and Orwell’s terms, language controls thought, perception, and bodily action; 
therefore, to eliminate a vital distinction of identity between two persons at the top, in their proper 
names as signifiers, results in severe restrictions on the lower levels as well. It seems, we cannot 
think, perceive, or act out what we cannot say. The Syracusan cannot be who he is as long as his 
name is Antipholus; therefore, he has to act the way he thinks Antipholus would. In this sense, he is 
different and creative, because, while Antipholus is Antipholus, the Syracusan acts like he is. This, 
however, does not mean he does so out of his own free choice. While Stanley Cavell argues that 
meaning something is conditioned by the system of language as much as by the speaker’s 
intention;40 here it seems appropriate to assert that the Syracusan cannot even perceive the world 
and cannot act in it the way he would as himself, whoever that self is, but he has to do so in 
compliance with what the situation communicates to him as the proper way to perceive it and act in 
it. Instead of examining with Cavell how language conditions “what we should mean in (by) saying” 
something (8), we should look into the question of whether the Syracusan is capable of thinking, 
perceiving, or acting with any degree of freedom as long as he inhabits the shell41 called Antipholus. 
He cannot mean something and say it; rather, he has to say what he believes is expected of him and 
try to mean it. This is what he is probably getting at when he says, “I’ll say as they say, and persever 
so, / And in this mist at all adventures go” (2.2.214f). 
 
                                                     
40 Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1969/2002) 39f. 
41 Sir Would-be Politic dons a tortoise shell to disguise himself in Ben Jonson’s Volpone, but as soon as he tries 
to creep like a tortoise, the merchants discover him. English Renaissance Drama: A Norton Anthology, ed. 
David Bevington et al. (New York, London: W W Norton, 2002) 679–771. 5.4.54–74. 
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4. Dromio of Syracuse 
Under the effect of Antipholus of Syracuse’s effort to eliminate the doubleness of the twin 
slaves, the challenge they represent to his perception, and the tension they create, by extension, in 
their names, Dromio of Syracuse senses the loss of his own humanity and his reduction to an 
inferior being. His master demands that he “fashion your demeanor to my looks” and threatens to 
“beat” in his “sconce” the “method” of appearing the way he wants to see him (2.2.33f). The word 
itself conveys a powerful presupposition Dromio is bold enough to question. “Sconce, call you it?,” 
he asks and attempts to represent his dignity in words to forestall further degradation: “So you 
would leave battering, I had rather have it a head” (35f). However, next, Dromio restricts himself to 
recording the process of being objectified: “An you use these blows long, I must get a sconce for my 
head and ensconce it too” (36–38). 
The only powerful way to defy being degraded is to assert one’s superiority in asking the 
embarrassing question for a reason. In his response to Dromio’s question, the violent master 
inadvertently admits the inferiority of the effort to do away with difference, with the variety in an 
independent existence, and with individual “wit” (2.2.38), for the sake of an easy controllability. “I 
pray you, sir, why am I beaten?” (39), Dromio ventures. The all-too obedient and rigorous 
Syracusan makes sure Dromio has to ask again before he agrees to answer, so that two questions 
arise, a “why” and a “wherefore,” opening up more eagerly for closure. And the master alleges that 
the provocation itself is the cause: “Why, first,” he says, “– for flouting me; and then, wherefore – for 
urging it the second time to me” (45f). That is, the persistent questioning seems to provoke the 
beating. Stephen Spielberg echoes the dialogue four-hundred years later in Helen Hirsch’s 
complaint to Oskar Schindler about the way Herr Kommandant Amon Goeth humiliated her: “I said 
to him,” she says, “‘Why are you beating me?’ He said, ‘The reason I beat you now is because you ask 
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why I beat you.’”42 In The Comedy of Errors, as in Schindler’s List, the assailant suffers from a severe 
restriction that does not allow him to accept the identity of his victim that, in many respects, 
resembles his but is still different. Moreover, in both the play and the movie, language and 
designation dominate perception.43 Dromio of Syracuse rises to the level of rhetoric and questions 
the ideology behind the treatment he receives in a lucid discourse. The Syracusan master cannot 
argue with him, but if he allowed his slave to negotiate the question of identity in such terms, it 
could soon force him to formulate his own status in the linguistic order and ask subversive 
questions about paternal authority. 
However, Dromio keeps asserting his independent “wit” (2.2.38) in language. First, he sums 
up the worthlessness of his master’s explanation asking, “Was there ever any man thus beaten out 
of season, / When in the why and the wherefore is neither rhyme nor reason?” (47f). Indeed, the 
clandestine paradox in the treatment that deprives the slave of a self is an enemy of clear 
formulations: he is told that his subsistence depends on his success in pleasing his master, but he is 
constantly reminded of his failure to do so. The defiant Dromio still flaunts his wit, producing, to 
borrow Charles Baudelaire’s words, “a few beautiful verses to prove” he is “not the lowest of men, 
[…] not inferior” to his master, whom he would have reason now to “despise.”44 Then, he produces 
evidence for his intellectual superiority in an almost sixty-line long repartee where he is 
continuously ahead of his master in wit. 
 
                                                     
42 Stephen Spielberg, Schindler’s List 1993 Universal Pictures. 
43 In the movie, Amon Goeth, wandering around Helen Hirsch, who is frozen by fear, questions his own 
perception of who she is and wrestles with the power of designations: “You know, maybe what’s wrong isn’t – 
it’s not us – it’s this. I mean, when they compare you to vermin and to rodents and to lice, I just, uh … you 
make a good point, a very good point. [He strokes her hair] Is this the face of a rat? Are these the eyes of a rat? 
‘Hath not a Jew eyes?’ I feel for you, Helen. [He decides not to kiss her] No, I don’t think so. You’re a Jewish 
bitch. You nearly talked me into it, didn’t you? [He beats her] 




While Luciana blames Antipholus of Ephesus’ absence from dinner on his obligations “out o’ 
door” (2.1.11) in the business world of Ephesus and his failing sense of time (8), or kairos,45 
Adriana identifies the effect of the lack of Antipholus’ kind look on her own face with the passage of 
time, chronos, in bringing about the loss of her physical attractiveness. “I at home starve for a merry 
look,” she complains. If “homely age” has “th’ alluring beauty took / From my poor cheek,” she 
concludes, “Then he hath wasted it” (88–90). She misses a “touch” (111) that, she says, keeps even 
gold shiny and brilliant. Such care would preserve the “biding” (110) intrinsic value of precious 
metal and protect her against the effect of “falsehood and corruption” in any man “that hath a 
name” (113, 112). In these words Adriana locates herself outside the traffic of exchangeable values, 
the trade her husband pursues, which is likely to make him elude personal attachment and judge 
even human beings based on their surface appearance. “I know his eye doth homage otherwhere” 
(104), she says, taking it for granted that, although Antipholus of Ephesus might identify her 
correctly, he misrecognizes her. 
In the next scene, Adriana misidentifies the Syracusan as his Ephesian twin and, as an ironic 
consequence, she addresses her words against her husband to him: her Antipholus, she complains, 
fails to acknowledge her intrinsic value. That value, she argues, consists in the very fluidity of her 
self that has been blended in marriage with the liquid self of her husband. It may be easy to “fall / A 
drop of water in the breaking gulf,” she illustrates the idea in a simile, but no one can “take 
unmingled thence that drop again / Without addition or diminishing” (2.2.124–27). Nonetheless, 
through his alleged unfaithfulness, their fused selves are now commingled with other selves: “if we 
two be one, and thou play false, / I do digest the poison of thy flesh, / Being strumpeted by thy 
contagion” (141–43). The ensuing sexual contamination tarnishes her identity that only an 
                                                     
45 “right timing and due measure.” James L. Kinneavy and Catherine R. Eskin, “Kairos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” 
Written Communication 17.3 (July 2000): 432–44. 432. Sage Journals. 25 Aug. 2014. 
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untainted marital union could safely preserve. Malleability is the essence of her female self, which 
relies not merely on the support of a solid male presence as its mainstay, as she argues, identifying 
herself in a metaphor with “a vine” that “communicate[s]” with the “strength” of “an elm” in her 
husband. Her female self also depends on the content of her husband’s persona for nourishment, as 
she indicates with her reference to the “sap” of the tree which is now “infect[ed]” due to the tree’s 
“confusion” with parasitic “ivy, brier, or idle moss” “Usurping” it (173, 175, 179, 177). 
The way vital fluids work in these figures of speech reminds the reader of the confluence of 
blood in John Donne’s “The Flea” as the means of a communion between the speaking persona and 
his love who are “more than married”46 as a result. In a less material sense, two “souls”47 meet 
between the bodies of the lovers in Donne’s “The Ecstasy,” so that “Love […] doth mix” them and 
“makes both one” (l. 35f) to form “a new concoction” (l. 27) in the “alchemical sense of sublimation 
or purification” (l. 27, n5). However, Adriana’s figures add a strong sense of vulnerability to the 
image of intermingling liquids that, without a firm embedment of the formal marital union in the 
network of other social institutions, might easily lose its unique formula. The perfect union in 
marriage, it seems, requires not only the blending of selves but also tight boundaries that the 
husband has to provide around it, around the “true bed” (144), so to speak, to protect it in the male-
dominated mercantile and legal systems against the kind of exchange and circulation that deprive 
units of currency of their intrinsic, personal value. 
Adriana believes that this value can be recovered in an encounter of selves when she 
invites, by mistake, the Syracusan, saying, “Husband, I’ll dine above with you today, / And shrive 
you of a thousand idle pranks” (2.2.206f). In the ensuing transfusion of selves, Adriana might hope 
to restore a unity of husband and wife with a bias: as a reenactment of an ideal and idealized 
symbiosis of mother and child. She nostalgically reminisces about a time when, she argues, her 
                                                     
46 John Donne, “The Flea,” Collected Poetry, ed. Ilona Bell (London: Penguin, 2012) 29f. l. 11. 
47 Donne, “The Ecstasy,” Collected Poetry 38–40. l. 15 
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husband still needed her, like infants need their mother: as “an information filter between the 
world and the child.”48 In this, childless Adriana seems to imagine a phase of development in which 
the baby “comes to know the world” through the mother who acts as “the prime source for 
stimulating a baby’s senses” (3f). At that time, she appears to recall, Antipholus vowed, “unurged,” 
that he was not able to perceive audible “words,” visible or tangible “objects,” nor could feel the 
taste of “meat,” “Unless I spake, or looked, or touched, or carved to thee” (112–14, 116f). In such an 
imaginary state of dependence, Adriana, the only voice that “spake,” eyes that “looked,” skin that 
“touched,” and the nourishing caregiver who “carved” (117) for him, would not mediate between 
Antipholus and the mercantile or legal systems of Ephesus, but would rather isolate him from its 
social world and prolonge his vital connection to her body. Adriana seems to wish to reverse the 
actual state of affairs that shows her to depend on Antipholus as a node of connection that lends her 
a fixed place in the male social network and provides her with a livelihood. 
 
6. Antipholus of Ephesus 
The Ephesian mercantile world that gives a framework to Antipholus of Syracuse’s identity 
organizes itself around individual material interest. His guide in Ephesus, a Merchant, turns down 
the Syracusan’s invitation for a casual walk “about the town” and dinner, because of his “present 
business” with “certain merchants, / Of whom,” he says, “I hope to make much benefit” (1.2.29, 24f). 
Another merchant, Balthasar, warns Antipholus of Ephesus not to risk his “yet ungallèd estimation” 
by breaking into his own house while his wife might be entertaining a substitute there. “A vulgar 
comment will be made of it,” he cautions 
That may with foul intrusion enter in 
And dwell upon your grave when you are dead; 
For slander lives upon succession, 
                                                     
48 Joan Steen Wilentz, The Senses of Man (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968) 5. 
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Forever housed where it gets possession. 
 (3.1.102, 100, 103–106) 
Balthasar describes the feared deterioration of Antipholus’ good name in terms of the 
decomposition of his dead body. In his words, a “vulgar comment” appears as the first worm that 
enters his grave and that there “lives upon succession,” that is, multiplies. By implication, 
preserving his reputation untouched might protect his body intact. The medieval notion of the 
“immortality or sempiternity49 of public bodies” underlies Shakespeare’s image. According to 
Walter Ullmann, this idea was based on the assumption that the law was the soul of a public body: 
“[b]ecause the soul was said to be immortal, public bodies, which were what they were through the 
law, could also not die and were credited, therefore, with sempiternity.” His “yet ungallèd 
estimation” connects the Ephesian brother to “the idea of right order, which holds the public and 
corporate body together”50 through which he, too, can possess sempiternity. 
Antipholus understands and shares the concern for his reputation and knows how to 
maintain a “merry” (3.1.108) mood by not interfering with events that might evolve into a scandal. 
He counters his own substitution in marriage by substituting “a wench of excellent discourse, / 
Pretty and witty, wild and yet, too, gentle” (109f) for his wife and dines, instead, with her. The chain 
he promised to his wife (2.1.106), he now decides, will be delivered not to the Phoenix but to the 
Porpentine and will end up on the Courtesan’s neck instead of his wife’s. “Since mine own doors 
refuse to entertain me,” Antipholus justifies the change, “I’ll knock elsewhere” (3.1.120f). 
Apparently, he has a different ideal of a relationship than the irreversible merger of two selves, 
which makes them unique in each other’s experience, as his wife imagines it. The Ephesian “man 
                                                     
49 “Duration without end; perpetuity.” “Sempiternity,” Oxford English Dictionary, ed. Judy Pearsall (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014) 17 Aug. 2014. 




about town,” Altman concludes, “sees a wife merely as a mindless instrument of his own comfort.”51 
In his perception, the unique identity of his companion is less decisive than the “entertain[ment]” 
she as a “hostess” (3.2.120, 119) can provide. 
The last scene of Act two and the first of Act three oppose Adriana’s attempt to (re)establish 
a personal attachment in the intimacy of an upstairs bedroom of the Phoenix to the “idle pranks” 
(2.2.207) of exchangeable faces and names (3.1.47) of men in a farcical matrix of identities in front 
of the house in the street. While Antipholus replaces his wife as if she were a piece on a board, a 
marble among other marbles, a link in a chain of identical links, Adriana has withdrawn “above” 
(2.2.206) with the wrong brother to restore the personal bond she has lost. Still, besides the irony, 
Adriana’s “error” raises hope in the reader or the audience that the Syracusan is a better candidate 
for such an encounter of authentic characters than his Ephesian brother and that Adriana has thus 
inadvertently made an exchange worth her while. Can the Syracusan fill the emptiness we sense 
behind Antipholus’ carefully polished public persona and make up for what Adriana has lost in her 
marriage? Can he even surprise his father with a reward for his penitential pilgrimage in quest of 
his kin, some of which he lost in shipwreck and some through his callous suppression of their 
identity? This is certainly a lot to expect from a cautiously rebellious son who is torn between his 
obedience and his sense of dignity. Such an expectation puts the burden of responsibility on his 
shoulders for the well-being of an entire family, stricken by natural disaster and paternal 
inadequacy. Nonetheless, we experience the simultaneity of contrasting perspectives on identity 
inside and out of the Phoenix still with a lingering hope that the Syracusan son and Egeon had both 
set sail at least five years before the action began in pursuit of the same mission: to reunite a family 
as a framework that acknowledges and restores human integrity. 
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7. Antipholus of Syracuse: Finding Himself 
The kaleidoscope of “errors” takes another turn, and the Syracusan meets his chance to put 
down roots in a world away from home, to establish himself outside the family, and to assume 
responsibility for his own life as a family man, instead of being weighed down by decisions made by 
his father, who is himself hesitant to face up to their consequences. This is the Syracusan’s 
opportunity to end his life as a substitute and begin one as himself. His words sound genuine, and 
they suggest that he is aware of the unique importance of the kairos and the world that is about to 
open up for him at this moment. He calls Adriana’s sister, Luciana, his “sweet love” (3.2.58), and 
explains to her face to face that by this he refers to “thyself” who, at this moment, emerges as 
mine own self’s better part; 
Mine eye’s clear eye, my dear heart’s dearer heart; 
My food, my fortune, and my sweet hope’s aim; 
My sole earth’s heaven, and my heaven’s claim. (61–64) 
A confluence of selves might as well take place. The Syracusan’s images resemble those Adriana 
used in describing to him her own aspiration to be “better than thy dear self’s better part” (2.2.122), 
thinking she was talking to her husband. She wished she would have his “sweet aspects” (110), that 
is, a “sunny look” (2.1.99) she was “starv[ing] for” (88), and that he would accept her as his only 
source of nourishment (2.2.116f). It seems the man she was actually talking to is responding to 
those wishes now as if they originated in Luciana, the desirous wife’s sister. However, in The 
Comedy of Errors longing circulates in a virtually endless pattern of misplaced reactions: the 
Syracusan sounds here as if he was responding to Adriana’s earlier invitation, which thwarts 
expectations of mutuality. 
Nevertheless, the Syracusan’s character shows through the extrinsic matrix of mistaken 
identities. He expects Luciana as a goddess to determine who he should become and thus to release 
him from his damaged sense of identity. Still, he seems to accept “Antipholus,” the name she calls 
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him (3.2.30) and wishes to submit himself to her in a status little better than that of a child, in a way 
similar to how Adriana wanted her husband to do. However, while Adriana attempted to dominate 
her husband through his senses, that is, his audition, vision, tactition, and gustation (2.2.112–17), 
the Syracusan wishes to submit to Luciana on the level of discourse. “Teach me, dear creature, how 
to think and speak,” he urges and wants her to initiate him into an understanding of her language, 
as if it was a kind of cypher: 
Lay open to my earthy-gross conceit, 
Smothered in errors, feeble, shallow, weak, 
The folded meaning of your words’ deceit. (3.2.33–36) 
The Syracusan succumbs to the power of Luciana’s words that for him hold the promise of a divine 
revelation. In this “real plea for enlightenment,”52 he is eager to be accepted in a signifying order 
different from the one in which he grew up. “Are you a god?,” he asks full of hope, and begins to 
worship her as the custodian of an unknown system of meaning-making that would redefine his 
being: “Would you create me new? / Transform me then, and to your power I’ll yield” (39f). In 
asserting that “to you do I decline,” the Syracusan discovers his emerging identity and experiences 
for the first time “that I am I” (44, 41). 
However, this “I” loses all character and melts into the female body as into a mold. After a 
brief acquaintance and her lecture to him about a “husband’s office” (3.2.2) to make his wife “but 
believe” that he loves her (21f), the Syracusan urges Luciana to “Spread o’er the silver waves thy 
golden hairs,” so that he can use them “as a bed […] and there lie” (48f). After a brief moment of 
unstable self-possession, the Syracusan seems to fall back on an almost suicidal urge of self-
annihilation in the gravitational field of his Luciana. He likes to think that he would gain by death, if 
drowning in “Love” was his “means to die” (52, 51). For Luciana, however, this is sheer madness 
(53); the Syracusan, she believes, is projecting these images onto the world without them being 
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there: “It is a fault,” she says, “that springeth from your eye” (55). While Luciana represents a 
hypocritical pragmatism in marriage, the Syracusan retreats into a formless subjectivism and 
dissolves uncritically in the object of his love. Rather than forging a meaningful bond, she and he 
represent the extreme opposites of an empty formalism, on the one hand, and an un-reflected state 
of overwhelming emotion, on the other, that do not complement each other. 
The fact that his image of Luciana remains so far from her perception of herself is crucial to 
the evolution of the Syracusan’s sense of identity. Due to the lack of a name of his own that would 
represent him to the outside world, he has not learned how to develop his persona as a container or 
façade to protect his “own content” (1.2.33), his core self, in his interaction with other characters or 
even with his inanimate environment. As a symptom of this deficiency in his identity, he said 
already at the moment of his arrival in Ephesus that he “will go lose himself” in his “view [of] the 
city” and disintegrate “Unseen,” “like a drop of water […] in the ocean,” due to what he calls his 
being “inquisitive” (30f, 38, 35f, 38). Now, in the scene of wooing and proposal, instead of 
introducing himself, which he by definition cannot do, this product of Syracusan upbringing simply 
says to Luciana that “I am thee” (3.2.66). Unlike Petruchio in The Taming of the Shrew,53 he supports 
his proposal by a declaration not of what he has but of what he does not: “Thou hast no husband 
yet, nor I no wife. / Give me thy hand” (68f). Luciana runs away from such a telling negativism. 
As a result of the shipwreck, the “Syracusa” (1.1.36) of the comedy, Egeon’s birth place and 
the home of his family, had become an exclusively male world where he lived with his son and his 
son’s Dromio. In his story of adventure, Egeon presented himself as a merchant struggling with the 
forces of nature and the not always benevolent pagan deities. “[M]y end / Was wrought by nature” 
(33), he emphasizes, and describes his awareness of imminent threats to his and his family’s 
                                                     
53 The Syracusan’s way to propose is indeed the very opposite of how Petruchio goes about it: “Petruchio is 
my name, Antonio’s son, / A man well known throughout all Italy,” he introduces himself to Baptista, 
Katherine’s father. “You knew my father well,” he moves on to the material details, “and in him me, / Left 
solely heir to all his lands and goods, / Which I have bettered rather than decreased. / Then tell me, if I get 
your daughter’s love, / What dowry shall I have with her to wife? (2.1.71f, 123–27). 
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fortunes in the way he perceived signs in the workings of the elements that indicate the will of 
pagan gods. He was sailing with his family across the Ionian Sea from Epidamnum toward Syracuse 
until, he says, “the always wind-obeying deep / Gave any tragic instances of our harm” (63f). And 
then, “the heavens did grant” them some “obscurèd light” which “convey[ed] unto our fearful minds 
/ A doubtful warrant of immediate death” (66–68). The fact that he reads natural phenomena as 
intimations of the gods’ will gives us the impression that Egeon is part of an ancient world view. 
Nature is here the changing face of the gods, and while he struggles to assert himself against it, 
Egeon ultimately resigns himself and his kin to being the playthings of gods. 
Although he grew up with his father, the Syracusan son does not experience nature and the 
gods as a unity, or even as allies in opposition to himself, as Egeon does. Divine power seems to 
have changed sides between the two generations, turning from the plural of pagan Rome into the 
singular in Christian monotheism, and now the Syracusan son does not have to fear or appease God 
anymore. However, nature remains an alien force to be tamed and is now lumped together with 
pagan and occult phenomena, and the power of women appears as one of these. When he demands 
the thousand marks he deposited with his slave, the amount that equals the value of a human life in 
Ephesus (1.1.21), the Syracusan emphasizes that God is on his side in a journey that involves actual 
sea voyage, his coming of age, that is, coming to terms with the past of his identity in kinship 
relations, on the one hand, and shaping his future identity in love, sexual attraction, and marriage, 
on the other, but which is also a financial enterprise. When he is asking for the money for the fifth 
time, he says to the Ephesian Dromio, “Now, as I am a Christian, answer me, / In what safe place you 
have bestowed my money; / Or I shall break that merry sconce of yours” (1.2.77–79). Below the 
shifting layers of his identity seems to run a constant current: the Syracusan is a Christian traveler 
with a clear sense of his financial interests and of his status as God’s harbinger in the world. 
In this respect, the Syracusan appears to be traveling in the opposite direction opposite 
than his father. Egeon is a merchant driven by guilt, which he is reluctant to admit, on a secret 
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mission to atone for his carelessness to his family and for having deprived his remaining kin of their 
names. The Syracusan son, however, seems to be running away from, rather than being driven by or 
identifying with, his father’s moral concerns. In constructing his identity, he relies on a sense of 
ideological superiority his father does not have. He seems to be on his way to free himself of his 
father’s scruples and to find a social pattern away from home which he can join for practical, rather 
than moral, considerations. While Egeon has personal experience and positive facts (even guilt is an 
inherent property of the self) to build his sense of identity, his falsely-named son seeks to define 
himself in negative terms, in opposition to roles and functions he tries out and then discards as not 
his own, and in opposition to other characters. 
This acquired lack of integrity becomes apparent in the different attitudes the Syracusan 
exhibits toward his slave and his love respectively. We saw that he beats his own slave (2.2.23 SD), 
but he also subjects a different master’s slave who happens to stray into his perceptual field to 
physical violence (1.2.92 SD), so that he can do away with the difference the Ephesian slave 
represents and that raises the intolerable possibility of multiple Dromios and Antipholuses. This 
pattern of the subjection of slave to master is the repetition of a similar one on a larger scale: the 
merchant who trades in a city other than his own will be executed, if not ransomed. As Duke Solinus 
explains, 
if any born at Ephesus 
Be seen at Syracusian marts and fairs; 
Again, if any Syracusian born 
Come to the bay of Ephesus, he dies, 
[…] 
Unless a thousand marks be levied (1.1.16–21). 
Shakespeare has arranged the two levels, that of a foreign merchant in Solinus’ Ephesus, and of a 
slave exposed to the power of the Syracusan master, so that the former includes the latter and 
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repeats the relationship between the elements. As a result, the two formations behave like self-
similar shapes that reappear on different levels of scale in fractal geometry.54 The relentless 
regularity of these structures in The Comedy of Errors emphasizes the mechanical aspect of a rigid 
social organization in Ephesus. 
Although the Syracusan son shows no awareness of the way the Ephesian society is 
structured, he enforces that structure by disciplining the Dromios and enacts one of its main 
organizing principles, the fear of pagan and occult forces, in his recurrent urge to run away from its 
women. The first time he hears the Ephesian Dromio talk about his mistress, who is allegedly 
waiting for the Syracusan with “dinner” (1.2.75) at “home” (48), he suspects the covert 
machinations of “Dark-working sorcerers that change the mind” and “Soul-killing witches that 
deform the body” (99f). When Adriana herself calls him “my husband” (2.2.118) and designates her 
body to be “consecrate to thee” (131), the Syracusan recognizes himself for the first time in 
alienation: he thinks he might be “Known unto” Adriana “and to myself disguised!” (3.1.213). Under 
Luciana’s spell, he calls himself “Not mad, but mated,” which might even mean the same as “mad:” 
“mated” is glossed as “amazed,” “confounded,” and “defeated” beside the more obvious sense of 
“married” (3.2.54 and n). Once Luciana refuses his selfless adoration and he meets his Dromio 
running, like “a man would run for life” (153), from Nell, the “kitchen wench” (95), who would be 
the slave’s “wife” (154), the Syracusan decides that Ephesus is inhabited by “witches.” He compares 
Luciana to a “mermaid” (155, 163) and says he wants to sail in “any bark,” “any way from shore” 
(149, 147). 
In the absence of positive values to support his sense of identity, the Syracusan shapes who 
he is characteristically in repeated acts of retreat. He associates women with pagan and occult 
forces and cannot treat them as his equals. While he initially obeys Adriana for fear of her 
                                                     
54 Benoit B. Mandelbrot calls fractals that exhibit self-similarity on different levels of scale “scaling fractals.” 
The Fractal Geometry of Nature (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1983) 18. 
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witchcraft (2.2.189–91), he later declares, “even my soul / Doth for a wife abhor” (3.2.157f) her. 
Then, he surrenders to Luciana’s power, only to flee her “mermaid’s song” (163) still in the same 
scene. As Constance Jordan points out, humanist treatises also depicted pagan women who 
achieved “worldly glory,” “not eternal glory” (244), in an ambiguous light: they “are always on the 
enemy side; the writer imagines them as it were at the borders of the culturally constituted 
community […], even as threatening the integrity of that community. But because they often 
brilliantly exemplify the nonbarbaric or civilized values of the writer’s own society […] they also 
invite sympathy.”55 We observe the same hesitation in the Syracusan’s attitude to his brother’s wife 
and to her sister. Adriana and Luciana seem to live in a pre-Christian Ephesus, but they represent 
the “civilized values” of marital chastity and polite tactfulness respectively. 
While Luciana takes the husband’s infidelity for granted and boldly prescribes the 
Syracusan the symptom, so to speak, of audacious denial to maintain a semblance of peace in 
marriage, Adriana inverts the power relations suggested in contemporary marital advice. She 
interprets the Biblical statement that husband and wife are one flesh56 in her own idiosyncratic 
way. Early modern tracts differ in their approaches to the literalness of the Biblical metaphor, but 
they generally represent “the husband as a kind of mother and the wife as a child.”57 Since the 
Genesis suggests that “Adam in effect gave birth to Eve,” metaphors often reflect “the husband’s 
fantasy of giving birth to the wife.” Examples of organic unity in “bondage rhetoric” express the 
wife’s inferiority to her husband: “she is joined to the husband’s midsection” or is “part or a limb of 
                                                     
55 Constance Jordan, “Feminism and the Humanists: The Case of Sir Thomas Elyot’s Defence of Good Women,” 
Rewriting the Renaissance: The Discourses of Sexual Difference in Early Modern Europe, eds. Margaret W. 
Ferguson et al. (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1986) 242–58. 256. 
56 William Whittingham, The Bible and Holy Scriptures Conteyned in the Olde and Newe Testament (Geneva: 
Rouland Hall, 1560) Genesis 2:24. Early English Books Online. 19 June 2014. 
57 Sid Ray, “‘Those Whom God Hath Joined Together.’ Bondage Metaphors and Marital Advice in Early Modern 
England,” Domestic Arrangements in Early Modern England, ed. Kari Boyd McBride (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 2002) 15–47. 29. Interestingly, an earlier tract, Heinrich Bullinger’s The Christen State of 
Matrimonye from 1546, allows for alternative interpretations, while William Gouge’s Of Domesticall Duties 
from 1622 “insists that there is a literalness to biblical metaphors of marital unity.” 
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her husband” (29). The kind of metaphors Ray identifies as “physiological” come exceedingly close 
to the way Adriana depicts her unity with her husband. Such figures “conjure an image of the 
married couple as a set of joined twins or as a monstrously deformed double body” (30). These 
apparently aim to inculcate the pain and virtual impossibility of separation in marriage. For 
example, Thomas Becon writes, “And lyke as the partes of a mans body when they are sundred one 
from another conceave an exceeding great anguish [and] doloures payne even so ought it to be an 
exceeding grefe for married folks to be separated.”58 These examples make it clear that when she 
depicts the ideal husband’s perception of the world as filtered through his wife’s senses, Adriana 
turns a well-known type of contemporary metaphor and imagery to her own advantage to brand an 
independent male identity as culturally illegitimate. 
This self-assertiveness, however, undermines the Syracusan’s confidence. Both Adriana and 
her sister resemble notable “pagan women celebrated in humanist defenses,” who, Jordan asserts, 
functioned collectively as the image of what might be possible if accepted 
social custom, shaped by Christianity and medieval scholasticism, were no 
longer to determine the nature and status of women in European society. 
They presented a fruitful enigma, a point of reference for the interesting 
doubts and difficult questions surrounding the accepted view of women as 
subordinate to men.59 
The Syracusan twice entertains the possibility of entering the unknown and choosing such a 
“culturally alien” (256), outspoken woman for his wife, and he shrinks from it in each case. His 
contradictory reactions are thus similar to the “overt disapproval marked with fear on one hand 
and occasional admiration on the other” that “great warrior maidens of Renaissance epic” (256f) 
are likely to provoke in the reader, as Jordan claims. 
                                                     
58 Thomas Becon’s trans. of Bullinger sig. A6v. Qtd. in Ray 30. 
59 Jordan 256. 
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The Syracusan Dromio runs away from the kitchen wench in a fear that unites him with his 
master in a male homosocial bond and a corresponding male chauvinist perception, for the 
duration of an imaginary travel and colonizing adventure around the globe. Dromio describes Nell’s 
complexion as “Swart, like my shoe” (3.2.102) and her shape as “spherical, like a globe” (114), 
which inspires both men to rise above her in their fantasy, enjoy a bird’s-eye-view of parts of her 
body and name them as countries that emerge as colonies and rich continents they will possess. 
The anti-blazon is an exercise in containing and transcending female possessiveness by 
representing a woman’s body as an uncivilized natural phenomenon and, at the same time, in 
shaping the concept of the earth as an ungodly monster to be conquered in a Christianizing mission 
with God on the side of the colonizers. 
The discursive effort to subjugate Nell reverses the recurrent fear in the men of being 
known as bodies and supplants it with their confidence in the superior subject position of knowing 
and the gesture of naming. Nell recognizes Dromio by “privy marks” on his male body, as he 
enumerates them, by “the mark of my shoulder, the mole in my neck, [and] the great wart on my left 
arm” (3.2.140–42), while Adriana and Luciana call the two men, as the Syracusan says, “by our 
names,” as it were “by inspiration” (2.2.165f) or “by […] wonder” (3.2.30). Although it amounts 
characteristically to misidentifications, master and slave conceive of such anagnorisis as being 
“claim[ed]” by a woman in a way a man would lay claim to his “horse” or a “curtal dog” and thus 
being degraded to the level of “a beast” (82, 86f, 145). As a result, they must reverse their power 
relation to pre-Christian women by dividing Nell’s representative body in their imagery into parts 
they have to avoid, like “her buttocks” that stand for the “bogs” of Ireland (117f), on the one hand, 
and resources, on the other, that might benefit the traveler: her “grease” would “burn” in “a lamp” 
(96, 98, 97) and her nose might shine like “rubies, carbuncles, [and] sapphires” do in “America, the 
Indies” (134, 132). Such designations control, not only the way men perceive women, but, more 
importantly, the way the roles of perceived and perceiver are distributed along the gender divide. 
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We moved far from the question and the expectation that the Syracusan might fill in his 
brother’s empty public persona with a sensitive and thoughtful self and thus merge into one 
satisfyingly complete identity with him, under one name, to please their father. Once he runs away 
from both his brother’s wife and her sister and refers to them as “witches” (155), there is not much 
hope left that he would form a meaningful attachment to Adriana or even to the eligible Luciana. As 
for the solidarity with his slave, its only basis is the exclusion of women from their circle. The 
prospect that the nameless brother, after having left his all-male home in Syracuse, will make a 
genuine discovery in Ephesus is already waning when the chain enters the stage. The single most 
important stage prop in the play is a central symbol that is meaningful in two ways. 
Notwithstanding the fact that it is made of gold in a “chargeful fashion” (4.1.29), as a single object 
without an owner, passing through many hands, it epitomizes the property of indistinct 
commonness. On the other hand, in its structure, consisting of identical links, it represents the 
democratic Ephesian mercantile and legal systems that connect members of the urban male society 
in a strictly regulated circulation of goods at the expense of taking away those members’ unique 
individuality. By withdrawing from a spontaneous and meaningful communication of selves 
between him and a woman, the Syracusan brother seems ready to join the kind of formalized 
exchange the chain stands for both in its shape and its fate. 
The change in meaning the chain goes through as a result of shifts in its intended and actual 
passage through hands anticipates in one respect the journey of the handkerchief in Othello 
Shakespeare composed ten years later:60 both objects start out as love tokens, and, in the course of 
the traffic to which they are subjected, they lose their significance as gifts that represent a unique 
                                                     
60 We know of two performances, ten years apart, of The Comedy of Errors in Shakespeare’s own time, both of 
which took place on December 28, Innocents’ Day. Shakespeare might have originally composed the play for 
the first “in the hall of Gray’s Inn in Holborn, London,” in 1594, which ended in disorder and was, therefore, 
“ever afterwards called ‘The Night of Errors’.” The other took place in 1604. Charles Whitworth, 
“Introduction,” The Comedy of Errors by Shakespeare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 1–79. 1. 
According to the records, the King’s Men presented Othello as a new play “at King James I’s Whitehall Palace 
on November 1, 1604.” Kim F. Hall, “Introduction,” Othello by Shakespeare (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. 
Martin’s, 2007) 1–42. 2. 
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emotional attachment. While its function to connect is organically inscribed in the making and the 
very fabric of the handkerchief, the shape and structure of the chain opens up an inherent 
ambiguity in its signification: its links are connected to, and isolated from, each other at the same 
time. Similarly, Ephesian citizens are “chained” together in a society organized by rules of 
commerce and law, but, at the same time, they are bound to maintain their own flawless reputation 
that encapsulates each of them separately in an image in the other merchants’ eyes. These two 
potentials in the meaning of the chain as a symbol come into a play of interdependence when the 
Syracusan Dromio alerts Adriana to the fact that her husband has been arrested on a “chain, a 
chain” (4.2.51) for allegedly (through the intervention of his brother unseen to him) violating the 
rule of “credit” and “reputation” (4.1.68, 71), which is the “law in Ephesus” (83) that cannot be bent, 
as the craftsman Angelo emphasizes, even for the sake of a “brother” (77). When one link seems to 
fail in its autonomous function, the others tighten their grip around it and secure its position in the 
“chain:” because Antipholus of Ephesus is not willing to pay for the jewel Angelo has delivered to 
the wrong twin, the goldsmith cannot settle his debt to the Second Merchant. As a result, 
Antipholus, the link in the commercial cycle that seems to have malfunctioned, will be arrested: as 
Angelo puts it, “I attach you by this officer” (73). 
By accepting the chain, the Syracusan brother enters the remorseless Ephesian system of 
exchange of convertible values we saw at work above. Even though he is aware that it was not made 
for him but for someone else with the same name who should be sojourning at the Porpentine, he is 
ready to pay its price. “I bespoke it not” (3.2.171), he protests first, but then insists that Angelo, the 
goldsmith, “receive the money now” (176). Nonetheless, there is no escape even from the credit his 
brother has earned in the business world: Angelo leaves without accepting immediate payment, 
indicating the strong trust that forms a vital net among established businessmen in Ephesus and at 
the same time controls their transactions. The Syracusan does not run away from this kind of 
exchange, as he did from a sexual entanglement with Adriana, who demanded that he subject his 
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perception of the world to hers, or with Luciana, who asserted her superior integrity and 
discernment in making a clear distinction between “an honest suit” (4.2.14) and the “shame” of 
“false love” in a “show of blindness” (3.2.10, 8). By this time, it seems, the Syracusan son has had 
enough experience to overcome the emotional turmoil of an adolescent and the desire to melt into 
the frame of another character’s persona. 
At the same time, when he joins the eternal present of the circulation of material goods 
among the industrious citizens of Ephesus, the Syracusan Antipholus unknowingly helps erase the 
historic dimension from the consciousness of its male-dominated community. Adriana claims to 
have been the originally intended recipient of the chain. However, she would have rather dispensed 
with the luxury of possessing it, if she could have enjoyed what the token stood for: her husband’s 
attention. “Sister, you know,” she confides to Luciana, “he promised me a chain; / Would that alone, 
a love he would detain,” she contemplates wistfully, “So he would keep fair quarter with his bed!” 
(2.1.106–108).61 The next “link” in the chain of intended recipients is the Courtesan. When, in an 
attempt to rekindle her husband’s abated passion, Adriana retires, by mistake, with his twin to the 
intimacy of an upstairs room at the Phoenix, Antipholus of Ephesus is ready with a response to 
being locked out: if only “to spite my wife,” he decides to “bestow” the chain on his “hostess” at the 
Porpentine (3.1.118, 117, 119). Nonetheless, the chain is still in the making, and when the tardy 
jeweler catches up with the Syracusan in the street, believing he is his customer, the jeweler wishes 
it would cement the marriage bond between Adriana and her husband. 
But the chain ends up in the Syracusan brother’s hands. The Courtesan demands it from him 
(4.3.45), since the Ephesian Antipholus promised it to her (4.1.23) after he promised it to his wife. If 
she has not sacrificed a life of yearning dedication in the hope of a “look” or a “touch” (2.1.88, 111) 
as Adriana has, the Courtesan has already given Antipholus a “diamond” “ring” (4.3.67, 66) for it, so 
                                                     
61 Adriana associates the news about her husband’s arrest with the promise in the symbol of the marriage 
bond into which she could rescue him from his custody: when she hears the Dromio who comes for the “bail” 
(4.1.80) speak about “a chain,” she exclaims, “What, the chain?” (4.2.51f, emphasis added). 
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it would be part of a barter transaction to upgrade her collection of jewelry. Once it is completed, 
she says to the wrong brother, she would “be gone, sir, and not trouble you” (68). The chain does 
not stand for the emotional content of a marital bond anymore; it rather represents the commercial 
value of “Two hundred ducats” (4.4.135), and the Courtesan would fain exchange it for a ring she 
gave to the Ephesian Antipholus worth “forty ducats” (81) only: “I pray you, sir,” she gives the 
Syracusan the alternative, “my ring, or else the chain” (75). In her usage, “to cheat me” (76) has the 
exclusively material sense of not remunerating her for her services lavishly. At the same time, the 
price for the Ephesian Antipholus’ freedom comes to exactly the same amount as the value of the 
chain: “Two hundred ducats.” The Syracusan brother is holding the worth of his brother’s ransom, 
which suggests that they are connected through mere numerical quantities. They are parts of the 
same surface reality but blotted out from each other’s view; they are two aspects, different 
projections of the same identity: two incomplete images that need to be integrated into one to 
appear solid. All fluid emotional content, the chaos of desire, the memory of past fulfilment, 
together with the hope of a recovery of these, have disappeared. The twins do not seem to be 
related through their history anymore. 
The Syracusan brother’s desire to restore his own identity in the context of the family he 
was born into seems to evaporate when he is about to fill a slot in a social system that transforms, 
overwrites, or simply abandons the kind of ideational and emotional content that filled Adriana’s 
sense of her self, that was part of the integrity Luciana represented, and that the Syracusan seemed 
to embark on to explore. When Angelo leaves him indebted to him, the traveler is puzzled at first: 
“What I should think of this, I cannot tell” (3.2.179), he wonders. But then, he takes the jewel and 
tells himself, “there’s no man is so vain / That would refuse so fair an offered chain” (180f). Have 
his “adventures” (2.2.215) with Adriana upstairs at the Phoenix left him unaffected? Has his 
eagerness to transcend his “earthly-gross conceit, / Smothered in errors, feeble, shallow, weak” and 
to learn anew from a “dear creature” like Luciana “how to think and speak” (3.2.34f, 33) yielded no 
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lasting results? Has he not experienced a formative exchange with either of these women? Has he 
fully surmounted the phase of experimentation in the process of maturation, or has it left a mark on 
his sense of who he is? Is the past adventure going to enable him to enrich the larger community he 
is going to enter and the family that will eventually reincorporate him? The analysis of the last two 
acts will hopefully yield answers to these questions concerning the evolution of the Syracusan 
Antipholus’ sense of identity. 
 
8. Antipholus of Syracuse: Firmly Embedded 
Five years before the action of the comedy begins, the traveler son left his father’s house in 
Syracuse in search of his twin brother of the same name, Antipholus. Although he has not seen him 
yet, in Ephesus everybody gives clear signs that they know such a man. “There’s not a man I meet 
but doth salute me,” the Syracusan muses, “As if I were their well-acquainted friend; / And 
everyone doth call me by my name” (4.3.1–3), he adds. His inability to make the obvious connection 
is acceptable, on the face of it, only if he does not know the name of the character he is looking for 
and, in addition, if he does not reckon with the common experience that one half of a set of twins 
might look just like the other.62 Nonetheless, since the incomprehensible curiosity of the 
circumstance that one can in fact have an identical double prevented him from making the 
necessary logical move at first, the resulting deferral has begun to generate a sense in the audience 
as well that the phenomenon must indeed be extraordinary. The more the Syracusan is 
incorporated in the Ephesian community by mistake, the greater our expectation of a resolution of 
the absurdity. 
From the moment that the Syracusan traveler ignores his own “computation” and his “host’s 
report” (2.2.4), which render the assumption unlikely that he met the same Dromio twice in rapid 
                                                     
62 Viola and Sebastian miss each other with a similarly fatal precision until the last scene of Shakespeare’s 
Twelfth Night. The Norton Shakespeare. Based on the Oxford Edition, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York, 
London: W W Norton, 1997) 1768–1821. 
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succession, the mechanism of the uncanny begins to take over the organization of the plot. The 
Syracusan twin is not only in search of his double, but he acts out in front of us the process of 
repression that leads to the uncanny experience of having one. In other words, through the act of 
dispelling the logical doubt about a physically impossible assumption, that is, that his own Dromio 
has returned “so soon” (1.2.43), the young Syracusan master evokes the perception that the 
sameness of the two slaves, and thus, by extension, of the two masters, is possible in some other 
way. Thus, he creates his uncanny double by denying the possibility that it can exist. Then, by 
quickly forgetting how he himself brought about this irrational probability in the face of, or rather 
by circumventing, the rational impossibility, he makes this detour seem the only way of dealing 
with the ghost he has conjured. He makes its presence felt by avoiding it. As a result, we become 
more and more fascinated by our own expectation that not simply a brother of the master and a 
brother of the slave but another Dromio and another Antipholus might actually appear onstage. 
In the first Act it still seems that the Syracusan will weigh possibilities rationally and 
investigate them in an orderly fashion. At the beginning of Act four, scene three, however, his 
avoidance of looking for his brother or of even taking into account his existence, and thus 
remembering the actual purpose of his mission, becomes more blatant than before. So far, we have 
forgiven him all this on account of the occasionally amusing, other times frightening references to 
occult and magical forces, and of his involvement with matters of ideational and emotional content 
that related him to the pagan sisters at Ephesus. Eventually, however, all this will be lumped 
together with an undefined notion of the demonic and summed up in a global perspective on the 
figure of Nell, the kitchen wench. The image of her body he constructs in concert with his slave 
provides the Syracusan master with the impetus he needs to surmount a fixation on his and others’ 
selves and to become a link in the chain in the trade and commerce of Ephesus. By aspiring to the 
same status that his brother assumes, he becomes more and more indistinguishable from him, as 
his father predicted at their birth (1.1.52). 
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By the end of Act three, the Syracusan traveler has abandoned all concern with the content 
of his own soul or the desire of others. From the beginning of Act four, the plot renders the 
structural peculiarity of the contrasting parallel realities more prominent than ever before. Pairs of 
master and slave alternate in front of our eyes, vying for the same position in the Ephesian society, 
like incompatible elements that mingle in a closed system drifting toward entropy. In the first two 
acts we encountered the Syracusan twin only, while in the third act, the brothers took turns once, at 
the beginning of scene two. In contrast, the fourth Act gives occasion for three such shifts, leaving 
an ever diminishing interval between the exit of one brother and the entry of another: Antipholus of 
Ephesus is led away under arrest in the first scene 77 lines before his Syracusan brother shows up 
in the street in the third. The Ephesian appears next, in the fourth scene, still accompanied by a 
jailer, only 16 lines after the other ran away from the Courtesan as if she was a “witch” (4.3.77) in 
the third. Finally, the Syracusan enters again, “with his rapier drawn” (4.4.144 SD), just 12 lines after 
his Ephesian brother was led away, in the same scene, seized by Dr. Pinch and guarded by an 
Officer, as a madman who refuses to pay his debt. This creates a sense of rotation at an ever 
increasing speed. 
Our spontaneous identification with the main character has taught us to observe a narrow 
perceptual horizon and not look for an explanation of unusual phenomena beyond it. This has given 
rise to an intuition that the action is controlled by invisible forces that have forbidden the 
Syracusan traveler to consider the circumstances that are most likely to affect how he perceives his 
own and his slave’s identity. This constraint or limitation both distinguishes him from his brother 
and makes them behave similarly, at the same time. Both of them are ignorant of the context of 
their experience; but while the Ephesian twin cannot know that his brother is near, his Syracusan 
counterpart apparently must disregard the same possibility. Especially from the beginning of the 
fourth Act, when the mercantile logic and the rigor of the law tighten around the Ephesian, we have 
a sense that individual choices are increasingly limited. Still, as in the first lines of the second scene 
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of the second Act, the Syracusan shows occasional signs of a faint awareness that his perception is 
limited: when his Dromio offers him the bail he never asked for, he remarks, “The fellow is 
distracted, and so am I; / And here we wander in illusions” (4.3.40f)—a comment that could 
summarize Guildenstern’s experience in Tom Stoppard or that of other characters in absurdist 
drama. 
In Act two, scene two, the Syracusan slave exercises his wit in formulating in elaborate 
images the idea of aging and that time passes remorselessly and irreversibly (2.2.65–106). There is 
“no time,” for example, he argued, “to recover hair lost by nature” (101f). In the second and third 
scenes of Act four, however, he mingles with this the theme of spatial limitations. He reports to 
Adriana on her husband’s arrest in a series of images and puns that represent closed space and 
constraint on physical movement, some of which have a strong religious connotation. For example, 
Adriana’s husband is, the Syracusan Dromio says, in “Tartar limbo” (4.2.32). The phrase combines 
places of confinement in pagan and Christian mythology.63 The Officer who arrested him appears as 
a “devil” in Dromio’s metaphor, wearing “an everlasting garment” (33), “a suit of buff” (45), which 
refers to “the leather […] uniform of an Elizabethan officer of the law,” according to Dolan (33n). 
Adriana enquires if her businessman husband has been “arrested on a band,” that is, a “bond” (49 
and n), which the slave takes to mean a strap.64 
The Syracusan Dromio then carries this “running joke” (4.3.18n) over to his dialogue with 
his own master he wants to bail out by mistake, and includes in it a reference to the parable of the 
Prodigal Son. By leaving his father five years earlier, the Syracusan traveler seems to have 
attempted to rouse him from an inertia and provoke him into enacting a version of the Biblical 
                                                     
63 “Limbo properly is a benign Christian place in hell for unbaptized infants; ‘Tartar’ combines this with a 
pagan place of punishment.” Frances E. Dolan, ed., The Comedy of Errors, by William Shakespeare, The Pelican 
Shakespeare Ser. (New York: Penguin Books, 1999) 4.2.32n. 
64 Joseph Ritson denies the significance of the pun. For him, “Adriana means a written band, and Dromio 
quibbles upon a hempen one.” He cannot admit “any such allusion” because, he says, “there would be very 
little humour in it.” Remarks, Critical and Illustrative, on the Text and Notes of the Last Edition of Shakespeare 
(London, 1783) 27, 26. Eighteenth Century Collections Online, 17 June 2014. 
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story. Dromio now picks up a detail that is irrelevant to the original meaning of Jesus’ parable, the 
value of a lost soul recovered from sin, and includes it in his travesty of it: the prison guard wears 
“the calf’s skin,” he says, “that was killed for the Prodigal” (4.3.17f). With this, he tries to remind his 
Syracusan master of the arrest that he thinks he underwent and, possibly, and more importantly, of 
the purpose and meaning of his own adventure. Compared to the freedom of the moment when he 
set sail from Sicily with an unknown destination, the Syracusan twin is now indeed in a situation 
similar to the one in which inmates who wear “suits of durance” (26) find themselves. His own 
choices, his repeated acts of avoidance, were leading him on a way that has by now diminished his 
options. Is his Dromio intimating that he has neglected restoring old family relations, as well as 
establishing new ones, as a context for his sense of identity? Does his reference to “the calf’s skin” 
mean that the Syracusan master may have forgotten what was at stake in his voyage were? The way 
“Adam that keeps the prison” (4.3.17) and “goes in the calf’s skin” (17f) has nothing to do anymore 
with the “compassion”65 that urged the father to kill the calf in the first place would be similar to the 
loss of purpose in Antipholus of Syracuse. How could the Syracusan son forget about his original 
intention with which he set out when he “became inquisitive / After his brother” (1.1.125f)? He 
compared himself in the first Act to a “drop of water / That in the ocean seeks another drop” 
(1.2.35f); but then, in the second Act, he ignores his own “computation and mine host’s report” that 
tell him he “could not speak with Dromio” (2.1.4f) when he thought he did. The evidence indicates 
he has reached his destination, but he disregards it and says he wants to flee Ephesus, which he 
then never does. 
Dromio’s attempt “to whet” the Syracusan traveler’s “almost blunted purpose”66 provides us 
with an opportunity to sum up the story of his master’s evasions up to the end of the fourth Act. 
Once he first hears about a housewife that expects her husband, who must obviously look like him 
                                                     
65 Luke 15:10. 
66 Shakespeare, Hamlet, The Norton Shakespeare. Based on the Oxford Edition, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. 
(New York, London: W W Norton, 1997) 1668–1756. 3.4.101. 
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and bear the same name, for dinner, he expresses his desire to leave Ephesus (1.2.103). However, 
when he meets the wife, Adriana, in person, he decides to go “at all adventures” (2.2.214), but 
particularly “to dine above” (206) with her, while her husband is away. He even orders his slave to 
secure the gate and “let none enter” (217), in case the husband should return in the meantime. 
When the wife’s sister, Luciana, upbraids him for not fulfilling a “husband’s office” (3.2.2) with 
Adriana, Antipholus of Syracuse begins to passionately woo the sister, who refuses him in 
consternation. He vents his frustration in humiliating a kitchen wench and decides, once again, not 
to “harbor in this town” (3.2.148) for another night. The goldsmith takes our Antipholus for a local 
customer of the same name and entrusts a precious jewel to him indicating that it was made for his 
wife. The Syracusan takes it as a gift for himself and prepares to sail “straight away” (183, 185). 
After his slave reminds him of the story of the Prodigal Son, he refuses to part with the chain for the 
sake of a Courtesan, even though he finds out that a man like him was recently arrested and his 
slave has “the angels […] to deliver” (4.3.38) him. He calls the Courtesan “a sorceress” (4.3.64) and, 
with his rapier drawn, chases her, Adriana, Luciana, and an officer away. Again, he is ready to “fetch 
our stuff” (4.4.151) from the Centaur and board the first vessel that leaves the harbor. 
None of the above activities serves the aim of establishing a relationship with the sibling of 
whom the Syracusan cannot have retained conscious memories. However, they effectively 
undermine the Ephesian businessman’s position and ruin his reputation. Soon after his slave 
accuses him of abusive behavior and of demanding money of him (3.1.6–9), Antipholus of Ephesus 
has to endure the humiliation of being locked out of his own house with his guest, a fellow 
merchant, and having to “depart in quiet” (107). In Act four, his goldsmith has him arrested in the 
street for refusing to pay for a “carcanet”67 he has never received. He sends the wrong Dromio home 
for money to bail him out, but his own slave returns with “a rope’s end” (4.4.16) instead. His wife, 
his sister-in-law, and the Courtesan diagnose him as “mad” (46); and since his experience 
                                                     
67 “a necklace of gold or set with jewels” (3.1.4n). 
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concerning the dinner and the payment does not match with theirs, Adriana orders Dr. Pinch, the 
conjurer, and other attendants to “bind him” (107). Now, even when he “strives” (106 SD), he might 
save himself from the humiliation of being “bound and laid in some dark room” (95) only by going 
to prison instead (110–112)—but he “strives” in vain. He will be locked up where he was locked out 
from: his own house (123f). His wife, who has been yearning for his “look” and his “touch” (2.1.88, 
111), now does “not” let him “come near me” (4.4.107). The career of a businessman of a “very 
reverend reputation” and of “credit infinite, highly beloved” (5.1.5f) ends, as the Ephesian himself 
formulates, in “deep shames and great indignities” (254) when the Doctor leads him away, bound, 
through the streets of Ephesus. His Syracusan brother could not have done all this to him, if he had 
remained a diffuse self seeking other selves to merge with or trying to fill the frame of his brother’s 
public persona with an empathetic self. To effect his ruin, the Syracusan had to steal outright the 
Ephesian’s public persona, wear it, and excuse himself by saying he would only “entertain the 
offered fallacy” (2.2.185). 
Soon after he received the first sign of his brother’s presence in Ephesus, the Syracusan 
imposed on himself a narrow perceptual horizon. In fact, he obeyed an impulse to emulate his 
brother and replicate his isolation in a way hauntingly similar to how “solemn synods” have 
“decreed” (1.1.13) in Ephesus that the city would cut off its “well-dealing” (1.1.7) merchants from 
an exchange with Syracuse, from whose duke the “enmity and discord” allegedly “Sprung” (5f). 
Moreover, by destroying his brother’s fragile “credit” and “reputation” (4.1.68, 71; 5.1.5f) in a city 
dominated by commerce and governed by “law” (4.1.83), where an apparent infringement can 
reduce a “yet ungallèd estimation” (3.1.102) to “notorious shame” (4.1.84), the Syracusan gives vent 
to a kind of suppressed anger that also animates the elder brother in the Prodigal Son story.68 The 
Syracusan son acts out his envy of the other’s freedom to live his own life, while he, as the elder 
brother in Jesus’ parable says of himself, has served his father “these many years” without ever 
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breaking his “commandment” (15:29). Seeing the reward of an independent existence and material 
success Antipholus of Ephesus has reaped for separating early from the family, the Syracusan twin 
cannot resist taking his brother’s “offered” place and sample the delights of the life of an adult. 
When he “entertain[s]” a “dream” (2.2.185, 181) of being married and enters his brother’s house as 
if it was “fairyland” (188), he acts upon a pang of resentment that overwhelms the Prodigal’s 
brother coming home from the field and hearing the “melodie, and dancing”69 from the house: the 




Although purportedly he is on a mission to find members of his family, Antipholus of 
Syracuse is, at the same time, in search of his identity. As it appears, the two goals are not 
compatible. The fact that, as a son of his father, Egeon, the Syracusan cannot surmount the 
consequences of his namelessness condemns him to a state of invisibility in the family, behind his 
socially successful brother’s persona. As a result, paradoxically, he has to lose himself to be reunited 
with the family and incorporated in his new home, the city of Ephesus. In the course of his 
preparation for this rebirth (5.1.405, 407), the Syracusan brother suspends the normal functioning 
of his perception and refuses to accept the possibility that one name may refer to two identities. By 
conspicuously avoiding the realization that his brother is near, he creates the impression in the 
audience that having an identical double is an improbable, fearful possibility. His behavior results 
from his submission to the power of language and its paternal origin. As a result, he eliminates his 
own freedom of action. In this paralysis, his attempts to develop an emotional attachment to either 
of the sisters, Adriana or Luciana, is arrested on a level of experimentation. Antipholus of Syracuse 
                                                     
69 Luke 15:25. 
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accepts his incorporation in the Christian family under the auspices of his mother, the abbess, at the 




Doctor Faustus and the Promise of Magic 
 
Christopher Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus presents us with the heroic effort of the protagonist, 
an accomplished scholar, to find personal fulfillment in transcendental consciousness. Faustus’s 
skills to employ language and perception in realizing his desire do not match his enthusiasm to 
acquire knowledge of, and power over, the material universe. The kind of discourse he learns in his 
interaction with diabolical forces limits his perception, and he constructs a simplified view of the 
world that does not allow him to act in it in a meaningful way. As a result, his sense of identity 
becomes rather stifled than fragmented. He retains his desire to experience the richness of his 
reality, but he cannot make the discourse that interprets it for him in the framework of theology his 
own. He resorts to magic as a way of understanding the world that originates outside this frame of 
reference, but the diabolical forces he conjures do not lead him beyond the kind of meaning-making 
that a restrictive Protestant view can offer. 
The criticism on Christopher Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus since World War II starts from a 
strictly Christian theological basis and a judgmental attitude about Faustus and gradually opens up 
the framework of interpretation to alternative world views contemporary with Marlowe. This 
change might bring us closer to an explanation of the contradiction in the doctor’s attitude: he 
refuses to participate in the Christian salvation plan while, at the same time, he cannot give up hope 
to win divine grace. The earlier critics, for example Paul Harold Kocher and Douglas Cole, view 
Faustus from the perspective of God the benevolent Father, whose role Marlowe certainly implies 
in the prevalent Christian world view. We must not identify the shape of the dramatic world of 
Faustus uncritically with what appears to be the dominant ideology of the period in England based 
on Protestant theological treatises. Therefore, including an approach to living in the world and to 
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shaping one’s own identity in relation to it in tension with Protestant Christianity may yield a more 
complete understanding of Faustus’s motives. 
In Marlowe’s play, a pagan, experiential, sensual, occult, and holistic view contends with a 
Christian, spiritual, and discursive1 approach that compartmentalizes phenomena and isolates 
Faustus from his natural environment.2 The former corresponds to viewing and experiencing the 
world primarily through our own eyes, while the latter results from assuming an alienating 
perspective outside and above us. These considerations, I hope, justify my choice of Doctor Faustus 
to elaborate on the theme of integrity and identity in Renaissance/early modern English drama. 
Paul Harold Kocher finds the theological meaning of Christopher Marlowe’s play epitomized 
in the Old Man’s image of an angel offering “a vial full of precious grace”3 to Faustus, who needs only 
to open up his soul in a “call for mercy” to “avoid despair.”4 Kocher emphasizes Faustus’s 
unhampered free will (108) and argues that his refusal of divine grace is the result of a conscious 
decision (110). The scholar is unable to repent, Kocher adds, because he has hardened his own 
heart (111), and so cannot believe he can be saved. It is all a matter of trying, but he fails to make an 
effort (112). Kocher points out that Marlowe presents Faustus’s struggle in an authentic theological 
framework that squares with Christian doctrine (105–6, 114), and that his poetry serves the aim of 
“authoritatively” condemning Faustus’s ambitions, already in the first act, as evil (115–16). The 
only weakness Kocher identifies in the tragedy is that Marlowe fails to persuade us that God is 
                                                     
1 Catherine Belsey distinguishes between discursive and empirical knowledge thus: “In the problematic of 
discursive knowledge understanding is a preparation for the dissolution of the self. It is empirical knowledge 
which promises dominion.” “Doctor Faustus and Knowledge in Conflict,” Marlowe: Contemporary Critical 
Essays, ed. Avraham Oz (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 163–71. 170. 
2 C. L. Barber points out that “Faustus must try to leap up [to heaven] by himself, without the aid of Grace. His 
focus on the one drop, half a drop, that he feels would save his soul, expresses the Reformation’s tendency to 
isolate the individual in his act of communion.” “The Form of Faustus’s Fortunes Good or Bad,” Faust: Sources, 
Works, Criticism, ed. Paul A. Bates (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969) 157–171. 159. 
3 Paul H. Kocher, Christopher Marlowe. A Study of his Thought, Learning, and Character (Chapel Hill, NC: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1946) 108. 
4 Christopher Marlowe, The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus, Doctor Faustus: A 1604-Version Edition, ed. 
Michael Keefer (1991; Peterborough, Ontario, Canada; Plymouth, UK: Broadview, 2007) 71–171. 5.1.56. All 
references are to this edition, unless otherwise noted. 
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“truly a Father who looks with tenderness on his erring children of the earth.” This omission has no 
dramatic function in the plot, he claims, and it issues merely from “some coldness in the poet’s own 
religious temperament” (118). Kocher identifies the reason for Faustus’s fall in his “sins of pride, 
curiosity, and ambition” (105), which, in turn, he derives from original sin (106). 
In his analysis of the play, Douglas Cole acknowledges a context for Faustus’s actions 
outside the Christian world view and theological tradition but fails to include it in his explanation of 
the hero’s motives. He sees Faustus’s obstinacy and denial of “the message of redemption”5 as part 
of “the mythic pattern of the forbidden quest for superhuman knowledge and power” (233). In his 
analysis, he incorporates Robert B. Heilman’s view that Faustus “embodies a perennial human 
aspiration—to escape inhibitions, to control the universe, to reconstruct the cosmos in naturalistic, 
non-theistic terms.”6 Although Cole admits that the dramatist took a “fundamental pattern of 
human experience” (234) as his raw material, he still insists that Faustus’s sin is linked to the 
“original sin of Christian theology” and that Marlowe presents the hero’s “moral choice” in this 
context (194). Consequently, Faustus’s tragedy is “a spiritual one” (231), and it issues from his sin 
of a willful reversal (192, 231). He sins “in the perversity of his will and intellect,” which torments 
his spirit (225). Cole analyzes the play consistently in terms of Faustus’s “self-imposed blindness” 
(199) and willful perversion of the Scriptures (198), which make him “in his aspiration to be as 
God,” choose “the not-God” (201). This perversion reaches its completion when God’s justice takes 
the place of his mercy, which Faustus has knowingly rejected (227). In spite of admitting the 
legitimacy of “naturalistic, non-theistic” notions in a philosophical context, Cole seems to insist that 
his “humanity” is a mere “burden” and the “root of […] suffering” (242) for Faustus, while his only 
                                                     
5 Douglas Cole, Suffering and Evil in the Plays of Christopher Marlowe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1962) 227. 
6 Robert Bertold Heilman, “The Tragedy of Knowledge: Marlowe's Treatment of Faustus,” Quarterly Review of 
Literature, (1946): 316–332. Qtd. in Cole 234. 
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reality is the spiritual light of salvation (199). Independent of the author’s own attitude to religion, 
the play is “thoroughly Christian in conception and import” (194). 
To refute critics who might sense a discrepancy between the theological status and the 
received negative moral judgment of Faustus’s position, on the one hand, and Marlowe’s 
sympathetic treatment of the character, on the other, Judith Weil argues that Marlowe allows 
Faustus to impress audiences with his magic and with his worship of “beauty, power and fame”7 
only to hide his “folly” behind a “heroic dimension” (50) and then “laugh[…] contemptuously” (57) 
at his “learned folly,” his “ridiculous blindness” (60), and the “wilful ignorance” that leads him to 
vice (59). Marlowe, she says, prompts our compassion for Faustus, a “damned hero,” by giving him 
“extraordinarily fine lines” (73) only to have them “subtly expose[…] him” (74). The “central irony” 
of the play is, she says, that before he takes to magic, Faustus must have lost his “wisdom” or at 
least that part of it that concerns divine matters (52). As a result of an “aberration of the will,” Weil 
contends, “Faustus has abused his will” (53) or “gorged himself on the wrong kind of wisdom” (61). 
His senses (55) cannot distinguish clearly between opposites like “Heaven” and “necromancy,” 
“Elysium” and “Hell” (54), and so he foolishly believes that the “merciful God” of St. Paul is his 
enemy (61). Faustus founders on the conflict between “faith and reason” (80). His reason is vain 
without “wisdom and grace” (80). Although God might not have bestowed “the essential wisdom of 
the heart” (52, 70, 75), that is, grace, on Faustus, Marlowe makes sure that he has plenty of 
opportunities to repent (52). Surprisingly, Weil concludes that Faustus’s wisdom is “more humane 
and worldly than that defined by St. Paul or Augustine,” by suggesting that such qualities might 
have value in contrast to a legalized and politically saturated theology. However, she argues, in his 
folly Faustus inverts this worldly humanity, too, and parodies it by neglecting its substance for 
mere show (80). Marlowe allows him to “achieve an intellectual perception of God” (75) and 
theological understanding (76) which, however, do not help him overcome the foolishness of his 
                                                     
7 Judith Weil, Christopher Marlowe: Merlin’s Prophet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) 51. 
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heart and repent (75). Although he knows he is a sinner, he cannot be saved, since he does not 
believe in salvation (76f). Weil sets faith in a hierarchical relationship above reason and suggests 
that Faustus’s inability to attain it locks him in a tragic paradox. 
Hilary Gatti moves decisively beyond the religious-theological framework to understand 
Faustus’s resistance to it. She explains magic in Marlowe as a reaction against a rationalistic, 
scientific way to learn about the world.8 Opposed to a “dogmatic religious” (84) approach, the most 
prominent representative in Europe of an alternative at the time, Giordano Bruno, shares with 
Marlowe a philosophical, directly human, and poetic (75, 77) endeavor to understand nature and 
the universe and to imitate their workings (81). To be able to imitate nature, one certainly has to be 
like it and to acknowledge a common ground with it. According to this concept, nature itself would 
justify the inquisitive mind of man who would be seeing her through his own eyes, unrestrained by 
his position as being created and having to be saved by the Christian God (87). This view opposes 
the “book of nature” to the Scriptures (97); and, instead of elevating him or her “beyond an obscure, 
phenomenal natural world,” it posits the subject in direct contact with it (98). Gatti points out that 
Faustus would prefer “a more empirical astronomy” to the “ten-(or in some cases eleven- or twelve-
) sphere universe” prevalent in his time (101). Gatti explains Faustus’s failure to mention divine 
mercy in St. Paul and St. John, on this basis, as a deliberate choice. Faustus denies the “concept of 
death in terms of rewards and punishments,”9 refuses his dependence on an arbitrary “act of mercy 
on the part of God,” and he tries to avoid thinking of “the possibility of everlasting torment” (92).10 
In this analysis, the play emerges as a “human rather than supernatural or demonic experience” 
(98) or a “theological” or “spiritual” drama as it appeared to be in Kocher’s and in Cole’s analysis 
                                                     
8 Hilary Gatti, The Renaissance Drama of Knowledge. Giordano Bruno in England (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1989) 74. 
9 An opinion which Weil understands Faustus is implying (56). 
10 While a combination of religious and national sentiments affected popular thinking during the late 
fourteenth century, statements often cropped up in England, France, and Bohemia asserting the 
empowerment of laymen to administer the sacraments and denying the importance of priests, of the Roman 
Church, and of the existence of hell, because it was alien to nature. Walter Ullmann, Medieval Foundations of 
Renaissance Humanism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977) 193. 
116 
 
respectively. The play’s irony for Gatti is that having accepted an alternative way of seeing and 
knowing, Faustus “can no longer be saved in Christian terms;” and still he cannot escape death (and 
the fear of it, (109)), according to the Protestant Christianity of the world he lives in (108). 
Instead of demanding that Faustus restore the perverted relationship in his contorted 
perception between God and his adversary, Alan Sinfield completes a reversal in the traditional 
approach of measuring Faustus against the context of Christian theology. For him, the play gives 
rise to “a moral perspective alternative to God’s.”11 Sinfield resists the urge to fill in with Biblical 
and theological references the role and image of an absent God that Marlowe has left blank in the 
script. Kocher, Cole, and Weil use the “default reasoning”12 described in the theory of how we 
interpret utterances; that is, they assume that no context-dependent inference is required to 
understand Doctor Faustus beyond what the author himself has included in the text of the play. Weil 
even elevates theology to the level of the framework of the play. Gatti, in contrast, moves beyond 
the theological framework and, following Marlowe’s personal and intellectual connections, includes 
references to an alternative world view to explain Faustus’s refusal to participate in the Christian 
salvation plan. Instead of looking at Faustus through the invisible eye of God, Sinfield rather 
examines contemporary Protestant theology from Faustus’s point of view. 
According to Sinfield, Faustus finds himself, in the context of Protestant theology, in an 
untenable position. Martin Luther,13 John Calvin, William Tyndale, and, in their wake, Elizabethan 
orthodoxy deprived the individual of his or her power to effectuate or deserve his or her own 
salvation (173f). Under such conditions, the Good Angel and the Old Man still encourage Faustus to 
implore Christ to save him.14 Urging believers to repent and rendering their religious fervor 
                                                     
11 Alan Sinfield, “Reading Faustus’s God,” Marlowe: Contemporary Critical Essays, ed. Avraham Oz (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 172–181. 176. 
12 Kent Bach, “Default Reasoning: Jumping to Conclusions and Knowing When to Think Twice,” Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 65.1 (1984): 37–58. 
13 Sinfield 175. 




ineffectual at the same time might indeed bring on the despair which Kocher and Cole observe in 
Faustus. In Sinfield’s analysis, the contradiction between faith and reason in Faustus characterizes 
the entire theological field he acts in, because it separates faith entirely from reason, oppressing 
adherents by making unreasonable demands on their faith. The Protestant Reformation in England 
adopts the doctrine of predestination. In response to this, Sinfield argues, the play intends to 
“embarrass” this ideological practice (177) and the Protestant God (178) rather than Faustus, who 
cannot comply with its stricture and who still shows a humane heart in his dire plight (179). 
 
1. Rising above Direct Experience 
In his opening soliloquy, Doctor Faustus leaves his direct involvement with worldly 
activities and detaches himself from the history of his previous experience. This detachment has a 
linguistic and a perceptual aspect: it finds expression in the rhetorical device of self-address, which 
corresponds to an outside, transcendental viewpoint in the observation of an image of which he 
himself is a part. In this effort to rise above his self in a discursive construct, Faustus prepares to 
assume a divine perspective in anticipation of a direct, personal, and active involvement with the 
salvation of his soul. 
In his struggle to define his own identity, Faustus is torn between two contesting 
viewpoints: one is outside of him and incorporeal, while the other is that of his own bodily eyes. 
From both, he appears to himself as a worldly, mortal being sharing a bodily existence limited in 
time and space with fellow humans and other living beings and even with earthly and celestial 
objects. The former, incorporeal viewpoint, however, represents for him the surrounding universe 
as immutable, his existence in it as insufficient, and urges him to transcend it and rise in status 
above other living creatures. This view dominated the earlier criticism of the play, prompting a 
prescriptive, judgmental attitude. The latter, experiential view, on the other hand, encourages 
Faustus to acknowledge himself as a part of this world of the senses, to understand the intricate 
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ways in which he is entangled with the world, the forces that animate it, and the laws that govern it. 
Furthermore, the experiential view urges him to take possession of this world: it promises to 
empower him to shape his relationship to the world of the senses, to mold the face of the world 
along its own knowable principles, and to evolve in the process, through his own effort, into its 
creator. The experiential way of Faustus’s self-understanding gains more acceptance in recent 
criticism of Doctor Faustus, and I intend my contribution to support this tradition by elaborating on 
the contrast between the two images of his identity that arise in Faustus in the framework of the 
two viewpoints: the incorporeal and the experiential. 
His use of language in the opening soliloquy shows a split between two speaking personae, 
as if he were representing his own train of thought in a dramatized fashion, in a dialogue between 
himself and an outside observer.15 He tends to give himself instructions on what to do next in the 
second person, as if from the perspective of an interlocutor, and to report on his own experience in 
the first. For example, he tells himself as if in a foreign voice to “live and die in Aristotle’s works,” 
and then responds to the injunction saying, “Sweet Analytics, ’tis thou hast ravished me” (1.1.5–6). 
He mixes an outside perspective on himself with a direct view of a familiar object from his own 
point of view. The distanced observer then tells him to drop the object with which he has been 
occupied on account of the restrictive nature of the pursuit: “Is to dispute well logic’s chiefest end? 
/ Affords this art no greater miracle? / Then read no more” (8–10). He addresses Galen, as he did 
Aristotle, showing he is on intimate terms with his thought, saying, “Galen come.” Then, in the voice 
of an impatient tutor, he reproaches himself for having attained the “end of physic,” that is, “our 
bodies’ health” and for being “still but Faustus, and a man” (12, 17, 23). It is not easy to decide 
where Faustus stands. As Belsey suggests, in Faustus’s speech the “subject of the enunciation,” that 
                                                     
15 Dollimore calls Faustus here “almost schizoid” (113). “On some occasions,” he says, Faustus is a soul that 
“fluctuates between contrary wills” in St Augustine’s terms. In terms of a Manichean “universal conflict,” 
however, he is “divided and, indeed, constituted by that division” (116). 
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is, the speaker, “exceeds the subject of the utterance.”16 Does he enjoy reading his “Sweet Analytics” 
and “to dispute well” (6, 8)? Does he value his own endeavor as a physician to begin where “the 
philosopher leaves off” and to ease a “thousand desperate maladies” (13n, 22)? Or does he rather 
identify with the voice that interrupts his reading and belittles his achievement as a savior of 
lives?17 
However, by the time he reaches his third profession as a lawyer, he seems to have made up 
his mind: he does not call Justinian with the familiarity he accorded to Aristotle and to Galen. 
“[W]here is Justinian?” (27), he demands impatiently, and discredits the discipline the Byzantine 
author of Corpus Juris Civilis stands for, in contrast to the previous two cases, without embodying an 
outside voice, finally dismissing it in the first person: “This study fits a mercenary drudge / Who 
aims at nothing but external trash— / Too servile and illiberal for me” (34–36). The tendency we 
have observed here is both linguistic and perceptual. The first and the second person pronouns, 
“me” and “thou,” invoke two different visual perspectives: the voice that refers to him as “me” looks 
at an object of study or an activity, and the one that addresses him as “thou” sees, instead, the 
student or practitioner in relation to that object. “Thou” indicates a detached perspective and a 
voice impatient with the focused attention of the addressee, who loses himself enthusiastically in 
each field in the beginning, but gradually yields to the perspective of the speaker and finally finds 
fault with his own fervor with a profession that deals only with everyday human affairs. Faustus—
the student, the physician, and the lawyer—works in close contact with his fellow human beings, 
and with ancient authors who evoke emotions of compassion and excitement in him. By the end of 
                                                     
16 Belsey 50, 52. 
17 The facts that, in contrast to the “conventional employment of abstract or metaphorical figures in the 
morality plays,” “Faustus never directs his attention to the Good and Evil Angels as dramatic entities,” that “he 
neither speaks directly to them nor shows any sensible awareness of their physical presence,” and that they 
“never appear except in the presence of the human protagonist” further strengthen Marlowe’s concentration 
on the internal conflict of Faustus’s mind. Unlike the human heroes of the morality tradition, Faustus is “never 
separated from the conflict” between the allegorical figures of good and evil. “The moral forces and principles 
that were once abstracted from man’s nature and presented separately as external agents are now within his 
own being. The battle between good and evil is fought in Faustus’s own mind” (Cole 234–35, 237, 242). 
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the “dialogue” with himself, however, he seems disappointed with these feelings of empathy and 
senses them as a weakness. 
This initial “dialogic” monologue serves as an exposition that continues the “Prologue” and, 
at the same time, brings Faustus’s relationship to his work and studies into focus and effectively 
sums up his history. It also reads and sounds like a dramatized summary of Faustus’s previous 
experience. Faustus here acts out his memory of his life up to the point where the plot begins. 
Memory, it seems, tends to alienate us from our own point of view, so that with time we give up our 
first-person perspective and see our past selves from the outside, as if through somebody else’s 
eyes. Charles Fernyhough, author of a recent study on how we retell our stories from the past,18 
recalls his first memory as a child, not as a direct experience seen from his own point of view, but 
rather from a peculiarly detached perspective. “I’m on the floor of the living room in the house 
where I lived at the time,” he begins. 
And I’ve got this toy forklift truck, and I’m pushing this thing across the 
carpet. There’s something really strange about this memory – it’s vivid, I can 
imagine the quality of the light, something of the atmosphere in the room. 
But I’m looking at myself in the third person. I’m not looking out at the room 
through my own eyes. I’m looking at myself as a kid in this memory. And that 
is one of the most puzzling things about particularly early memories,19 
Fernyhough generalizes. “Sometimes we see ourselves in our memories as people in the third 
person – we don’t look out through our own eyes,” he adds. His answer to the question why we 
often remember past events from an outside perspective is that “memories are not literal 
representations of the past as it happened,” but rather “they’re shaped by who we are now. They’re 
                                                     
18 Charles Fernyhough, Pieces of Light: How the New Science of Memory Illuminates the Stories we Tell about 
our Pasts (New York: HarperCollins, 2013). 
19 NPR Staff, “Reminder: Our Memories Are Less Reliable Than We Think,” NPR: Books, NPR.org, 13 Mar. 2013. 
24 Dec. 2013. 
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shaped by what we feel, what we believe, what our biases are.”20 Memory, in short, involves a 
change in perspective, which we achieve over time. When Faustus retells his own story, he reenacts 
this shift from direct experience to conscious observation in front of the audience. 
Fernyhough’s explanation implies that we record past experiences first, when they are 
happening, from our own perspective, but later, before we recall and retell them, “[s]omething has 
flipped around. The perspective has changed.”21 However, our view of ourselves does not become 
alienated only with time; but, as Jacques Lacan argues, we form our very identity in the first place 
via a perspective that is not available to us directly.22 Both the formation of identity and the way our 
relationship to objects changes contain an element of alienation.23 In contrast to Peter Ramus’s 
“logically articulated art of memory,” Giordano Bruno’s method attempts to reconnect the mind, 
through “a symbolic pattern of ‘shadows’ or ‘signs’” to the “intimate structure of the universe.”24 In 
the The Art of Memory, Frances Yates calls this “one of the most basic of all Elizabethan 
controversies.”25 
Faustus, however, retells his experience as seen both from his own perspective and from 
that of an unnamed observer, so that each viewpoint represents a different kind of relationship to 
himself and a different quality of his being in the world. We are witnessing here Faustus’s transition 
from an unreflected consciousness and a direct connection to objects at the second level, to 
“consciousness of consciousness,” that is, to an awareness of his own relationship to the objects of 
                                                     
20 NPR Staff, “Reminder.” 
21 NPR Staff, “Reminder.” 
22 See Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic 
Experience,” trans. Alan Sheridan, Contemporary Literary Criticism, eds. Robert Con Davis and Ronald 
Schleifer (New York, London: Longman, 1994) 382–86. 383. 
23 This alienation from our own selves empowers us to shape who we are in the sense of Pico della Mirandola: 
as if to compensate us for having given away all the particular characteristics before he decided to create 
man, “God the Father, the supreme Architect” endowed us with the “joint possession of whatever had been 
peculiar to each of the different kinds of being.” So, he told man, the product of an afterthought, to “fashion 
thyself in whatever shape thou shalt prefer.” Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, “Oration on the Dignity of Man,” 
trans. Elizabeth Livermore Forbes, The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, eds. Ernst Cassirer et al. (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1948). 223–54. 224–25. 
24 Gatti 95. 
25 Frances Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966) 266. 
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his occupation. This transition is “accompanied by the intrusion of language, by the rise of objects, 
and by the fragmentation of reality,” and it epitomizes in miniature (and foreshadows) Faustus’s 
struggle for an awareness of the relations that connect language to reality and objects to his senses, 
while he tries to maintain his control over these relations. According to Jewel Spears Brooker and 
Joseph Bentley, T. S. Eliot “often refers to the first level as feeling, the second as thought” (39). 
Before Faustus arrives at his discussion of the tenet of salvation in the New Testament, he has 
broken away from a direct identification with the study of dialectic and with the practice of 
medicine and law. He has detached himself from his worldly affairs and is ready to assume a new, 
incorporeal identity, resembling the protagonist in the morality tradition. 
 
2. The Moment of Hesitation 
The condition for salvation is a complete trust in divine grace. By omitting passages in the 
New Testament, Faustus refuses even to acknowledge that this requirement is codified in Scripture. 
He has embarked on an imaginary journey toward a disembodied, transcendental existence, when 
he realizes he is not able to accept this condition, this textual, doctrinal constraint on his freedom to 
shape his view of himself. The hope that in a rhetorical distance to himself he will be able to actively 
determine his fate does not seem to materialize. 
The crucial moment of Faustus’s transformation of identity occurs when he confronts the 
words of St. Paul and St. John the Evangelist and Apostle, in reading what he calls “Jerome’s Bible.”26 
On the one hand, Faustus seems to set himself up for a painful surprise, while, on the other, he has 
secured himself mentally against it. From worldly occupations, he turns to divinity hoping it would 
be “best” (1.1.37), only to find, upon a closer examination of scripture, self-annihilation as the 
“hard” (40) precondition for salvation. Nonetheless, he does so only after he has determined to “be 
                                                     
26 According to the editor, Marlowe probably uses his own “back-translation from English texts:” the Geneva 
Bible from 1560 and The Book of Common Prayer. 1.1.38n. 
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a divine” merely “in show” (3), so that the hypocritical garb of a professional interpreter might 
protect him against the edge of the theological doctrine, even if it still leaves him vulnerable to it as 
a person. His self-imposed injunctions27 in the opening soliloquy sound spontaneous, but his 
deliberations follow the structure of a university disputation exercise in utramque partem, that is, 
on both sides of the argument, and he sums up in them not his reaction to a recent event, but the 
experience of a lifetime in the study of logic and in the practice of medicine and jurisprudence. He 
starts from Aristotelian logic and the kind of formalized disputation the constraints of which he 
would like to leave behind but still observes throughout this soliloquy itself, and ends up with the 
study of theology which he, in spite of his determination to consider it a mere “show,” unexpectedly 
takes to heart. 
Faustus’s wish to protect himself and hide behind false pretenses, behind the texts of 
antiquity and highly formalized ways of expression is itself half-hearted and affected. While he 
depends on the language of both the Scripture and magical texts, he struggles with the limitations of 
those texts. Working his way through his discussion of the practices of logic, medicine, and law, he 
reenacts the way he exposed himself to all the branches of learning and now rejects them one by 
one for bestowing on him a certain, but limiting, identity. This, in turn, suggests that he is in search 
of an occupation that will allow him to rise above such earthly constraints as the company of fellow 
disputants (1.1.7), the “desperate maladies” (22) of the human body, and the ungenerous 
arguments about “external trash” (35) between father and son. He complains about being not more 
than those who enjoy these or suffer from them, about being “still but Faustus, and a man” (23). 
Gatti formulates a sense of suspense at this moment in the play saying that it “is only when this 
sense of man as free to achieve for himself, through his own intellectual impetus, an almost divine 
status has already been hinted at that Faustus reaches, in the central verses of his monologue, the 
                                                     
27 “Settle thy studies Faustus, and begin / To sound the depth of that thou wilt profess” (1.1.1–2), “live and die 
in Aristotle’s works” (5), etc. 
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hard kernel of his problem: his studies of divinity.”28 When he finally encounters the question of 
salvation, a theological tenet that offers him a vista of personal, transcendental self-realization,29 we 
would expect him to embrace it and make it his immediate goal to reach it, as does the Redcrosse 
Knight upon his sight of “new Hierusalem”30 in The Faerie Queene, first printed in 1590,31 around the 
time Marlowe was composing Doctor Faustus.32 Nonetheless, St. Paul’s and St. John’s words touch 
him in a way he cannot cope with. He cannot even reach the promise of “eternal life” and the 
“forgiue[ness of] our sinnes”33 in his reading of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans and St. John’s First 
Epistle, respectively, but stops in St. Paul at the clause foreseeing the punishment of adherents for 
their sins and couples with this John’s statement forestalling claims of exemption from impurity. 
Above, I quoted Gatti on Faustus’s reasons to refuse the “Christian solution to the drastic 
conclusion to the syllogism”34 the Doctor builds by selecting the first halves of two statements and 
omitting the second halves. The “possibility of everlasting torment” and the complete dependence 
“on an act of mercy,” Gatti points out, are themselves, however, the result of a process of reduction. 
To follow the tradition that Heilman inaugurated, Cole acknowledged, even Weil partially admitted, 
that Gatti brought to fruition, and Sinfield drew further conclusions from, I will search for 
archetypes of the “perennial human aspiration […] to reconstruct the cosmos in naturalistic, non-
                                                     
28 Gatti 91. 
29 Colin Morris, The Discovery of the Individual 1050–1200, Church History Outlines Ser. (London: SPCK, 1972) 
147–49. 
30 The Redcrosse Knight says, “O let me not (quoth he) then turne againe / Backe to the world, whose ioyes so 
fruitlesse are; / But let me here for aye in peace remaine, / Or straight way on that last long voyage fare, / 
That nothing may my present hope empire.” Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene, ed. Thomas P. Roche, Jr. 
(London: Penguin, 1978) I X 57, 63. 
31 Thomas P. Roche, Jr, “Introduction,” The Faerie Queene by Edmund Spenser, ed. Thomas P. Roche (London: 
Penguin, 1978) 10. 
32 David Bevington dates Marlowe’s tragedy to the late 1580s. “Introduction to Doctor Faustus,” English 
Renaissance Drama. A Norton Anthology, eds. David Bevington et al. (New York, London: W. W. Norton, 2002) 
245–49. 245. Gatti refers to a consensus among historians that it was “probably written only shortly before 
[Marlowe’s] death in […] 1593” (74). 
33 William Whittingham, The Bible and Holy Scriptures Conteyned in the Olde and Newe Testament (Geneva: 
Rouland Hall, 1560) “To the Romans” 6:23. The First Epistle General of Iohn 1:8–9. Reel position STC 1019 / 
06. Images 568 even page and 607 even page. Early English Books Online. 26 Dec. 2013. 
34 “[F]irst of all,” Gatti argues, “because its concept of death in terms of rewards and punishments leaves open 
the possibility of everlasting torment; and second because it develops a doctrine which leaves man dependent 
for his salvation on an act of mercy on the part of God” (92). 
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theistic terms,”35 because it seems such an ambition lies behind Faustus’s refusal of the Christian 
salvation plan as well as behind the magic he turns to. It is difficult to clearly keep apart two 
notions: one is a trial the individual has to endure to reach self-realization, and the other is the 
experience of death—both are a one-shot affair. While Marlowe focuses Faustus’s initial soliloquy 
on the former and his concluding one on the latter, the Doctor cannot complete his initiation as a 
Christian in the first scene because he does not accept the conditions of his death which, we have all 
reason to assume, takes place in the final scene. This complicates our perception of Faustus’s death 
and makes its actual nature dependent on the status of Faustus’s identity as a Christian, which is 
highly questionable. Therefore, the connections between the notions of initiation and death in 
Doctor Faustus are intricate and would require a separate study.36 
Studying and comparing the most diverse mythologies, religions, and folktales, Joseph 
Campbell assembles, in an archetypical pattern, the journey of the solitary hero. It begins, he claims, 
with a “call to adventure” heralding a serious undertaking, for example, “religious illumination.”37 
Mystics, he writes, quoting Evelyn Underhill, refer to this as “the awakening of the self.”38 Faustus’s 
words in the first scene suggest, indeed, that, as Campbell formulates, the “familiar life horizon has 
                                                     
35 Heilman qtd. in Cole 234. 
36 Robert Ornstein indicates his sensitivity to the subtle problem of the status of Faustus’s death: “Faustus 
makes his own personal hell of negation, a hell that ‘hath no limits, nor is circumscrib’d / In one self place.’ 
But he attempts to escape it in death by losing himself in the natural forces that were to have been his agents 
of creation.” “The Comic Synthesis in Doctor Faustus,” Faust: Sources, Works, Criticism, ed. Paul A. Bates (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969) 150–153. 153. Faustus, it appears, does not die a death in the Christian 
sense, but rather, I would venture, a death in the sense of Lucretius. His prayer, “O soul, be changed into little 
water drops / And fall into the ocean, ne’er be found” (5.2.110f) recalls the poetic description of death in De 
Rerum Natura comparing the human soul to liquid flowing away: “that liquid, once its vessels are shattered, is 
dissipated and its moisture dispersed in all directions, and since mist and smoke disperse into the breezes, 
you must believe that the soul in turn drains away, perishes much more swiftly and dissolves more quickly 
into its original particles, once it has escaped and departed from a man’s frame.” Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, 
Book Three, trans. P. Michael Brown (Warminster, England: Aris & Phillips, 1997) 435–440. Gatti quotes this 
passage in a different translation adding that Giordano Bruno held on to a similar image “throughout his long 
trial” “to dismiss visions of death, both Platonic and Christian, which contemplated in an afterlife the 
judgment of the individual soul” (105–106). The connection between the passage from Lucretius and 
Faustus’s dying words seems obvious. 
37 Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (New World Library: Novato, CA, 2008) 42. 
38 Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism, A Study in the Nature and Development of Man’s Spiritual Consciousness (New 




been outgrown; the old concepts, ideals, and emotional patterns no longer fit; the time for the 
passing of a threshold is at hand.”39 
And still, Faustus falters, and the call, instead of guiding him, deflects his intended 
trajectory. The mythologist’s explanation of the refusal of the call casts some light on the 
consequences of Faustus’s decision. The subject who turns away from the call generally “loses the 
power of significant affirmative action and becomes a victim to be saved,” Campbell says.40 He 
refers to Proverbs for support, to show that life for such a nonconformist “feels meaningless” (49) 
and, apparently, hopeless. “Because I haue called, and ye refused: I haue stretched out mine hand, 
and none wolde regarde,” the Lord of the Old Testament says to the “fooles [who] despise wisdome 
& instruction,” “I will also laugh at your destruction, and mocke, when your feare cometh. When 
your feare […] and your destruction shal come, […] Then shal they call vpon me, but I wil not 
answer.”41 Faustus’s God refuses, indeed, to respond to his call in the last scene of the play, when his 
borrowed time on earth expires and Faustus is, not for the first time, in despair. 
Although the “divinity itself” seems to become Faustus’s “terror” and “the will of God” does 
turn into “a monster” for him, as Campbell characterizes the consequences the uncooperative hero 
must endure, it would be a narrow interpretation to assert that Faustus follows his own selfish 
interest42 to make his “present system of ideals, virtues, goals, and advantages […] fixed and […] 
secure” (49–50). In contrast, Faustus is rather obsessed with the idea that he has to give himself 
away in the pursuit of a goal that is higher than him, even if he is unable to name that goal.43 If he is 
                                                     
39 Campbell 43. 
40 Campbell 49. 
41 William Whittingham, The Bible and Holy Scriptures Conteyned in the Olde and Newe Testament (Geneva: 
Rouland Hall, 1560) Prouerbs 2:24, 7, 26–28. leafe 39, even page; 7:36–50, leafe 268 even page, 267 odd page. 
Early English Books Online 26 Dec. 2013. 
42 Campbell refers here to King Minos, who kept the bull sent to him by Poseidon instead of offering it to the 
god as a sacrifice (49). 
43 Both Christian and occult magical beliefs base their definitions of an ultimate personal goal on the 
realization of identity in an outside entity. In Christianity, this entity is a personal but immaterial presence, 
while in cabbala it is the impersonal and material but knowable world. Cole implies that in Christian theology 
the spirit achieves “meaning and fulfillment to its existence” in “God’s presence.” Faustus suffers, he claims, 
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“timorous” and “fails to make the passage through the door and come to birth in the world without” 
(52), as Campbell outlines the fate of the hero who refuses the call of coming of age, he immediately 
seeks a new “door,” not so well respected, to be sure, but still in the hope that it would lead him to 
the same world “without,” even if by doing so he risks his chance of being accepted in that world in 
Christian terms. In other words, magic and conjuration, in opposition to self-abnegation and the 
acknowledgment of God’s grace, become a way for him to intensify and control his interaction with 
the material world. It is the task of this chapter to answer the question why Faustus cannot pass the 
door that seems to open for him in St. Paul’s and St. John’s words. 
The only way for Faustus to reach independent adulthood in the Christian sense would be 
by overcoming his “terror” of passing through a “door” that threatens to trap him in utter 
helplessness before it may release him. Paradoxically, in the framework of Christian theology, 
adulthood would also mean that, to be saved, Faustus must willingly yield his control over his fate 
to a distant and unaccountable force. He has to decide, freely, to relinquish his freedom and not to 
try to influence his own fate.44 That is, the concept of salvation demands that he make a choice, 
while the notion itself would not arise for Faustus and remain on his horizon throughout the plot if 
he had not made one already, that is, if he did not want to be saved. However, St. Paul and St. John 
make it a point to compel their readers to make a choice, through the promise of eternal happiness, 
in the framework of the Christian salvation plan. The fact that the reader is in the only framework 
                                                                                                                                                                           
exactly because “he has eternally separated himself from the only power that can fulfill and perfect his 
humanity” (192, 243). Kocher, in a similar vein, suggests that Marlowe himself had, at times, an awareness of 
having lost his chance to attain the “highest consummation” of his life when he grew estranged from the 
“religious instruction” of his childhood. On the other hand, according to Gatti, Guiordano Bruno emphasizes 
the cabbalist “mystical death of the soul,” when the mind, in its search for knowledge, “dissolves itself in the 
object” (104). Gatti admits that “the ends [Faustus] is pursuing through” “the art ‘Wherein all natures 
treasury is contained’” “are uncertainly defined” (97). The entity most of the heroes in the plays I analyze in 
this dissertation want to be a part of is larger than their selves: for Iago and Othello it is the idea of the City, 
while for Faustus it is that of the humanly knowable universe. 
44 Jonathan Dollimore characterizes Faustus’s sin as “not the error of fallen judgment but a conscious and 
deliberate transgression of limit. It is a limit which, among other things, […] holds the individual subject 
terrifyingly responsible for the fallen human condition while disallowing him or her any subjective power of 
redemption.” Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his 
Contemporaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004) 115. 
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where the injunction to make this choice might make sense would indicate that the reader has 
already done so. The paradox arrests Faustus’s progress toward an absolute freedom in self-
determination. 
 
3. The Turn to Forbidden Knowledge 
As a result of the split in his subjecthood in his self-address and of the outside point of view 
he attempted to assume in self-observation, Faustus has now involuntarily submitted to a 
Scriptural definition of his identity. This deprives him of a freedom to define himself as a 
questioning, enquiring subject in search of a transcendental point of view he was striving for in his 
opening soliloquy. Nonetheless, the knowledge Faustus has acquired as a student and practitioner 
of logic, medicine, and law, while he still experienced the world directly from an experiential, 
unaffected point of view as Faustus, “a man” (1.1.23), might now be of service in an attempt to 
regain his integrity: to retain the authenticity of his desiring self and to attain, at the same time, a 
vantage point from which he could control his own view of the world. This is what the power of 
magic promises. 
A constant sense of insufficiency justifies the individual’s subjection in Protestant theology. 
Dollimore quotes Walzer when he argues that “The protestant God—‘an arbitrary and wilful, 
omnipotent and universal tyrant’ […]—demanded of each subject that s/he submit personally and 
without mediation.”45 As Calvin makes it clear in The Institution of Christian Religion, “our saluation 
floweth out of the fountaine of the free mercy of God [who] doth not without difference adopt all 
into the hope of saluation, but geueth to some that which he denyeth to other.”46 This doctrine is, 
Calvin adds, the most effective way “to humble us as we ought to be,” and to compel us to “feele 
                                                     
45 Michael Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1966) 151., qtd. in Dollimore 114. 
46 Dollimore 114. 
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from our hart how much we are bounde to God.”47 This does not mean only, as Dollimore explains, 
that the “modes of power formerly incorporated in mediating institutions and practices now 
devolve”48 solely on the Protestant God, but also that God turns entirely unknowable and invisible. 
The “limit” that spurs Faustus to a “conscious and deliberate transgression” “renders God remote 
and inscrutable yet subjects the individual to constant surveillance and correction” (115). He who 
would enquire into God’s foreknowledge, Calvin declares, 
shall both not attaine wherewith to satisfie his curiousnesse, and he shal enter into a 
mase whereof he shal finde no way to get out againe. For neither is it mete that man 
should freely search those thinges which God hath willed to be hidden in himselfe, 
and to turne ouer from very eternitie the height of wisdom, which he willed to be 
honored and not be conceiued, that by it also he mought be meruailous unto us.49 
This renders the adherent blind to God’s knowledge of him or her and, at the same time, conscious 
of being seen and controlled by Him. Dollimore concludes that God’s power in this new 
dispensation is “intimately conceived:”50 in William Perkins’s words, one is not only “to yield 
subjection to him,” but also “to cleave unto him.”51 In terms of the visual metaphor of Faustus’s two 
viewpoints, corporeal and transcendental, God becomes invisible like an impenetrable mirror that 
throws only the believer’s own image back to him or her as invariably insufficient and empty of 
individuality: a mere surface appearance. The believer thus loses confidence in his or her own 
identity and depends for a mere sense of existence on his or her reflected image as if seen from 
God’s point of view, with God’s eyes. 
                                                     
47 John Calvin, The Institution of Christian Religion, trans. Thomas Norton (London: Richarde Harrison, 1562). 
Book III, Chapter xxi. Fol. 302 (odd page)–Fol. 303 (even page). Images 333 odd page and 334 even page. 
Early English Books Online. 27 Dec. 2013. 
48 Dollimore 114. 
49 Calvin 303 even page. 
50 Dollimore 114. 
51 William Perkins, An Instruction Touching Religious or Divine Worship. Works. ed. I. Breward (Abington: 
Sutton Courtenay Press, 1970) 313. Qtd. in Dollimore 114. 
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The helpless isolation of the Christian believer in God’s sight in Elizabethan orthodoxy is the 
result of a loss of self and a devaluation of internal, psychic reality. “It is not in our powers to repent 
when we will,” Phillip Stubbes says. “It is the Lord that giveth the gift, when, where, and to whom it 
pleaseth him.”52 “So if Faustus does not have it, there is nothing he can do,” Sinfield concludes (174). 
Faustus does not accept the arbitrariness of divine grace, and his disappointment is obvious: “Che 
sarà sarà, / What will be, shall be? Divinity, adieu!” (1.1.48f). He attempts to escape the 
contemporary religious and political consciousness. The “daring provocation offered by Faustus’s 
reasoning” in saying “What doctrine call you this? Che sarà sarà, / What will be, shall be? Divinity 
adieu!” (1.1.48f) “can only be fully understood in terms of the historical situation which Marlowe 
was expressing,” Gatti argues.53 Marlowe “was writing at the end of a century in which opposing 
Christian factions had been making ever more drastic use of visions of hell and eternal punishment 
to ensure the obedience of their adherents” (92). Dollimore remarks that “as embodiment of naked 
power alone, God could so easily be collapsed into those tyrants who, we are repeatedly told by 
writers in this period, exploited Him as ideological mystification of their own power.”54 
The mythical hero, in contrast, when he does pass a threshold is scarcely left alone in his 
trials: “there is a benign power everywhere supporting him in his superhuman passage.”55 Even the 
Christian Redcrosse Knight is not without a friendly companion when Una escorts him to the 
“house of Holinesse” and takes him to the “shoolehouse,” even though her support is not 
reciprocated. While Amendment is plucking out his “Inward corruption […] with pincers firie whot,” 
Patience provides him “reliefe” and Una feels “pitty of his paine and anguish sore.”56 A stage in the 
mythical hero’s descent into “his own spiritual labyrinth” is “the ‘purification of the self,’ when the 
senses are ‘cleansed and humbled,’ and the energies and interests ‘concentrated upon 
                                                     
52 Phillip Stubbes, The Anatomie of Abuses, ed. Frederick J. Furnivall (London, 1877–79). Qtd. in Sinfield 174. 
53 Gatti 92. 
54 Dollimore 118f. 
55 Campbell 81. 
56 Spenser I X 18, 25–26, 24, 28. 
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transcendental things’,” Campbell says,57 quoting Underhill. And even in our dreams, Campbell 
assures us, “we may see […] the clue to what we must do to be saved” (84–85). Our ancestors, 
Campbell claims, were able to rely on “symbols and spiritual exercises” when facing mental 
distress, because their beliefs still represented “the real problems of contemporary life” (86f). 
Faustus, however, in his quest of a transcendental fulfillment, does not only have to lose his agency, 
but is bereft of the help of sympathetic fellow travelers. 
Even if he submitted to the salvation plan outlined by Paul and John, he would depend on 
divine mercy as a consequence of the universal inevitability of sin.58 Faustus is defenseless against 
the textual determination of what would happen to him as the explorer of a higher, transcendental 
existence, and he must forgo the hope of making amends for his sins in purgatory.59 But if he turns 
to magic, he might fill the void and experience his own existence in interaction with material reality, 
learn about the virtues of living beings, the influences of celestial bodies on them, and an intricate 
network of inter-dependence that might give him a dynamic sense of identity. No sooner does he 
say farewell to divinity than he puts down the Bible and picks up another book, possibly Cornelius 
Agrippa’s Occult Philosophy or Magic,60 in the hope of bringing his mind in harmony with a spirited 
world: “his dominion that exceeds in this / Stretcheth as far as doth the mind of man!” (1.1.61f). The 
practice of magic requires a knowledge in natural philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, and 
theology.61 Even the Chorus admits Faustus “profits in divinity” (Prologue 15); he has just cast 
                                                     
57 Campbell 84. 
58 The fact that Faustus does not pass the “door” to enter Protestant Christianity through the holy Scriptures 
(according to the doctrine sola scriptura attributed to Martin Luther and confirmed in Calvin, Fol. 303, even 
page) in the first scene postpones his initiation to collapse it with his death in the final scene of the play. This, 
as I observed above, lends to both events an unrealistic quality. 
59 Stephen Greenblatt claims that the Catholic clergy in England benefited enormously from the willingness of 
the wealthy to buy ritual services on their behalf to shorten their time of atonement in Purgatory. The 
anticlerical sentiment arising from this made the doctrine of Purgatory “vulnerable.” Hamlet in Purgatory 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001) 28. 
60 Gatti conjectures that it might be either this or the Picatrix (97). Agrippa’s book is likely, she says, since 
Marlowe chooses the name Cornelius for one of the magicians Faustus calls for as aids and because Faustus 
dreams about becoming “as cunning as Agrippa was” (1.1.118). 
61 Henry Cornelius Agrippa, Occult Philosophy or Magic (Chicago: Hahn & Whitehead, 1898) 38. 
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Aristotle aside, and Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy were parts of the Quadrivium.62 In the 
practice of magic, he might reconcile his desiring self and an external point of view. 
 
4. The Promise of Magic 
Although he hopes to unite his desire for immediate experience with a capacity to conscious 
knowledge and control in magic, Faustus cannot redeem this promise. His perception has been 
shaped by the nature of signs he intends to use as tools, and these afford him a mere abstraction 
and a distant view of the world. The subtle play of interdependences in occult philosophy eludes 
Faustus’s eagerness to know, when he plans to use the material world as a repository of resources. 
As a result, he remains outside the knowable world he intends to grasp. 
Instead of an isolation from the natural environment, Agrippa instructs “the studious 
artisan” (1.1.56) in understanding resemblances that connect “Stones, Metals, Plants and 
Animals,”63 the soul (54), and even each of the human senses (54f) to the different elements. Here, 
God does not appear to be distant, but is in “all things,” and “nothing […] is content with the nature 
of itself.” As Faustus anticipated, “the Soul [is] extended into divers things about which it operates,” 
and “man […] extends his intellect unto intelligible things, and his imagination unto imaginable 
things.” Moreover, as Zoroaster and Synesius believed, when the Soul leaves its habitation and 
permeates another thing, it alters it (69). Agrippa’s is a fluid universe of interdependences. 
The Picatrix, similar to Agrippa’s Occult Philosophy or Magic, is an extensive treatise on 
“theurgic Neoplatonism,” describing a world with “currents of influence cascad[ing] from the divine 
unity at its summit” and teaching the magician about the “ways of these currents” and how to tap 
                                                     
62 E. H. Gombrich, “The Renaissance – Period or Movement?,” Background to the English Renaissance. 
Introductory Lectures, eds. A. G. Dickens et al. (London: Gray-Mills, 1974) 9–30. 11. 
63 Agrippa 53. 
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into them “to perform magical works.”64 Rather than closing himself down, the God of the Picatrix 
wants to be known; in fact, his “greatest gift […] to humanity [is] that they might seek to know and 
understand.”65 Faustus seems to be animated with the “passion” (26) to acquire such a knowledge. 
At least, magic seems to have “ravish’d” (1.1.111) him as did previously Aristotle (5f), then 
medicine, law, and divinity had done. 
The experience of a narrow escape from the emptiness and subjection he feared would 
overpower him in the “hard” (40) tenet of sin and death, however, might make his “libido sciendi,” 
the longing for knowledge, tainted with a “libido dominandi” a desire to rule.66 As a consequence, 
instead of a desire to understand and interact with living and inanimate beings, a sense of 
possession and a tendency to arbitrary, whimsical, and ruthless exploitation characterize his 
treatment of them. He acts as if he impersonated the Protestant God whom Walzer characterized as 
tyrannical.67 However he purports to ignore the Christian doctrine he refuses to name, Faustus has 
already internalized the rigor of God who seems to be absent from his creation. Once he aspires to a 
transcendental agency, Faustus cannot help being energized by the perspective which offers him an 
operational distance to the world. As soon as he says “adieu” to divinity, he imagines that, 
empowered by a “metaphysics of magicians,” he can fill its place. He replaces Jerome’s Bible with 
“necromantic books” (1.1.49–51) full of “[l]ines, circles, seals, letters and characters” (52) that are 
just as much removed from the experience of the world they purport to explain as the paradoxical 
injunction in Paul and John he tried to escape from before. Mere signs do not bring him closer to 
finding himself, “the studious artisan” (56). The more he expands his view, the more general it 
appears to be. In his climactic moment of grasping the world in a heroic intellectual effort he 
identifies it with his own abstract imagination: “his dominion that exceeds in this,” that is, in magic, 
                                                     
64 John Michael Greer and Christopher Warnock, “Introduction,” The Picatrix, eds. John Michael and 
Christopher Warnock (Iowa City: Adocentyn Press, 2010) 11–19. 12. 
65 The Picatrix 26. 
66 Gatti 98. 
67 Dollimore 114. 
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“[s]tretcheth as far as doth the mind of man!” (61f), he exclaims. Ironically, he calls his sources of 
inspiration “heavenly” (51). 
His perception of the world changes once Faustus assumes a standpoint which promises a 
comprehensive view of the universe and perhaps an understanding of the seeming paradox that its 
creator offers participation in his divine plan to his most “excellent” creature, “man” (2.3.9), only in 
exchange for his self-annihilation. Now he tries to vindicate his previous anticipation of a “greater 
subject” than “to dispute well” (11, 8), of a “profession […] esteem’d” more than one aiming merely 
at “our bodies’ health” (26, 17), and less “servile and illiberal” than parceling out “external trash” 
(36, 35) among disputants. All these professions engaged Faustus in a give-and-take of offer and 
acceptance. All of them required him to submit his senses and his action to tedious rules of 
interaction and the “ravishment” of reading (7–8, 6), to meet the challenge of the “plague” and other 
“desperate maladies” (21, 22), and to respond to “petty case[s] of paltry legacies” with his 
knowledge of Justinian (30). Now, in a state of delusion, such restrictions almost entirely evaporate; 
and the power of mere desire transports “the studious artisan” (56) to “a world of profit and 
delight, / Of power, of honor, [and] of omnipotence” (54f), where an exchange between parties 
gives way to the power of a disembodied, all-seeing eye. 
 
5. “Libido Dominandi” 
The distance Faustus creates between himself and the world by attempting to appropriate it 
by means of signs corresponds to the unreality of an all-encompassing and simplifying visual image. 
Faustus constructs the world anew in his appropriating gaze. The view he creates in his fantasy 
does not afford him any understanding of processes or the connections and correspondences 
among objects or phenomena magic seemed to promise.68 Faustus even seems to have lost the 
                                                     
68 In his article on “Marlowe and the Fruits of Scholarism,” Richard F. Hardin sums up the disappointing lack 
of insight magic yields to Faustus, saying, “the play supposedly rejects the stale bread of conventional 
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capacity for empathy to recognize the similarity between his position and that of Mephastophilis 
with regard to a distant and unapproachable God. While he is not able to reflect on his own 
perception consciously, Faustus alienates himself from the world he was eager to turn into his own 
“dominion” (1.1.61). 
Seen from Faustus’s transcendental vantage point, the world changes its appearance. Its 
image appears as an even surface with point-like objects at clearly defined locations or moving 
predictably across it. To make his vision unobstructed, Faustus irons his image of the globe into a 
flat plane displaying what he desires to see. Even the remotest objects appear with the same 
sharpness in outline, be they gold in India, pearls at the bottom of the ocean, or “pleasant fruits and 
princely delicates” in any “corners of the new found world” (1.1.83, 84, 86, 85). At the same time, 
Faustus perceives these objects as types or categories exhibiting their most characteristic attributes 
as their hallmarks. Gold is typically in India, pearl is “orient,” that is, “lustrous,” fruits are “pleasant,” 
and delicacies are “princely” (83, 84, 84n, 86). Disparate targets in the field of his vision have no 
intrinsic qualities to individuate them; each exemplifies invariably the premium quality of its 
category. 
Previously, Faustus was able to immerse himself in one subject at a time, even though his 
attention had a limited span. He had to shift his attention and activity constantly from one field to 
the other: from “Aristotle’s works” to Galen, to Justinian, and to what he called Jerome’s Vulgate. 
This way he focused on one subject at a time, and reached a considerable depth of understanding in 
each, before he moved on to the next. Now he has no difficulty in fixing his gaze on the whole world 
at once from a distance to encompass its totality. “All things that move between the quiet poles,” he 
asserts, “Shall be at my command” (1.1.58). He stresses his achievement in overcoming the strict 
boundaries that hitherto separated the fields of which he could engage only in one at a time: 
                                                                                                                                                                           
learning and doctrine for the exhilarating narcotic of occult knowledge, forbidden power. Yet, this reading 
collapses when we learn, beginning with the pranks on the Pope, the folly of Faustus.” Philological Quarterly 
63 (1984): 387–400. 393. 
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“Emperors and kings / Are but obey’d in their several provinces,” he revels in his new-found 
freedom, “But his dominion that exceeds in this,” that is, “excels” in magic, “Stretcheth as far as doth 
the mind of man!” (1.1.58f, 61, 61n, 62). 
Nonetheless, while he has a vision of the whole knowable world, Faustus lacks an 
understanding of its processes and of the nature of the connections between its constituent 
elements. Objects on display in this visible and characteristically visual world are not related to 
each other or connected to a larger whole of which they would form an organic part. They have no 
history: they are not subject to change, evolution, growth or decay. Gold is pure without needing to 
be mined or processed from the ore, pearls are ready to be collected, fruits always ripe for the 
harvest, and “delicates” need only be relished. Resources are in endless supply and ready to serve 
Faustus’s gaze, and he is unaware of the constitutive effect it has on their existence, their 
arrangement and appearance. 
Faustus’s relation to his world is, nonetheless, more complicated by his impulse to take 
possession of it as a conglomerate of diverse objects and opportunities in a single intellectual and 
creative gesture. Moreover, while his imagination gives rise to an array of potential targets for his 
desire, his attitude about them betrays a distrust of their reality and an uncertainty of their actual 
availability for him. At first sight, all items in the inventory seem to be offering themselves like 
fruits hanging from a tree awaiting Faustus’s picking, if he wished to reach out for them. However, 
Faustus is so overpowered by the effect of this mirage, the “conceit” of what he only refers to with 
the vague deixis “this” (79), that he is not even sure if he can inhabit this world as if it was his home. 
He does not even consider what he needs of the infinite resources, for what purpose, or in what 
order. In addition to being at a remove from his imaginary world, he senses even the spirit that 
might give rise to this garden, this “fruitful plot” (Prologue 16), as a being separate from himself. He 
gives life to it in a purely intellectual, masculine kind of procreation when he says, “Here tire, my 
brains, to [be]get a deity” (1.1.64 and 64n). And then he halts in his gesture of plucking the “apple” 
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he has conjured, asking, “Shall I make spirits fetch me what I please […]?” (80, emphasis added), as 
if he were wary of treading on the ground of this earthly paradise himself lest it should turn out to 
be the figment of somebody’s imagination—and possibly not even his own. He had rather send 
those spirits to explore it than do it himself. As he goes along and reveals more of the miracles of 
this created universe and his own perception of it, he resembles more and more Bottom in the fairy 
world.69 However, Faustus’s orders are even less direct than those of Bottom, and their conditional 
character undercuts the effect of his hesitant attempts to ascertain the nature of his world.70 
Continuing from the tentative question quoted above, Faustus wonders if he should ask those 
spirits to “Resolve me of all ambiguities” (81), as if even his own doubts were an entity separate 
from himself. His implicit references to his own perception create the impression in the reader or 
the audience that he hesitates to trespass on alien territory. He is not appropriating this world in 
his own right, but rather tentatively testing the reality of his own existence in somebody else’s 
image of it. 
For the medieval chronicler, the surface appearance of separate entities expresses their 
characteristic nature. This is not unlike Faustus’s identification of gold with its origin in India, pearl 
by its “lustrous” or “orient” quality, and of “fruits” and “delicates” by their being “pleasant” and 
“princely” respectively (83f, 86). From his reading of English medieval texts, William J. Brandt 
concludes that the description of the essence of something by a list of its attributes with no 
reference to its “relationship to anything else in the universe […] is characteristic of medieval 
                                                     
69 “Scratch my head, Peaseblossom. […] Monsieur Cobweb,” Bottom says, “kill me a red-hipped humble-bee on 
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thought generally.”71 This “approach to the phenomenal world,” Brandt makes it clear, “prohibits 
explanation and, in any modern sense, understanding” (8). 
In this respect, too, the new vision Faustus acquires is medieval. It deprives him of an 
understanding of anything that might lurk beneath the even surface of his mirage, like, for example, 
the psychological reality of a suffering mind. He can imagine hell only as a location like every other 
place on earth, and has no concept of an altered state of mind like being “tormented” mentally as a 
result of “being depriv’d of everlasting bliss” (1.3.79f), as Mephastophilis is trying to explain the 
consequences of the Fall for him. Faustus calls his own lack of compassion “manly fortitude” (85), 
while he is, in fact, unable to see the close connection between Mephastophilis’s rue over his loss 
and his own longing to become part of God’s eternal bliss in heaven.72 
Faustus shares with Mephastophilis his obsession with and fear of the Christian God and his 
inability to resolve the conflict between his desire to experience his nearness and his dread of being 
annihilated by it. Stephen Greenblatt calls this ambiguous attitude a “subversive identification with 
the alien.”73 Faustus’s constant hesitation issues from a resentment at his own perception that to 
embrace the scriptural doctrine, to enjoy a position of belonging to God, requires that he dissolves 
his self in a predetermined mold. He senses a potential companionship with Mephastophilis on the 
basis of their shared distance from God and their inability to overcome it. Still, this companionship 
cannot develop into a solidarity or an understanding. Neither Faustus nor Mephastophilis can 
accept and take ownership of their religious personae. 
In his fantasy, Faustus becomes God himself, the magician, who creates spirits to serve him 
and who holds the entirety of creation in his all-encompassing gaze. He takes up the creator’s point 
                                                     
71 William J. Brandt, The Shape of Medieval History: Studies in Modes of Perception (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1966) 8. 
72 Faustus’s inability to understand Mephastophilis’ sense of loss is all the more striking because, in contrast 
to the morality tradition, “the more typical qualities of the stage devil” in this play “are thrust into the 
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73 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1980) 203. Qtd. in Dollimore 118. See also footnote 51 above. 
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of view to understand his divine plan, but the vision he acquires this way is severely restrictive and 
disappointingly simplifying. If he is an impersonator, this attire does not become his own.74 
Faustus’s science of “[l]ines, circles, seals, letters and characters” enables him to “raise the wind,” to 
“rend the clouds” (1.1.52, 60), and to render the resources of the earth ready at his disposal in his 
fantasy. He is not in interaction with them anymore because he cannot respond to their needs as 
beings in their own right. His vision of the world is now alienating compared to his experience of it 
when he was “still but Faustus, and a man” (1.1.23). 
At the moment when he manages to formulate his own attitude to the universe surrounding 
him most explicitly, Faustus loses it as an object of his genuine, unprepossessed interest. The 
exclamation that “his dominion that exceeds in this / Stretcheth as far as doth the mind of man” 
(1.1.61f) signals the summit of Faustus’s intellectual achievement and introduces a decline in his 
ability to take and understand the world that he thus appropriates on its own terms. As a result of 
the dramatic irony in the way Marlowe represents him, when Faustus names objects that appear to 
him now in a characteristically medieval, disparate manner and describes ways he could play with 
them by merely rearranging and redistributing them, he in fact celebrates a way of seeing which 
envelops him and protects him from being affected by those objects. In this, his view of the world 
becomes mechanistic and superficial. Instead of understanding it, he holds it at an arm’s length, at 
an operational distance. 
In spite of his refusal of the plan of salvation, Faustus is still a captive of the medieval, 
Augustinian model of the Christian view of subjectivity. Charles Taylor calls this view “the 
inwardness of radical reflexivity.”75 As St Augustine prescribed it, Faustus rises above his own self 
in search of a “higher reality” (128). While he makes himself, as a consequence, the “object of [his 
                                                     
74 Wearing it, he is “besides his part” like the “unperfect actor on the stage” in Shakespeare’s “Sonnet 23,” 
“Whose strength’s abundance weakens his own heart.” The Norton Shakespeare. Based on the Oxford Edition, 
ed. Stephen Greenblatt (New York, London: W W Norton, 1997) 1930f. 
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own] attention” (130), he also puts himself in a position outside the sensual world. Faustus is not 
merely a decentered subject in Jonathan Dollimore’s sense,76 but he also loses his grasp on the 
world he desires to inhabit. He becomes a mere spectator of an image he projects onto the screen of 
his imagination. 
 
6. Referential Semantics 
Not only Faustus’s perception, but his attitude to signification, too, lags behind the creative 
use of language in contemporary literary texts where, according to Sir Phillip Sidney, wisdom is 
“figured forth by the speaking picture of poesy.”77 Although he has exceptional poetic skills, his 
dependence on the theological frame of reference condemns him to a simplifying literalism. The 
training he receives from the devils limits Faustus’s chances to give meaning to his experience. His 
attempted escape from a narrow discursive and perceptual framework does not allow him a greater 
freedom of action. 
While the play is meta-theatrical in the sense that it emphasizes the experience of the world 
as a show, Faustus approaches this series of performances as audience, as impersonator, and as 
director, in a thoroughly anti-theatrical, and what is more, anti-poetical way. He conceives of the 
theatrical production of meaning in a predominantly referential manner, in which each word 
corresponds to one single referent in the outside world. Gatti argues that the strictly allegorical way 
of signification in “that most dreary of tired spectacles,”78 for example the procession of the seven 
deadly sins, reinforces Faustus’s belief in a “magic” “connection between words and things.”79 Each 
character in this show is a tautology in itself to reconfirm the “power of language” in a naïve sense 
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79 Richard Waswo, Laguage and meaning in the Renaissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) 26. 
141 
 
of reference as Richard Waswo defines it: “the immediate, magical control of objects and persons” 
(25). Belzebub instructs Faustus in the art of taking each character to represent exactly what its 
name suggests80 and, conversely, to say its name to invoke it as a notion that that name designates: 
“Now Faustus, question them of their names and dispositions” (2.3.107), Belzebub says. Faustus’s 
experience in each case that those “dispositions” are identical with their “names” confirms his 
concept that words and ideas fuse in an ideal and unquestionable unity, and this conviction, in turn, 
provokes and justifies his response to each appearance. 
This kind of training in the simple referential use of words forestalls an understanding of 
how words signify and how they create meaning and an illusion of reality. In the B-Text, Pride, for 
example, introduces itself saying, “I am Pride,” and once it gives enough evidence of its identity, 
Faustus remarks, “[t]hou art a proud knave indeed.”81 Envy enters in the same fashion, with the 
words “I am Envy,” and Faustus gives it its cue to exit, exclaiming, “Away, envious rascal!”82 
Gluttony names itself, similarly, as “Gluttony,” and Faustus condemns it saying, “Choke thyself, 
glutton!”83 Finally, Faustus comments on this exercise in unproblematically identifying name with 
essence saying, “this feeds my soul.”84 
Waswo contrasts the strict unity of word and its meaning in medieval referential semantics 
and the Renaissance semantic revolution which recognized the conditional relationship between 
sign and referent and employed the creative power of the word in poetry. His definition of 
referential semantics sums up the kind of signification Faustus practices here: “referential 
semantics,” Waswo argues, “does not explain how language means, but either escapes or celebrates 
its power to do so.”85 The Renaissance, however, was a period with a heightened linguistic and 
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poetic creativity. In the linguistic consciousness of the period, a shift took place “from referential to 
relational semantics.” The former model takes language “as the clothing or container of thoughts, 
feelings, objects, and meanings,” while the latter regards it “as constituting those thoughts, feelings, 
objects, and meanings in the very act of articulating them.”86 The exercise in signification Lucifer 
and Belzebub provide defies Waswo’s argument that “a constitutive view of the relation between 
language and meaning emerged in the Renaissance” (61). 
Lucifer and Belzebub’s instruction on language use is, further, the opposite of Giordano 
Bruno’s emphasis on experience as the primary guide in a creative, poetic name giving. Gatti sums 
up Bruno’s stance in De triplici minimo saying, words “must be the servants of meanings, not 
meanings the servants of words as the grammarians make them.”87 
Lucifer and Belzebub train Faustus to perceive the world as a collection of separate, 
“unique,” and “self-subsistent”88 entities, to identify the essence of these with their surface 
appearance and behavior, and to sum each of them up in a word that automatically invokes it, so as 
to etch this elementary perception of a fragmented and incoherent world in his mind. This exercise 
in a stupefying, unimaginative, and unpoetic signification is in harmony with Mephastophilis’ 
attempt to confine Faustus’s vision of the universe within the limits of the Ptolemaic world view.89 
“Nowhere does Mephostophilis allow him so much as to crack the compact shell of conventional 
dogma and explanation,” Gatti states (103). To Faustus’s enquiry about “the nature of demons and 
hell,” Gatti adds, Mephostophilis “replies with the accepted biblical explanation of the war in heaven 
and the defeat of the over-proud Lucifer” (103). His position in the hierarchy of being determines 
what Faustus is allowed to know: “to Faustus’s ultimate question about the creator and the 
creation, he returns a scandalized refusal to offer to man knowledge beyond his station” (103). The 
                                                     
86 Waswo 60. 
87 Gatti 103. 
88 Brandt 9f. 
89 Gatti 102. 
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restriction of thinking via emblematic concepts helps Mephastophilis confine Faustus’s thinking 
within the limits of “the traditional dichotomy between good and evil, salvation and sin” (103). 
This practice includes a tableau vivant with Faustus at its center to confirm his sense of 
identity. Mephastophilis “fetch[es]” devils to crown him, dress him in lavish costume, and dance 
around him. When Faustus looks for a sense behind this “show,” Mephastophilis dismisses the 
question saying that it means “[n]othing” and that its purpose is merely to “let thee see what magic 
can perform” (2.1.82–85). At the same time, Mephastophilis reassures Faustus that he, too, “may 
[…] raise such spirits when [he] please[s]” and “do greater things than these” (86f). Faustus’s 
perception of self-contained objects is going to be reinforced in acts of language that isolate them 
from the rest of the world. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Faustus endeavors to reach beyond the discursive theological framework because he does 
not accept an identity in the corporate church. However, this attempt falters in both his language 
and his perception. As a result, he constructs for himself a simplified, imaginary world that 
corresponds to a static, literal use of language, which allow him no understanding or meaningful 
action. The third play I have discussed represents an exception from the others in this dissertation: 
it does not continue the progress toward an isolation of the two components of identity, self and 
persona, in separate characters that The Comedy of Errors has begun. While Antipholus of Syracuse 
represents an amorphous sense of desire, his Ephesian counterpart appears as an empty public 
figure. Arden of Faversham and Othello will continue this progress of growing division. Nonetheless, 
Doctor Faustus stands alone in his thwarted attempt to build a discursive persona and use it as a 
vantage point to manipulate the world as a collection of objects. He cannot make the discourse he 






From “Circulating Passions” to the Power of Discourse: 
The Structure of Identity in Henry VIII and in Arden of Faversham 
 
This chapter takes a step deeper into the crisis of identity. While Hodge overcomes his 
conundrum triumphantly and finds a unity of public persona and inner self in a gesture of tying up 
his breeches with a leather thong and understanding himself as a marriageable young man, 
Antipholus of Syracuse’s search for a social function ends with the stifling of his unique identity in 
perpetual namelessness. Arden’s insistence on his essential, organic self and his blatant denial of 
the necessity to build a social figure for himself in Faversham creates a tragic irony: everybody 
around him perceives him as a representative of the crown. As a result, he cannot escape his fate in 
a town controlled by forces reactionary to the economic and political consequences of Henry VIII’s 
reformation and even to Edward VI’s radical Protestant innovations in worship. 
After a survey of how the two main elements, passion and discourse, that influence the 
perception of identity in the play appear in the criticism, I will rehearse the main points of the 
theory of identity formation that dominated early modern Christianity, based on the explanation I 
included in the Introduction. I will use Henry VIII’s formidable figure as an example to show how 
identity formation worked in practice. To uncover the reasons for Arden’s failure, I will ask the 
question if similarities can be detected between the technique Henry used to successfully present 
himself as a political figure and the way dramatic characters in fictional Faversham struggle for 





1. Passion versus Discourse in the Criticism 
Domestic tragedy emerges as a forerunner of modern tragic drama in Ada Lou Carson and 
Herbert L. Carson’s survey of Domestic Tragedy in English insofar as both genres use “common 
characters,” and the tragic outcome in neither of them follows “only from inner weakness” but “can 
be the result of outer forces.”1 This definition in itself accounts for much of the attention paid to 
those “outer forces” around “common characters,” especially in the case of Arden of Faversham—a 
play with obvious references to real-life people below the line of “the most important of all 
divisions in early modern society: that between the nobility and gentry on the one hand and the 
commonality on the other.”2 With respect to modern drama, the authors of the survey characterize 
those “outer forces” as “not the mysterious forces of fate” but rather a determining frame “created 
by humans but not necessarily controlled by humans” (1). By this the authors mean “social 
influences, economic developments, the confluence of national movements,” etc., which I would 
sum up as the unintended consequences of human activity, and which can be observed not only in 
the background of modern British and American drama but certainly in the drama of Tudor 
England as well. However, Arden of Faversham is special in this respect because the forces that 
influenced the historic event the play dramatizes, the murder of Thomas Ardern,3 can be traced 
back directly to royal policies under Henry VIII and under his son Edward VI. Edward continued his 
father’s primarily “political” and “legislative” reformations and turned them into a more 
                                                     
1 Ada Lou Carson and Herbert L. Carson, Domestic Tragedy in English, Vol. 1 (Salzburg, Austria: Universität 
Salzburg, 1982). 1. “In English domestic tragedy are the roots of modern drama” (33), they argue. With Keith 
Sturgess, the authors suggest even that “the better Elizabethan domestic tragedies anticipate twentieth-
century ‘kitchen-sink drama’.” Keith Sturgess, Three Elizabethan Domestic Tragedies (Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 
1969) 7, qtd. in Carson and Carson 35. 
2 Michael Neill, Putting History to the Question: Power, Politics, and Society in English Renaissance Drama (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2000) 52. 
3 The historic personage the dramatic character Thomas Arden stands for was “known in his own time as 
Ardern.” Lena Cowen Orlin, Private Matters and Public Culture in Post-reformation England (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1994) 15. 
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pronouncedly “Protestant”4 reformation. The play reflects both the socio-economic and the 
religious consequences of these policies. 
Written accounts tried to obscure and erase references to such connections to the crown 
beginning with the Harley manuscript Holinshed used for his 1577 edition of the Chronicles,5 the 
primary source of Arden of Faversham. Due to a perceived “impertinence” of the story, in the 
decades following the publication (1577 and 1587) of Holinshed’s Chronicles, Richard Helgerson 
argues, “Arden’s murder wholly lost its place in the formal writing of history.”6 In this respect, the 
story fared no better than “a whole range of […] suspect historical interests […] that were repressed 
by the post-Holinshed redefinition of history” in the framework of what Helgerson dubs the 
“humanist enterprise” of Holinshed’s “more discriminating Elizabethan and Jacobean successors” 
(135). As a result of this tendency in “humanist historiography,” the murder story has been driven 
out of the bounds of “serious” (135) writings and survived in marginal genres like popular history, 
the history of crime, and domestic history which accommodate interests in the play and its real-life 
background at the expense of defining its subject matter as “vulgar” (136), “disruptive” (137), and 
“private” (138), respectively.7 
As Helgerson formulates, in the light of documentary evidence pertaining to Arden’s murder 
“the division of elite from popular, of law-abiding (or law-making) from criminal, of public from 
private, of men from women, of national from local […] all crumble” (152). In Neill’s words, Arden of 
Faversham presents a world of ambitious bourgeoisie, upstart serving-men, and masterless 
                                                     
4 Christopher Haigh distinguishes between the two in his English Reformations: Religion, Politics, and Society 
under the Tudors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 187–202. 
5 Martin L. Wine, “Introduction,” The Tragedy of Master Arden of Faversham, ed. Martin L. Wine. The Revels 
Plays Ser. (London: Methuen, 1973) xlii. Richard Helgerson sums up the most crucial connections between 
low and high that are absent from written accounts. 
6 Richard Helgerson, “Murder in Faversham,” The Historical Imagination in Early Modern Britain: History, 
Rhetoric, and Fiction, 1500–1800, eds. Donald R. Kelley and David Harris Sacks, Woodrow Wilson Center Ser. 
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 
134. 
7 New historicist studies seem to save the value of stories like that of Arden by presenting them as 
“particular” and “odd” (Helgerson 144). And this, Helgerson claims, was Holinshed’s attitude in telling the 
story as well. 
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swaggerers, in which [a] boundary between the gentle and the common appears dangerously 
porous” (57f). In the country, as in London, belief in the power of textuality fights its battle against 
menacing, chaotic forces like female sexuality, Catholic idolatry, and pagan mythology8—with the 
latter bundle of forces having slightly more chances of survival in the country, as the play 
illustrates, than in London, and enjoying there even a short-lived dominance. However, writing and 
humanist exegesis in the service of the monarchy prevailed in Tudor England, and they drove the 
story of the struggle out of memory by denying Arden and his demise a place in prestigious writing. 
One of the reasons, according to Helgerson, for the exclusion of Arden’s case from history, 
that is, “a new insistence on narrative coherence” (148), is already apparent in the play in two 
major ways that compete with each other for dominance. On the one hand, the crown attempts to 
define Arden’s persona through the authoritative text of a royal patent; on the other hand, his 
murderers constantly strive to organize the forces of resistance to Henry’s and Edward’s revolution 
in myths of their own creation that would, by the power of their own coherence, incorporate and 
eventually defeat Arden. 
Although the two Carsons’ survey does not yet acknowledge the social or historic relevance 
of Arden of Faversham, the connection between Henry VIII’s Dissolution and the tensions in the play 
surrounding Arden, the new owner of the abbey lands in Faversham, is one of cause and effect. As 
Lena Cohen Orlin formulates, “Thomas Ardern […] played a supporting part in what has been called 
Cromwell’s administrative ‘revolution’.”9 The time that had elapsed between the dissolution of the 
first monasteries under Henry10 and the events the play represents is merely fourteen years, 
roughly a third only of the forty years that passed from those events until the first performance of 
                                                     
8 “The dissolution of the monasteries, the establishment of a state religion, the growth in royal sovereignty, 
the networks of national patronage and affiliation, the laws of marriage and divorce – all these are implicated 
in this local story of adultery and murder” (Helgerson 158). 
9 Orlin 24. 
10 Henry dissolved the first three monasteries (Whalley, Barlings, and Kirkstead) in March 1537. G. W. 
Bernard, The King’s Reformation: Henry VIII and the Remaking of the English Church (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2005) 433. Arden’s murder occurred on February 15, 1551. Patricia Hyde, “Arden, 
Thomas,” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 7 Apr. 2014. 
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the play. Those fourteen years indicate the historic proximity between the Dissolution and, four 
years after Henry’s death, the murder of Thomas Ardern, while the forty years show the lasting 
interest in the events and in their historic circumstances. According to Orlin, the historic Ardern 
established himself in Faversham by 154011 and acquired town property there in 1545 (31), that is, 
during Henry’s reign. This proves the important connection between Henry’s policies and Arden’s 
murder, the subject of the play. 
A gradual revelation and close examination in the criticism of the political and economic 
connections between the court and the social life in Faversham have provided us with a context to 
understand the treasonous rebellion as a local reaction to the impact of the most important political 
and economic changes in Tudor England, namely Henry VIII’s break with Rome and the dissolution 
of the monasteries. Although this endeavor has revealed intriguing connections of cause and effect 
between acts at the court and the murder, it presupposes a one-way relationship top down, and it 
does not allow for an understanding of possible analogies between how agents on the national and 
on the local level deal with the same political and economic changes that they participate in and to 
which they have to adapt. An examination of such analogies might take us beyond the traditional 
dichotomy of private and public, local or domestic and national, and show that the political, 
economic, and religious changes in question necessitate the evolution of similar techniques of 
identity formation both below and above the great divide in early modern society, certainly with 
vastly different chances of success, as I will try to show. 
Furthermore, there is a connection between “the disruption of normal family 
relationships”12 as it is apparent in Arden and Alice’s marriage and the violence and suffering that 
                                                     
11 Orlin 27. 
12 Keith Sturgess, ed. Three Elizabethan Domestic Tragedies (Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 1969) 14, 18f, qtd. in 
Carson and Carson 16. 
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accompanied the marital career of the English monarch Henry VIII,13 most notably his marriages to 
Catherine of Aragon and Anne Boleyn, which were entangled with his struggle for dominance over 
the Church of England14 and the crucial role of the historic, legal, and religious textual evidence and 
its tendentious interpretation that helped him succeed. Catherine Belsey makes a direct connection 
between Thomas Ardern’s murder in Faversham in 1551 and a large-scale social tendency she 
identifies as the crisis of “the institution of marriage” in the period. The crime, she claims, coincided 
with the beginning of a struggle to eliminate the independence of the private realm of the 
household in the name of “the public good.”15 The play Arden of Faversham, she adds, appeared at a 
time when the “debate about marriage” (84) became intense. Based on historic evidence she argues 
that, although the actual number of wives who murdered their husbands did not increase 
significantly in the sixteenth century,16 there was a heightened awareness of the presence of 
mariticide and a fear of its likely occurrence. 
In spite of efforts to control marriage and divorce institutionally after Henry’s legislative 
reformation, “the position of marriage remained extremely confused and controversial for the rest 
of the century,” Catherine Belsey claims,17 with the rigid “Anglican doctrine of the indissolubility 
of marriage” (96) leaving no escape for desperate spouses other than “whoredoms and adulteries, 
                                                     
13 “Alice, if one accepts the arguments of Catherine Belsey, was prompted in her crime by a crisis in the 
institutional basis of marriage that derived from state action” (Helgerson 133–158. 154). Catherine Belsey, 
The Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in Renaissance Drama (London: Methuen, 1985) 137–144. 
14 In his lecture, Keith Wrightson says, “Henry’s interesting marital career was […] part” of the “larger 
process” of the English reformation he initiated. Keith Wrightson, Hist 251: Early Modern England: Politics, 
Religion, and Society under the Tudors and Stuarts. Lecture 8 – Reformation and Division, 1530–1558. Yale Open 
Courses. oyc.yale.edu, Fall 2009. 18 April 2014. 
15 Catherine Belsey, “Alice Arden’s Crime,” Renaissance Drama 13 (1982): 83–102. 84. Catherine Belsey, The 
Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in Renaissance Drama (London and New York: Methuen, 1985) 130. 
16 In early modern England, “(and indeed down to the present), men have consistently made up the great 
majority of those prosecuted for noninfanticidal homicide, and violent offenses generally, and for marital 
homicide in particular,” Martin J. Wiener argues. While men were always the predominant perpetrators of 
marital homicide, and women the pronounced exception in this role, the attention and treatment each gender 
received varied greatly over time.” Further, Wiener remarks that popular literature in the later sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries significantly overrepresented women among murderers. “Alice Arden to Bill Sikes: 
Changing Nightmares of Intimate Violence in England, 1558–1869.” The Journal of British Studies 40.2 (Apr. 
2001): 184–212. 186f, 188. 
17 Belsey, “Alice Arden’s Crime” 94. 
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and worse things than these.”18 Alice’s crime in its historic reality, Belsey sums up, was evidence of 
a failed effort on the part of the government to control domestic affairs and instrumentalize the 
family as “a training ground for the ready acceptance of the power relations established in the 
social body” (100). However, Belsey does not raise the question whether affairs in the royal family 
might have contributed to the failure of institutional efforts to stabilize marriage and utilize it in the 
interest of the state. Henry, the most prominent husband in the nation, divorced and abandoned his 
first wife, Catherine of Aragon, and Thomas Cromwell abused the charge of infidelity in his case 
against Anne Boleyn in the service of the state to bring about her judicial murder. 
The possible effect of Henry’s “domestic” affairs on the status of what we might term private 
indicates that, besides the social and economic consequences of the Dissolution and the fight over 
choices in the modes of religious worship during the rest of the Tudor era, the division Henry 
sowed in the royal household and among his children as successors must have complicated the 
perception of gender relations and the function and value of the family. Michael Neill emphasizes in 
the language of the play, a domestic tragedy, the “dramatization of conflicts over rank and status” 
(52). Henry’s reformation came along with events that questioned the independent value of 
marriage and brutally asserted the primacy of national interest over family relations at the highest 
level of Tudor society. Belsey’s essay places the real-life murder of Arden in a social perspective and 
acknowledges that the historic figure behind Alice Arden was “caught up in a struggle larger than 
her chroniclers recognize.”19 The arguments over the meaning of marriage between absolutists and 
liberals, she says, “cannot be isolated from the political struggles which characterize the century 
between the Reformation and the Revolution.”20 
                                                     
18 Martin Bucer, “De Regno Christi,” transl. John Milton, Complete Prose Works by John Milton, ed. Ernest 
Sirluck, vol. 2 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959) 447. Qtd. in Belsey, “Alice Arden’s Crime” 95, The 
Subject of Tragedy 141. 
19 Belsey, “Alice Arden’s Crime” 98, The Subject of Tragedy 144. 
20 Belsey, “Alice Arden’s Crime” 97, The Subject of Tragedy 143. 
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Theories of a crossing of the boundary between private and public21 point out but do not 
quite explain this intricate entanglement of sexuality, marriage, and the family with the larger 
political and religious changes in the period. Neither Neill nor Belsey, for example, mentions the 
effect Henry’s highly visible figure, towering over his successors and casting his shadow beyond the 
Tudor era, imprints characters of the play as a model on how to deal with tensions between the two 
poles of inward passion and social status which affect characters both on the local and the national 
level, connecting these analogically rather than separating them in terms of hierarchy. Apparently, 
the historic figure of the “great” king deployed a powerful rhetoric and a vast array of textual 
evidence in the public arena to overcome his powerful subjects’ and the clergy’s resistance to his 
will and that characters in Arden of Faversham, similarly, strive to invent more or less coherent 
narratives, in some cases, like that of Alice, even to rival the authority of an official printed text, to 
fulfill their desire. This suggests a tension-filled connection between the source of such a will and 
the medium that allows it to materialize in the public sphere both on the local and the national 
levels. This is why I suggest in this chapter taking a closer look at the workings of this tension and 
the way it propels the formation and determines the structure and perception of early modern 
identity. 
Accordingly, Arden’s indecision does not merely place him in a precarious position simply 
between local and national interest, but, more important, between the religiously subversive forces 
of passion, desire, and illicit worship on the one hand and the discursive practices to which these 
give rise in social interaction and in the political struggle for dominance. Arden does not take an 
active part in either of these but succumbs to their combined power as they dominate the local 
scene in Faversham. The inconsistency Orlin identifies in the play’s effort to maintain Arden’s tragic 
                                                     
21 Mihoko Suzuki, “Gender, Class, and the Social Order in Late Elizabethan Drama,” Theatre Journal 44.1 
(March 1992): 31–45. 38 and passim. See also Frances E. Dolan, “The Subordinate(’s) Plot: Petty Treason and 
the Forms of Domestic Rebellion.” Shakespeare Quarterly, 43.3 (Autumn 1992): 317–340. Most informative in 
this respect, however, is Orlin’s work on Private Matters and Public Culture in Post-Reformation England. 
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stature when Franklin abandons him “to rash and willful uxoriousness” (72) may give the reader 
further insight into the actual conflict Arden is struggling with. His sudden change in the perception 
of his position among the local forces of Faversham and with respect to the court in London 
highlights the two options he has been trying to keep open up to Scene 13: yielding to the sway of 
local forces or following the command laid down in the fixed and transparent legal and political 
discourse of the “letters patents.” Local powers are chaotic, with religious, sexual, and magical 
aspects to it, besides the economic in which Orlin is primarily interested, but the service of the state 
would allow Arden to appropriate them as resources. What Arden thinks he is is not merely not 
identical with the role the court assigns to him but also differs widely from how he is perceived in 
the play’s Faversham. I see Arden almost as a morality hero in psychomachia plagued by a pressure 
to take sides. Orlin correctly states that Ardern had “few possible allies on site” (50), but they are 
unreliable for Arden in the play not merely for incompatible economic interests but, first of all, 
because they have their own ways to create meaning, their own interplay of passion and discourse 
that enthrall him and that he cannot possibly understand, let alone manipulate. 
Orlin is aware of the problem of the importance of the context, of the characteristic local 
ways of exchange, in determining the nature of the meaning they support, and she makes use of a 
holistic understanding of semiotics in her analysis of Shakespeare’s Othello. She quotes Clifford 
Geertz’s suggestion in this respect that semiotics should include an approach to signs not only “as 
means of communication” but also “as modes of thought” for us to be able to “determine the 
meaning of things for the life that surrounds them.”22 The way Clarke, Michael, Mosby, Black Will, 
and Alice conceptualize their world, often in nonverbal ways, and translate it into religious, legal, 
and literary discourse also deserves such a scrutiny. Orlin also points out that Arden seems 
“indifferent” to the “royal letters patent” (64) that grant him possession of the abbey lands, which 
                                                     
22 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 
1983) 120, qtd. in Orlin 192. 
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should prompt us to qualify her statement that identifies him as “a king’s man in Faversham” (31): 
he is, I contend, Edward’s (and, by extension, Henry’s) unwilling man at best. In this light, the play 
itself may do more than serve the aim of “reconfirming […] patriarchal authority” (19). It may 
present Arden in between two signifying orders, two modes of meaning-making: one pagan, occult, 
and religiously reactionary, based more on the body, its senses, and its iconic representations than 
on language; and another which is politically progressive, discursive, and textual. The former is 
present and it dominates the local, while the absent center of power wields the latter more 
successfully to represent and convey its message. 
Frank Whigham addresses the question of discursive self-assertion in the play, and he is 
especially concerned with the lack of stability in Arden’s standing. Mosby’s aspirations compel him 
to reconceptualize it, Whigham argues, which reveals the constructed, non-essential character of 
Arden’s “honor,”23 of the “ascriptive entitlement to gentle status” (70) he lays claim to. Whigham is 
equally sensitive to the mythmaking tendencies in Black Will’s fantasy about his own power—a 
poetry that results from pain and need (98–100). Furthermore, he suggests that Black Will attempts 
to appropriate a “legalist language” (102) that is not his own. The ruffian’s attempt at oral 
mythmaking exhibits, I think, signs of an emerging heroic narrative, and they rival the power of 
Arden’s verbal fantasies of self-assertion and lay the foundations for Black Will’s own entitlement to 
a semi-legal status to emulate, on his own level, that of his intended victim, Arden. As far as Black 
Will’s poetry is mythical in its aspirations, I am arguing in this chapter, so is Henry VIII’s use of texts 
from “Old Testament kings, Roman emperors and earlier English kings” in the Collectanea satis 
copiosa as “an exercise in propaganda”24 to support his claim of authority over the English church. 
Michael Neill, too, turns his attention to the discourse of power within the play text to point 
out the “entanglement of sexuality and status […] in the adulterous triangle” of Mosby, Alice, and 
                                                     
23 Frank Whigham, Seizures of the Will in Early Modern English Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996) 67. 
24 Bernard 49. 
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Arden25 and to Alice’s deliberate “conflation of honor, wealth, status, power, and sexual 
attractiveness” (71) in her effort to organize the action of the play. Paradoxically, Neill argues, while 
Arden’s possession of the estate is the basis for his “claim to gentility,” it exposes the dependence of 
this claim on the royal patron who bestows it (58). Similarly, women can have access to power, he 
says, only through sexuality, but their very act of exercising it erodes the system of relations that 
gives rise to this power in the first place (71). Notwithstanding the constant danger that women’s 
identities might be reduced to the level of a mere body, Alice in the play makes a considerable effort 
to give her heathen worship of Love a respectable status when she fantasizes about codifying it in 
writing, in the emerging medium of the printed book, and binding it to make it look like the Book of 
Common Prayer (8.116–122). While power in itself appears to be illusory indeed, I will try to show 
that Arden’s sense of identity depends exactly on his deliberate avoidance of being defined either 
by the “letters patents”26 or by a personal attachment to the place, the land he owns, or its people. 
He defines himself rather in his own fiction of being a “gentleman of blood” (1.36), which is an 
essentialist claim not unlike Alice’s adherence to the power of sexuality as a positive fact in her 
worship of “Love” as a “god” (1.101). The fundamental difference between the two, however, 
appears in the way they utilize their respective assets, the confessed core of their selves, in their 
struggle for dominance: for Arden, being a “gentleman” is an escape from the persona of landed 
gentry everybody in Faversham identifies him with. Alice, however, actively builds and maintains a 
persona for herself of powerful discourse to establish and protect her pagan worship and her love 
for Mosby; by wielding words as her weapon she ultimately defeats Arden and attempts to 
dominate even Mosby in the quarrel scene, Scene 8. Arden, in his simplicity, cannot keep up with 
her strategic employment of the structural superiority of her identity: she blinds Arden with her 
                                                     
25 Neill 68. 
26 Anonymous, Arden of Faversham, English Renaissance Drama: A Norton Anthology, eds. David Bevington et 




powerful discourse to hide her real intentions—a powerful front that makes Arden suspicious but 
leaves him defenseless. 
While Whigham elaborates on Black Will’s use of discourse in his effort to build his public 
persona, Mary Floyd-Wilson gives a thorough analysis of the local forces that the royal grant of the 
abbey lands to Arden stirs up in the Faversham of the play and that it provokes to engulf and 
annihilate him. The common denominator of the phenomena she discusses is that they are not 
textual, not even verbal, their signification is ambiguous, and their effect is difficult to control or 
direct. The interaction among entities and living beings in this realm is often mutual and circular. 
The powers Floyd-Wilson sums up in what she calls “horizontal theories of causation”27 are 
uncontrollable in themselves and cannot be easily translated into verbal or written discourse. What 
Orlin calls the scapegoating of the historic Alyce,28 her brutal reduction to a sexualized body and her 
burning as a witch (81f), especially if we relate it to Henry’s charge of witchcraft against Anne and 
her subsequent indictment, arrest, and execution for alleged adultery, exemplify the danger that the 
female body could easily be contaminated by occult influences and identified as the source of 
chaotic passion. Arden, for example, perceives Alice in similar terms. He is characteristically unsure 
of how to judge the force that drives her. Once he thinks “she is rooted in her wickedness, / 
Perverse and stubborn, not to be reclaimed” (4.9f); another time he believes she “seeks by fair 
means to redeem old faults” (13.64). 
The kind of secrets Clarke taps into is similarly ambiguous, and its workings are, in addition, 
circular. He knows how to make and use poisons and, “to an equal degree, remedies” (Floyd-Wilson 
193). Self-poisoning through “beams” that emit from the eye and release harmful particles from an 
object “complements the naturalistic explanations of cruentation,” since both are examples of the 
                                                     
27 Mary Floyd-Wilson, “Arden of Faversham: Tragic Action at a Distance,” The Cambridge Companion to English 
Renaissance Tragedy, eds. Emma Smith and Garrett A. Sullivan Jr (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010) 190. 
28 Orlin 82. 
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concept of “action-at-a-distance.” Furthermore, self-poisoning works on the same principle as do 
“the neo-platonic theory of love” and the practice of the “evil eye” (193). Floyd-Wilson sums up the 
“mysterious events” in the Faversham of the play as “a horizontal circulation of eye-beams, spirits 
and passions” (194). She interprets this circularity as an instantiation of the self-perpetuating 
“spectatorial” (194) exchange within the theater but, although she mentions “anti-theatrical 
anxieties” (197) which characterized Puritan thinking, she does not connect the potential danger 
perceived in figural representation to the most important ideological question at the time of the 
events the play represents, namely the Protestant fear of the effects of visual symbols in worship, 
which became prominent during the reign of Henry VIII’s son, the boy king Edward VI. 
This might help us understand the pressure that shapes Alice’s identity. The historic Alyce 
Ardern, née Mirfyn,29 functioned as Ardern’s link to the source of wealth, her stepfather, who 
served from 1539 as “treasurer of the court of augmentations, handling the substantial revenue 
accruing to the crown from the dissolution of the monasteries.”30 According to Whigham, the play 
depicts Alice in a similar light as a “sexual linkage”31 between Arden and the court. We might 
assume that Alice, as a result of these circumstances, defines her own identity in defiance of her 
assigned role as a mediator of material wealth and power from one man to another:32 she professes 
adherence to an unnamed pagan god of Love, a positive value in contrast to the relative one of 
power with which Neill associates her (71). This suggests a gender difference between Alice, who 
represents a positive, inherent value in the play and Arden, to whom the royal grant assigns a 
relational position as landowner and representative, a placeholder for, and watchful eye of, the 
government. 
                                                     
29 Wine xxxvi. 
30 P. R. N. Carter, “North, Edward, first Baron North,” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 20 Apr. 2014. 
31 Whigham 73. 
32 This takes place in a process Orlin describes as “the redistribution of national wealth through the transfer 




Orlin and Helgerson characterize the historic Thomas Ardern as “a king’s man in 
Faversham”33 and “a servant of the crown,”34 respectively, but the analysis of the character’s 
perception of his own identity in the play will show that, as I indicated above, he is an unwilling one 
at that. This already foretells that a rivalry between the power of the textual definition of who 
Arden is and what I called above the force of passion, in the foreground of what Helgerson terms a 
“nationally determined partisan and sectarian conflict” (153), will be a central question in this 
chapter. This rivalry, I argue, had its origin in Henry VIII, who, in contrast to Arden the fictional 
character, successfully combined the two forces in shaping his identity: he used and bent the power 
of the written word of chronicles, of legal texts, and of the Scripture to build his persona and to 
bring fulfillment to the passion of his self. 
Following Orlin’s and Helgerson’s efforts to uncover connections between public and 
private, between events at the court and in the country, in this chapter I am going to examine the 
nature of the relationship between those “ordinary people” in the play and “the moral and social 
problems of the common world” in contemporary England. We have already established that the 
anxiety and unrest that a social and economic landslide created in the “common world” of Arden of 
Faversham are not limited to its parochial, private, and criminal milieu but appear in the town of the 
play as ripple effects of anxieties and unrests higher up on the social scale in the England of Henry 
VIII and Edward VI. The remaining question to answer is if only the effect of political, economic, and 
religious changes in the period travel down from the national level to the local and the domestic, 
which the play focuses on, or there is a larger correspondence between underlying assumptions, 
fears, desires, and means to cope with them “down there” in Arden’s Faversham and “up there” at 
the court. 
                                                     
33 Orlin 31. 
34 Helgerson 153, 158. 
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Although there was even some personal continuity between the Dissolution and the reign of 
Elizabeth,35 I would like to emphasize only two crucial aspects of Henry’s legacy that continued to 
determine conditions for later generations in England even beyond the Tudor era. The first is 
obvious from the main theme of the play: the far-reaching economic and social consequences of the 
sudden release and commodification of land, which, in the eyes of local landowners and tenants, 
undermine the essentialism in Arden’s own perception of his identity. For them, it descends on him 
from above in the royal patent. Edward Seymour, the Duke of Somerset, in this position during the 
reign of Edward VI officially until October 13, 1549,36 permitted “extensive appropriations of 
episcopal lands” and the “transfer of crown wealth to private hands” (Beer). In this way, Somerset 
continued the “plundering and subsequent liquidation of the accumulated wealth of the church” 
which Henry VIII began and practiced throughout his reign to build up “the number of important 
landowners who were sworn to his service.”37 This establishes Arden’s public persona in an official 
written document in contradiction to his own sense of identity as a hereditary nobleman, and this 
remains a contradiction he cannot resolve. 
Although his essentialism would relate Arden logically through his possession of the land to 
the local, organic world of natural causations, the local community ultimately rejects him as an 
intruder. Doing so, the local forces do not restore their own attachment and natural right to the land 
either, but rather further precipitate its commodification which Henry began. Franklin’s decision to 
                                                     
35 Besides the fact that all of Henry’s Tudor successors were his children, there is a curious thread that 
strengthens our sense that we are dealing here with a continuity in administration. Edward North, stepfather 
to the historic Alyce Ardern, from 1539 “treasurer of the court of augmentations, handling the substantial 
revenue accruing to the crown from the dissolution of the monasteries,” Carter explains, prospered as an 
administrator and landowner under four different regimes and through radical political and religious changes 
in England during the first half of the sixteenth century. He managed to maintain his important position at 
court, in different functions, from the reign of Henry VIII, through the regency under Edward VI, Mary’s 
Catholic restoration, and into the early years of Elizabeth I. 
36 Barrett L. Beer, “Seymour, Edward,” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 28 March 2014. Since Arden 
was murdered on February 15, 1551, the fictional time of the play has to span at least one year and four 
months. 
37 E. W. Ives, “Henry VIII (1491–1547), king of England and Ireland,” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
19 Apr. 2014. 
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desert Arden when he yields himself up to the local forces, and his, Franklin’s role in the 
investigation and the narrativization of the events, do not merely precipitate the denouement—and 
this is the second and more important aspect of Henry’s legacy that concerns us here—, but they 
further a shift from a magical way of meaning-making which gives primacy to forces inherent in 
objects and substances to a belief in the power of the word and opens up the field for a competition 
among narratives vying for dominance. The way Henry shaped and perceived his identity served, 
and still serves us, as a model in this process, and the main characters’ struggle with identity-
formation becomes more apparent if we measure it against his formidable example. Henry did not 
entirely abandon the Catholic belief in visual, kinesthetic, and tactile representations; but he rather 
retained their magic as an inalienable component of his self and used its energy to fuel his belief in 
the power of his verbal and written rhetoric. 
 
2. Arden in the Reformation 
An understanding of the conflict in Arden of Faversham in the foreground of a larger change 
from the direct access to meaning in objects, substances, and living beings toward manipulating 
them through language will explain the inevitable development in the formation of identity Henry 
championed and characters in the play seem to try to imitate. Charles Taylor sums up this break in 
Christianity away from magic as “a revolution which produced the modern idea of the psyche” and 
which had to “undermine and replace a deeply rooted popular way of understanding human life 
and its place in nature, that which underlay and made possible a serious belief in magic.”38 Taylor 
further elaborates on the character of this change saying that 
it was not just a matter of magic fading away before science. The new 
disengagement was carried by profound changes in spiritual outlook. One of 
the most powerful forces working against magic, and for the disenchanted 
                                                     
38 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989) 191. 
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view of the world, was the Protestant Reformation, which was profoundly 
suspicious of such meddling with occult forces. Magical practices couldn’t be 
allowed as a proper use of divine power, because that would be to assume 
human control over this, which was against the very principle of the 
Reformation. Indeed, the Catholic sacraments were often assimilated to 
magic practices by Reformers and condemned in similar terms. The power 
must be diabolic, if it existed at all; Protestants accentuated the traditional 
Christian suspicion of magic. (191) 
I am arguing in this chapter that Henry accomplished a similar shift from a belief in natural 
causations to a Protestant emphasis on the power of the word in creating a layered identity: in his 
self, he preserved a belief, intact, in the former and tapped into its energies when interpreting texts. 
This will enable us to see characters of Arden of Faversham in their attempts to form their identity 
in contrast to Henry’s monumentally successful technique. 
In the “Conclusion” to his extensive study on Henry’s reformation, G. W. Bernard states that 
“the commons were” “deeply mistrustful […] of Henry’s policies and [were] attached to their parish 
churches, religious processions and local monasteries.”39 Neither could the “projected Edwardian 
Reformation […] expect enthusiastic support from the majority of lay people in positions of power, 
gentry and nobility,” as we learn from Diarmaid MacCulloch.40 However, in venting their anger on 
Arden, who outwardly benefits from Henry’s policies but inwardly distances himself from them, the 
commons in the play ignore Arden as their possible ally in essentialism and treat him, like what 
Orlin calls him, “a king’s man in Faversham,”41 a “servant of the crown.”42 While they sacrifice Arden 
in the name of the locally circulating, immanent forces of nature, they move beyond their own 
                                                     
39 Bernard 601. 
40 Diarmaid MacCulloch, The Boy King: Edward VI and the Protestant Reformation (New York, NY: Palgrave, 
2001) 59. 
41 Orlin 31. 
42 Helgerson 133–58. 153, 158. 
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reliance on such forces and engage in oral mythmaking and the linear production of narratives to 
represent themselves as victorious over Arden, their perceived enemy. This technique of tapping 
into primordial, immanent forces and deploying them in verbal meaning-making to rise above them 
imitates the way Henry VIII shaped his own identity. 
Orlin argues in her “formidably learned”43 study of the play that “early modern ideas of 
order were constructed hierarchically, but they were conveyed analogically.”44 While she uses this 
axiom as a starting point for her survey of “domestic ideas and ideals” across genres and fields of 
interest in Early modern English studies, I think the combination of the ideas of hierarchy and 
analogy might also support, and to an extent structure, my inquiry into the possible resemblances 
between the way Henry developed his complex sense of identity and the attempts of dramatic 
characters like Alice, Mosby, and Black Will to move away from their direct experience to reach 
fulfilment in a narrative. How do characters perceive their identity in the context of this putative 
similarity of tensions “up” and “down”? To what extent do they emulate in their identity formation a 
pattern that Henry created in his struggle for fulfilment in power? 
As I will try to show in this chapter, the Henrician technique of identity formation that 
characters unknowingly imitate in the play follows the pattern of the Protestant replacement of 
images and of the consciousness of a bodily presence in worship and interaction by the power of 
the word in myth, in narrative, and in scriptural exegesis. Alice refuses Mosby’s suggestion to kill 
Arden by her own poisoned “counterfeit” (1.234) for, although its effect would originate from her 
likeness, being impossible to control, it might as well kill her. Consequently, Mosby commissions 
Clarke to manufacture a “crucifix impoisonèd” (1.612). This would not merely free Alice to an 
uncontrolled pleasure in love in spite of the “oath” she swore to her husband (1.434f)45 but also, via 
                                                     
43 Neill 50. 
44 Orlin 10. 
45 The Book of Common Prayer codified the oath in “The Forme of Solemnization of Matrimonie” in 1549, still 
in Thomas Ardern’s lifetime. After Mary banned it, Elizabeth restored the book as the basis of worship in 
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“action-at-a-distance,” insult the state that her husband is supposed to represent in Faversham by 
the perceived idolatry of the representation.46 
 
3. Arden’s Perception of his Identity 
The theory of this circularity in causation among objects and bodies, whether dead or alive, 
helps us explain also how it eventually can draw Arden into its network after so many frustrated 
attempts to kill him.47 The Book of Secrets (from 1550), Floyd-Wilson reports, sets out on a study of 
mysterious connections “by establishing that all things possess a particular disposition” as, for 
example, “‘boldness is in a harlot’.”48 Throughout the play we observe Arden struggling with what 
appears to him not as a structural complexity in Alice’s identity (words of affection for him 
screening sexual desire for another man) but rather as a genuine ambiguity (does she love me?). 
Therefore, the resolution of his doubt has to be equally simplistic: she is either benevolent or 
harmful to Arden. Mosby’s disposition appears to be similarly doubtful to him until after the 
moment he and Alice appear to Arden “marching arm in arm” (12.67) in a tauntingly ambiguous 
performance intended to “boldly beard and brave him to his teeth” (69) but also explicable as 
coming “lovingly to meet thee on the way” (91), as Alice says, “but merrily to try thy patience” (95) 
with “thoughts […] free from harm” (93). Arden, not being an initiate to the network of mutual 
causations but depending on Alice’s and his own verbal efforts to disambiguate Mosby’s and Alice’s 
                                                                                                                                                                           
1559, long before the play was written. Haigh 168, 241. Church of England, The Booke of the Common Praier 
and Administracion of the Sacramentes (London: 1549) Early English Books Online 20 Apr. 2014. 
46 In 1547, three and a half years before the murder of the historic Ardern (February 15, 1551), the 
Edwardian government launched a campaign of “royal visitation of the Church,” similar to the one in Henry’s 
reign in 1538. In the course of the invasion, the rood, “one of the most spectacular pieces of furniture in any 
traditional church, as it reared above the chancel screen, dominating the laity’s view as they looked towards 
the altar or pulpit,” was treated “like any other church image,” and it was considered an object likely to be 
“abused for devotion.” As a result, hardly any of them were spared in London, not even the one in “the 
conservative stronghold of St Paul’s Cathedral.” Diarmaid MacCulloch, The Boy King: Edward VI and the 
Protestant Reformation (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001) 69, 71. 
47 Dolan (332) counts eight, but he includes in his list contemplated attempts as well like the one with a 
poisoned counterfeit and the plan to stab him in the fair. 
48 Floyd-Wilson 194. 
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disposition, can no longer tolerate “being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts,” which would be 
required to maintain what John Keats terms Negative Capability, and gives in to his own urge to 
reach “after fact and reason.”49 Thus, he offers himself up trustingly to powers he has been trying to 
sort out in vain. Alice’s question, “Hast thou not lately found me overkind?” (13.101), echoes 
Arden’s expectation earlier in the scene that Alice might meet him on his way home, since he, as he 
explained to Franklin, had perceived Alice lately having “changèd from the old humor / Of her 
wonted frowardness, / And seek[ing] by fair means to redeem old faults” (13.62–64). So far, Arden 
has been trying to ignore the contradiction between her words and her murderous intention and to 
eliminate the ambiguity in his perception of her. Now, he succumbs to a possible explanation that 
vindicates his belief in his position as a respectable gentleman, head of the household, and, at the 
same time, an Ovidian lover of the “dark Night” (1.62).50 
Not having a powerful shield of discourse at his disposal, nor being able to identify with his 
assigned role as the representative of the distant court51 to protect his self, Arden hopes to find 
safety in being accepted in the local community, in fact in his own house, where Mosby is a constant 
                                                     
49 John Keats, The Complete Poetical Works and Letters of John Keats, The Cambridge Edition of the Poets Ser. 
(Boston; New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1899) 277. 
50 Arden outdoes Alice in poetic fantasy and ambiguity. While Alice forces one literal meaning on her gesture 
of embracing Arden while calling on Mosby at night, Arden’s words seem to have the power to lengthen the 
night for more embrace: “Sweet love, thou know’st that we two, Ovid-like, / Have often chid the morning 
when it gan to peep, / And often wished that dark Night’s purblind steeds / Would pull her by the purple 
mantle back / And cast her in the ocean to her love” (1.60-64). These words cannot be easily traced back to 
one specific passage in Ovid, but rather to two. Martin L. Wine presents Warnke and Proescholdt’s reference 
to one candidate in “Ovid’s thirteenth Elegy from the first book of the Amores” about Aurora mounting her 
“hateful carriage” and putting an end to night, the time of love: “Whither runs thou, that men, and women loue 
not ? / Hold in thy rosy horses that they moue not…” Anonymous, The Tragedy of Master Arden of Faversham, 
ed. Martin L. Wine. The Revels Plays Ser. (London: Methuen, 1973) 1.60–64n. 
As opposed to this image of dawn, Ruth Harwood Cline, in discussing Ovidian influence on Chrétien 
de Troyes’s Lancelot or the Knight of the Cart calls attention to a description of dusk in book 15 of Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses which, with the “figure of night defeating day at twilight and throwing her dark cape over the 
world.” Chrétien de Troyes, Lancelot or the Knight of the Cart, trans. Ruth Harwood Cline (Athens; London: 
The University of Georgia Press, 1990) ll. 4544–4545n, p. 222. This resembles “the purple mantle” in Arden 
even more closely than the Elegy does from Amores. At the same time, the passage in Metamorphoses 
substitutes evening for morning, which further enhances the ambiguity in Arden’s allusion in contrast to 
Alice’s insistence on the literal meaning of her bodily presence. 




presence. This is how the play changes the reason for Arden’s dependence on Mosby as it appears 
in the chronicles so as to represent Arden’s unstable position in the context of his wife’s 
aggressively advancing discurse. Holinshed explained Ardern’s tolerance of Mosbie’s lingering 
presence in his house exclusively by Ardern’s dependence on his wife’s relatives,52 whom the 
earlier Harley manuscript still identified as one person, namely Alice’s stepfather, Edward North 
(149). The play, on the other hand, presents Arden’s acceptance of Mosby as part of his submission 
to the power in his wife’s discourse over his identity. Arden, a “gentleman”53 floating in a world 
where the ownership of commodified land is no longer proof of such a standing and where “issues 
of rank are negotiated” in “a ferocious competition for status,”54 does not understand the desire for 
self-assertion behind that discourse. Thus, the play presents not one point of reference above him 
hierarchically but two poles between which Arden hovers: the court that appears in a mere 
document for Arden but which, paradoxically, binds him to a land with its people who create their 
own myths out of hunger and desire. Arden loses his safe distance to the local world of horizontal 
causations, which suck him up in the “deep play”55 of Faversham where sexual and murderous 
desire, the worship of fertility, the direct dependence on the yield of the land, and the 
uncontrollable power of images unite chaotically. 
From the above, it is apparent that Arden does not have the means to assert himself, 
probably because the essentialism and simplicity with which he attempts to define his identity are, 
both in the historic context and in the context of the play, inadequate. Arden does not only try to 
ignore the persona that has been imposed on him by royal patent, but he insists that his identity is 
not a layered construct but consists in an essence that he carries in the tissue of his body when he 
                                                     
52 Raphael Holinshed, from Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland (from the second edition, 1587, vol. 2, 
pp. 1062–6), The Tragedy of Master Arden of Faversham, ed. M. L. Wine 148f. 
53 Neill calls attention to Franklin’s ironic address to Arden as a “gentle gentleman” at 4.43 (56). 
54 Neill 56. 
55 The words are from Clifford Geertz, “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight,” Daedalus 101.1 (Winter 
1972) 1–37. JSTOR, 28 Feb. 2014. The “disquietfulness” of the fight issues, he argues, from its three attributes: 
“its immediate dramatic shape; its metaphoric content; and its social context” (24). 
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says, “I am by birth a gentleman of blood” (1.36). His declaration as part of the exposition is the 
inverse of the way Iago positions himself; more precisely, Iago repudiates what Arden asserts. “For 
when my outward action doth demonstrate / The native act and figure of my heart / In compliment 
extern,” he begins his run-up to the famous paradoxical definition of his identity, “’tis not long after 
/ But I will wear my heart upon my sleeve / For daws to peck at.”56 And this is exactly what Arden 
does: in his words and action he consistently impersonates and exhibits his nobility, especially in 
being unavailable for a negotiation of the way land is distributed among men living in the 
community. Even his descent to the level of Mosby, whom he called a “botcher” (1.25) earlier and 
whose rise as a social climber he dreads,57 he disguises, somewhat contrary to his purported 
essentialism, as Mosby’s gracious cooption to gentle status. Before the “botcher” stabs him, Arden 
calls him “good Master Mosby” and tells Alice to “bid him welcome” saying that “he and I are 
friends” (14.179f). His claim to authenticity deprives Arden of the means other characters use to 
assert themselves in what Neill calls a “ferocious jostling for status” in the wake of the “break-up 
and redistribution of monastic estates” which “accelerated the general commodification of land and 
rendered disturbingly conspicuous the social mobility attendant upon it” (52). The means other 
characters utilize in the struggle is mythmaking in discourse. 
To build a flexible attitude to his own persona, Arden would need an authority above him he 
could accept as authentic and that would legitimize, in his eyes, the persona it confers on him. Since 
this is not the case, he in a self-delusion believes he can sever his ties to the crown; and he perceives 
himself as an unstructured entity of an independent and inherent essence. His relationship to both 
Franklin and Alice appears to him to work in terms of an on-or-off binary. He takes Franklin’s 
friendship and support as a temporary basis from which he can reach Alice’s love and reestablish 
their lost intimacy. The ideal of fulfillment for him is an escape from the sight of “foul objects that 
                                                     
56 William Shakespeare. Othello, ed. Kim F. Hall (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007) 1.1.63–67. 
57 Whigham explains Arden’s “fury at Mosby” by referring to the sources which show that Arden has risen to 
status the way he claims Mosby did (69). 
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offend mine eyes” (1.12), that is, the evidence of Alice’s refusal of him, in a perfect sensual union of 
“we two” who, like one person, prolong their embrace during the night which the power of the 
Ovidian image extends at 1.60–64. The condition for Arden’s wished-for union with Alice is a self-
imposed blindness. 
Arden would fain turn a blind eye to any nonessential use of signs and tokens. He describes 
his desired distance from the world around him in self-conscious terms of perception. The 
exchange of “Love letters,” the arrangement of “privy meetings” between his wife and Mosby, and 
Mosby’s flaunting of outward signs and symbolic objects to advertise his possession of Alice and of 
a social status higher than the one he was born into he calls “foul objects that offend mine eyes” 
(1.15–18, 12). When Mosby wears the ring that, as Arden says, “the priest put on” (1.18) Alice’s 
finger to mark her as his, Arden takes it as the abuse of a token. When Mosby, a “botcher,” that is, 
tailor “at the first” (25), now “bravely jets it in his silken gown” (30), Arden thinks Mosby disguises 
himself as somebody other and more important than he actually is. In fact, however, Mosby does 
more than violate sumptuary laws or steal a ring. He has actually acquired “some small stock” and 
“become the steward” (26, 29) of a nobleman, as Arden admits, and he has indeed won Alice’s 
affections. It seems, then, that Arden finds it “monstrous” and “intolerable” (23) that Alice would 
“dote on such a one” (22) who climbs the social ladder and transforms his appearance in the 
process because this might reflect on essences and expose them as unstable. 
The reality of Mosby and Alice affects Arden directly: not as objects he might handle and 
control, but as an immediate threat to his identity. Their actions determine his self-esteem and even 
his reputation among the nobility. He is defenseless against the shame he feels Mosby is bringing on 
him, and he cannot grasp what power enables Mosby to do that: “were he by the Lord Protector 
backed,” Arden contends, “He should not make me to be pointed at” (34f). He even bewails that the 
Lord Clifford “loves not me” (32) and favors Mosby instead. Since all these circumstances touch him 
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with a force of immediacy, Arden escapes into a state of denial: he refuses to register them as real 
and attempts to dismiss them as nonessential. 
Consequently, he cannot tolerate hints at inauthenticity in his own actions either. According 
to the sources, “Mosby precedes Arden” (Whigham 72) in his attachment to Alice. She has been 
forced into a marriage against her desire, which has reduced her to a mere impersonal link in the 
chain of the smooth “transfer of properties from the church to the crown and from the crown to 
members of the aristocracy and gentry” (Orlin 17). As a result, she desperately tries to reassert her 
own power as a woman in her own right over Mosby. To love Arden would mean for her to embrace 
her function in an exchange of relative values and her appropriation as similar to them. “The play-
Arden,” Whigham argues, “is now detached, as a landowner, from the great household that 
rewarded and elevated Mosby and himself alike” in Holinshed and in Stow. Arden “is rewritten as 
(almost) honorably resenting the entanglements of sexual, social, and economic mobility.” He 
enacts his “subtracted resemblance [to Mosby] by a pattern of conspicuous denial” (71 emphasis in 
original). 
Arden, who, as we have seen, has good reason to consider himself a gentleman by birth, 
cannot possibly become the loyal representative and local executive of the court any more than 
Hamlet, who argues that he has “that within which passeth show,”58 can become king of Denmark. 
Arden, like Hamlet, is a tragic hero who identifies himself with what he conceives as the invisible 
core of his personality, his self. He refuses to admit he has to assume a persona and play a role in 
social situations. Since he insists on his innocence, he cannot impersonate his assigned function in a 
social order that he rejects for its mendacity,59 and so he resists an attempt on the part of the 
                                                     
58 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, The Norton Shakespeare. Based on the Oxford Edition, eds. Stephen Greenblatt 
et al. (New York, London: W W Norton, 1997) 1668–1756. 1.2.85. 
59 Thomas More is a historical figure with a similarly tragic inhibition. When he was “asked to swear to the 
Act of Succession on 12 April 1534,” Seymour Baker House explains, “he refused to do [so] because of the 
oath’s preamble [which] reject[ed] papal jurisdiction.” “He pointedly refused to attend [Anne’s] coronation, 
and to the bishops who urged his attendance he related a parable whose application he summed up for them: 
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Edwardian government to define his identity by royal patent. As a consequence, for the state he 
becomes, if not an enemy, still potentially subversive and, at least, useless. This is why Franklin, the 
single loyal representative of the interest of state in the play, as Orlin formulates, “abandons Arden 
to rash and willful uxoriousness and goes some way toward making his murder aesthetically 
palatable—if still not ethically justifiable” (72). 
Arden’s “I am by birth a gentleman of blood” (1.36) also indicates his fear that her adultery 
with Mosby might undermine Alice’s respect for the hereditary essentialism Arden purports to 
represent. As a result of her betrayal, he might lose the security his privileged position among other 
noblemen has granted him. This suggests that Arden is, already at the beginning of the action, 
aware that the nearness of Mosby, who has redefined his persona by means of insincere “flattery,” 
“fawning” (28), and outward signs, is capable of destabilizing his organic identity. The possibility 
“torments” Arden’s soul, because, to be able to defend his rights actively against Mosby, he would 
have to acknowledge that his “birth,” even together with the “letters patents” that he never 
mentions explicitly, does not give him that protection automatically. As Whigham formulates, the 
readiness with which Arden is repeatedly dissuaded from the act, as 
opposed to the posture, of vengeance perhaps suggests the posture’s 
assumed character, a would-be aristocratic mantle of the nemo me impune 
lacessit stance (“no man harms me with impunity”) that reaffirms by 
negation Arden’s actual similarity to the mobile Mosby (69). 
                                                                                                                                                                           
‘Your lordshippes have in the matter of the matrimony hitherto kepte your selves pure virgines, yeat take 
good head, my lordes, that you keepe your virginity still. For some there be that by procuringe your 
lordshippes first at the coronacion to be present, and next to preach for the setting forth of it, and finally to 
write bookes to all the world in defens thereof, are desirous to deffloure you; and when they have defloured 
you, then will they not faile soone after to devoure you. Nowe my lordes … it lieth not in my power but that 
they may devoure me; but god being my good lord, I will provide that they shall never deffloure me’ ([Roper] 
59).” Seymour Baker House, “Sir Thomas More.” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 22 Feb. 2014. House 
quotes William Roper, The lyfe of Sir Thomas Moore, knighte, ed. Elsie Vaughan Hitchcock, Early English Text 
Society Ser. 197 (London: Oxford University Press, 1935) 59. 
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This reading of his perception of his own identity suggests that Arden’s cautious distancing of 
himself from the disingenuous political and economic practices, the “fruits” (Whigham 63) of which 
he never explicitly refuses but, nevertheless, cannot relish, defines his position in the drama as 
awkward. 
 
4. The Formation of the Early Modern Identity 
Examined in the foreground of the dominant early modern ideal of identity formation, 
Arden’s attitude about who he is is anomalous. The period seems to be an important stage in the 
process of the maturation of the western Christian subject. The subjection to authority as 
prescribed in Protestantism shapes the adherent’s sense of identity as a representative of that 
authority. Jonathan Dollimore explains the mechanism at work here: 
although God is remote and inscrutable he is also intimately conceived: “The 
principal worship of God hath two parts. One is to yield subjection to him, 
the other to draw near to him and to cleave unto him” (Perkins, An 
Instruction Touching Religious or Divine Worship, p. 313). Such perhaps are 
the conditions for masochistic transgression: intimacy becomes the means 
of a defiance of power, the new-found importance of the subject the impetus 
of that defiance, the abjectness of the subject its self-sacrificial nature.60 
Once the subject has gone through a similar experience of helpless subjection and “intimate” 
identification with the source of power, it will become aware of itself in a radical separation from it. 
The identification first endows it with a new sense of its own “importance” which, in turn, will 
enable it to represent that power independently in the world. Since Arden is not able to represent 
                                                     
60 Jonathan Dollimore, Radical Tragedy. Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his 
Contemporaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). 114. 
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the absent crown in Faversham effectively, we must suspect that his sense of identity has not been 
shaped by the experience of a subjection to its authority in the first place, as Perkins prescribes it. 
The subjection William Perkins elaborates on and demands has two main aspects: 
conformity and separation. On the one hand, the Christian believer has to strive to achieve a 
maximum of spirituality, similar to that of God. He or she has to let go of visible and tangible aids 
and to give up “outward & bodily rites and actions”61 in the practice of his or her worship. Only in 
overcoming the physical aspect of our selves can we do justice to God “in spirit and trueth” (203), 
he says. To secure this sincerity, in Saint Paul’s words a “faith unfeigned,” we have to worship God 
not only in the heart but also in “the spirituall renewed motions thereof.” Our trust in and reliance 
on God’s “Mercie” as “the maine and principall” form of worship serves the believer’s conformity 
with God “in holinesse and goodnesse […] whereby his image is renewed or restored in vs” (202). 
On the other hand, our “sacrifice” of ourselves to God as an “accessary or lesse-principal” form of 
worship secures a sense of separation from his power in abject devotion. 
Parallel to the Protestant ideal of identity formation through proper worship, Franklin’s 
offer of the written document of the royal patent in the first lines of the play works emblematically 
as an invitation to Arden to identify with the remote state and to represent its interest 
independently in Faversham. At the same time, this offer entails a request to turn away from the 
local, the figural and tangible, and to “Read” the written “deeds” instead (1.6, 8). In the context of 
post-Reformation, Edwardian England, with the church firmly incorporated in the state in the Act of 
Supremacy, Franklin’s words and gesture appear as a secular, profaned, and politicized version of 
the injunction “tolle lege”62 which St Augustine described he had heard and followed. Arden, 
                                                     
61 William Perkins, A Warning against the Idolatrie of the Last Times. And an Instruction Touching Religious, or 
Diuine Worship (Cambridge: Iohn Legat, 1601) 203. Early English Books Online. 14 March 2014. 
62 “Take it, read it!” Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. Vernon J. Bourke, The Fathers of the Church Ser. 21 
(Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1953) 224. 
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however, refuses to read; instead, he continues to attend to “those foul objects that,” he says, 
“offend mine eyes” (1.12). 
The early modern evolution of individualism is inseparable from the emergence and the 
“glorification of the individual household” (Orlin 2). Lena Cowen Orlin, the reader will recall, 
conceptualizes “early modern ideas of order” in terms of a dichotomy similar to Perkins’s 
conformity and separation: they were, she writes, “constructed hierarchically, but they were 
conveyed analogically” (10). The patriarchal family resembled in structure the realm, but it was 
subject to a function of support: “every man’s house could be […] a little world sufficient unto itself” 
with its “individual privacy” (2), but the “state designated the individual household […] as the 
primary unit of social control” (3). We observe here, too, the conformity that governed the analogy 
between “domestic philosophy” and “political ideology” (11f) and the separation when “the 
domestic began to be […] viewed as a mere service philosophy […] of a larger order” (12). 
Ownership of property resulting from the Dissolution, Orlin claims, precipitated the development of 
a sense of “individual identity” together with a manifest subjection to the government that allowed 
the ensuing “merchant economy” to thrive (2). 
William Perkins’s principles of “Diuine Worship” originated in St Augustine’s doctrine 
which, in turn, built on the Platonic distinction between body and soul. Charles Taylor identifies the 
sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries as the period of “an immense flowering of Augustinian 
spirituality across all confessional differences,” and he adds that it did not only help shape the 
Enlightenment but still powerfully influences our perception of identity today.63 According to 
Augustine, and herein he contrasts with Plato, we have to direct our gaze inward first to find, 
understand, and follow the ultimate reality below the surface of our bodily existence (129). This act 
Taylor calls “the inwardness of radical reflexivity” and argues that Augustine introduced it into 
Western thought (131). Modern subjectivism, he says, is founded on this recognition of the 
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superiority of reason to sense as the truth within, which is, at the same time, “common to all” 
(132f). This is how “the way within leads above,” to the truth which is “not in me” but above me, 
“‘in’ God” (135). 
The demand for a personal subjection to the good as the way to moral improvement comes 
to the fore, Taylor claims, in the early modern period (137). But how is this subjection enforced? 
The will has to be freed from its inborn adherence to the senses, which we all inherited with the 
original sin. In Augustine, the “weakness of the will—‘akrasia’—” is “the central crisis of moral 
experience.”64 How do we heal the “perversity” (138) in our own will that makes it adhere to the 
senses? The reflexivity of the self is evil when it is “enclosed on itself.” Healing, however, “comes 
when it is broken open” and it acknowledges that it depends on God. Taylor’s statement that “the 
very essence of Christian piety is to sense this dependence of my inmost being on God” (139) 
reminds us of the notion of conformity, the first criterion which we distilled from Perkins’s treatise 
on proper worship, and now it is easy to make a connection from here to the indispensable function 
of divine grace in achieving this conformity as the only means of salvation in Protestant theologians 
like John Calvin. As a result of grace, the individual is put in contact with “a perfection which is,” 
nevertheless, “beyond us,” which is “not our own product,” as Augustine says (140), and not in our 
control, as Calvin forcefully argues. Here is the origin of the other important principle we saw was 
guiding Perkins, namely, separation. The awareness of a being “in myself […] more perfect than I” 
inevitably gives rise to a sense of a lack, an insufficiency, an acknowledgement that it is “beyond my 
powers to have produced it myself” (141). 
The image of breaking open the “evil” self like a nut to heal it is in itself a contradiction, and 
it provides us with a model, a justification for the use of the energies originating in such reflexive 
                                                     
64 …as it is, we remember, central to the second book, on “Temperaunce,” of Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie 
Queene, first published in 1590, around which time (1588–92) Arden of Faversham was written according to 
David Bevington et al. “Introduction to Arden of Faversham,” English Renaissance Drama: A Norton Anthology, 
eds. David Bevington et al. (New York and London: W W Norton, 2002) 421–26. 421. It was first performed in 
1591 and printed in 1592 (Helgerson 136). 
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selves that appear to be “enclosed” in themselves, subject to their senses, and, therefore, evil, as 
resources in the formation of mythical, narrative, and textual personas in the process of assuming 
an independent will. The metaphor of healing by cracking open in the evolution of early modern 
identity also explains why members of the Faversham subculture shape their personas in 
narratives emerging out of the circulating, chaotic energies available to them locally. Franklin 
ultimately subsumes these independent growths under his singularly authoritative master 
narrative that retrospectively seems to have framed them all. Consequently, Franklin, rather than 
Arden as Orlin and Helgerson claim, is the actual “king’s man in Faversham,”65 the true “servant of 
the crown.”66 
 
5. The Most Prominent Self in the Period 
What experiences shaped Henry VIII’s sense of identity which imprinted itself on the Tudor 
age, and how did that sense influence the identities characters assume in Arden of Faversham? How 
do they try to conform to Henry’s example analogically, and to what extent are they aware of the 
injunction of separation and of subjection in a hierarchical relationship to it? I answer that Henry 
presented an unsurpassable example of the power of individualism, which he derived from the 
fullness of a well-developed dichotomy in his sense of identity: the tension between a strong self, 
rooted in the sensuality of his bodily existence, his desire, and his belief in the power of nonverbal, 
figural symbols in worship on the one hand, and a strategically calculated effective discourse with 
reliance on authoritative texts to bring those powers to fruition in politics. He identified with a 
chivalric ideal as a child and, as an adult, used historic, legal, and religious discourse successfully to 
impose his role as a mythical hero on his nation. He knew no separation from his ego-ideal, but 
conformed with it unhesitatingly. On their own levels, characters like Mosby, Alice, and Black Will 
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exhibit a similar striving for totality: they weave the desire of their selves into more or less 
elaborate narratives to reach fulfillment. They, too, forget how to separate themselves from the idea 
of perfection which lies, in Perkins’s Christian piety, strictly beyond the self. 
Franklin’s identity, however, seems to have been shaped ideally in the political variety of 
the Perkinsean mold: he does not embody his own power but represents and conveys that of the 
distant crown, while he stands above the material reality of the subjects below him. He disappears 
at the end of Scene 13, giving Arden over to his fate and his wife, its “instrument” (13.154), thus 
preserving himself “vnspotted of the world” (Perkins 203). In contrast to Arden, he has no conflict 
with the viewpoint of the authority above him, and he has no desire for a fulfilment on his own that 
would compromise his detachment from the local world of Faversham. He appears as sheer, sterile 
persona with no core of a self within it. Thus, opposite to that of the local forces, Franklin 
represents the other of the two poles Arden is caught in between. 
To illustrate the way Henry submerged in sensual experience and drew on it to rise above 
the senses and to hold them in control by the power of reason in a way similar to the Augustinian 
inwardness of reflexivity, I would like to offer the event of his initiation to knighthood. The 
experience of the three-and-a-half-year-old boy and later its memory represented for Henry VIII, 
David Starkey argues, an opportunity to live “the fantasy for real”67 and, I would add, it was filled 
with sensory stimuli that do not originate in language. The ceremony Henry went through involved 
ritual gestures and visual and tactile symbols68 of the kind that were still in practice in churches at 
that time (in 1494) but became anathema for believers during his son Edward’s reign when the 
events Arden of Faversham represents took place. Henry’s experience was an immersion into the 
                                                     
67 David Starkey, Henry VIII: Mind of a Tyrant. Episode 1: Prince (1485–1509). Channel 4, April 6, 2009. 
OVGuide.com. June 8, 2013. 21 Feb 2014. 
68 The structure of the ceremony followed the trajectory of initiation rituals with humbling and the infliction 
of some pain on the body followed by relief. The series of events started after sunset with a ceremonial bath 
and admonition, and it continued into the night with a moderate mortification of the flesh and the imposition 
of humble submission. This took place in the evening of October 30, 1494. In the early morning, Henry was 
elevated into the ranks of knighthood. Robert Hutchinson, Young Henry: The Rise to Power of Henry VIII 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2011) 21. 
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world of the senses, and in one important respect at least it was strikingly similar to the mode of 
signification Mary Floyd-Wilson dubs “horizontal circulation:” it consisted more in physical action 
and perception than it was textual or verbal, and, as a result, its meaning was ambiguous and 
subject to discursive interpretation. The repetition of the gestures in the “deep play” of an old 
ritual,69 might have represented in Henry’s memory later a moment of unmediated presence, 
similar to the Augustinian look inward, but not yet up. This also shaped his religious belief: as 
MacCulloch emphasizes, Henry insisted forcefully “on the corporal presence of Christ” in the 
eucharist.70 
The experience at this stage was not yet affected by Perkins’s later condemnation of 
“outward & bodily rites and actions” which, as he thought, had “no power to sanctifie” (203). In one 
word, the initiation was an event in the pre-Reformation way of meaning-making in an old 
tradition. Henry’s “bath” might have become memorable to him in its pictures and sounds, in 
sensations on the tongue, on the skin, and even in internal bodily organs.71 The process of going 
through “a second and higher baptism into the sacred role of a knight,” David Starkey says, “would 
change [Henry’s] life.”72 Robert Hutchinson points out that, many years later, the adult king Henry 
“amended the herald’s report of the ceremony, inserting,” for example, “a phrase demonstrating” 
that, as a child, he was holding in his hand a golden rod during the initiation (24). Henry must have 
                                                     
69 Anstis in his Observations Introductory to an Historical Essay upon the Knighthood of the Bath “traced ‘the 
Antiquity of Knighthood of the Bath,’ in a wide sense of the concept, to the ‘old Franks’ and the Saxons, who 
introduced it to England, but admitted that it was ‘of no greater Antiquity, in this Kingdom, than from’ Henry 
IV’s reign.” Antti Matikkala, The Orders of Knighthood and the Formation of the British Honours System: 1660–
1760 (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: Boydell Press, 2008), 92. John Anstis, Observations Introductory to an 
Historical Essay, upon the Knighthood of the Bath (London: printed for James Woodman, 1725). 
70 MacCulloch 67. 
71 The Historical Account of the Honourable Order of the Bath interprets the tangible symbols of the ceremony: 
“The new clean Bed into which he is put after Bathing is said to denote the perfect Serenity of Mind, which is to 
be the final reward of a Series of virtuous Actions” (28f). “The White Belt represents the inviolable Chastity he 
is obliged to observe, in Opposition to impure Love; which is the rather to be expected from him, as he is 
himself now become an avow’d Protector of Female Virtue. […] The Sword is a Symbol of declaring open 
Defiance to the Devil, and his Resolution to defend the Cause of the Poor, against the Rich, and of the Weak 
against the Strong” (29). An Historical Account of the Honourable Order of the Bath, Eighteenth Century 
Collections Online. Gale Cengage Learning 2008. 26 Feb 2014. 
72 Henry VIII: Mind of a Tyrant. Episode 1: Prince. 
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thought it was an important detail to emphasize retrospectively; he turned his memory of himself 
touching an object, a meaningful symbol, into an image and documented it himself, writing the 
words between the lines of the herald that he carried “his verge [rod] of gold in his hand” (24).73 
The rod represented the power he attained when he became king74—a power that rose even above 
the church and subdued it. Hutchinson thinks this shows his “delight in gaudy pageantry and lavish 
ceremonial” (24). Starkey, however, sees more in this: for him, it “proves that the ceremony made 
an unforgettable impression on the little boy” and that “all his life Henry would think of himself, 
however badly he actually behaved, as a chivalrous knight.”75 
The fact that Henry found it necessary to put the detail with the “rod” in words which he 
inserted in the court document might seem paradoxical at first. However, it exemplifies the idea of 
transition from tangible, visible symbols to writing and reading, which is at the heart both of the 
humanist enterprise and of the protestant Reformation. Haigh sums up the importance of textuality 
and discourse in the reformation claiming that “Protestantism was the religion of the Word printed 
as well as preached.”76 Henry had his dream in the sensual order of signification and made it work 
through exegesis, in the order of the textual. In his early education, he made a connection between 
martial exercises and serious study. In the education of royal sons in the period, Carolly Erickson 
                                                     
73 Two years before the appearance of Hutchinson’s book, David Starkey claimed to have made this discovery 
himself with Andrea Clarke in the original copy of the report held in the British Library. Henry VIII: Mind of a 
Tyrant. Episode 1: Prince. 
74 Cola di Rienzo’s seven-months “rule” in the Rome of 1347 offers a curious antecedent to Henry’s 
reformation in European history. Cola, Walter Ullmann says, “proclaimed the restoration of secular Rome, […] 
the ‘demundanization’ of the Church and its confinement to exclusively supranatural issues.” The bath Cola 
took “in the tub allegedly used by Constantine,” Ullmann asserts, had a highly symbolic importance as a 
“rebirth” Cola himself termed the “lavacrum militare or the ‘bath of military glory’.” Since he became a 
tribune, which was the title of a military commander in ancient Rome, he called himself Miles Nicolaus (Knight 
Nicholas). He “appeared in scarlet, girded with a sword and wearing the golden spurs of the equestrian 
commander.” In his manifestos, he promised “to reform, renew, renovate the world by applying the ancient 
purely human, secular principles of Rome.” Medieval Foundations of Renaissance Humanism (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1977) 137–39. 
75 Henry VIII: Mind of a Tyrant. Episode 1: Prince. In amending the text, Henry turned a non-discursive 
childhood experience retrospectively into a promise that later came true: when he took the “bath,” he “was 
not expected to succeed to the throne;” instead, his elder brother, Arthur, “Prince of Wales was being trained 
for the kingship.” D. M. Loades, Henry VIII, King of England, 1491–1547 (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Amberley, 
2011) 42. 
76 Haigh 193. 
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writes, chivalry “was taken as seriously as the classics, and Henry’s young head was filled with tales 
of knightly valor, of ‘virtue and honor,’ and of the prowess of his medieval ancestors.”77 Characters 
in Arden of Faversham like Mosby, Alice, and Black Will also attempt to make use of texts and 
narratives to fulfill their desires of dominance. 
 
6. Building the Textual Armor, the Persona, for the Self 
When Henry read William Tyndale’s The Obedience of a Christian Man, besides the attractive 
notion of the absolute obedience of the subject to the monarch, he might also have found his belief 
in the prophetic force of sacred rituals corroborated in it.78 Tyndale treated sacraments as holy 
signs that represented “allwaye some promise of God.”79 He discussed the importance of baptism, 
one of what he believed to be the only two true sacraments right after his section on the other one, 
the Eucharist. The “plunging in to the water,” he argued, 
signifieth that we dye and are buryed with Christ as cōcerninge the olde lyfe 
of synne which is Adam. And the pulling out agayne signifieth that we rise 
agayne with chaste in a new lyfe full of the holy goost which shall reach vs 
and gyde vs ād worke the will of God in vs as thou seist Roma. vj. (xc). 
With his reference to St Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, Tyndale here places baptism in the context of 
the salvation plan the fulfilment of which the “washinge” prefigures and promises. In Tyndale’s own 
translation the passage reads, 
Remember ye not / that all we whiche are baptysed in the name of Jesu 
Christ are baptysed to dye with hym. We are buried with him by baptyme / 
                                                     
77 Carolly Erickson, Great Harry (New York: Summit Books, 1980) 28f. 
78 Henry read the book upon receiving it from Anne Boleyn. Upon doing so, he famously declared, “This is a 
book for me and all kings to read!” Alison Weir, Henry VIII: The King and his Court (New York: Ballantine 
Books, 2008) 297. 
79 William Tyndale, The Obediēce of a Christian Man (1528) lxxxix. Early English Books Online. 20 March 2014.  
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for to dye / that lyke wyse as Christ was raysed vp from deeth by the glory of 
the father / euen so we also shulde walke in a newe lyfe.80 
Besides the discursive explication of the meaning of a ritual, Henry must have understood Tyndale’s 
prophetic attitude to interpretation. Sacraments as signs for Tyndale are transparent. They point to 
a promise, and he emphasizes again and again the importance of believing in that promise: “the 
work of the sacramente saveth not / but the faith in the promise which the sacramente signyfieth 
iustifieth vs only” (clx). This interpretation presupposes a hypothesis that the believer can 
determine the meaning of the ritual through a faith that does not necessarily originate in it. 
Along with the notion of the arbitrary explication of symbolic acts, Tyndale teaches the 
attentive reader how to grasp the essence of written discourse by working through figures of 
speech and reducing them to the function of mere glue or solvent for the truth: “allegoryes […] are 
nothinge but ensamples borrowed of the scripture to expresse a texte or an open conclusion of the 
scripture as it were to paynte it before thyne eyes / that thou maist seale the meaning and the 
power of the scripture in thine herte” (cli). Meaning, accordingly, does not reside or originate in the 
text and the “conclusion” is “open” to an immediate, intuitive understanding, almost independently 
of the actual words. In his exegesis, Henry did not start from the text itself but from his passion 
which urged him to select passages that supported his case and to manipulate them to do so. 
Henry commissioned scholars to prove by documentary evidence that his kingdom was not 
subject to the authority of the pope. This committee assembled in 1530 a “compendium” called the 
Collectanea satis copiosa,81 “loosely translated as the collection that says it all,” based on “English 
history, Anglo-Saxon law, and the Old Testament.”82 After studying it attentively, Starkey says, 
Henry “convinced himself that the pope in Rome had no legitimate authority in England. From this, 
                                                     
80 William Tyndale, The New Testament of our Sauior Jesus Christ (1536) Romans 6:3f. Early English Books 
Online. 14 March 2014. 
81 The Sufficiently Abundant Collections. 
82 David Starkey, Henry VIII: Mind of a Tyrant. Episode 3: Lover. Channel 4, April 20, 2009. OVGuide.com. June 
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the king apparently concluded that instead, as Starkey adds, it was he, “Henry as king who was 
rightful head of the English church.” The technique of using legal, textual support for the persona of 
the secular ruler as a front against papal authority was not Henry’s original invention. Public law, 
Walter Ullmann argues, was the “instrument” in the hands of late Roman emperors “to harness the 
ecclesiastical organism to their governmental designs.”83 Public law gave the secular ruler “a 
profiled countenance with clean-cut features” which helped him prevent “intervention by the 
papacy on juristic grounds” (43). The distinction between, and the successful combination of, self 
and persona we observe in Henry can also be summed up in the terms of “individua substantia” and 
“persona mundialis” Otto Freising used in his historical writings (67). 
The attempt in Mosby, Alice, and Black Will in Arden of Faversham to emulate the dominant 
way of identity-formation and -perception by developing a tension between passion and discourse, 
self and persona, is finally punished as treasonous. Besides sexual and murderous desire, 
subversive passion in these characters includes religious belief and practices that were illicit in 
Edwardian England. 
 
7. Textual Persona and Passionate Self in Arden 
In elevating himself above his church in political terms and terms of possession, Henry 
fulfilled conformity with the divine order, the first principle that underlay Perkins’s teaching on 
worship and Augustine’s theory of the formation of identity, but he clearly ignored and flouted the 
second, a humble separation of himself from divine power and an acknowledgement of his 
insufficiency. One of Henry’s most lasting historic achievements is that he replaced the church with 
the state as the ultimate judge over individual conscience. From now on, rightful action was 
whatever served the mythical state (impersonated by the king) as the worldly manifestation of 
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God’s will, and the written law of the state (also dictated by the king) gave structure to that will. 
Henry managed to institute this in the framework of “national sovereignty”84 as the outward 
appearance of a mythical chivalric impulse and desire. 
Arden of Faversham testifies to the effort in the characters of Alice, Mosby, and Black Will to 
emulate this eagerness to stake out new territories for individual action and to free themselves 
from the control of conscience by formulating alternative mythical and poetic narratives and 
impersonating them similar to the way Henry did. Compliance with these evolving narratives, these 
characters believe, would confer legislative power on them as their authors and, as it seemed to 
happen to Henry, would exculpate them from moral blame. As I will try to show, the two modes of 
meaning-making are also components of a structured identity. I would sum them up, somewhat 
simplistically and phenomenologically, based on how they appear, in the words passion and 
discourse respectively. The former gives the stuff, I propound, of the invisible self while the latter is 
the fabric of the public persona. 
 
7.1. Alice 
Henry built his persona up consciously as a shield of textual references to protect his self, 
his heart’s desire, his sexuality, and used the written word as his weapon to fight off obstacles in his 
way. Alice Arden shows a similar twofold structure in her identity: she is driven by a powerful 
sexual desire,85 and she throws a barrage of words on her husband to create a screen of seemingly 
literal assertions. She is an expert in wielding language to build her persona and in making Arden 
believe that it is identical with her true self. Nonetheless, in a short soliloquy she reveals the 
discrepancy in terms of true inward feeling and public discourse: 
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Sweet Mosby is the man that hath my heart, 
And he [Arden] usurps it, having naught but this: 
That I am tied to him by marriage. 
Love is a god, and marriage is but words, 
And therefore Mosby’s title is the best. (1.98–102) 
This clearly indicates the primacy of emotions over the words that constitute marriage which Alice 
considers a mere formality. In her attitude, love is bound up with the idea of the fertility of her 
body. Accordingly, she blames Arden for thrusting “his sickle in our corn” (10.86) and thus 
interrupting an ongoing natural cycle similar to that in agricultural production. She equates “life” 
with “love” (91) suggesting that by thwarting their love, Arden is in the way of life. Consequently, 
he, the representative of the Protestant government, “must leave to live, that we may love” (90). 
Therefore, when Black Will pulls Arden down from his “stool” (14.120) with a towel, Alice stabs 
him “for hind’ring Mosby’s love and mine” (239). 
In contrast to her marriage, where Arden depends on her words, in her communication with 
Mosby Alice depends on Mosby’s bodily gestures as acknowledgment of her emotions. She sends a 
“pair of silver dice” (123) to remotivate the allegedly “wondrous sad” (115) Mosby and to remind 
him of their play for “kisses” where “winning” and “losing” (126) alike resulted in an exchange of 
bodily signs of mutual affection. The sight of Mosby and his gesture in “salut[ing]” (129) her, even 
from afar, would be more meaningful for her than Arden’s recitation of a passage from Ovid’s 
Amores, to which she fails to respond. Alice’s strategy is to engage Arden’s attention with the power 
of her words and to endear herself to Mosby with bodily gestures. 
As far as it involves human sacrifice86 to a personified instinct, Alice’s pagan worship of love 
as “a god” (1.101) goes even beyond Catholic practices. Moreover, she turns her protest against the 
                                                     
86 Helgerson remarks that “a Faversham agronomist assured me that Alice was a witch and that Arden was 
murdered in a ritual sacrifice” (141). 
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imprisonment of her love in marriage into a demonstration of the body in the strict Edwardian 
regime that organized rallies to uproot visible symbols and the practice of elaborate bodily gestures 
in worship. MacDonald P. Jackson connects the notions of adultery and of religious impropriety, 
arguing that “Alice’s sacrilege defines her moral world.”87 In her interaction with Arden and Mosby, 
Alice does not merely defy the modesty associated with chastity, but she brings back “the drama, 
movement and visual impact” that “Somerset and his colleagues” removed from “the Church’s 
traditional liturgy” and “which gave it much of its power.”88 Consequently, while Alice has good 
reason to keep her “religion” and the plan of the ritual murder of her husband as a form of worship 
secret from Arden, in demonstrating her presence in spectacular bodily gestures she makes an 
unmistakable statement that puzzles Arden by its crass opposition to her words. While in bed with 
her husband, she enacts a gesture of love for the absent Mosby and explains it to Arden next day 
saying, “Why, who was there but you? / And where but one is, how can I mistake?” (1.71f). She 
poisons Arden’s broth and refuses his suggestion that it is “not wholesome” saying, “You were best 
to say I would have poisoned you!” (1.367, 370). In Alice’s usage, words indeed “become 
weapons.”89 
At the same time, the shame in being seen and the lingering power of the words she herself 
has uttered are a source of hesitation in Alice. She threatens Mosby with renouncing their shared 
belief in the power of love and fertility, with returning to Arden, and restoring the truthfulness of 
her marriage vow. Her reason to do so would be that, instead of protecting her from the literal 
power of the written word, her escape to “Mosby’s love” and her surrender to blind pleasure 
“without control” (1.275) rather expose her to the censure of the watchful world. Like her husband, 
she feels she carries Mosby’s “lowborn name” in her “forehead […] engraven” (8.77, 76). She tells 
                                                     
87 MacDonald P. Jackson, “Shakespeare and the Quarrel Scene in Arden of Faversham,” Shakespeare Quarterly 
57.3 (Fall 2006): 249–293. 252. 
88 MacCulloch 81. 
89 Jackson 252. 
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Mosby that she regrets having let her “words be carried with the wind / And published in the 
world, to both our shames” (8.64f). After her attempt to renounce Mosby and return to her role as 
“honest Arden’s wife—not,” she points out, “Arden’s honest wife” (8.73) in the quarrel scene, she 
urges Mosby to “let us in to shun suspicion” (8.165). While previously she was eager to publicize 
her love and murderous desire “without control” (1.275), now it seems she cannot escape from 
being seen and being heard. 
Moreover, Alice fears that her unruly desire would produce monstrous results: “I pray thee, 
Mosby,” she entreats her adulterous lover, “let our springtime wither! / Our harvest else will yield 
but loathsome90 weeds” (8.66f). However, when Mosby skillfully asserts his own dignity and 
threatens Alice with reducing her to the image of an “unhallowed” witch (8.93f) and a “foul” 
“counterfeit” (102, 101) who overpowered him temporarily with her “spells and exorcisms” (95), 
Alice gives in and admits that Mosby’s “stormy look” (113) has more power over her than that of 
the world. As a proof of her submission, she now promises to “burn this prayer book where I here 
use / The holy word that had converted me.” While she is aware of the risk of degradation and 
shame involved in her pagan worship of fertility and contemplates returning to chastity in 
marriage, she finally chooses to destroy the words of prayer printed on paper in a spectacularly 
defiant act of sacrilege.91 “See, Mosby,” she urges, 
I will tear away the leaves, 
And all the leaves, and in this golden cover 
Shall thy sweet phrases and thy letters dwell; 
                                                     
90 The belief that “a deformed child was evidence of misconduct” surfaced in the later rumors that the foetus 
of Anne’s miscarried third pregnancy in 1563 was ill-shapen (Loades 263f). 
91 David Cressy approaches instances of book burning in Tudor and Stuart England as examples of “symbolic 
action,” “part of the public performance of power as well as a means of policing discourse” (361). “They 
demonstrate,” he argues, “that English political culture from the Reformation to the Revolution experienced a 
long and continuing nervousness about texts” (360). Being a symbolic gesture, its effect on the participants 
and the spectators was difficult to control, and it was subject to discursive clarification. Therefore, “subjects 
and citizens could subvert the proceedings to impose meanings and interpretations of their own” (361). The 
first books to be burned in England were Lutheran prints during the reign of Henry VIII. “Book Burning in 
Tudor and Stuart England,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 36.2 (2005): 359–374. JSTOR. 3 Apr. 2014. 
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And thereon will I chiefly meditate, 
And hold no other sect but such devotion. (8.116–122) 
She destroys the printed word only to overwrite it, like a palimpsest, in words of her own faith. Her 
hesitation indicates that passionate love and the cult of fertility are in opposition to the printed 
word of governmentally sanctioned worship. However, Alice’s wish to have Mosby’s “letters dwell” 
in the same “golden cover” and to “meditate” on them suggests that even her adamant belief in the 
pagan “god” of “Love” (1.101) and her worship of Mosby, the self-transforming idol of fertility, 
needs a codified form, a printed text, to compete with the official, state-sanctioned form of 
reverence. 
After successfully employing a screen of discourse throughout the action to hide her desire 
and to reach fulfillment, in the short period in Scene 14 leading up to the sacrifice of Arden’s blood 
to her longing, Alice is still in control of the deliberate ambiguity of her figures of speech and 
confidently directs one meaning to Arden and another to Mosby, who overhears the conversation. 
However, once Arden’s blood is spent, her elaborate discursive persona collapses, and she falls back 
on an inherent kind of signification. Her feelings overwhelm her body and invade her words. Alice 
admits in embarrassment that she does not blush at Arden’s death (14.260). When she realizes the 
blood stains will not disappear from the floor, she confesses to Mosby that “My husband’s death 
torments me at the heart” (14.270). Her words indicate that Alice now is a captive of Arden’s 
perceived presence, the effect of which is not anymore in her power to control. The experience of 
the ritual murder has enveloped her, and now she cannot extricate herself from it. She has turned 
into a sign with its meaning inherent in her body, in her face, similar to the floor of her house that 
now has absorbed the blood. It is as if visual symbolism with its intrinsic meaning had overpowered 
Alice, who has so far wielded it and governed its interpretive mechanism discursively to manipulate 
Mosby and Arden. 
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As a result of her falling back on the intrinsic meaning of feelings and gestures, Alice’s 
playacting, in front of the guests, intended to portray the wife anxious about her husband’s absence 
assumes, ironically, a genuine tone. She asks Greene and then Franklin to confirm that they saw 
Arden recently alive (14.279, 282); and when Mosby offers a toast to her “husband,” Alice cries out 
in anguish, “My husband?,” and adds that her “husband’s being forth torments my mind” (300f, 
304). Here she is having fought for more than a year (if we take her to represent the historic Alice) 
for her freedom, and now she realizes she cannot make the exchange. She feels Arden’s presence 
more powerfully than when he was alive. Although she tells Mosby to replace him in his “seat” 
(14.288), when he leaves with Franklin and Greene, she realizes that, even if he came back to her, 
he could not substitute for him or dispel the “fear” (326). Her real feelings break through the thin 
layer of pretense uncontrollably, and her acting connects and confounds meanings rather than 
sorting them out, as it did before she committed the act. When she tells Franklin to “seek” Arden 
“forth” and to “tell him what a fear he hath put me in” (311, 313), we have no doubt that, 
confounded though she is, her emotions are real and unrestrainable. 
Alice’s concern for the power of fertility at the core of her rebellion leads us naturally to 
summarize the importance of this notion in the play. Alice herself sets the subplot in motion when 
she recruits candidates to kill her husband by offering Susan, her waiting-maid, Mosby’s sister, as a 
prize to two men at the same time: Michael (1.148) and Clarke (287). In accordance with this, the 
energy for murder, as a precondition for the renewal of productive energies, is frequently expected 
in the play to issue from love and sexual desire. As Julie R. Schutzman sums up the connection, 
“murder takes on much more than the significance of revenge; […] it becomes synonymous with the 
fulfillment of desire.”92 For example, by helping the assassins devise how they may “conclude” 
Arden’s death, Shakebag suggests, Michael will “purchase Mosby for thy friend / And by his 
                                                     
92 Julie R. Schutzman, “Alice Arden’s Freedom and the Suspended Moment of Arden of Faversham,” Studies in 
English Literature, 1500–1900 36.2 (Spring 1996): 289–314. 291. 
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friendship gain his sister’s love” (3.168f). Michael declares his desire for Susan and his hope to 
marry her as his motive for agreeing to Arden’s murder (18.23–25). 
The expectations to overcome Arden’s lingering presence as a perceived obstacle in the way 
to Susan and Michael’s betrothal fills the supper scene with the importance of the climax. For 
Arden, however, this is the celebration of his reconciliation with Mosby, who is actually his wife’s 
lover. Arden himself invites Franklin, Mosby, the goldsmith, and the host of the local inn “With 
diverse of his neighbors and his friends” (14.39) to witness the event. Alice orders a cook (46) and 
arranges Michael and Susan’s engagement for the same night (44). To make the absurdity in the 
conflation of three divergent meanings (ritual sacrifice, betrothal, and reconciliation) manageable, 
Alice has to make sure the guests Arden has invited will be locked out while he is being murdered in 
the house (168f). Alice’s investment in primordial forces has attracted and brought together a 
chaotic circulation of contradictory energies in Arden’s house this evening. Unaware of their fatal 
uncontrollability, the hesitant Arden will fall victim to them, while Franklin, the true representative 
of the Protestant government, stays away from the pull of their tide. 
 
7.2. Idolatry versus Textuality 
The rivalry Alice foments between Michael and Clarke for Susan’s hand in marriage offers 
an example of the strife of the explicit power of the written text against the more inherent meaning 
of visual images. At first, Mosby favors Clarke (1.262) and poisoning as the means of murder (280), 
but he drops the idea later with Alice, and Clarke disappears from the action altogether. As a result, 
not only the act of murder becomes a more dramatic event and a communal one at that, but the 
effect of visual symbolism also loses the competition against the power of the written word: 
Michael, who woos Susan in letters, defeats the painter Clarke’s efforts to attract her with pictures. 
The play puts subversive forces to two different uses: it explicates them and destroys their agents. 
On the one hand, Franklin, the impassive representative of the government, constructs the 
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narrative of indictment based on visual and tangible evidence in the denouement, and, on the other, 
the murderers, who deploy more or less coherent mythical accounts to rival the written law and 
authoritative religious texts for the dominance of the local scene and to help their passion to 
victory, are severely punished. In this light, Michael’s defeat of the painter suggests that Catholic 
visual representations, too, are doomed as subversive together with the occult powers of nature 
and sexuality. 
While Mosby moves from playing with idolatry to textuality, the rivals for his sister, Susan’s 
hand represent the two ways of meaning-making as antithetical poles respectively. Clarke is an 
artist, a manufacturer of poisonous images—idols in Protestant terminology—, who carries poison 
on him (1.283ff). He woos Susan by sending her an emblem with the likeness of “a dagger sticking 
in a heart” (1.153); and when he is confident that he has won her, he boasts of laying “his colors to 
the life” and drawing “no shadows in his love” (597f). “Love is the painter’s muse,” he formulates his 
desire for Susan Mosby proudly, “That makes him frame a speaking countenance, / A weeping eye 
that witnesses heart’s grief” (1.257–59). His words celebrate the unmediated and uncensored 
communication of emotion through signs of the body and the direct medium of pictures. 
Michael, on the other hand, hopes to outdo Clarke by utilizing the power of written words: 
“I’ll send from London,” he boasts in dialogue with Alice, “such a taunting letter / As she [Susan] 
shall eat the heart he [Clarke] sent with salt / And fling the dagger at the painter’s head” (1.159–
61).93 When he overhears Michael read his letter to Mistress Susan, Arden calls Clarke, Michael, and 
Susan a “crew of harlots all in love” (3.26) and forbids him to “write to her a word” (28). In contrast, 
he promised Alice to write to her from London “every other tide” (1.408). The use of the written 
word is easier to intercept and censor than visual symbols are. Arden’s attitude to writing is 
                                                     
93 However, both the verse accompanying Clarke’s emblem and the text of Michael’s planned letter lack in 
originality: the former, according to Michael, was “stolen from a painted cloth” (154), a cheaper substitute for 
tapestry, and the latter should be produced, not by the wooer, Michael, himself, but by a fellow who “can both 
write and read, and make rhyme too” (157). For the use of painted cloth, see Jeffrey L. Singman, Daily Life in 
Elizabethan England (Westport, CT, London: Greenwood Press, 1995), 80. 
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ambiguous. While he resists royal power in fixing his persona in the “latters patents,” he judges 
characters from Faversham on the basis of a letter. Two of them, Michael and Susan, will be 
accomplices in his overthrow. This fact supports the claim that Arden of Faversham represents the 
struggle between two forms of meaning-making in the formation of identity: one is implicit, 
physical, and circular, while the other is discursive and linear. 
 
7.3. The Drive toward Textuality in Black Will 
Black Will testifies to the divide between the material world of the senses, on the one hand, 
and the Protestant belief in the literal truth of the word and the power emanating from sacred texts, 
on the other. At the same time, he exemplifies a shift from the former to the latter as Henry VIII 
powerfully prefigured it. He reminds Bradshaw with nostalgia of the position he had as a corporal 
in Henry’s war at Boulogne when they were “fellow soldiers” (2.19f). Black Will proudly remembers 
his heroism of stealing “the half ox from John the victualer” and the way he “domineered with it 
amongst good fellows in one night” (24–26). Those days are still “not past” with him, he 
emphasizes, and adds that he keeps “that same honorable mind still” (28f). Black Will’s indulgence 
in sensual experience is less honorable than Henry’s initiation to knighthood. Instead of a “verge of 
gold” as a promise of future power, he could grab only “a cudgel stick” with which he “broke the 
tapster’s head of the Lion,” an inn, to seek immediate satisfaction in quenching his thirst: “we 
trolled the bowl at Sittingburgh” (61–63), he reminisces, meaning, they passed the “cup” around 
(62n). 
Black Will still celebrates the memory of the sensual pleasure in the social and culinary 
opportunities the war scene offered, not the least because, besides the carousal at nights, it also 
gave him a sense of power. Bradshaw, who is now a goldsmith, used to be “but a base mercenary 
groom,” Black Will recalls, who begged him, “with a curtsy to the earth,” for “One snatch” (2.20f, 
23f) of the meat. In the commission to murder Arden, he sees a new opportunity to rise to a yet 
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unexperienced sense of honor. He refuses to make a solemn promise to “effect” the “deed” (89), 
because, he says echoing Alice, he has “broken five hundred oaths” (3.88). Instead, he would like to 
be further motivated by Greene, whom he asks to “charm” him by conjuring up the sight “of gold” 
and to entertain him with images of Mosby swearing allegiance to him as his feudal lord and Alice 
as a fairy offering him riches she carries on her body. “Say,” he tells Green, “thou see’st Mosby 
kneeling at my knees, / Offering me service for my high attempt; / And sweet Alice Arden, with a 
lap of crowns, / Comes with a lowly curtsy to the earth” (89–94). The images recall the medieval 
oath of fealty and scenes from Arthurian legends. Black Will, who fought in Henry’s ambitious war 
at Boulogne (9.24) for advantages of dubious value,94 realizes, long before Mosby, that he has to 
relive the chivalric myth that Henry did to make a campaign successful, regardless of the moral 
worth in its goal. At the center of his myth stands “sweet Alice Arden” rewarding him, the hero, with 
riches issuing forth from her “lap” (3.93), with a hint at Black Will’s possible sexual ambitions. 
Black Will’s words at first do not possess the power to make this work in his reality. As 
Whigham formulates, “Will wants direct action.”95 His travesty of passages from Elizabethan 
tragedy and his Biblical references might have made his language sound familiar to contemporary 
audiences, but what makes it powerful is the life he breathes into it by his readiness to believe in its 
literal truth. As a travesty of Psalm 42, he renders his eagerness to kill Arden in a poetic simile: “the 
forlorn traveler,” he begins telling Greene, “Whose lips are glued with summer’s parching heat, / 
Ne’er longed so much to see a running brook / As I to finish Arden’s tragedy” (3.99–102). Besides 
its metatheatrical effect, his last phrase shows a peculiar awareness in Black Will of his role in a 
literary genre of more than fictional significance.96 Whigham argues that the life of “bourgeois 
                                                     
94 Loades 178. 
95 Whigham 99. 
96 Shakebag similarly expends his energy spared from the frustrated attempt at assassinating Arden in 
London to create bombastic poetic images. “I cannot paint my valor out with words” (3.107), he excuses 
himself, before he compares the mercy he would have on Arden, given “place and opportunity” (3.108), in an 
adynaton, to that a “starven lioness” would show “to the prey” (3.109, 111). 
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competence at his trade” Will dreams of is “a real fantasy” (100) for him. He sounds as if he knew 
that he would have to enter the world of a myth to be able to carry out the formidable task of a 
hero. In this respect, his undertaking seems comparable, if not in magnitude, still in nature, to that 
of Don Quixote. 
Black Will elaborates further on the heroic narrative to develop it into a self-generating 
myth and names himself its protagonist: “I am the very man, / Marked in my birth hour by the 
Destinies, / To give an end to Arden’s life on earth” (3.158). In a next step, he assigns a supporting 
role to Michael as a “member” in the deed who will “whet the knife / Whose edge must search the 
closet of his breast” (3.161f), by which he means setting a trap for Arden. To have physical access to 
Arden’s body, his assassins first need to invent a narrative to organize their “drift.” Here we witness 
the evolution of a poetic narrative into a myth intended from now on to control the action. 
Whigham claims that Will uses a “legalist language” to achieve what he calls a “self-
institutionalization” (102), a “positive identity” (103). In a way parallel to how Henry VIII identified 
with his self in an Augustinian reflexivity and then encoded his political power in the Act of 
Supremacy to secure fulfillment, Will starts from a “charm[ing]” fantasy and unfolds his persona in 
a “highly legalist language” (102). For him, as for Michael (1.173f, 3.9), murder leads naturally to a 
fulfillment of desire. In terms of Orlin’s combined principles of hierarchy and analogy, Black Will’s 
heroic narrative follows the latter without observing the former. He creates his myth, as Henry did 
the one of his own chivalry, out of passionate desire to be empowered by it and to gain fulfillment. 
 
7.4. Mosby 
In his urge to gain power and in his sexual motivation, Mosby exhibits most clearly in the 
play the workings of the Henrician pattern of identity formation moving through a full sense of 
bodily presence toward a mythical rise to status in the framework of a narrative. He identifies with 
his sexuality in formulating his ideal of masculine power in an image of the “pillar” of “constancy” 
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(10.95, 94), a telling phallic reference to the symbol of fertility. To match Alice’s expectations of 
Love as a god (1.101), the symbol that represents it has to be “rocks of adamant” which no “time 
nor place nor tempest can asunder” (101f). On the other hand, Mosby frames his desire in a 
narrative with elements that have been scripted for him in contemporary plays. Eugene D. Hill 
claims that the “narcissist Mosby derives [his] sense of self […] from the stagy royals of recent 
drama.”97 In the vulnerable image Mosby paints of himself to justify his strategy as a “perpetual 
plotter” (367), Hill identifies allusions to the familiar topos of the “‘complaints’ of kings.”98 To his 
examples from The Spanish Tragedy I would add a passage from Shakespeare’s later Henry V only to 
show that this dramatic theme was indeed frequently reused. Here is Mosby’s “complaint:” 
Well fares the man, howe’er his cates do taste, 
That tables not with foul suspicion; 
And he but pines amongst his delicates 
Whose troubled mind is stuffed with discontent. 
My golden time was when I had no gold; 
Though then I wanted, yet I slept secure. (8.7–12) 
It is curious to think that Harry, a “real” monarch picks up the same motif in lamenting that the 
king, though blessed with “the balm, the sceptre, and the ball, / The sword, the mace, the crown 
imperial,” etc., cannot sleep in his “bed majestical […] so soundly as the wretched slave / Who with 
a body filled and vacant mind / Gets him to rest.”99 Mosby, a social climber in Protestant England, 
begins his plot contemplating the use of a Catholic object of worship and ends up fashioning himself 
in a markedly dramatic discourse as a literary hero. By joining in a literary tradition, he imagines 
himself to be a king, a fictional one, to be sure. But he seems to be taking the fiction literally and 
                                                     
97 Eugene D. Hill, “Parody and History in ‘Arden of Faversham’ (1592),” Huntington Library Quarterly 56.4 
(Autumn 1993): 359–382. 367. 
98 Raymond Chapman, “Arden of Faversham: Its Interest Today,” English 11 (1956): 15–17. 16, qtd. in Hill 366. 
99 Shakespeare, Henry V, The Norton Shakespeare. Based on the Oxford Edition, eds. Stephen Greenblatt et al. 
(New York, London: W W Norton, 1997) 1454–1521. 4.1.242f, 249–52. 
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thus turns it into a myth with himself in the role of the hero. In a way, this relapse from fiction to 
myth is similar to the way king Henry VIII formed his own identity when, as Starkey says, he “would 
live the fantasy,” the “tales of knights and chivalry […] for real” and when “inhabited in his 
imagination and dreams” the “world of chivalry and romance,” the tales “of disguises and 
transformations, of hermits and kings.”100 
Mosby is aware of the value, not only in his own desire, but in the desire of others he can 
use as a resource to fuel his own drive to position. He first proposes that Clarke draw Alice’s 
“counterfeit, / That Arden may by gazing on it perish” (1.234f). When Susan announces they have 
“grown onto a match” (603) with Clarke (which will later be inconspicuously dropped), Mosby taps 
into their love and uses the fact that his sister is at his “dispose” (606) to stipulate a condition. He 
commissions a “crucifix impoisonèd, / That whoso look upon it should wax blind / And with the 
scent be stifled, that ere long / He should die poisoned that did view it well” (612–15). Clarke, for 
the sake of Susan’s love, undertakes to manufacture the idolatrous weapon: “Though I am loath, 
because it toucheth life, / Yet, rather or I’ll leave sweet Susan’s love, / I’ll do it” (618–20). Murder, 
indeed, figures as a precondition for renewal,101 and the energy to commit it issues from sexual 
desire. 
Mosby is driven by a genuine sense of insufficiency and anticipation. He has, as he says, “a 
drift” (1.590).102 While Alice acknowledges his efforts to rise from a lowly origin saying, “whatsoe’er 
my Mosby’s father was, / Himself is valued gentle by his worth” (8.144f), both Franklin and Arden 
try to suppress Mosby’s ambition by connecting him in designation to his humble origins. This 
heightens Mosby’s sense of reality and enables him to restrain his desire temporarily and postpone 
the hoped-for fulfillment. In a gesture that reminds us of Henry’s self-restraint and his claim to a 
                                                     
100 Starkey, Henry VIII: Mind of a Tyrant. Episode 1: Prince. 
101 In the second chapter of her From Ritual to Romance, Jessie L. Weston investigates the connection between 
the removal of the disabled king and the restoration of the Waste Land to fertility in versions of the Grail 
legend. Doubleday Anchor Books Ser. A125 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1957) 11–22. 
102 At 579 he calls their common plot with Alice to murder Arden “our drifts.” 
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“high moral ground” (Bernard 8), Mosby strives to achieve an agreement between words and 
deeds: to love Alice while Arden is alive is for him unacceptable. He swears a Catholic oath to Arden 
saying, “as I intend to live / With God and His elected saints in heaven, / I never meant more to 
solicit her, / And that she knows, and all the world shall see” (1.327–30). After Arden has survived 
the attempted poisoning and left for London, Alice encourages Mosby to continue their love “albeit 
he [Arden] live.” Mosby, however, protests: “It is unpossible, for I have sworn / Never to hereafter 
to solicit thee / Or, whilst he lives, once more importune thee” (429–32). While “oaths are words, 
and words is wind, / And wind is mutable” in Alice’s stark opposition to a Protestant belief in the 
truthfulness of words, Mosby insists on keeping his oath “unbroken whilst he [Arden] lives” (437f, 
441). 
Henry’s attitude to sexual fulfillment is exemplary here as well: it was in compliance with St 
Augustine’s view of the maturation of the Christian personality we saw earlier in this chapter. 
Having had his own experience of what Taylor calls the Augustinian “inwardness of radical 
reflexivity”103 and having found his own truth within himself, he recognized the superiority of 
reason to sense as, for example, his letters to Anne testify. In one of them he thanked her for “the 
suppressing of your inutile vain thoughts and fantasies with the bridle of reason.” In doing so, he 
used the phrase “conformableness to reason” (Bernard 6), which reminds us of the first of Perkins’s 
principles, namely conformity to a higher will. When he staked “a claim to the high moral ground” 
(8), Henry saw “God, not Anne, […] as the arbiter of his desires” (6). And so does Mosby, too, at least 
until he strikes a deal with Clarke, the “compound[er] by art” (1.611) of poisonous images, to 
quietly move Arden out of the way. Instead of a dependence on immediate gratification “without 
control” (275), Mosby, at least temporarily, exhibits a Henrician sense of opportunity (kairos) and 
planning. 
 
                                                     




Thomas Arden receives his persona, so to speak, in the mail. As Frank Whigham formulates, 
he “gets his entitlement […] to the Abbey lands, by express law, not by customary ontological 
possession” (77). His friend, Franklin delivers it to him probably on vellum, penned by a scribe in 
official hand, with the Great Seal showing the full figure of the king enthroned, and signed both by 
the Duke of Somerset as Lord Protector and king Edward VI. The grant binds Arden to “the lands of 
the Abbey of Faversham” (1.5) in the eyes of every other character in the play except his own. 
Identifying with his duty to the crown would require that Arden accept and act out the persona the 
letters patents assign to him.104 However, he asserts his distance from the reason of state by 
insisting on having an unstructured identity of an inherited, aristocratic essence. Anticipating that 
they will reciprocate, he acknowledges Alice’s and Mosby’s identity to be similarly “of one piece.”105 
When they approach him, as Alice says, “arm in arm” (12.67) in Scene 13, he takes it as an 
expression of their genuine affection. He can process the irony, however, when Alice explains it to 
him: they did it, she says, “but merrily to try thy patience” (13.95). Although in a sense it is true, 
Arden cannot conceptualize a layered identity. As a result, he becomes the victim of his own 
essentialism, which demands that any discrepancy between a discursive persona and a heartfelt 
self must be explained away. 
While he is expected to be the watchful eye and the executive of the state in the country, 
Arden is rather anxious about being an object of vision himself. His position, Julie R. Schutzman 
formulates, “shifts from surveyor to object of surveillance.”106 As long as he suffers from not being 
recognized as an Ovidian lover and a hereditary nobleman by Alice and Mosby, on whom his sense 
of identity primarily depends, he is vulnerable to his own fantasies about what other people might 
                                                     
104 Leanore Lieblein argues that Arden betrays “his social responsibility” (186). In the sense of romance, he is 
a disabled king, who is in the way of the renewal of the Waste Land. See Weston 11–22. 
105 This is how as A. C. Bradley characterizes Othello. Shakespearean Tragedy: Lectures on Hamlet, Othello, 
King Lear, Macbeth. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. 163. 
106 Schutzman 304. 
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think of him. He imagines himself as a blank screen on which anyone can project images at least as 
bad as the offenses he himself is not determined enough to attribute clearly to Alice and Mosby: 
“Her faults, methink, are painted in my face, / For every searching eye to overread,” he complains in 
an outburst to Franklin. “And Mosby’s name,” he adds, “a scandal unto mine, / Is deeply trenchèd in 
my blushing brow” (4.14–17).107 While he thought he could ignore the persona that the patents 
prescribed for him, considering it incompatible with his genuine identity, now he cannot dispel the 
notion that anyone can impose one on him. His own skin becomes the vellum itself: he imagines a 
“botcher[’s]” (1.25, 316) name written over his own forehead. 
Although he expresses his death wish already in his first words in the play, to be ready to 
die, Arden has to accept his role as a “member” in what Dolan terms the “subordinates’ plots,”108 
that is, a conglomerate of mythic narratives, authored by Mosby, Alice, and Black Will separately to 
remove him. Black Will’s oral poetry and Mosby’s fantasy of deposing him will eventually impose 
the persona on Arden he was reluctant to assume. When he thinks about “Mosby’s name” eclipsing 
his in his “brow” of shame, he senses that Mosby will, at once, take the place of his self as well (“that 
base Mosby doth usurp my room”) and that he has no means to defend himself: Mosby’s “triumph,” 
Arden says, “lies” in his, that is, Arden’s, heart and “will not out till wretched Arden dies” (4.29f, 
32f). He senses the time of his life running “away” (37) toward the point when he might be freed 
from dishonor. He averts his eye from “the open world,” as Franklin says, and looks “up towards the 
heavens […] for redress of wrong” (46–48). This sounds similar to what Arden himself had already 
said in the first scene, about his wish not to see the obvious signs of his wife’s infidelity that “offend 
mine eyes” and to his desire that, instead of “this vale of heaven / The earth hung over my head and 
covered me” (1.12–14). 
                                                     
107 In a parallel image, Alice will be ashamed of carrying Mosby’s “lowborn name” in her “forehead […] 
engraven” (8.77, 76). 
108 Dolan 332. When Dolan claims that these are “the plot,” she seems to disregard the possibility that Arden’s 
murder evolves as Franklin’s plot; Franklin knowingly lets it happen and sums it up in a coherent master 
narrative retrospectively as prosecutor at the end of Scene 14 and in the Epilogue. 
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Instead of acting on his estate as the observant, controlling eye of the court, Arden becomes 
increasingly paralyzed as the object of vision himself. He even dreams about being caught in a net, 
like a deer, and being identified by a herdsman as “the game” (6.19) of a hunt. His life has turned 
into a nightmare, so that when he awakes, he is still not sure whether he “waked or no” (29). He 
believes his dreams “oftentimes […] presage too true” (37), as if he could not distinguish clearly 
between reality and imagination, or he perceived his life in terms of the fulfilment of fate, not his 
own will. Arden is gradually reduced to a body, a hunted animal. Since he refuses to follow the 
Protestant focus on the power of the written word, Arden falls victim to the mounting force of non-
textual modes of representation in the play’s Faversham: visual symbols in Catholicism, idolatry, 
the direct control of passion over the body, and the pagan worship of fertility. All this appears 
lumped together as a foil to Protestant textuality which emerges against this background as its own 
past from which it distinguishes itself and its source of energy. 
Arden believes in the truthfulness of bodily gestures as symbols that do not merely express 
or point to some meaning but carry meaning in themselves. He tries to convince himself that Alice 
has genuinely “changèd from the old humor / Of her wonted frowardness, / And seeks by fair 
means to redeem old faults” (13.62–64). When he imagines himself arriving earlier than she 
expects him, Alice appears to him in a picture as “playing the cook” (73). In fact, Alice is planning to 
confront her husband with a bold display of her unfaithfulness “marching arm in arm” (12.67) with 
Mosby, to provoke him to fight in jealousy and then to have him killed by Shakebag and Black Will 
in the commotion. When Arden meets them, he demands that they “Untwine those arms!” (13.79). 
To restore her image of the faithful wife, Arden thinks, she only has to let go of Mosby’s arm. 
Although meaning is inherent for him in its representations as images, Arden is ready to be 
instructed verbally in the interpretation of what he sees. He listens while Alice rattles off a baffling 
list of images and the allegedly wrong conclusions Arden has drawn from them: 
If I be merry, thou straightway thinks me light; 
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If sad, thou sayest the sullens trouble me; 
If well attired, thou thinks I will be gadding; 
If homely, I seem sluttish in thine eye. (13.108–111) 
The ambiguity of visual images leaves Arden dumbfounded. “But is it for truth that neither thou nor 
he / Intended’st malice in your misdemeanor?” (114f), he asks helplessly, and submits to Alice’s 
explanation: “Impose me penance and I will perform it, / For in thy discontent I find a death” (119f). 
What is more, Arden is eager to conciliate Mosby to prove he has learned Alice’s lesson and 
relinquished his claim for an independent explication of what bodily gestures mean. While Mosby 
teased him with a signs of cuckolding, which Arden now learns were ambiguous, Alice demands 
that Arden confess his “fault” to Mosby in unequivocal verbal terms. 
Franklin attempts, in vain, to train Arden in how to use words purposefully to attain a 
woman’s heart. “Entreat her fair,” he recommends and explains the performative force of discourse 
saying, “sweet words are fittest engines / To raze the flint walls of a woman’s breast” (1.46f). Arden, 
however, is more apt to express his own feeling of disappointment than to impress Alice and 
change her mood of constant resentment. He speaks as if Alice has expelled him from the blissful 
union in marital love, which only she can restore between them. Instead of fighting to regain her, he 
gives in to Alice’s confident denial of a discrepancy between her word and gesture at night when 
she, as he says, called “on Mosby in thy sleep” and “caught me about the neck” (66, 70). When Alice 
assures him of the alleged harmony of her words and gesture, Arden accepts her interpretation 
with relief: “I know thou lovest me well” (75). Rather than using words as “weapons,”109 as Alice 
does, to influence Alice’s emotions, Arden surrenders to her promise that there could be no 
“mistake” (72) in her embrace. He accepts Alice’s words that deny the irony. If Mosby utilizes most 
successfully the Henrician pattern of a layered identity, Arden is the least well equipped among the 
characters with a discursive armor to protect his sense of self. 
                                                     
109 Jackson 252. 
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When he tastes the poison Alice administered to him in the broth, for example, he asks 
Franklin for “mithridate,” “a poison antidote” (1.383 and n) to, as he says, “prevent the worst” 
(384). At the same time, he assures Alice saying, “I mistrust not thee” (391). Whenever he falls into 
the discomfort of disbelief resulting from his direct sensation and subsequently overcomes it by 
holding on to Alice’s words, he experiences an almost cathartic relief. When, in the wake of the 
unsuccessful first attempt at murdering him, Alice assures him that “never woman loved her 
husband better / Than I do thee,” he asks her to “Cease to complain, / Lest that in tears I answer 
thee again” (393–96). Arden expects to experience truthfulness in Alice and agreement with her in 
terms of the direct, bodily, iconic communication of emotions. He repeats this cycle a last time when 
Alice and Mosby meet him on his way home in Scene 13 and finds peace and comfort in an 
anesthetic state of acquiescence, ready for the offering. Arden is easily misguided by Alice’s verbal 
interpretation of her and Mosby’s gestures, because he himself is an uncritical believer in essences. 
 
7.6. Franklin 
At the end of Scene 13, Franklin leaves his friend to his fate, saying that he is “bewitched” 
and driven by the “devil” (13.152f). Franklin is absent for the duration of the ritual murder and 
emerges again only at the end of Scene 14, carrying the towel and the knife, the murder weapons. 
He has found Arden’s body; he has seen Mosby’s and Greene’s footprints in the snow and spotted 
“rushes” from the house in Arden’s “slipshoe” (14.400). He knew what was awaiting Arden when 
Arden left to appease Mosby, whom he injured, and he forewarned him (13.135f, 143f). Although he 
failed to prevent the fulfillment of Arden’s tragedy, as a government representative, he is the first 
everywhere to pick up clues and to collect evidence. Did he, before the feast of reconciliation, to 
which he was invited (14.38) but where he did not appear, give up trying to persuade Arden to 
prove Alice’s guilt and judge her? Did he decide instead to rise above the events and become the 
judge himself? Did he foresee the events and let them happen? Do they serve his interest? Lieblein 
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calls him “a disinterested friend who serves as the play’s center of moral judgment.” In him, she 
says, “the play’s point of view emerges.”110 He acts as a detective guiding the search and drawing 
logical conclusions from his observations, but he could foresee the events before they took place: 
“look about this chamber where we are,” he tells the Mayor, 
And you shall find part of his guiltless blood; 
For in his slipshoe did I find some rushes, 
Which argueth he was murdered in this room. (15.398–401) 
Franklin even knows Mosby can be apprehended at the “Flower-de-Luce” (14.413f). He reads signs 
and attaches meaning to them according to a narrative that he has seen unfolding and that he let 
reach its conclusion by its own momentum. He seems to sum up events in retrospect, like a 
chronicler, with insight; but in fact he allowed it all to happen, so that he can draw predictable 
conclusions. Arden’s death seems to serve the purpose of his narrative that subsumes and 
overwrites all other plots in the play, like Arden’s “letters patents […] cut off” “all former grants” 
(1.460, 462f), as Greene puts it. Franklin can now clean up the Faversham pocket of resistance to 
the written law of state. He sums up the story of executions that exterminate agents of chaotic local 
energies, pagan worship, and Catholic idolatry, once they have eliminated the unreliable 
representative of the crown. 
All the circumstantial evidence does not prove Franklin’s charge that it is Alice who has 
“shed” (406) Arden’s blood.111 She does not confess and does not deny: “I loved him more than all 
the world beside” (14.410), she says. However, if she herself does not come up with a coherent 
narrative of what happened, the authorities representing the realm will. Alice is not willing to 
formulate her own story in words and probably not capable of doing so. Her own experience of 
being compelled to subject her body, her self, to a marriage vow that sounded empty and alien to 
                                                     
110 Lieblein 184. 
111 Orlin comes to the conclusion that “a criminal investigation” “in the archives,” “independent of […] 
fictionalized” “contemporary narratives,” would not “lead us to indict Alyce Ardern” (20). 
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her,112 does not have room in the emerging narrative the authorities are now constructing with 
Franklin as its narrator in the Epilogue. 
 
8. Conclusion 
All the rebel characters, Alice, Mosby, and Black Will, have a reason to envy Arden, who 
would willingly be their ally, for living the dream of being “of one piece,” for conceptualizing his 
identity as an inalienable essence. However, they act in a way to further and, in fact, enforce the 
Henrician split of identity. They kill Arden as a sign, a reminder, of what gets lost in this split: the 
rather illusionary unity of identity, of self and persona. In this sense, the act of sacrificing Arden is 
symbolic. His presence in Faversham as an example of being “by birth a gentleman of blood,” a 
“gentle gentleman,” is as intolerable as withholding property rights by royal patent. Arden does the 
former by conviction and the latter by fate. These two attitudes result from the two components of 
his identity, but he fails to see them and acknowledge them as such and insists on being pure self. 
In this chapter I have shown that telling details of the political connection between the real-
life murder of Ardern and the court of Edward VI have been suppressed already in the first written 
accounts, but never entirely erased. Humanist historiography continued focusing on the business of 
state and glossing over the way it achieved a semblance of narrative coherence. Henry VIII took 
advantage of the power of the written word when he argued that his legislative and political 
reformation was a logical step issuing from the documented history of England. He incorporated 
those texts into his own strategic effort to build his powerful public persona. 
The historic Thomas Ardern rose to wealth and power as a result of Henry’s Dissolution 
under his reign. His dependence on Alice, a practitioner of subversive religious worship, however, 
turns the dramatic character Arden into a potential partaker in the signifying economy the 
                                                     
112 Alice admits she has “sworn” and “given my hand unto him in the church,” but she dismisses the validity of 
the verbal promise saying, “oaths are words, and words is wind, / And wind is mutable” (1.435–38). 
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Protestant reformation strives to overcome and suppress: a disorderly conglomerate of pagan 
fertility cult, Catholic idolatry, and sexual and murderous desire. Consequently, as a representative 
of state under Henry’s successor, Arden fails to execute the political responsibilities the written 
entitlement from the court entrusts to him. Thus, he represents a crack, a flaw in the narrative of 
state and, therefore, even his friend, the loyal Franklin, abandons him. 
However, Alice, Mosby, Clarke, and Black Will, the local agents of the uncontrollable forces 
of passion, fabricate their own myths to achieve fulfillment and to rival the official master narrative 
issuing from the “letters patents.” They too, like Henry, take their own desire and translate it into 
their own different scenarios, originating in fertility myth, contemporary drama, poisoning magic, 
and romance narrative, respectively. Since he insists on the inherent meaning of symbols, Arden 
cannot easily interpret it in discourse, and he cannot tolerate a tension between the two. As a result, 
ultimately he falls victim to a simplistic explanation of Alice’s bodily gestures. Similar to Henry, 
Arden’s murderers follow the Augustinian pattern of identity formation: they retain the power of 
passion in their selves, rise above it to a higher moral point of view, and build a discursive persona 
of a bricolage of strategically presented and literally interpreted texts and narratives. While they 
have to fall because their narratives are not compatible with the official order of signification and 
worship, Arden “muss sterben”113 because he does not build up a layered identity of self and 
persona. 
                                                     
113 Arden muss sterben (Arden Must Die), opera composed by Alexander Goehr, libretto Erich Fried, trans. 
Geoffrey Skelton, Sadler's Wells Theatre, London, April 17, 1974, the New Opera Company, conductor, 
Meredith Davies; producer, Jonathan Miller. The above information comes from Christopher Shaw, “‘Arden 




Language and the Perception of Identity in Othello 
 
My primary aim in this chapter is to answer two main and interrelated questions that have 
intrigued critics of Shakespeare’s Othello from the earliest times of the play’s performance history. 
The first one is what gives Iago power to, as Othello formulates, “ensnare[…] my soul and body?”1 
The second problem complements it, because it concerns Othello’s susceptibility to be “ensnared” 
(310): what makes him believe the unbelievable? Or does he, indeed, believe, against all probability, 
that Desdemona has been unfaithful? This is how I formulate the problems, and the answer is likely 
to question the ingrained assumption that Othello kills Desdemona for love, out of jealousy, as “one 
that loved not wisely but too well” (5.2.254). Here, as elsewhere, it is not judicious to take Othello’s 
words about himself at face value, as F. R. Leavis reminds us.2 To shake at least, if not to dispel, a 
common and stubborn supposition about Othello’s perception of, and attitude toward, Desdemona, 
as I hope my answers will, would be to change our sense of the nature of the tragedy in Othello. In 
his monograph and comprehensive study Othello and Interpretive Traditions, to which I am 
indebted, Edward Pechter happens to subscribe to this fallacious assumption, and he sums it up 
stating, “Othello is in love.”3 It is easier to refute this statement, based on the very evidence Pechter 
uses, than to fight a long-established stereotype. So, I will proceed in this order, taking Pechter’s 
claim first and then present my interpretation of the problem in Othello. 
Pechter bases his claim on Othello’s language, while he ignores the immediate 
circumstances of the Moor’s utterance. He contrasts the complex “Latinate” words and syntax in 
Othello’s description of his unmarried condition with “a simple and direct expression of affection” 
                                                     
1 William Shakespeare, Othello, ed. Kim F. Hall (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007) 5.2.310. All 
quotations from Othello are from this edition, unless otherwise indicated. 
2 F. R. Leavis, “Diabolic Intellect and the Noble Hero: A Note on Othello,” Scrutiny 6 (December 1937): 259–
283. 276. 
3 Edward Pechter, Othello and Interpretive Traditions (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 1999) 40. 
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(40) in the words “I love the gentle Desdemona” (1.2.25). Only because he does love her, Pechter 
asserts in empathy, can Othello do what he wants Iago to believe is a sacrifice, namely, put his 
“unhoused free condition […] into circumscription and confine” (1.2.26f) for her sake. This 
difference in grammar underlines the profoundness of the change Othello had made before the 
action of the play started, Pechter suggests, from “the freedom of his soldierly celibacy […] for 
something better” (40). The lines are “beautiful” (40) indeed, but we should not overlook that 
Othello utters them on his wedding night, chatting with his disgruntled ancient in the street, 
apparently still “unhoused” and “free,” while he now seems to feel obliged to appease him, even at 
the expense of leaving his fresh bride, who took more than ordinary risks for this union, alone at an 
inn, in what must be “circumscription and confine,” indeed, for a young virgin, who has presumably 
never spent a night away from home. The irony is striking. 
Considering that, throughout the action, Iago takes advantage of Othello’s bad conscience 
for letting him down, for selfish reasons, in his hopes of due promotion, it is unlikely that Iago 
would take Othello’s above words at face value. Iago’s own cynical attitude to his marriage to Emilia 
and the misogyny he expresses in Act 2, scene 1 at the harbor in Cyprus, before Othello arrives, 
should warn us that he probably “knows more, much more than he unfolds” (3.3.260). We should 
not be easily duped, either. That, on his wedding night, Othello speaks of his own marriage as a 
burden and sacrifice might not be flattering to the bride he has temporarily abandoned, but it 
fulfills the criteria for the maxims of Agreement and Sympathy,4 terms well-established in linguistic 
pragmatics and discourse analysis. In his words, Othello “exaggerate[s] agreement” with Iago and 
he might even aim at evoking his sympathy based on the underlying negative presupposition 
                                                     
4 Bronisław Malinowski termed “the communion of words […] to establish links of fellowship” “phatic 
communion” in “Phatic Communion,” Communication in Face to Face Interaction: Selected Readings, eds. Laver, 
John, and Sandy Hutcheson, (Harmondsworth, UK, etc.: Penguin Books, 1972) 150f. Geoffrey N. Leech 
elaborated on the Maxims of Politeness in his Principles of Pragmatics (London and New York: Longman, 
1983) 138f. More recently, Bethan Benwell and Elizabeth Stokoe discuss them in Discourse and Identity 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006) 274. 
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concerning the state of a married man. In making the confession in the given circumstances, 
therefore, Othello is more likely to attempt to establish common ground with Iago than with 
Desdemona. 
In a more general sense, the belief that Othello is in love with Desdemona has obliged critics 
to go to extreme lengths in explaining how this love can transform into murderous hatred—an 
undertaking which is not supported by convincing evidence. And still, Othello’s “I love the gentle 
Desdemona” has garnered more attention and credibility, and still causes confusion as a result, than 
Desdemona’s refutation of it in protesting, in the very real shadow of death, that “That death’s 
unnatural that kills for loving” (5.2.44). Desdemona cannot reconcile killing with loving, and I think 
we would fail to pay due respect to the meaning of these words if we tried. Othello obviously has 
some interest in believing, or at least pretending to believe, in Desdemona’s guilt, if he makes the 
effort to do so; and the effort must be considerable, since he must know that what Iago offers to him 
to believe has no foundation in any real fact. However, this impossibility strikes us as probable in 
the sense of Aristotle’s recipe for tragedians,5 and this is the mystery that forces critics to focus on 
the Temptation Scene (3.3), where Othello seems to believe what he must not believe. This chapter 
attempts to unravel this mystery by focusing on the two main questions that have constantly 
occupied critics of Othello: what is the source of Iago’s power over Othello, and what is the reason 
for Othello’s vulnerability to that power? 
 
1. The Problem in Othello 
In her “Introduction” to Contemporary Critical Essays on Othello, Lena Cowen Orlin divides 
the history of the reception of the play into two main periods. For a long time, she argues, emotional 
reactions dominated audience and critical responses, while in recent decades Othello, providing 
                                                     
5 Aristotle, Poetics, transl. S. H. Butcher, Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Arts by S. H. Butcher, 4th ed. (New 
York: Dover Publications, 1951) XXIV. 7–10, 95, pp. 93–97. 
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material for “a case study,” as she formulates, yielded to questions raised in all of the newly 
emerging “politicized readings” like “gender, power, sexuality, [and] race.”6 Character criticism in 
the earlier period of the history of Othello’s reception seems to have focused on two persistent and 
closely related issues: the question of how Iago is capable of impressing other characters, most 
importantly Othello, as “honest” while being in fact a villain and the problem of what makes Othello 
vulnerable to Iago’s insinuation of Desdemona’s infidelity in the Temptation Scene in Act 3, scene 3. 
Before trying to answer these questions in terms of perception and identity, and of the perception 
of identity, in the hierarchical Iago–Othello–Desdemona–Cassio quadrangle, I would like to consider 
how the criticism conceptualizes these two problems: that of the power in Iago others refer to as 
his “honesty” and of Othello’s vulnerability to it. 
The initial attention in the criticism to Desdemona shifted to Othello and finally settled on 
Iago. The mesmerizing effect of the tragic fate of Othello and Desdemona urged critics early on to 
question the forces that determine it. Once we had lost our taste for the murderous streak in 
Othello’s noble heroism in A. C. Bradley as the source of the tragic denouement, we became more 
engaged in trying to resolve the intellectual mystery of Iago.7 However, our interest in the enigma of 
Iago has not entirely eliminated the emotional appeal of the play. According to Edward Pechter, we 
want both to suffer with Othello and to act with Iago, and then again be punished for it (29). It 
seems, we tend to see Iago and Othello in tandem and understand Othello’s character more in 
association with that of Iago than with that of Desdemona. Othello’s vulnerability might arise from 
his perception of Iago as “honest,” which would entail that, in the context of the play, the two 
concepts, Othello’s vulnerability and Iago’s “honesty,” cannot be defined in isolation from one 
another. However, critics have often tried to explore Iago’s identity independently of, and prior to, 
                                                     
6 Lena Cowen Orlin. “Introduction.” Othello: Contemporary Critical Essays. Ed. Lena Cowen Orlin (Basingstoke, 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 1–21. 1. 
7 Pechter 28f. F. R. Leavis claims that already “from Coleridge down, Iago—his motivation or his 
motivelessness—has commonly been, in commentaries on the play, the main focus of attention” (261). 
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Othello’s perception of it and without considering if Othello might have affected it or even shaped it. 
Still, a quest for Iago’s motivation independently of that of Othello has never yielded a satisfactory 
explanation.8 Even though the ancient has more lines in the text than the protagonist and 
eponymous hero, Othello,9 Iago is still a character in a play titled Othello, not Iago. What hidden 
interests, what principles does Iago represent? 
 
2. The Question of Power and Vulnerability in the Criticism 
The earliest extant eye witness account of a performance of Othello comes from Oxford in 
1610; this report focuses only on the immediate effect of the suffering of Desdemona on the 
spectator.10 The first mention of Iago from the 1640s calls him a “rogue” and, besides a “villainous 
humor,” attributes to him a power to “persuade[…] Othello to his jealousy” (Salgādo 47). Robert 
Gould’s poem from 1689, similarly, points out the ability of “cursed Iago” to “Work up the noble 
Moor to Jealousy.” It calls Iago cunning and represents his effect on Othello in a metaphor of feeding 
him with “poison” (Salgādo 58). Thomas Rymer repeats this assessment almost word for word and 
adds that Iago works Othello up “to be Jealous.”11 The earliest critics of the play try to grasp Iago’s 
character in its one-way effect on Othello, and posit him as the origin of evil in the play. 
Regarding Iago’s character as an evil influence goes hand in hand with considering it 
duplicitous. Rymer calls Iago “a close, dissembling, false, insinuating rascal, instead of an open-
hearted, frank, plain-dealing soldier, a character” he says we have known from tragedy, comedy, 
                                                     
8 Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s proverbial phrase indicates the difficulty to fathom the depth of Iago’s character. 
Iago’s soliloquy closing the first act, Coleridge famously observes, “shows the motive-hunting of motiveless 
malignity.” Terence Hawkes, ed. Coleridge on Shakespeare (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1969) 190. 
9 Orlin 2. R. A. Foakes’s statistics show that Iago has “‘43 per cent of the lines’ in the first two acts compared to 
‘32.58 per cent of the words in the play’ as a whole.” “The Descent of Iago: Satire, Ben Jonson, and 
Shakespeare’s Othello,” Shakespeare and His Contemporaries: Essays in Comparison. Ed. E. J. A. Honigmann 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986) 16–30. 29. Qtd. in Pechter 54. 
10 Gāmini Salgādo, Eyewitnesses of Shakespeare: First Hand Accounts of Performances 1590–1890. London: 
Sussex University Press, 1975) 30. 
11 “Iago by shrugs, half words, and ambiguous reflections, works Othello up to be Jealous.” Thomas Rymer, A 
Short View of Tragedy; It’s Original, Excellency, and Corruption (London: Richard Baldwin, 1693) 118. Early 
English Books Online 15 Jan. 2014. 
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and from “Nature” “for some thousands of years in the World” (Salgādo 93f). William Hazlitt in 
1814 calls Iago similarly “an accomplished hypocrite” and refers to his character as “odious” 
(Salgādo 262). The word “hypocrite” suggests that Iago’s character is double-layered, that the 
impression it creates of itself in others is false, and that behind it, like behind a screen or a mask, 
lurks its putative true identity. The critic of the Morning Herald, under the influence of the same 
production that inspired Hazlitt,12 observes contradictions of this kind in Iago. His “rude and blunt 
honesty,” he claims, “is not real” and his “candour […] merely affected.” Iago, “the villain,” here 
appears to have a twofold character: he seems to “deceive everyone except himself” (Salgādo 265). 
In spite of this perceived elusiveness in Iago’s identity, the critic tries to grasp its essence in 
attributes such as “cold, and designing, and unvaried in its nature.” Even more surprisingly, he 
states that it requires “a deep and comprehensive knowledge of human nature” (Salgādo 264) to 
impersonate it on the stage, suggesting that Iago, somehow in his rigid, calculating, and merciless 
appearance, exemplifies that “human nature.” In spite of the premise of hollowness on which he 
bases his characterization of Iago, the critic insists that the actor should be able to maintain “a 
distinct feeling” with which he can “unite and give identity to the portrait” (Salgādo 265) onstage. 
Even though they experience Iago’s surface persona only, to call him “false,” “hypocritical,” and 
“deceptive,” they have to assume a core behind the mask. This is a remarkable presupposition 
critics do not account for. 
The theme of evil persuasion, first sounded in the 1640s as I indicated above, continues to 
dominate the critical opinion of the character of Iago, and it certainly complements the axiom that 
Othello is, at least initially, in love. The first account of a production of the play I referred to 
emphasizes the way Desdemona affected a spectator. Nonetheless, Iago does not provoke such 
direct emotions in critics, perhaps because his involvement with the action onstage is also indirect, 
detached. Critics refer to him rather in terms of the effect he has on his “audience” onstage, 
                                                     
12 Edmund Kean played Iago at the Drury Lane on May 9, 1814 (Salgādo 262–65). 
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primarily on Othello, without considering the possibility that his character and sense of identity, 
too, evolve, and that he goes through a crucial process of transformation in the first scene of the 
play which he attributes to his disappointment in his general. In connection with a Drury Lane 
production in 1817, the European Magazine uses the verb to “tempt” in the context of the ancient’s 
influence on Othello and represents his machinations in terms that might remind one of the way 
John Milton characterizes those of Satan in Paradise Lost as far as they aim at putting to the test and 
corrupting the innocence of Adam and Eve.13 Iago, the review goes, “tempts the unsuspicious Moor 
to jealousy, and works upon his ardent nature with the suspicion of Desdemona’s honesty.”14 
Charles Dickens, in the second half of the nineteenth century, holds Iago capable of “dissect[ing] his 
master’s soul,” so that Othello does not even realize it, and of “overpower[ing]” (Salgādo 269) 
Emilia without the semblance of ill will. Dickens seems to be the first critic to suggest that Iago 
harms other characters without being passionate about it. 
Iago’s effect of persuasion on his “audience” onstage is thus intimately related to the 
perception that he is duplicitous. Accordingly, if Iago is a “hypocrite,” as Hazlitt and his fellow 
reviewer claimed in the 19th century, he is one not only in the modern sense of the word but also 
according to the meaning of the ancient Greek ὑποκριτής (hupokritēs), that is, actor, player. 
Moreover, as far as he gives voice to Othello’s, Roderigo’s, and even Cassio’s motives, supports their 
hidden potentials, and helps them unfold their identity, Iago does not initiate these intrinsic forces 
but merely responds to them and by reflecting them augments them and drives them to an absurd 
conclusion: he is the interpreter, the expounder, which is another meaning of the same ancient 
Greek noun, hupokritēs. Does Iago, when, as he says, his “Muse labors” (2.1.129), introduce 
something alien to Othello, or does he act as a midwife helping “events in the womb of time” 
                                                     
13 A. C. Bradley would protest saying, “to compare Iago with the Satan of Paradise Lost seems almost absurd, 
so immensely does Shakespeare’s man exceed Milton’s Fiend in evil.” Shakespearean Tragedy: Lectures on 
Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, Macbeth (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992) 178. 
14 Salgādo 266. 
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(1.3.355) unfold, a desire in Othello take shape? In any case, Iago’s perspective on Othello seems to 
be of a different order from the way Othello sees himself. While Iago’s perspective on Desdemona as 
an adulteress attracts Othello, Othello’s efforts to appropriate it introduces a curious split in his 
perception of who Desdemona is and thus perhaps even in his perception of his own identity. In his 
testimony in the trial scene (1.3), Desdemona emerges as a compassionate virgin, an object of 
desire and Othello’s selfless patron, a worldly embodiment of the Virgin Mary, an emblematic figure 
in Venetian iconography from the day of the City’s foundation,15 while she appears to Othello, in an 
astounding perceptual delusion, the “cunning whore of Venice” (4.2.93) in the brothel scene. Is this 
the same Othello who said he “loved her” (1.3.170)? Or was his love flawed from the beginning? So, 
what makes it vulnerable to Iago’s insinuation? 
 
2.1. Iago Larger than Life 
Critics I referred to above approach the problem of Iago’s identity within the strict limits of 
character criticism. A. C. Bradley from 1904,16 however, is perhaps the first critic who suspects 
larger than merely personal forces behind Iago’s intrigue.17 Coleridge still judges Iago’s character in 
terms of “truth” and “falsehood,”18 but Bradley acknowledges Iago’s “extraordinary” personal “skill” 
in weaving and controlling the plot,19 as if in some sense he was not a part of it. Bradley also calls 
attention to the force of the “intrigue” itself as a mechanism that, apart from the effect of character, 
also contributes to the catastrophe. The “part played by accident,” he points out, “accentuates the 
                                                     
15 Venice was founded on March 25, the day of the Annunciation, in 421, and Venice consequently “adopted 
the Virgin Mary as special patroness.” David Rosand, Myths of Venice: The Figuration of a State (Chapel Hill & 
London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001) 12, 13. 
16 John Russell Brown, “Introduction to the Third Edition,” Shakespearean Tragedy: Lectures on Hamlet, 
Othello, King Lear, Macbeth by A. C. Bradley (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992) xiii–xxxiii. xiv. 
17 According to Orlin, A. C. Bradley’s criticism of Othello commences the modern era of the play’s reception, 
and his approach influenced our understanding of it to the 1980s and possibly beyond (2). 
18 Hawkes 189. 
19 This significant shift from the attention to the truthfulness in the character to his power to shape the 
dramatic situation will be followed by an explication of this change from truth conditions to performative acts 
in the philosophy of language initiated by John Langshaw Austin’s How to do Things with Words (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1962). 
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feeling of fate” (154) which even Othello has to respect. For example, Bradley says, Othello could 
ruin Iago’s scheme by asking a simple question—but then he does not, which, along with the other 
“accident[s]” (154) in the plot, “seems to us quite natural,” he explains, because “so potent is the art 
of the dramatist.” Bradley concludes that in Othello, as in Oedipus Tyrannus, “fortune” or “fate has 
taken sides with villainy” (155). In his interpretation, fate appears like a force quite detached from 
the conscious intentions not only of Othello but of the other characters as well, framing and limiting 
them, and functioning as an artistic device Shakespeare applies to the plot. 
In spite of his understanding of Iago’s exceptional position in the plot, Bradley still 
continues the search for the “inner man” in the character. His contradictory critical impulses allow 
us a glimpse into the emptiness of Iago’s character when viewed in itself, in isolation from others, 
most importantly from Othello, and, at the same time, relate it to some substance: Iago’s “insight 
[…] into human nature” (187), Bradley argues, exhausts itself in his “lordship of the will” (188), of 
“his inner world” (200), but he admits that “there never was […] any violent storm” in Iago to be 
controlled” (186f) in the first place. Iago does “frightful things,” he claims, without being driven by 
any kind of passion (192) or “ill-will” (193), and “that is the very horror of him” (192). Bradley 
seems to be on the brink of admitting that the problem of motivation in Iago eludes his grip as long 
as he considers it in itself. He attributes to Iago a “definite creed,” he even sums it up as an “absolute 
egoism” which lies “wholly outside the world of morality” (188), but then he adds that any inward 
value in other characters “annoys” Iago (190). This points toward the possible object or cause of the 
repulsion in Iago and suggests that Iago cannot be, after all, only a source of influence. He must be 
influenced himself by events and other characters.20 
It is curious to consider if Othello represents such an “annoying” inward value for Iago, 
what the nature of that value is, and how it affects him. If we found reference to this in the criticism, 
                                                     
20 Professor Richard Hardin comments on this saying that the “actor” Iago, as Shakespeare’s Richard III, 




it should bring us closer to an understanding of at least the first of the questions with which we 
began about the secret of Iago’s power over this value and perhaps even of the other one about the 
weakness in Othello that forces him to yield up that value. Bradley sees Othello as “exceptionally 
noble and trustful” (149), a man “who was indeed ‘great of heart’” (151) and whom Iago can ruin 
only with a “knowledge of Othello’s character” and with “an elaborate plot” (152) at his disposal. In 
his famous response, however, F. R. Leavis attacked the Bradleian binary of “the noble Moor” and 
“the devilish cunning of Iago,” the pattern of the fall of “a nearly faultless hero” caused by “external 
evil.”21 Leavis attempts to move the focus of attention, which, he claims, since Coleridge has shifted 
unduly to Iago, back to Othello. Most importantly, he argues that Othello’s “immediate surrender to 
Iago” indicates that his “trust […] can never have been in Desdemona” (263). “Iago’s power […] in 
the temptation-scene,” he asserts, resides in the fact that “he represents something that is in 
Othello” (264). Interestingly, Leavis blames Othello for what Bradley blamed Iago, egotism and self-
centredness (265), and adds to these a “heroic self-dramatization” and “self-idealization” (270). 
In addition to locating the cause of his vulnerability (this was my second question) in 
Othello himself, Leavis reveals a split in Othello’s perception that might help us better understand 
the Moor’s outlook on who Desdemona is: Leavis shows that from the first scene of the fourth act 
onward Othello subtly distinguishes between what Leavis calls Desdemona’s “person” and “the 
character of the owner” of that “person,” between what Othello perceives of her in his “romantic 
idealizing love” and “reality” (271). His murder of Desdemona Leavis explains then as “a sacrifice” 
to save the ideal from Desdemona herself (272). For Leavis, not Iago but Othello himself is the 
hupokritēs in the first meaning of the word I expounded on above: the actor or player. Othello’s 
“self-dramatization,” Leavis argues, is “un-self-comprehending” (275), that is, Othello deceives not 
only us, who are inclined “to see the play through [his] eyes” (276), but himself as well. Othello’s 
perception, Leavis claims, suffers from a divorce between “appearance and reality” (278). With this, 
                                                     
21 Leavis 260. 
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he has taken us a substantive step closer to resolving our question about the source of Othello’s 
vulnerability. The Moor’s promptness in his response to “Iago’s diabolic intellect” and his readiness 
to “doubt his wife” (264) cannot indeed issue from Iago’s character alone. Leavis sets up a 
reciprocal relationship between the effect of “Iago’s diabolic intellect” and “Othello’s readiness to 
respond” (264), a zero-sum economy, which suggests that my two initial questions about Iago’s 
power and Othello’s vulnerability to it cannot be answered independently of each other. 
 
2.2. Inherent and Analytical Signification 
Instead of considering the two characters’ perception separately to share the responsibility 
for the tragedy between them, an examination of how Iago arrives at his point of view and how 
Othello then attempts to join him in observing Desdemona as a common object of desire over 
whose “appetite[…]” (3.3.287) he has no control promises to yield a more complete understanding 
of the source of the ancient’s growing power over the general. One of the important texts that 
“dislodged Othello from the old interpretive boxes of character criticism, genre studies and literary 
appraisal,” Orlin says, was Lynda E. Boose’s “Othello’s Handkerchief: ‘The Recognizance and Pledge 
of Love’” in 1975.22 In fact, Robert Bechtold Heilman was the first to point out that the handkerchief, 
“far from being only the trivial object that Rymer saw, has a specific symbolic status” and that it 
leads us “in to the crowning statement in the play of love.”23 “The handkerchief is a talisman,” 
Heilman argues, and he uses its “quasi-sacramental” power to contrast Iago’s “minimizing 
naturalism” (212) in the play. Othello becomes vulnerable to the influence of “the Iago naturalism,” 
Heilman writes, and, as a result, “rejects the magical powers of love” (212). Boose adopts Heilman’s 
emphasis on the “magic in the web” and, following him,24 places the handkerchief at the center of 
                                                     
22 Orlin 2f. 
23 Robert Bechtold Heilman, Magic in the Web: Action and Language in Othello (Lexington, KY: University of 
Kentucky Press, 1956) 211. 
24 Boose 369. 
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the plot “around which the rest of the tragedy inexorably whirls.”25 She elaborates on the range of 
multilayered meanings in the symbol in opposition to what she calls, in echoing Heilman’s phrase, 
Iago’s “pornographic literalism” (367). Iago rouses Brabantio and shocks audiences in the first 
scene of the play with images in this mode. I am turning now to Boose’s study on how a change in 
Othello’s perception of an object so important to him may transform the meaning of that object. 
Since, due to its metonymic connection to her, the handkerchief represents Desdemona’s power 
over Othello, Boose’s insight into the signifying properties of this object may cast light also on how 
Othello’s perception of Desdemona changes in the course of his interaction with Iago. As Paul 
Yachnin says, “the play trades the handkerchief for Desdemona’s body.”26 
Picking up the handkerchief which Thomas Rymer dropped,27 so to speak, because he did 
not understand how it could “raise every where all this clutter and turmoil” “on the Stage,”28 Boose 
tugs at a network of rich and complex “ritual significations,”29 a whole order of poetic semiotics 
with tension-filled pairs of symbol and referent, to show “what is ultimately destroyed” (367). At its 
hidden and mainly forgotten levels, the handkerchief connects more or less natural phenomena to 
each other, and it inspires symbolic and artistic human imitation of their perceptual forms. The 
“highly visual picture of a square piece of white linen spotted with strawberry-red fruit,” for 
example, Boose says, bears a visual and metaphoric connection to “virgin blood” (362) and to 
“stained wedding sheets” (363).30 The fact that the former appears frequently as an emblem among 
                                                     
25 Lynda E. Boose. “Othello’s Handkerchief: ‘The Recognizance and Pledge of Love’.” English Literary 
Renaissance 5.3 (Autumn 1975): 360–74. 368. 
26 Paul Yachnin, “Magical Properties: Vision, Possession, and Wonder in Othello,” Theatre Journal 48 (1996): 
197–208. 206. 
27 Othello himself depreciates it saying, “Your napkin is too little: / Let it alone” (3.3.304f), and lets it drop. 
28 Rymer 140. 
29 Boose 363. 
30 In his The Purpose of Playing: Shakespeare and the Cultural Politics of the Elizabethan Theater (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), Louis Adrian Montrose elaborates on similarly flexible 
associations in Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream between the “wedding rite,” the “act of 
defloration,” and the “metamorphosis” (172–73) of the flower “love-in-idleness” (MND 2.1.168), “Before, 
milk-white; now, purple with love’s wound” (167). Montrose observes, too, a difference between “physical,” 
“symbolic,” and “literalized” modes of the conceptualization of marriage. Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s 
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“embroidery designs from the period” might be related to the observation that “the treble-leafed 
strawberry plant bore a red fruit from its initially white flower” and to the association of “love and 
desire” with flowers of the “generic rose family” to which strawberry also belonged (362). The 
perceptual similarity between such phenomena establishes less than direct associations between 
layers of observed natural processes, opens them up for unconscious imitation in rituals based on 
this similarity, and renders them available for more deliberate symbolic, artistic creation. 
The loose connection between these layers, however, can under circumstances tighten, and 
metaphor may succumb to the force of the simpler figure of allegory, symbol to that of analogy, and 
both may collapse into a straight and “honest” equation, a putative literal correspondence between 
symbol and referent. Iago’s image representing Desdemona and Othello’s love in a picture of 
copulating animals right in the first scene of the play represents this extreme case in our analytic 
system of signification when the voyeur unveils the “thing” and presents it to the embarrassment of 
sign users who unexpectedly glimpse the physical reality of lovemaking conjured up by the literal 
power of language. This expectation that follows from our training creates the horror and the 
reaction of refusal in facing a limit of signification in the literal force of words. Partly, but not 
entirely, under Iago’s influence, Othello loses his grasp on the multilayered depth in the meaning of 
the handkerchief, or rather he escapes its magic power, and for him it turns from a token of love 
into a piece of evidence with a flat literal meaning. At the end of this process, the handkerchief does 
not act anymore as a tissue that connects through its rich symbolism and through the repetition of 
the performative gestures it organizes, like ritual observances and its passage from one generation 
to the next, but it litigates by the fact of its mere presence or absence. 
The shift of the handkerchief in Othello’s perception from the magical order of signification 
with meaning inherent in its very substance to that of a symbol with a corresponding referent 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Dream, The Norton Shakespeare. Based on the Oxford Edition, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York, London: 
W W Norton, 1997) 814–861. 
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outside it—as it is understood in western semiotics since Augustine of Hippo31—might bring us 
closer to seeing a change in Othello’s relationship to Desdemona from the absolute value of a sense 
of magical sympathy in love to the yes/no alternative of “strumpet” or “not,” “whore” or “not a 
whore” (4.2.84, 89). However, this would account only for Othello’s attraction to the binary 
mechanism in the western way of meaning-making or for his readiness to formulate his view of 
Desdemona in such terms. Putting our finger on the moment when Othello first responds to Iago’s 
reductionist dyad might be relatively easy, and probably we will find that it is not Othello’s 
invention but that Iago introduces him first to this framework. However, we will still have to 
explain the origin of Othello’s negative bias within the binary. Apparently, the Augustinian 
signifying order offers a simple approach to what might have seemed to Othello a restricting bond 
of attachment, which the handkerchief, laden with layers upon layers of powerful symbols, 
metonymically stands for.32 Freed from the magic of such ties, he seems to approach Desdemona 
with a distinct curiosity about the possibility of her guilt his words can conjure up without 
implicating him in their signifying power: 
OTHELLO: […] 
Impudent strumpet! 
DESDEMONA: By heaven, you do me wrong. 
                                                     
31 For simplicity’s and clarity’s sake, I am using Ogden and Richards’ terminology here. As Augustine 
formulates, a sign is “a thing which of itself makes some other thing come to mind, besides the impression 
that it presents to the senses.” Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, ed. and trans. R. P. H. Green (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995) 57. Austin discovered that our order of signification still retains a remnant of the 
power of the “Egyptian” immediacy of reference and named this aspect “performative” (6). 
32 The difference between the two signifying orders stood at the center of a theological debate from early on 
in Protestantism. Based on St. Augustine’s concept of the duality of word and the “thing” that it points to, John 
Calvin asserted that the promise in the sacrament does not change even though words that refer to it do. 
Lutherans, on the other hand, postulated “a more intrinsic, even indissoluble, connection between words and 
meaning.” Richard Waswo, Language and Meaning in the Renaissance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1987) 254f. Calvin’s “mystical participation of the sign in the thing” which are, however, still separate, 
Waswo argues, “is the central principle of Augustinian semantics” (255). Martin Luther, in contrast, “refused 
to divide words from meanings” (256) in the Augustinian way and insisted on a “‘literal’ and inexplicable 
union of bread and [Christ’s] body” (255) in the Eucharist. Luther’s position on signification corresponds to 
the magical properties of the handkerchief which get lost in the Iagovian order of signification that follows 
the Augustinian and Calvinian “linguistic dualism” (256). 
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OTHELLO: Are you not a strumpet? (4.2.83f) 
While such words might extricate him from the power of Desdemona’s body, Othello seems 
interested in filling those “stops” and “close dilations”33 that, as he says, “fright me” and the content 
of which he assumes issues “from the heart” (3.3.136) of a “brother,”34 Iago, that “passion cannot 
rule” (137). It seems as if Othello is compensating himself for the imaginary loss of Desdemona’s 
love with his loyalty to Iago, who offers to liberate him from it. To prove that Desdemona’s love 
indeed restricts Othello’s freedom of movement, we should be able to test against the evidence 
Leavis’s claim that Othello has never trusted Desdemona in the first place. If this is the case, we will 
not have to search further for a reason for Othello’s vulnerability. 
In what was the most important book in Shakespeare studies in the 1980s,35 and certainly 
in early modern scholarship in general, Stephen Greenblatt does not see a liberating promise for 
Othello in discourse. He does not see two alternative modes of signification at work in the play but 
only one, and he calls it “narrative self-fashioning.”36 Othello and Iago, however, depend on it in 
different ways, which accounts for Iago’s influence over Othello. We observed the power of 
narrative in Arden in the previous chapter. Iago, Greenblatt claims, in a way similar to how I thought 
Black Will was doing it, “inscribes […] those around him” into the narrative he “constructs” (234). 
The ancient is in command due to his “improvisational” skill, while Othello is weighed down by his 
inflexible and helpless submission to a long tradition of antifeminist writing. Even though this 
                                                     
33 Iago’s “pauses, single words and pregnant phrases,” Patricia Parker begins her analysis of Shakespeare’s 
rhetoric in Othello “seem to suggest something secret or withheld, a withholding which fills the Moor with the 
desire to hear more.” “Shakespeare and Rhetoric: ‘Dilation’ and ‘delation’ in Othello,” Shakespeare and the 
Question of Theory, ed. Patricia Parker and Geoffrey H. Hartman (New York, London: Methuen, 1985) 55–74. 
55. Parker points out that “the Ensign Iago’s ‘dilations’ open up a sense of something much larger than can be 
unfolded or shown” (64), that is, the rich meaning behind the handkerchief. This way of nonverbal signication 
touches Othello’s self, I argue in this chapter, and gives him hope in the fourth scene of the third Act that 
Desdemona might be able to save him from his own “accusation” (one of the meanings of the word “dilation,” 
57) of her by producing the handkerchief. 
34 Coppélia Kahn, Man’s Estate: Masculine Identity in Shakespeare (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University 
of California Press, 1981) 144. 
35 Orlin 6. 
36 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago, London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1980) 234. 
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tradition is not explicitly represented in the play, Greenblatt invokes it on account of the possibility 
that a deictic element in one of Iago’s soliloquies points to a hidden and unexpected referent. The 
element that sums up “the dark essence of Iago’s whole enterprise” for Greenblatt is the “felicitous” 
“ambiguity of the third-person pronoun” in Iago’s words from the end of the first act when he plans 
“to abuse Othello’s ear / That he is too familiar with his wife” (233 emphasis added). The 
emblematic significance of the phrase, Greenblatt argues, hinges on the assumption that the “he” I 
highlighted above means Othello, not Cassio, to whom, however, he clearly refers in a “his” three 
lines preceding this (1.3.376) and in naming him the line before that (375). This would certainly 
require that the pronoun “he” in the following line as well refers, not to Cassio, but to Othello, who 
should be, accordingly, “suspected, framed to make women false” (381), even though Iago 
characterized Cassio, not Othello, as “a proper man” for the role of Desdemona’s seducer in line 375. 
If this improbable condition does not hold, then Iago must suddenly switch to a reference to Othello 
and immediately back to one to Cassio without indicating it in a longer passage that otherwise 
discusses how appropriate Cassio is as a means to Iago’s aim of abusing Othello. The language game 
Greenblatt attributes to Iago here is indeed narrative, what is more, purely linguistic and narrowly 
grammatical in its variation of the deixis of a pronoun. If Iago does this here, it is unique in his 
diction throughout the play text. 
Besides the puzzling question whom Iago intends to mislead or secretly inform here with an 
allegedly ambiguous usage in a soliloquy, there is a bigger problem with this interpretation: it does 
not fit the overall course of the way language functions in the play. Although, as I hope I will be able 
to show, Othello becomes gradually more well-versed in the dichotomy in the Augustinian 
semiotics of “sign” and “thing”37 and the Protestant belief in the literal power of language,38 it is 
                                                     
37 A sign is “a thing which of itself makes some other thing come to mind, besides the impression that it 
presents to the senses.” Augustine. De Doctrina Christiana, ed. and trans. R. P. H. Green (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995) 57. John Longshaw Austin discovered that our order of signification still retains a remnant of the 
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apparent that in Act 3, scene 3 he still cannot process the significance of Iago’s words in abstraction, 
without presupposing the workings of “passion” behind them as a source from which they should 
issue. The example I presented two paragraphs earlier where Othello supplies for himself the 
context of a passionate “heart” (3.3.136) in Iago, in which he can embed the ancient’s words to 
carry vital significance for him, is a case in point. Without providing an opportunity for such a 
context to emerge, with the unmotivated switch in the deixis of a pronoun, Iago could hardly “abuse 
Othello’s ear” (1.3.378), as Greenblatt argues, especially as early as the first act. 
As far as Iago’s typical signifying habit is concerned, it is more characteristic of him to 
impress his audience, onstage and off, with vivid images based on the listeners’ expectation of a 
complete correspondence of words and reality. A belief that words can cover reality fully enables 
men to wield power successfully in Othello, as, for example, the Duke of Venice and Iago. The Duke 
sums up this literalist belief when he instructs Brabantio to read “the bloody book of law / […] in 
the bitter letter / After your own sense” (1.3.69–71). These words so tellingly reveal, at the same 
time, the arbitrariness of such a “reading.” Not even Brabantio, a senator, is able to follow the 
Duke’s prescription to turn “injury” into “a mock’ry” by imposing a “smile” on “a bootless grief” 
(210–12). For Brabantio, words are of no consequence when it comes to “sorrow,” because “words 
                                                                                                                                                                           
power of the “Egyptian” immediacy of reference and named this aspect “performative” in How to do Things 
with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962) 6. 
38 To be able to appreciate, and make use of, the power of language to create and control dramatic reality, a 
character has to be able to free him- or her-self from the assumption that language and words inhere in things 
they designate. Frank Kermode observes a development in Shakespeare over his career, “in the course of the 
greatest decade of English drama,” toward such a kind of “new rhetoric” that he established, Kermode says, 
“about the time of Hamlet and highly developed by the time of Coriolanus and the Romances.” He describes 
this process in terms of a “gradual toughening up of the language, accompanied by a new freedom of 
metaphor and allusion” and what he calls an even “subtler change[…] from the simpler expressiveness of the 
early plays to an almost self-indulgent, obsessive passion for particular words, their chimings and 
interchimings, their repetition.” Shakespeare’s Language (London, New York: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2000) 16f. 
It seems Iago has the means to compel Othello to go along with such a poetic freedom in language use which 
entails an acceptance of the dualism of sign and thing. Is this kind of independent use of figurative language 
lying? This question in writing came to the forefront of debates in the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth 
centuries, Maria Franziska Fahey asserts, and St. Augustine, she adds, took a stance on the issue saying that 
“figurative or prophetic speech” can be “truthful” and they are “only misunderstood to be lies.” Metaphor and 
Shakespearean Drama: Unchaste Signification, Early Modern Literature in History Ser. (Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 75f. 
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are words.” He cannot imagine how “the bruised heart” could be “pierced,” that is, “relieved” 
“through the ear” (217, 221f, 222n). Brabantio is at an intermediary stage between Desdemona and 
Iago, if we accept them as representatives of two extremes, where he can already formulate in a 
clear language his dependence on kinship ties of “blood” (1.1.171) and his fear of the power of 
witchcraft, of natural substances over the mind (1.1.173, 1.2.74–76), and of the “practices of 
cunning hell” (1.3.104) — all of which he associates metonymically with the “sooty bosom” (1.2.71) 
of the Moor —, but where he cannot yet protect himself against these by taking up a sterile 
narrative position above them. This and a constant play with constructing a language to delve into 
such fears and to channel them along a coherent narrative will be Iago’s invention in the play. 
Brabantio’s example should clearly warn us not to focus narrowly and exclusively on narrativity 
and textuality in self-fashioning, because these are only a part of a larger game that characters play 
on a broader scale. This scale in Othello includes shades and registers all the way from the 
inarticulate expression of emotion (“She gave me for my pains a world of sighs,” 1.3.161) and the 
belief in magic (as “in the web” of the handkerchief, 3.4.65) to the sophisticated and powerful use of 
language to evoke primordial instinct, desire, and fear or at least the impression of these in 
onlookers (typically in Iago’s language, for example, in the image of “the beast with two backs,” 
1.1.118, and in his “reading” of Bianca’s body for iconic signs in 5.1.106–120). 
Greenblatt argues that Othello succumbs to “the colonial power of Christian doctrine over 
sexuality”39 because, under the pressure to accommodate to a foreign culture, “he cannot allow 
himself the moderately flexible adherence that most ordinary men have toward their own formal 
beliefs” (245). Since he “at once represents the institution and the alien, the conqueror and the 
infidel” (234), “Christianity is the alienating yet constitutive force in Othello’s identity” (245). 
Othello is thus vulnerable to, and submits to, Iago’s “ceaseless narrative invention” (235) due to his 
own vague recognition of “his status as a text” (238). Iago, by contrast, “knows that an identity that 
                                                     
39 Greenblatt 242. 
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has been fashioned as a story can be unfashioned, refashioned, inscribed anew in a different 
narrative” (238). Enabled by this knowledge, he inscribes Othello, together with “those around him” 
(234) who “have always already experienced submission” to such fictions (237), in the story he 
constructs (234). This would explain, in Greenblatt’s framework of “submission to narrative self-
fashioning” (234), that Othello, who has constituted himself as text already, must compulsively 
restore his identity in these terms after his wife has subverted it, however “unintentionally,” 
through her own “erotic submission” to him (244). Instead of an Othello who enters the play as his 
own narrative construct and defends his textual identity against Desdemona’s erotic assault, I 
would like to argue for one whose identity is grounded at least as firmly in his lived experience, in 
his sensuality, and in his belief in the magic of union in desire as in his denial of all this as well as, 
finally, in his regret for having betrayed it. As a consequence, Othello’s self-fashioning might appear 
narrative in its aspirations; but it is, in fact, narrative and, at the same time, emotional, bodily, 
sexual, magical, and inwardly felt. 
Nonetheless, in Greenblatt’s interpretation, once he subjects his already textual identity 
entirely to an “institutional hostility to desire” (248), desire which is “a kind of idolatry” (249) in 
written Christian doctrine, the Moor betrays a “deep current of sexual anxiety” that Desdemona’s 
“frank acceptance of pleasure and [her] submission to her spouse’s pleasure […] awakens” (250) in 
him. A strong presupposition underlies this argument: it attributes to Othello an orthodox 
dogmatism without showing how he, as a newcomer to Christianity, has been exposed to the effect 
of the long tradition of such writings that Greenblatt traces from Saint Jerome through English 
Protestantism to early seventeenth-century Puritanism. Furthermore, when the argument presents 
Othello’s identity as “always already” textual, it ignores the heartfelt sensuality of his language, for 
example, in his “round unvarnished tale” (1.3.92) of “the story of my life” (131) in the third scene of 
the first act, as opposed to the pornographic literalness in Iago’s language in the first scene of the 
play and elsewhere. As a result of presenting Othello and Iago as if they were subject to the same 
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kind of “narrative self-fashioning,” Greenblatt’s interpretation cannot account for why they cannot 
use its technique with a similar level of command and thus for the foundation of Iago’s advantage 
and his controlling position over Othello. Othello retells his own story at several different occasions 
with shifting emphases: this indicates that he, too, as a servant of the state, knows how to refashion 
identity, like Iago does. As a convert employed by the Christian state of Venice, he probably has to. 
In the text of the play, there are no signs of a dogmatic aspect of Othello’s denial of his own 
sexuality; instead, it seems to originate, like his decision to take advantage of Desdemona, of Iago, 
and of Cassio, even before the action of the play begins, from his anxious desire to secure his 
position in the political elite of Venice. Othello’s vulnerability is more power-related than strictly 
religious. 
 
2.3. Power and Vulnerability in the Feminist, Cultural Materialist, 
and Postcolonialist criticism of Othello 
The articles I have selected for review in these schools of criticism reach out beyond a pure 
textuality in their explanations of the Othello–Iago power dynamics, and thus they open the field for 
a more satisfying account of the interplay between the power of discourse and of forces outside it. 
In a “particularly influential” work of “first-wave”40 feminist criticism, Coppélia Kahn continued on 
the path F. R. Leavis had broken. According to Kahn, Iago needs only to help Othello to an 
anamnesis41 to awaken “the sleeping monster” that is already there in his mind,42 in a way similar 
to what Leavis called “the essential traitor […] within the gates.”43 She also calls attention to the 
“rapidity” in Othello’s reaction to Iago’s gesture of “reminding” (143), but she explains Othello’s 
                                                     
40 Orlin 4. 
41 Jacques Derrida uses the word “anamnesia” in the sense of “live memory,” as the “proper[…] psychic 
motion” of “true science” in opposition to “hypomnesia,” that is, remembering with the help of an external 
reminder, writing. Dissemination, transl. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981) 
107. 
42 Kahn 143. 
43 Leavis 264. 
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vulnerability to the power of this “monster” (143) by arguing only that he has a share in what 
appears to be a static collective unconscious of his host culture, a “fantasy […] commonly held in 
[Iago’s] society” which confirms the “fears [Othello] already has about women” (140). This fear is 
the basis of the bond between Othello and Iago as his “brother” (140), Kahn argues, but how it finds 
its way into Othello’s mind she does not say. Our reading of Leavis raised the question of the origin 
of Othello’s negative bias against Desdemona, and Kahn seems to suggest, in accordance with 
Leavis, that Othello has never trusted Desdemona in the first place. Kahn collapses my two 
questions into one statement, arguing that “Iago’s revenge depends on his gaining the Moor’s 
absolute trust” (143). Has Shakespeare not left a hint in the text to indicate what makes Othello go 
beyond merely allowing Iago to “take” Desdemona’s place in his “heart” (143)? A shared fear of 
women might explain why Othello enters into a “union […] of two male minds” (144), but not what 
makes him allow Iago to overwrite his own lived experience in a fiction and why he defeats his own 
resistance in a painful struggle to finally accept that fiction and act upon it as if he believed it was 
true. 
Alan Sinfield, in the “most significant cultural-materialist intervention in Othello studies,”44 
posits the omnipotence of texts and attempts to transcend it at once. Sinfield’s “Cultural 
Materialism, Othello and the Politics of Plausibility”45 answers my first question about the power of 
Iago’s “honesty” claiming that the ancient is “convincing […] because his is the voice of ‘common 
sense’, the ceaseless repetition of the always-already ‘known’, the culturally ‘given’” (52). “The state 
is the most powerful scriptor” of ideology (54), Sinfield argues, suggesting that Iago, the powerful 
man in Othello, embodies the state and its “common sense” in the “effective stories” (53) he wields 
as his weapons. While individual identity can normally develop solely on a given ideological and 
                                                     
44 Orlin 9. 
45 Alan Sinfield, “Cultural Materialism, Othello and the Politics of Plausibility,” Othello: Contemporary Critical 




textual basis, Sinfield sees a possibility for subversive action in an emerging feminist subculture 
(58). Thus, he implicitly assigns Othello to one camp with Iago, on the side of the dominant 
discourse of the state. Ultimately, however, power struggle takes place exclusively on the level of 
texts, Sinfield argues (68). Textuality has its own mechanisms, he claims, and there is no safe 
position outside it from which the “reading” of texts could be controlled (69). Sinfield still attempts 
to move beyond the realm of texts to a vaguely defined “conceptual framework” that might emerge 
as the ultimate source of available meanings (71). Since Sinfield’s understanding of textuality does 
not attribute to Othello an independent agency outside it, we cannot explain in this framework why 
stories are more effective in Iago’s hands than in Othello’s, unless we assume that Iago has control 
over those extra-textual “concepts.” But Sinfield does not elaborate on this question further. 
A representative postcolonial study by Emily C. Bartels shows a possible way out of our 
“entrapment” (Sinfield 59) in discourse and will help us open a broader context for the 
understanding of the power relationship between Othello and Iago. Bartels invokes the critical 
opinion that “Othello’s claim to identity” is founded merely in an established set of texts and, 
therefore, it is “tenuous and derivative.”46 Othello limits his testimony in the trial scene, Bartels 
allows, to summing up Brabantio’s and Desdemona’s perception of who he is (158), and thus he 
seems to be dissolving willingly in “an exoticizing European discourse” (159), feeding “Europe its 
own fantasies” of the colonized subject. Paradoxically, however, exactly as a result of this 
submissive self-presentation, Othello emerges as a flexible subject forming his own identity. Bartels 
uses as proof the way Othello resorts to the handkerchief in a “crisis” and “puts ‘magic’ in its web” 
retrospectively, so to speak, to “manipulate” Desdemona. Bartels questions whether “the enchanted 
past Othello produces is, to his mind, finally his” (161), but she observes that in the performance 
history Shakespeare’s Moor has resisted being “typecast” (163). Therefore, Othello remains a 
                                                     
46 Emily C. Bartels, “Othello on Trial,” Othello: Contemporary Critical Essays, ed. Lena Cowen Orlin, New 
Casebooks Ser. (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 148–170. 151. 
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controversial figure whose “search for interiority” allows him to “stand apart as well as within” the 
forms of “fixed European fantasies” (165). With this, Bartels accepts the force of inwardness as a 
possible factor, in opposition to the linearity of texts and narratives, in the shaping of Othello’s 
identity. Her work opens the field for a study of how these two poles affect the power relations 
between him and Iago, which may help us understand the reasons for Othello’s submission to the 
ancient’s narrative. 
 
3. Iago’s “Honesty” 
3.1. Iago and the Power of Discourse 
While he admits he cannot give a complete explanation of Othello’s vulnerability,47 Edward 
Pechter brings together much of the material we need to mount a case for the origin of Iago’s 
extraordinary power: the way Pechter describes Othello’s aggressive expansionist technique it 
appears to be the opposite of Arden’s defensive attitude. As I tried to show in the previous chapter, 
Arden avoids identification with both the substance of local passions as the source of religious and 
political subversion in Faversham and the written assignment of his function he receives from the 
distant royal court to control those passions. Iago, however, exploits the power of both poles in a 
dichotomy which is implicitly there in the way the Augustinian semiotic system makes sense of the 
world. One is the stuff that builds the putative core of the self, makes it unique, and lends sexuality a 
sense of singularity in personal sympathy — all of which we might sum up in the term of 
inwardness; the other results from a tendency in all of this to lose its unmistakable personal hue 
and dissolve in a discourse that handles and organizes these essential, positive qualities in social 
interaction and in the interest of the larger social and political unit of the nation and the state. The 
power of discourse to organize social interaction derives in a general sense from the notion that 
                                                     
47 Pechter 105, 109. 
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Jimmy Durante formulated saying, “Everybody wants to get into the act.”48 More specifically, we 
experience in Othello that Iago scripts the “act” in what is the only powerful narrative in the play. 
We can observe a similar dichotomy appearing in the tension-filled relationship between the 
“thing” itself and the “sign” that names it and arranges it in distinct categories in a system of other 
signs in language. 
Pechter finds the readiness of discourse and textuality to appropriate the sense of 
inwardness so pervasive that he thinks a process similar to the dissolution of Othello’s character in 
the stream of Iago’s dehumanizing generalizations is taking place in the criticism of the play itself as 
it accepts more and more the centrality of the ancient’s function in the plot. “The ascendancy of 
Iago,” Pechter says, “is a major triumph of modern Othello criticism” (28); and later he adds, 
“critical interpretation of Othello has increasingly absorbed itself into Iago’s unillusioned and self-
assured generalizations, to the point where current commentary on the play seems designed as an 
instrument for Iago’s voice” (161). This is, he suggests, our way of escaping from the painful 
experience of the tragedy itself (29): this is why we follow Iago’s lead in transforming “the 
materials of pain into an achieved insensibility” (161). Moreover, Pechter sees the apparent power 
of texts to intrude upon inwardness in the larger context of “the relationship between structure and 
subject in human history and society” as he finds it in Perry Anderson’s formulation.49 
Pechter frames the problem indicated in the first of my two questions, asking how “we 
explain” Iago’s “extraordinary domination,” his “power to shape belief” (50, 54), and “why […] we 
believe him?” (136). He characterizes the nihilism in Iago’s “anxiety-driven and anxiety-producing 
perspective” as something that eradicates the unique significance of specific locales and collapses 
the distinction between self and other “into a monstrous undifferentiation” (38). Othello and 
                                                     
48 Kenneth Burke, “Othello: An Essay to Illustrate a Method,” The Hudson Review 4.2 (1951): 165–203. 188, 
also qtd. in Pechter 190. 
49 Perry Anderson, In the Tracks of Historical Materialism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984) 33, qtd. 
in Pechter 106. 
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Desdemona’s lovemaking Iago represents as “bestial passion” (43), Pechter claims, and a similar 
view of it haunts Brabantio in his “subconscious fear of an apparently recurring nightmare” (51). 
This in itself indicates a curious connection between the idea of Iago’s “mere” textuality so often 
dominating critical views of the play since the 1980s and the power of extra-linguistic forces 
Brabantio himself hopes have already been textualized and thus contained: “Is there not charms / 
By which the property of youth and maidenhood / May be abused?,” he asks Roderigo anxiously 
once he has been roused from his sleep and found out that Desdemona had indeed left his house. 
“Have you not read, Roderigo, / Of some such thing?” (1.1.173–76). Roderigo answers in the 
affirmative, which suggests that textuality can make non-verbal fears indeed manifest and “palpable 
to thinking” (1.2.77). 
Pechter calls attention not only to what Iago says but also to the pauses (54) he makes to 
invite Othello not merely to fill in missing words and ideas but also, and most importantly, to allow 
him to actively provide his own self as the substance to complete the structure of Iago’s abstract 
scenario as a principle of organization and to urge Othello to shape his own perception in it from 
Iago’s point of view. Not only Coleridge and Romanticism followed Othello’s example in adapting to 
Iago’s character by fleshing it out to dispel its “mystery” (55), Pechter argues, but Iago’s technique 
makes us as well “joint venturers with him” (56). Instead of attributing a positive value to a unique 
place or showing genuine sympathy toward another self, Iago’s perspective organizes such entities 
in terms of their position in relation to a dominant, dispassionate point of view. Thus, Pechter asks 
with Greenblatt if the “ego underlie[s] … all institutional structures,” or is it “constituted by 
institutional structures” (63). In this respect, Iago’s perspective coincides with that of the state 
which he claims to “know” (1.1.149) already in the first scene of the play. This allows him, for 
example, to give a fair estimate of Othello’s fate in the trial that will take place two scenes later: “the 
state,” he predicts, “Cannot with safety cast him, for he’s embarked / With such loud reason to the 
Cyprus wars,” in which “Another of his fathom they have none / To lead their business” (151f, 
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154f). Iago’s insider information and his identification with the reason of state are already in the 
first scene astounding. By speaking “with the authority of the canny insider” (Pechter 135), he 
“manages to stay one step ahead of us” (73), and he does so by having Othello fill the gaps in his 
authoritative narrative by willingly transforming the stuff of his own self into its textual terms. But 
what makes Othello so eager to accept Iago’s false explanation of his own experience? What makes 
Othello shun his own felt reality and exchange it for the one Iago constructs? 
Not essence but relation holds Iago’s attention. For Pechter, Iago is not interested in the 
meaning but rather in the “enabling condition ” of human identity which, he asserts, lies in 
“differentiation” (64). Iago realizes identity “in difference” (64), and he imparts to us his 
understanding that we know “real facts” only through “differentiation” (65). Comparisons are “the 
basis of identity” (66), Pechter writes. Iago, he claims, “is pure negativity, difference without 
positive terms” (67). This conceptualization of identity parallels Ferdinand de Saussure’s view of 
language. “The value of just any term,” he argues, “is […] determined,” synchronically, “by its 
environment,”50 and not by its content, the idea it stands for. Every linguistic term cuts out a 
concept from “the floating realm of thought” (112), but concepts, again, like words, “are purely 
differential and defined not by their positive content but negatively by their relations with the other 
terms of the system” (117). Thus, I propose, when Iago uses the power of language to create a vivid 
image of reality, he derives that force not merely from the meaning we associate with his words but, 
at least in part, from the function those words fulfill among other words in the system of language 
that strives for an existence independent of the reality it designates or creates. This might account 
for the independent, system-building potential in his narrative which, if it is coherent in itself, can 
create the impression of a self-contained system in Othello’s perception. 
                                                     
50 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, transl. Wade Baskin, ed. Charles Bally et al. (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1959) 116. 
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Othello taps into this creative effect of language, as we see it in his narrative of life as early 
as the trial scene. Desdemona here interrupts the flow of imperial discourse, where everything is 
relations,51 with the uncontextualized positive fact of her bodily desire. Othello, however, defines 
who he is in contrast to Desdemona’s heartfelt identification with, and subjection to, him. When she 
“trumpet[s] to the world” that her “heart’s subdued / Even to the very quality of my lord” 
(1.3.252f), Othello dissociates himself from her love by calling his eyes “speculative and officed 
instruments,” withdrawing them from the “light-winged toys / Of feathered Cupid” and offering 
them, instead, to the “serious and great business” (272, 270f, 269) of the state. Once Othello enters 
the inner circle of the state with her help, not even Desdemona seems to belong to him personally 
anymore.52 Pechter admits he cannot quite pinpoint the reason why Othello dissociates himself 
from Desdemona. He concludes, however, that the “aspects of identity and self-understanding” that 
Iago works with are “essential to the way we experience ourselves in the world” (63). In the light of 
the system-building tendency of language, we only need to identify the cause that might make a 
guilty Desdemona an attractive prospect for Othello to understand why he gets carried away by a 
fiction about Desdemona’s unfaithfulness that he himself expands then under Iago’s tutelage. 
 
                                                     
51 The headquarters teem with “composition” (1.3.1) and “credit” (2), “news […] disproportioned” (1, 3) and 
“just account” (6), “difference” and “confirm[ation]” (8), and all this adds up to some “judgment” (10) that 
makes islands in the Mediterranean with their history and population appear as mere signifiers and that 
accounts for “galleys” (4) of the Turkish fleet that carry human cargo in terms of sheer numbers. 
52 The appropriation of inherent values seems to result from the nature of power in an imperial state. The 
Roman Empire, too, was transparent only from a single but in itself obscure point of view: the point of view of 
the princeps. “It was understood that to him, as omnipotent ruler, all marvels should be conveyed or 
reported.” Richard J. A. Talbert, “Emperor,” The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Greece and Rome, ed. Michael 
Gagarin, Vol. 3 (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) 55. In his Myths of Venice: The Figuration of 
a State (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), David Rosand points out that 
“Venice claimed to be […] a true historical successor to pagan Rome” (6). As a result, it seems inevitable that 
empire figures in Shakespeare as the site of the fatal dissolution of the personal attachment between 
Desdemona and Othello. In connection with the unity as an ideal in medieval society (which finds its perfect 
visual expression in the representation of space in the Renaissance invention of linear perspective, as I will 
argue in section 3.3.), Walter Ullmann argues that “the medieval thesis of the corporational structure of 
society” as an “indivisible” “whole” was “rooted […] in Roman conceptions.” The Individual and Society in the 
Middle Ages (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966) 36. 
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3.2. Literalness and Depth in Signification: Iago’s Position and the Body 
If an important aspect of Iago’s persona is a “disgust for the flesh” (77), as Pechter argues, 
we might wonder why Iago “sets the play in motion” (97) with appalling images of Desdemona and 
Othello’s love-making and insists that Othello “Strangle her in her bed, even the bed she hath 
contaminated” (4.1.193f), thus driving the action “relentlessly to an inevitably ‘incorporate 
conclusion’” (97, Pechter quotes Othello 2.1.248). While Iago weaves a powerfully coherent 
narrative to organize the plot that often seems far-fetched and widely detached from what other 
characters and we perceive onstage,53 his signifiers, in the Saussurean sense, are precise in evoking 
irresistible images of sexualized bodies and body parts in action through what Saussure calls their 
“arbitrary”54 association with the signified. We cannot resist “seeing,” as it were, the very details in 
Iago’s rendering, for example, of what the stage direction terms Desdemona and Cassio’s intimate 
conversation (2.1.164): “He takes her by the palm. Ay, well said, whisper,” Iago reports and 
commands at the same time. “Ay, smile upon her, do […]. Very good; well kissed! An excellent 
courtesy! ’Tis so, indeed. Yet again your fingers to your lips?” (165–67, 170f). The mental link 
between “signifiant” and “signifié” is the psychologically internalized version of the connection 
between Augustine’s “sign” and “thing” or of that between what Ogden and Richards call “symbol” 
and “referent.”55 The power of Iago’s words relies on our expectation that they are literally true and 
that they report bodily motion from moment to moment as they are happening, accurately. We 
expect them to be true because, even though it appears arbitrary synchronically, the connection 
                                                     
53 To the information about Desdemona being “directly in love with” Cassio, Roderigo responds with an 
incredulous “With him? Why, ’tis not possible” (2.1.215f). 
54 Saussure 67. 
55 Charles Kay Ogden and Ivor Armstrong Richards, The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of 
Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism (New York: Harcourt, Brace; London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1923/1952) 9–12. 
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between signifier and signified is, diachronically, natural and organic56 like those layers we 
observed in the rich symbolism of the handkerchief. 
When he reflects on details of bodily acts, Iago’s language is so powerful that description 
and imaginary creation in it become indistinguishable. Pechter points out the way Iago implicates 
Bianca in the cause of Cassio’s injury. Here, we observe the characteristic way Iago’s references 
create a sense of his identity: up to the moment in the last scene when he refuses to speak,57 he is an 
inexhaustible source of narratives, but the selves he describes and thus creates are corporeal. In 
other words, while he appears to other characters as pure discourse, he represents them as 
material bodies. He alleges that Cassio is “almost slain” is “the fruits of whoring,” and he fashions 
himself as an interpreter of iconic bodily signs. “Look you pale, mistress?” (5.1.116, 118, 107), he 
turns to Bianca after Roderigo’s body and Cassio have been carried off. He uses her physical 
appearance for the purpose of a “cultural inscription,” as Pechter formulates (139):58 “Do you 
perceive the gastness of her eye? […] Behold her well; I pray you, look upon her. / Do you see, 
gentlemen?” After he suggests that Cassio’s company at supper might be suspect, he turns to Bianca 
and pointedly asks her, “What, do you shake at that?” (5.1.116, 118, 120). Upon this, Bianca feels 
compelled to make a partial confession and to defend herself: “He supped at my house, but I 
therefore shake not” (121). Such is the power of Iago’s language game that it creates a vivid image 
of a whore who might be complicit in her client’s attempted murder. Iago can project “men’s guilt 
onto the women who arouse sexual interest,” thus substituting “desire for desirability” (135) as the 
cause of illicit bodily acts. 
                                                     
56 Robin Allott dedicates his book on The Natural Origin of Language: The Structural Inter-relation of 
Language, Visual Perception and Action to the support of the claim that “words, the fabric of language, are not 
arbitrary, […] but derive from, evolutionarily and psychologically, and are integrated with, perception and 
action, the other main components of total human behavior” (Knebworth, Hertfordshire: Able, 2001) i. 
57 “Demand me nothing. What you know, you know. / From this time forth I never will speak word” (5.2.311f). 
58 Thomas Mann’s Chipolla in Mario and the Magician will parallel “Iago’s contaminating villainy” (Pechter 
137) in a language that creates while purports to describe. 
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Moreover, Iago suggests that for other characters a bodily, often even beastly, existence is 
the only acceptable reality. For them to appear otherwise, he suggests, is dishonest. He 
characterizes Cassio, whom Othello promoted instead of him, as “Mere prattle, without practice” 
(1.1.27); he slanders Roderigo to win Othello’s confidence saying “he prated, / And spoke […] 
scurvy and provoking terms / Against your honor” (1.2.6–8); he disparages Othello’s manhood by 
telling Roderigo about the “violence” with which Desdemona “first loved the Moor, / but for 
bragging and telling her fantastical lies,” and then asks him disdainfully if she will “love him still for 
prating?” (2.1.218f). This last example shows how Iago transforms our impression of Othello’s 
speech, a set piece, on which the Duke commented saying, “this tale would win my daughter too” 
(1.3.173). Iago enhances the ascendancy of his own discourse by discrediting that of others. 
To a large extent, Iago’s dominance over other characters is due to his identification with 
the Augustinian “sign” in contradistinction to the “thing,” while his special attractiveness to Othello 
consists in allowing him to transmute his corporeal self, connected in sympathy to that of 
Desdemona, into a discursive persona similar to his. The ancient’s discursive existence is not a 
matter of choice on his part. What Greenblatt calls “improvisation,” he says, “depends first upon the 
ability and willingness to play a role, to transform oneself […] into another. This necessitates,” he 
goes further, “the acceptance of disguise, the ability to effect a divorce […] between the tongue and 
the heart. Such role-playing in turn depends,” he concludes, “upon the transformation of another’s 
reality into manipulable fiction.”59 But behind this all, the above analysis of the seeming literalism 
and its creative function suggests, lies in fact a compulsive subordination of perception to the 
tyranny of language. Othello cannot eliminate the ambiguity in the use of Iago’s language and find 
out if it is descriptive or creative, because he is not allowed to go behind the ancient’s words and 
approach them through what he can see first. Language and perception in Iago are fixed in a strict 
hierarchical order: words dominate vision. 
                                                     
59 Greenblatt 228. 
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Therefore, to fully accept the literalness in Iago’s practice of discursive signification and its 
creative function, Othello has to learn how to rein in and bring under control the power of his 
vision. While he initially valiantly asserts his right to an independent point of view and demands 
first-hand “ocular” (3.3.377) evidence, a “living reason” to verify “she’s disloyal” (426), in the course 
of the plot Othello reluctantly but masochistically acquires from Iago an impairment of vision to 
eliminate the necessity of eye-witness evidence and to comply with Iago’s discursive approach to 
prosecution. In contrast to the continent, rules that governed what evidence was “necessary for 
conviction” in Tudor England, Katharine Eisaman Maus writes, “remained loose, almost chaotic.” In 
such circumstances, the “power to convince the jury was all that mattered.”60 As Iago explains, it 
“were a tedious difficulty […] / To bring” Desdemona to a “prospect” (3.3.414f) where the general, 
as “supervisor,” could “grossly gape on” and “Behold her topped” (412f). “It is impossible you 
should see this” (419), he declares and adds meaningfully that Desdemona and Cassio themselves 
would be damned “If ever mortal eyes do see them bolster / More than their own” (415–17), 
possibly suggesting that this would be something impossible even for them to see. The images Iago 
conjures through the literal power of his words cannot possibly relate to experiential reality and 
signify it; they are the product of differences in the system of Iago’s language and are determined, 
as the “value of just any term” is, according to Saussure, by the value of the other terms in his 
discourse, and not by what they purport to represent. Consequently, Iago does not impose his 
narrative of Desdemona and Cassio’s betrayal on Othello because he chooses to, but because he 
cannot do otherwise. 
So, how does the idea that he must ruin his general’s burgeoning political career with a 
narrative of sexual intrigue enter into Iago’s mind? The ancient himself often refers, deceptively, to 
his own restrictions in the choice of how he should behave. “I lack iniquity / Sometimes to do me 
                                                     
60 Katharine Eisaman Maus, Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1995) 104. 
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service” (1.2.3f), he excuses himself hypocritically to Othello for not being able to murder the 
“prating” Roderigo and defend the general against his “scurvy and provoking terms” (1.2.7). Instead 
of revenging himself on Othello in some bodily action, Iago must encourage Roderigo to do so for 
him: “If thou canst cuckold him, thou dost thyself a pleasure, me a sport.” Moreover, he situates this 
possibility in the context of some larger force beyond his control and a process that unfolds by itself 
when he says he foresees “many events in the womb of time which will be delivered” (1.3.353–55). 
He helplessly admits his compulsion to Desdemona to be “nothing if not critical” (2.1.121), and his 
toil in complying with a request to “write” (2.1.119) in praise about her: “my invention / Comes 
from my pate as birdlime does from frieze — / It pucks out brains and all” (127–29). These 
examples suggest that producing texts is Iago’s only skill, and it imposes itself on him irresistibly 
and obsessively. He formulates even his statement about his initial transformation, “I am not what I 
am” (1.1.67) in state verbs, not action verbs. It is not the result of a choice but that of his situation as 
“beleed and calmed” (31) in a helpless situation in a power relationship that has come about in a 
process intricately interwoven with sexual desire—so, Iago is obsessively unravelling it by undoing 
that desire for his own political purposes. 
As I indicated above, perception is subordinate to language in Iago. To support this claim I 
would like to show that these two aspects of a character’s being in his or her dramatic world61 can 
relate to each other in a hierarchical order, because they show structural similarities: the literalness 
of language in reference corresponds to a lack of depth in the field of one’s vision. The implosion of 
the delicate structure of the kind of the multilayered network of signification Boose showed us at 
work in the handkerchief has its equivalent in Renaissance painting as the outer limit of the 
representation of depth. In the wake of the invention of linear perspective to represent three-
                                                     
61 As I quoted above in a footnote, Allott names language, perception, and action as the three “main 
components of total human behavior” (i). 
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dimensional space on the canvas by Philippo Brunelleschi in Florence in 1425,62 many painters 
constructed such pictures with the vanishing point falling into the square of an open door or 
window at the far back of the interior space they depicted.63 This corroborates the idea that the 
vanishing point, although literally visible, falls in an empty space, outside of the eye’s capacity to 
perceive, exactly because the closer an object is to it the less distinct its depth (i.e., its distance from 
the beholder) appears to be from the depth of another object even if the actual distance between 
them is sizeable. Consequently, close to the vanishing point, depth seems to be compressed until, at 
the perspectival center of a picture, there is no depth at all. Therefore, when the painter places the 
vanishing point on the surface of the canvas, the eye can sense its literal presence; but we cannot 
perceive it meaningfully in our stereoscopic vision, because outside of the three-dimensional space 
the painter represents there is no depth in the visual field anymore. 
Thus, the vanishing point is a blind spot for the interpretive eye. And still, this spot, like a 
magnet, attracts the eye and threatens it with robbing it of its capacity to perceive differences in 
depth. Correspondingly, the sense of a phenomenon of rich complexity like the love between 
Othello and Desdemona, as Iago attempts to represent it in his image of the “old black ram […] 
tupping [a] white ewe” (1.1.90f), tests the limits of our capacity in interpretation and it might strike 
us, simply for this reason, as horrifying. From Othello’s perspective, the direct sensation of love 
between Cassio and Desdemona, in its physical form, literally, is not possible. The extreme case of 
the overlap of discourse and of bodily reality in a perfect literalness is Iago’s horrible invention. His 
use of literalness is like presenting the vanishing point, a meta-sign that makes pictorial 
signification possible in the first place, as if it was just like any other spot on the canvas.64 As we 
                                                     
62 Samuel Y. Edgerton, The Mirror, the Window, and the Telescope: How Renaissance Linear Perspective 
Changed our Vision of the Universe, Cornell Paperbacks Ser. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009) 90. 
63 The most famous example, perhaps, is Las Meninas by Diego Velásquez (1656. Oil on canvas. Museo del 
Prado, Madrid). 
64 Brian Rotman draws these parallels between treating zero, a meta-sign allowing other numbers to mean 
something, as if it was “just another number among the infinity of numbers,” making the vanishing point 
appear indistinguishable from all the many other depicted locations within a painting,” and the phenomenon 
235 
 
saw it in examples above, the way Iago relates words to visible bodily acts is similarly ambiguous: it 
stimulates the imagination creatively while it purports merely to describe the “thing.” 
The ambiguity of Iago’s literalness in the relation between words and the body is also his 
weakness. He is not only embarrassed by the potential appearance of reality as layers of depth and 
not a flat, literal surface, but he also worries about the challenge and the strain the demand of 
keeping up with the diversity of real phenomena might exert on his eyes. Still, he plays with the 
idea. Right before he renders Othello and Desdemona’s love in flat literalness, he reminds Brabantio 
of the demand of propriety saying, “For shame, put on your gown!” (1.1.88). While he is careful to 
conceal aristocratic white male flesh, he represents women, all of them as a type, in terms of a set of 
disparate but related images—some of them only visual, some also auditory, and some even tactile. 
The typical woman is irritatingly complex in all of Iago’s images and elusive in her artful play on the 
difference between self and persona, essence and appearance, meaning and its indirect, equivocal 
representation. According to Iago’s elaborate picture, it is difficult to reduce women to a singular, 
unified image, since in every context they assume a different persona that is always in contrast to 
an unknowable self that defies containment. Iago still attempts to sum up this uncontrollable 
diversity in a typifying list of commonplaces65 in his banter with Desdemona saying, 
You are pictures out of doors, 
Bells in your parlors, wildcats in your kitchens, 
Saints in your injuries, devils being offended, 
Players in your huswifery, and huswives in your beds. (2.1.111–14) 
                                                                                                                                                                           
of “figures of speech dying and becoming literal.” Signifying Nothing: The Semiotics of Zero (Basingstoke, 
Hampshire and London: Macmillan, 1987) 3f. 
65 The Araignment of Lewd, Idle, Froward, and Vnconstant Women attempts the same. In his effort to suit the 
world to the word, the author Joseph Swetnam declares that “all women are alike.” At the same time, toward 
the end of his pamphlet, he admits that as “in all things there is a contrary, which sheweth the difference 
betwixt the good and the bad, even so both of men and women there are contrary sortes of behavior.” 
(London, 1615) 9, 50. Early English Books Online. 19 Jan. 2014. 
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The woman in the last image is naked, sexualized, but curiously alone in her shameful act. In 
accordance with the rest of the generalizing images in the series, this one focuses also on a woman 
only. In its flatness, it reminds us of the way Iago invoked Desdemona and Othello in love as a sight 
similar to that of mating animals. Iago seems fascinated by the mutability of a woman’s appearance 
in changing circumstances and by the tantalizing difference in depth between her appearance and 
her putative essence, but he also appears anxious to reduce these to a simple formula. With a 
character of integrity, however, with a live and deliberate connection, consistent but flexible, 
between self and persona, Iago cannot enter into a meaningful exchange. He dismisses a woman of 
integrity, the exception to the “dissembling”66 majority, one who “being angered,” for example, 
“Bade her wrong stay” (2.1.151f), in an anticlimax as bland and unworthy of a more respectable 
task than “To suckle fools and chronicle small beer” (2.1.159). This type of woman apparently does 
not hold his attention. 
 
3.3. The Perspective of Empire 
Sinfield located the power of the state in its dominant ideological discourse. As we saw 
above, Iago claims to “know the state” (1.1.149) and even predicts its action accurately based on his 
familiarity with its interests and on his up-to-date information on the current political situation. 
Moreover, he uses discourse to deprive the ordinary female subject of her interiority, to lay bare 
her body in a visual image, and, at the same time, to make sure the statesman Brabantio’s body is 
properly covered from view. A similar urge to build a sense of male integrity on the assumption of 
women’s lack thereof, or rather on forcefully divesting them of it, is apparent in Joseph Swetnam’s 
The Araignment of Lewd, Idle, Froward, and Vnconstant Women from 1615. To make the difference 
                                                     
66 For Swetnam, “for the most part,” women prove to be “dissembling in their deeds” (4), “blubbering forth 
abundance of dissembling tears” (8), etc. 
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between the sexes clear, the pamphlet denies women a right to independent existence: “Men […] 
may liue without women,” Swetnam asserts, “but women cannot liue without men” (14). 
In Swetnam’s view, inwardness is a forbidden fruit for women and a privilege of men.67 He 
brands women who have some tension between an inner self and an outward persona as erratically 
and maliciously unreasonable and deliberately wicked. Swetnam’s framework for women 
recognizes two categories only: one is the devilish68 woman who cunningly undermines a man’s 
position in the world, and the other is the angelic helper69 and protector that uncritically submits 
herself to his interest. The former dissembles and acts as a trap, while the latter is transparent and 
will-less. Swetnam has the same two main objections to the character of women as Iago does: as 
reflected in the experience of men they are, on the one hand, extremely adaptable to changing 
circumstances and, therefore, lack a stable identity; on the other hand, they hide an unknowable 
self behind their various personae like behind masks. Both contribute to an indeterminacy in 
women’s position in society, which frustrates men’s effort to weave a strong network of solidarity 
among themselves and secure their own material and spiritual position in it. 
The fact that women are difficult to know is not merely an epistemological problem but a 
security risk.70 The diversity and functional ambiguity as perceptual and hermeneutic problems do 
not only harm individual men, but they hazard the usefulness and reliability of women in the 
execution of household tasks and in production, and thus they might weaken the competitiveness of 
a nation’s economy and defense. Swetnam names the interest of the nation, of the state itself, as the 
greatest good he is dedicated to protect from the destabilizing influence of wayward women. “For 
we are not borne for our selues to liue at pleasure,” he declares, “but to take paines, and to labour 
                                                     
67 In her Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance, Katharine Eisaman Maus observes that Othello, in 
agreement with Iago, comes to interpret Desdemona’s “inwardness as guilty secrecy” (Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1995) 121f. 
68 “[W]omen sprung from the Deuill,” Swetnam asserts (15). 
69 “At the first beginning” Moses said according to Swetnam “a woman was made to be a helper vnto man” (1). 
70 Eisaman Maus examines “the epistemological anxieties” “the difference between an unexpressed interior 
and a theatricalized exterior […] generates” (2) and claims that “[s]ocial life demands the constant practice of 
induction […]: reasoning from the superficial to the deep […], from seeming to being” (5). 
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for the good of our Countrey” (26). He encourages men to control women and gives examples to 
show that women are unable to control themselves (21). 
One of the worrisome aspects of a woman’s wickedness according to Swetnam is that it can 
go unnoticed. “[I]n all ill vices she would goe namelesse,” he complains and adds that “shee thinks 
to doe all her knauery inuisible” (25). Therefore, it is essential to strip away the “figge leafe” she 
uses “to couer her name” and “shew their nakednesse to the world,” to “take away their painted 
cloathes, […] their ruffes, […] their coyfes and stomachers,” without which they “looke wildly,” “like 
ragged wals,” and “are simple to behold” (25). Because of the misleading surface of their 
appearance, to be protected against deception in women, Swetnam advises, “thou must not trust 
thy owne eyes” (45) and be guided by looks alone (45f). This admonition reminds us of Iago’s 
picture laying bare the woman’s nakedness to shame her of her body, on the one hand, and give a 
political significance to Othello’s promise not to let Desdemona’s nearness “seel” his eyes “with 
wanton dullness” (1.3.271), on the other. 
In contrast to views vehemently advocating a subjection of women to men, Constance 
Jordan examines humanist arguments that are often more liberal with respect to the admittance of 
women to public affairs. Sir Thomas Elyot’s Defence of Good Women, for example, contends that as 
far as they possess masculine characteristics, women are capable of participating fully in “civic 
life.”71 Elyot’s dialogue confronts orthodox views, derived mainly from Aristotle (249), that confine 
women to the family and use their subordinate role there for a modeling of their status in the state 
(251) with the humanist argument that exceptional women who exhibit manly virtues like courage 
and intelligence can take an active part in “civile policie” (252). In his Instruction of a Christen 
woman, however, Juan Luis Vives explicitly connects the study of oratory to political practice and 
refuses to allow women to “medle” with either (253). The argument for the reduction of female 
                                                     
71 Constance Jordan, “Feminism and the Humanists: The Case of Sir Thomas Elyot’s Defence of Good Women,” 
Rewriting the Renaissance: The Discourses of Sexual Difference in Early Modern Europe, eds. Margaret W. 
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interiority, for the control of female sexual energies, and for the silencing of women in public affairs 
was, therefore, not the only current in early modern Europe. To participate in politics, however, 
women had to relinquish at least one of the characteristics traditionally required of them, namely 
silence (243); and if they did so, their other cardinal virtue, chastity, was immediately doubted. 
Therefore, female behavior that questioned “the accepted view of women as subordinate to men” 
and opposed to it the alternative of “a woman who is the virtuous equal of the man” always 
conjured “an image of the culturally alien” (256). Accordingly, when Desdemona enters the Senate 
Chamber to declare her readiness to participate in Othello’s life in a daring self-assertion,72 she 
presents a testimony to her own alienation and initiates her isolation within the state. When she 
petitions the Duke to let her go with Othello to Cyprus (1.3.261), she saves herself from being 
ostracized and homeless, because, after her night at the Sagittary, in Venice she has nowhere to go. 
Like the status of the vanishing point in a painting, Iago’s position in the play is ambiguous. 
He acts as a character in the action and as its author at the same time. His position defines his 
identity, and he does not represent any value. And still, he appears authentic to other characters. 
The status of the emotionless perfectionist at the point in our visual field where it has no depth is 
curiously impersonal. Iago acts in the play’s world and is still somehow outside it, organizing the 
appearance, the relative position, and the meaning of everything within his well-defined scope of 
operation. Characters in Othello behave, think, and speak in a way that betrays an awareness of 
their status relative to such a superior, god-like point of view. The remark Cassio makes to Iago 
about the lieutenant who is “to be saved before the ancient” (2.3.91f) betrays a way of thinking that 
is dominated by the importance of status. Iago, who has emptied out his identity in his 
transformation in the first scene, acts as the center of gravitation in the field of the play and defines 
the function of characters. 
                                                     




Renaissance painters who acquired the technique of linear perspective created pictures, 
illustrating this pulling effect toward the emptiness of the vanishing point, which is somehow both 
within the three-dimensional space they created and outside it. Paolo Uccello’s painting titled The 
Hunt in the Forest73 from around 1470 evokes a similar sensation with the hunters riding or 
running toward what seems the distant center of the deep, dark forest. Although we can see very 
few straight lines pointing toward it, even the dogs and the deer they are chasing race away from us 
to diminish in size and then disappear completely close to the geometric center of the panel.74 Both 
Othello and Emilia fear Iago and serve him, and their movements gesture toward his character that 
dominates the annihilating center of the plot. Othello, who is about to wriggle out of the sexual and 
emotional attachment to his wife and of the bond of a friendship to Cassio, is especially vulnerable 
to the void the presence of Iago’s character creates. Othello is sliding on a slippery slope toward this 
void like an abyss, and barely has something to hang on to. 
Although Brunelleschi’s way to represent three-dimensional space on the canvas is 
innovative in its appearance, in fact it preserved a medieval, or even more ancient, world view. 
James Burke reproduces a fourteenth-century fresco from the Guidalotti (Spanish) Chapel in the 
Basilica of Santa Maria Novella in Florence to illustrate the tendency in the medieval visual arts to 
represent figures in size proportionate to their importance from God’s point of view.75 In this fresco 
the “relative status” of figures “is conventionally indicated by size.”76 Accordingly, saints are larger 
than “the good people of their flock, who are, in turn, bigger than sinful dancers.”77 The size of a 
character depended on his or her liturgical value in the story even though their relative position on 
                                                     
73 Paolo (Di Dono) Uccello, The Hunt in the Forest, c. 1470, tempera and oil, with traces of gold, on panel, 
Ashmolean Museum, Oxford. 
74 Giorgio Vasari blames the Florentine painter for neglecting “human figures and animals” and concentrating, 
instead, “on problems of perspective,” which rendered his talent “sterile” as a result. Giorgio Vasari, Lives of 
the Artists (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) 74. ebrary Reader. 7 May 2014. 
75 Andrea di Bonaiuto (Andrea da Firenze), Allegory of the Active and Triumphant Church and the Dominican 
Order, 1365–67, fresco, Spanish Chapel of the Basilica of Santa Maria Novella. 
76 John T. Paoletti and Gary M. Radke, Art in Renaissance Italy (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997) 
150. 
77 James Burke, The Day the Universe Changed (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1985) 58. 
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the surface of the wall does not reflect this: small female figures dancing and playing music appear 
above the bigger good men, who stand next to the even larger shape of saints. So, compared to a 
picture in mathematical perspective, figures here seem to be randomly placed. 
Brunelleschi, in comparison, seems rather to have arranged in a visually appealing, unified, 
and centrally organized scheme an in fact ideologically motivated view of the world that was 
already in place before him.78 His merit is then primarily in arranging in a picture objects and 
figures that acknowledge their dependence on a ruling center not merely in their relative size but 
also in their strictly regulated relative position. Iago as the organizing center in the play represents 
a stabilizing, conservative force similar to that of the vanishing point in a picture of linear 
perspective. 
Two sixteenth-century Italian political thinkers Giovanni Botero and Niccolò Machiavelli 
represent contrasting views concerning individual male virtue in public affairs: their different 
approaches can be aligned with principles of intrinsic values and the power to create an impression 
of their presence, respectively, as Othello and Iago stand for them in the play. The reason of state, D. 
P. Waley argues, was “a catch-word in the second half of the sixteenth century—not in Italy 
alone.”79 Botero remarks in the 1589 “Dedication” to his book The Reason of State that he found the 
notion “a constant subject of discussion.”80 I oppose in this chapter Iago’s skillful use of discourse 
from an ambiguous position analogous to that of the head of state, on the one hand, to horizontal 
relations between selves as exemplified between Desdemona and Othello, as Othello recalls it in his 
“unvarnished tale” (1.3.92) in the trial scene, and between Desdemona and Cassio in the way she 
takes his point of view and represents it to her husband from the beginning of Act 3, scene 3, on the 
                                                     
78 “Linear perspective […] was derived from the optics of Euclid [who] analyzed vision in terms of a cone 
emanating from the eye. Perspective is the application of Euclid’s visual cone to a glass plane intersecting it.” 
Nicholas J. Wade, Perception and Illusion: Historical Perspectives (New York: Springer Science, 2005) 8. 
79 D. P. Waley, “Introduction,” The Reason of State by Giovanni Botero, transl. P. J. and D. P. Waley, Rare 
Masterpieces of Philosophy and Science Ser. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956) vii–xi. viii. 
80 Giovanni Botero, The Reason of State, transl. P. J. and D. P. Waley, Rare Masterpieces of Philosophy and 
Science Ser. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956) xiii. 
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other. Botero, in a way parallel to this, sets up an opposition between “things being permissible by 
Reason of State and others by conscience” (xiv). In his reaction to Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince, 
Botero was trying to restore “conscience” to “its universal jurisdiction” not only in private life but 
also “over all that concerns man in his public” life as well (xiv). Inherent values like “valour” (52) 
are worth more for Botero than a skillful use of rhetoric. Accordingly, he recommends a virtue often 
associated with good women, silence, to men who want to achieve success in action. A ruler, he 
advises, should prefer achieving “his purpose with deeds” to doing so by using “words.” And when 
he still has to speak, he should “avoid overstatement and hyperbole.” Instead of a flexibility in 
improvisation, he recommends a “firmness of will” in keeping “one’s word” (54). 
Although Botero was aware of the importance of Machiavellian ideas like “religion and 
piety” in maintaining obedience in a Christian state (67) and that the image of a “common enemy” 
will drive “evil humors […] elsewhere” (77), he still tried to undo The Prince’s “break with […] 
idealism”81 and opposed its explicit argument that “good government requires the skillful use of 
cruelty and deception” (3). His efforts were futile: not many people read, let alone refer to, Botero 
today, while Machiavelli’s ideas are alive. In one respect, the history of Machiavelli’s reception is 
similar to Iago’s shifting evaluation in Othello criticism: Machiavelli is no longer “seen as evil 
through and through” (3) but often considered “a ‘realist’ or a ‘result-oriented’ thinker” (4). He 
wrote The Prince, early in the sixteenth century, soon after Italian states, “the republics of Florence 
and Venice” among them, enlarged the territories under their control and, as a result, a “more 
distant and impersonal rule of a few controlling regimes replaced the face-to-face style of 
government of hundreds of formerly independent communes” (7). Therefore, a rhetorical approach 
to identity came to dominate Italy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as opposed to a chivalric 
ideal, and the interest of a kingdom, a duchy, or a republic had to define the function of the 
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individual in the state. Machiavel’s words in the “Prologue” to Christopher Marlowe’s The Jew of 
Malta allow us a glimpse into the contradictory reactions in the England of the late sixteenth 
century82 to an explicit formulation of such political developments: “Admired I am of those who 
hate me most.”83 
Venice, “the printing capital of Europe,” played an important part in the appearance of The 
Prince in print before 1550. By this time, “European interpretations of Machiavelli had firmly 
coalesced around two rival readings of his works:” some regarded him as “an agent of the Devil,” 
while others as “the apostle of secular republicanism” (22–24). The long-term transformation in the 
critical reception of Iago’s ambiguous position inside the plot and outside it, of his function as 
interpreter or instigator, as evil tempter or the embodiment of the state, provides the context for 
our attempt to understand Iago’s power over Othello and Othello’s dependence on Iago’s character 
which was influenced, according to Connell, simply by “the diabolical Machiavelli” (25) who was, at 
the same time, according to a note on the title page of a copy of the first edition that might have 
belonged to Queen Elizabeth, “an enemy of tyrants” (26). 
Machiavelli had less concern for questions of content in religion or politics than for the 
abilities and skills of “a political and military leader.”84 His discovery that politics are an 
autonomous system of ideas and field of practice was, Connell argues, “as revolutionary and as solid 
as the European discovery of the New World.” Once this has taken place, attempts “to bring politics 
and ethics back together again” could never succeed (28). A new sense of skill and professionalism 
in leadership gives an undoubted advantage to Iago over Othello, and this was also part of 
Machiavelli’s experience in government in Florence, when new technology, “including artillery and 
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firearms, demanded professional expertise” (16). All this might explain the perceived nihilism in 
Iago’s character:85 the rules of politics, Connell argues, could be determined simply by the selfish 
need of the prince to survive, “without […] reference to religious and moral considerations.”86 
Besides Othello’s guilt as the source of his vulnerability, Iago’s power over Othello in the 
Temptation Scene derives from the effect of the Machiavellian principle in Iago’s figure: “it is much 
safer” for him “to be feared than loved,”87 because Othello’s fear of a Iago who “knows more […] 
than he unfolds” (3.3.260) deters Othello from questioning his insinuations about an affair between 
Desdemona and Cassio88 simply on account of its perceptual impossibility. Making himself feared, 
as Machiavelli recommends that the prince do, by pretending to withhold knowledge (he responds 
to Othello’s “I’ll know thy thoughts” by saying, “You cannot, if my heart were in your hand, / Nor 
shall not, whilst ’tis in my custody,” 175–77), Iago also avoids being hated, for “being feared and 
being not hated may exist together very well,” according to Machiavelli (92). And, indeed, Othello 
says gratefully, “I am bound to thee forever” (3.3.229). 
 
3.4. The Motive of Iago’s “Malignity” 
The ancient’s simultaneous fascination with and “disgust for the flesh”89 is an essential part, 
if not the inexplicit core tenet, of the cult that he stands for and that he drives to a culmination in 
the ultimate observance, the sacrifice of Desdemona. The act that Othello carries out evokes and 
enacts but at the same time overwrites and stifles her bold and intolerable sexuality. Iago himself 
has presumably completed the cycle of substituting the “desirability” of a woman for his own 
“desire” (135) as a source of the stimulation of his own sexual fantasies and this way objectified, 
                                                     
85 Pechter 38. 
86 Connell 28. 
87 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, transl. and ed. William J. Connell, The Bedford Series in History and Culture 
Ser. (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2005) 91. 
88 Spivack remarks that Iago has a “cynical Machiavellianism toward sex, which hovers over everyone in the 
play” (428f). 
89 Pechter 77. 
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depersonalized, and generalized his own libido. As a result, now he can locate his alienated 
sexuality in other bodies (in Cassio’s, in Othello’s, and in Desdemona’s) and find vicarious 
satisfaction in a literal and pornographic rendering of desire and bodily acts in a vividly descriptive, 
evocative, and imposing discourse. Here is how he depicts his disgust for his own wife’s body when 
Cassio kisses Emilia in what he calls a “bold show of courtesy:” “Sir,” Iago addresses Cassio, “would 
she give you so much of her lips / As of her tongue she oft bestows on me, / You would have 
enough” (2.1.101–104). The emptiness of his heart is sufficient motive for Iago to fill it with a 
medley of free-floating and detached fantasies about a fulfilment he cannot have. 
To attribute a mere “lust of the blood” (1.3.330) to the freshly married couple seems a 
misunderstanding of both Desdemona’s and Othello’s original motives for choosing each other, but 
accepting it might provide Othello with a plausible excuse for withdrawing from the responsibilities 
his marriage to Desdemona entails. He made Desdemona and Cassio depend on him by creating 
them his wife and his lieutenant respectively; but from the moment we encounter him in his first 
dialogue with Iago at the beginning of the second scene, Othello is ready to betray them. This might 
encourage Iago to overemphasize the role of sexuality among the three of them and draw up a 
hypothetical but powerful road map to satiation and to a desire for variety to move the plot forward 
and to provide himself with an opportunity to vicariously relive the cycle he has already completed 
in his own marriage. “These Moors are changeable in their wills,” he declares to Roderigo and 
continues to explain: 
The food that to him now is as luscious as locusts shall be to him shortly as 
bitter as coloquintida. She must change for youth; when she is sated with his 




Still, however closely Iago’s script maps out the trajectory Othello’s inchoate hypocrisy anticipates, 
it takes a long time and a fierce struggle for the Moor to resign himself to following it and taking the 
last step. 
 
4. Othello’s Vulnerability 
Othello’s willingness to inhabit an imaginary construct seems to dovetail with Iago’s 
intentions, with his expectation that by “throwing but shows of service on” Othello, he will convince 
the general to join him in doing Iago “homage” (1.1.54, 56). Othello appears so willing to replace 
Desdemona in his affections by the pursuit of a companionship of a different sort, of an acceptance 
in the abstract body of the Venetian state,90 toward which Iago might guide him, as if his marriage 
to Desdemona had only been a preliminary stage on the way to this integration. Indeed, there seem 
to be two ways to citizenship for Othello, one through marriage and another due to merit. He might 
have considered these two ways complementary sometime before we first encounter him in front 
of the Sagittary, but, once he is confident he has secured his marriage to the daughter of a Venetian 
senator, he turns his attention to how he might best appear in the eyes of the state. Geraldo U. de 
Sousa explains that the so-called “Serrata laws (1497–1535)” made marriage to a Venetian 
noblewoman desirable in terms of status by securing “noble identity” for a child born of such a 
union. As a result, de Sousa quotes Dennis Romano, “‘Women’s bodies served as sites for 
demonstrations of family wealth and power,’ and ‘helped establish noble identity’.”91 This is one 
reason for Othello to consider a marriage to Desdemona a step toward fulfilment in the more 
abstract sense of becoming a full member of the state. Othello is not a “natural citizen” in terms of 
                                                     
90 A. D. Nuttall comments on Venice as an abstraction in Shakespeare characterizing it as being in fact 
“nowhere, suspended between sea and sky” and receiving and utilizing “all kinds of people.” A. D. Nuttall, A 
New Mimesis: Shakespeare and the Representation of Reality (London: Methuen, 1983) 141. Qtd. in Thomas 
Moisan, “Relating Things to the State: ‘The State’ and the Subject of Othello,” Othello: New Critical Essays, ed. 
Philip C. Kolin (New York and London: Routledge, 2002) 189–202. 195. 
91 Geraldo U. de Sousa, At Home in Shakespeare’s Tragedies (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010) 89. 
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belonging to the “ethnic,” the “linguistic,”92 or, more important, the religious group that 
predominates the territory of Venice; therefore, he has to undergo a transformation in terms of 
Baldus de Ubaldis, fourteenth-century commentator on the Justinian law, from “natural man” to 
“politicus,” that is, “a member of the State.” In this sense, he can legally acquire citizenship (“civilitas 
acquisita”) “through marriage or through residence” (135). 
On the other hand, the marriage had taken place before the theatrical time of the play 
began, and Othello presents us with his own love merely in the framework of a narrative. When we 
first encounter him, chatting with Iago in the street during his wedding night, we hear him 
emphasize the “services which I have done the signiory” (1.2.18), in the first lines he utters onstage, 
rather than his conjugal bliss. Thomas Moisan points out that “the discourse of ‘the state’ serves 
Othello” both “to elude detention at the beginning of the play” and in his final emphasis on the 
“service” he has “done the state” and on his belief that “they know’t” (5.2.349). Moisan refers to 
Gasparo Contareni’s remark that “some forrain men and strangers haue beene adopted into this 
number of citizens [i.e. ‘natives of “the state”’ of Venice], eyther in regard of their great nobility, or 
that they had beene dutifull towards the state, or else had done vnto them some notable seruice.”93 
Even before he elaborates, in the trial scene, on his asceticism and his dedication to “business” 
(1.3.273) in an attempt to counter Desdemona’s unabashed insistence on participating in the “rites 
for which I love him” (1.3.259), Othello gives signs of his desire to be rewarded for the merits he 
earned in the services of the state. While Desdemona lies safely “stowed” (1.2.63) away from her 
father in the Sagittary, Othello spends time with Iago, ready to “be found” by the “raisèd father” 
(1.2.30, 29) but happy to meet Cassio first and be “hotly called for” by the Duke in a state “business 
of some heat” (44, 40). Only once he expresses his satisfaction with the news of the emergency and 
                                                     
92 Walter Ullmann, Medieval Foundations of Renaissance Humanism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1977) 135. 




his call to the meeting of the Senate at the Ducal Palace, does he excuse himself for a moment to 
“spend a word here in the house” (1.2.48), by which he refers to where he left Desdemona. The 
senator’s daughter has freshly eloped with him and, having abandoned her father and her “Good 
name,” “the immediate jewel of” her soul (3.3.168f) for Othello’s sake, is presumably staying at the 
Sagittary by herself. 
If, as his conduct in the first act indicates, Othello does not need to be persuaded to betray 
Desdemona because, as Leavis said, “the essential traitor is within the gates” to begin with, then, 
Pechter concludes, “there is no problem of trying to explain Othello’s transformation because there 
is no transformation to explain” (105). Yes, I would argue, Othello does undergo a transformation, 
and it is indeed complex. In the scene he enters with the aside “Oh, hardness to dissemble!” (3.4.28), 
he will realize he is losing Desdemona and will make her responsible for this loss. Here, the absence 
of the magic handkerchief will play a crucial role as a symbol of Othello’s realization, and his 
demand that she recover it is his futile attempt to restore their union in love, which suggests that 
merit and marriage, political function and inherent values, like the Reason of State and conscience 
in Botero, and politics and ethics according to Connell, are hard, if not impossible, to reconcile. At 
the same time, Othello’s displaced insistence on the visible presence of the handkerchief to secure 
marital love, which should be the inherent meaning of it as a talisman wherever it happens to be, 
changes its magic value from a connective tissue to a mere piece of evidence in the Augustinian 
sense of signification with an added Iagovian literalness in the connection between “sign” and 
“thing.” The handkerchief as evidence will then serve Othello as an excuse to finally condemn 
Desdemona and satisfy the “disgust for the flesh” which, in turn, works as a pretense under which 
he can hide the actual motive of the murder: the suppression of his own guilt about the original sin 
he had committed before the action of the play began. Othello abused the trust of those who 
depended on him, namely that of Desdemona, of Cassio, and of Iago. And for what purpose did he 
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betray them all? Not for the sake of his religious convictions but for his self-interest in securing his 
position in the state of Venice. 
 
4.1. Othello’s Transformation 
Pechter begins his analysis of Othello’s transformation by pointing out the striking contrast 
of the calmness in his first appearance onstage to the “ranting buffoon,”94 the “extravagant and 
wheeling stranger” (1.1.137), as Iago depicted him in the first scene. The images in Othello’s speech 
in the trial scene overwhelm the senses of his listeners (42); however, Pechter observes, his love for 
Desdemona is fraught with guilt (40). Pechter calls attention to the moment in the Temptation 
Scene when Othello “takes the initiative” (83) in his own degradation by attributing Desdemona’s 
love for him to “nature erring from itself” (3.3.244), which then makes Pechter ask the fundamental 
question why Othello should, “against all evidence and self-interest, buy into the view Iago offers 
[Othello] of himself and Desdemona?” (84). It might happen, indeed, “against all evidence,” as 
something that appears impossible, but if the Moor believed Iago against his “self-interest,” his 
acquiescence to the ancient’s insinuation of Cassio’s betrayal and Desdemona’s infidelity would not 
strike us as somehow still plausible. But it does. We accept that Othello cooperates willingly with 
Iago in the construction of a narrative, first only in the abstract, like a thought experiment, even 
though it might contradict “all evidence.” However, he does so, I argue, in his “self-interest.” He 
asserts, “once in doubt,” he would be “resolved,” and he assures Iago he would never “turn the 
business of my soul / To such exsufflicate and blown surmises” (3.3.194–197) but that, instead, he 
will “see before I doubt; when I doubt, prove; / And on the proof, there is no more but this — / 
Away at once with love or jealousy” (205–207). And still, Othello does not act upon these—his 
own—words. He does as Estragon and Vladimir repeatedly do in Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for 
                                                     
94 Pechter 38. 
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Godot.95 As a result, it sounds like the general is blowing hot air and, like the Player Queen does in 
Hamlet according to Gertrude, he “protests too much.”96 The rest of his utterances in the 
Temptation Scene prove that, for some reason, “To be […] in doubt” (194) is exactly what Othello 
wants to do. 
This is not the first instance in which we catch Othello in the act of saying something and 
observing in a helpless astonishment how reality slides from below his words. The play consists of 
competing narratives, as recent critics believe, but it is not a mere word game. Othello and Iago 
compete against each other in their power to create a sense of reality: in other words, Othello and 
Iago, to put it bluntly, engage in a “bragging” contest throughout the play and try to impress each 
other mutually with some “fantastical lies” (2.1.219) to always outdo a previous one and still make 
the next lie sound plausible. However, those critics who pay attention only to the discursive quality 
of the play should not forget that each successful lie derives its power from its intricate relationship 
to what has seemed experiential reality before and which it ingenuously (re)interprets. In this 
sense, we might trace the chain of lies and interpretations back to events that took place even 
before the action begins and about which we have only a few vague hints to rely on. Gestures of 
meaning-making in Othello go back to a time “before ‘meaning’ meant anything at all.”97 
In saying, “Nay, yet there’s more in this,” Othello hangs his curiosity about what may lurk 
behind Iago’s claim that “Cassio’s an honest man” on more than the mere hedges “I think” and “Why 
then,” with which Iago qualifies his statement in what comes to “Why then, I think Cassio’s an 
honest man” (3.3.142). Certainly, Iago said that “Men should be what they seem” (139) and that 
“Ha! I like not that” (35, when Othello and Iago saw Cassio leaving Desdemona) before, but Othello’s 
                                                     
95 “ESTRAGON: I’m going. He does not move.” “VLADIMIR: I’ll give it [his hat] to him [to Lucky]. He does not move.” 
Samuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot: Tragicomedy in Two Acts (New York: Grove Press, 1954) Act 1, pp. 9, 27. 
96 Shakespeare, Hamlet, The Norton Shakespeare. Based on the Oxford Edition, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. 
(New York, London: W W Norton, 1997) 1668–1756. 3.2.210. 
97 T. S. Eliot, “Introduction,” Savonarola: A Dramatic Poem, by Charlotte Eliot (London: R. Cobden-Sanderson, 
1926) vii–xii. viii. Qtd. in Catherine Mary McLoughlin, The Modernist Party (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2013) 63, n85. 
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readiness “against all evidence” to go along with Iago still requires an explanation. Especially 
Othello’s silent acceptance of Iago’s jump from a long belaboring of the point that a “good name” is 
the “jewel” of one’s soul in a non sequitur to “Oh, beware, my lord, of jealousy” (169, 179) should 
warn us that the lock Iago is picking here might open a floodgate of memories in Othello and make 
him suspect that Iago indeed does see and know “more, much more, than he unfolds” (260) and, 
therefore, he deserves respect. Is it in Othello’s interest to question him further and to prove him 
wrong, which would be still so easy to do; or is it better for him to stop pushing him, to give in at 
least seemingly, and to pretend that he believes his absurd lie in the hope that Iago would be 
merciful and would not pursue the matter further? But what is that matter?, we have to ask with 
Brabantio and, following him, with all the main characters echoing the question throughout the 
play.98 
Indeed, Iago’s lie has to be absurd to show to what length Othello is ready to go in accepting 
a “fantastical” suggestion only to avoid an inconvenient confrontation with his own dishonesty. The 
lie has to be absurd to make Othello appear a fool to himself, and Othello has to play along with it to 
prove that, although it is not possible, it is believable. According to Aristotle, “the poet should prefer 
probable impossibilities to improbable possibilities,”99 and Iago’s poetic “trick”100 on Othello, and 
on us, follows this precept. Too much questioning might force Othello to a full disclosure of his own 
dealings, of the original sin he committed against all of the parties involved here: against 
Desdemona, against Cassio, and against Iago. Therefore, it is still better for Othello to leave things 
                                                     
98 “What is the matter there?,” Brabantio asks at 1.1.85 to trigger a series of similar questions by Othello, the 
Duke, Montano, Desdemona, Cassio, Emilia, Iago, Bianca, and even Gratiano throughout the play text. 
99 Aristotle, Poetics, XXIV. 7–10, p. 95. 
100 “‘Probability’ here is […] a legalized trick played on the reader by the poet—provided he has the skill. The 
end justifies the means; and the end is after all nothing but a low form of pleasure,” Gerald F. Else comments 
in Aristotle’s Poetics: The Argument (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967) 630. 
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hanging in the air and to try to appease Iago along with his own conscience, with the reiterated 
epithet “honest” (259) which hides more meaning than it expresses.101 
We need not argue that Othello is ready to go to extreme lengths, indeed, in order to believe 
in what he must know is not true: the offering of Desdemona in what he “thought a sacrifice,” which 
must not be called what it is, that is, “murder” (5.2.69), speaks eloquently for this. Orson Welles acts 
out the altered state of mind in Othello particularly effectively when he enters the final scene of the 
play and the theatrical space of the bed chamber where Desdemona is already asleep. Welles’s 
Othello works himself up to a trance by a chant-like intonation, lengthening the monophthong of 
the repeated “cause” to create a monotonous rhythm in “It is the cause, it is the cause, my soul. / Let 
me not name it to you, you chaste stars! / It is the cause” (5.2.1–3).102 Othello knows that now he 
must not mix up the Desdemona he is sacrificing with the one who “gave me for my pains a world of 
sighs,” who “loved me for the dangers I had passed,” and whom “I loved” because “she did pity 
them” (1.3.161, 169f). He plans his act in advance cautioning himself not to “expostulate with her, 
lest her body and beauty unprovide my mind again” (4.1.191). But Iago must be appeased and his 
story must be acted out in the same sense that controls Emilia when she filches the handkerchief: 
“What he will do with it,” she says in a childish attempt to deny her complicity, “Heaven knows, not 
I; / I nothing but to please his fantasy” (3.3.314–16). Similarly, Othello performs the act for Iago: 
“This night, Iago” (4.1.191f), he promises. 
Othello’s self-delusion, however, goes deeper than keeping himself from admitting he is 
punishing Desdemona, not merely in the absence of substantial evidence, but for a crime she could 
                                                     
101 The principle behind Iago’s “trick” on Othello is similar to the one Quomodo practices on Easye, the 
“unsuspicious” visitor to London in Thomas Middleton’s Michaelmas Term, composed probably in the same 
year, 1604, that Othello was first performed in London. George R. Price, “Introduction,” Michaelmas Term, by 
Thomas Middleton, ed. George R. Price (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1976) 11–21. 15. Price sees in the 
comedy a “pointed commentary on Jacobean society” (15) and traces the tradition of “cozening” as far back as 
Petronius’ Satyricon (16) in the first century AD. While Machiavelli discovered, and by his influence possibly 
precipitated, a separation of politics from ethics, Michaelmas Term reflects, in the wake of the devastating 
effect on the economy of the activities of “individualists like Quomodo” (18), a rift in popular opinion between 
economics and ethics (19). 
102 Orson Welles, dir., Othello, Mercury Productions Inc. and Les Films Marceau, 1952. 
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not have committed. The profoundness of his deliberate identification with the role of the deceived 
husband is perhaps even more astounding than in the final scene, indeed, in the Temptation Scene. 
In a mood composed of one part self-imposed paranoia, one part self-doubt, and one part self-pity, 
Othello is “searching” for a possible reason for why he should be abused. “Haply, for I am black / 
And have not those soft parts of conversation / That chamberers have,” he ruminates in the 
Temptation Scene, “or for I am declined / Into the vale of years” (3.3.280–83). And then, as if giving 
up to ever fathom the proverbially treacherous depths of the female soul by trying to explain it by 
mere objective facts, he adds, “yet that’s not much — / She’s gone” (283f). To convince himself that 
the wrong Desdemona has done him is irreparable, he concludes laconically, “I am abused” (284). 
From this only, from the trumped-up charge of her possible unfaithfulness, that is, does Othello 
have to derive, certainly, and certainly hypocritically, his verdict: “and my relief / Must be to loath 
her” (284f). With the “must” he makes the welcome “relief,” which he has to thank Iago’s invention, 
sound like fate. To be able to believe in her culpability, Othello has to suppress his solidarity with 
his wife. 
In fact, the real reason why Desdemona has to appear unfaithful, we suspect, is Othello’s 
hidden resentment against the woman whose hand in marriage, in the circumstances of a war 
emergency, did not raise him to a more stable position in Venice.103 She offered her body and soul 
instead, “trumpeting,” to his embarrassment, to the decision-making political body of the City104 her 
intimate subjection to him. As a result, Othello feels compelled to subtly but firmly deny, in front of 
                                                     
103 While Othello attempts to approach and win over the father through the daughter (“command with 
years”), Desdemona embarks Othello’s discursive “carrack” with her heartfelt emotions. Both Desdemona and 
Cassio let their fortunes depend on Othello, only Iago saves himself from Othello’s discursive power by not 
believing in him. 
104 According to Quentin Skinner, “the Venetians managed to combine their political liberty with the 
avoidance of faction.” The unique and enduring solution was first described by Pier Paolo Vergerio in a letter 
to the Chancellor of Venice in 1394. This argues that the Venetian political system followed Plato’s Laws in 
combining “three ‘pure’ forms” of government, “the result being an amalgam of monarchy, aristocracy, and 
democracy.” The three leading political agents embodying these forms of rule were “the Doge representing 
the monarchical element, the Senate the aristocratic and the Consiglio Grande the element of democracy. 
Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. Volume One: The Renaissance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978) 140. 
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the Senate, being involved sexually with Desdemona, who is now held in bad repute even by her 
father for eloping with Othello. By taking seriously Othello’s invitation to participate in his life, 
Desdemona compromised Othello’s public image; by presenting her undivided identity in a spirited 
body, she set off, as with a foil, Othello’s stylized, formal entry into what he perceived to be an 
abstract Venetian political elite. Othello, at the same time, has received his own perception of his 
“visage in his mind” (1.3.254) from Desdemona, and now, transformed as he believes he is, he 
expects the Senate and the Duke to see him as an eminent servant, the way he sees himself, having 
earned incontestable merit in the service of an abstract state. Now that she has helped his sense of 
identity emerge, Desdemona appears to Othello to taint his hoped-for discursive incorporation in 
the state with the noise of her too corporeal “trumpet” (1.3.252). 
 
4.2. The Handkerchief: Is the Transformation Reversible? 
The handkerchief offers a point of reaction where Othello attempts to break out of Iago’s 
paralyzing early modern discursive and visual regime. Since the power he attributes to it is 
supposed to constrain the husband, not the wife, Othello’s account of the story of the handkerchief 
seems to have the conative function105 of an appeal to Desdemona to stop him in his fall into an 
abyss. An Egyptian gave it to his mother,106 he says, telling her that it would 
subdue my father 
Entirely to her love, but if she lost it 
Or made a gift of it, my father’s eye 
                                                     
105 In the sense Roman Jacobson uses the term, this is the function of language directed to the addressee, and 
it “finds its purest grammatical expression in the vocative and imperative.” Roman Jacobson, Language in 
Literature (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1987) 67. 
106 According to Othello’s other version of the origin of the handkerchief, his father gave it to Othello’s mother 
(5.2.224). Lynda Boose asserts that the two versions “make perfect sense.” The second story, she argues, 
“does not really contradict the first one but rather amplifies it. Important here is,” she emphasizes, “our 
realization that the entire legend and almost every reference to the handkerchief must be read in terms of 




Should hold her loathed, and his spirits should hunt 
After new fancies (3.4.55–59). 
If he purported to try and use the handkerchief as a means of recovering her from her alleged “new 
fancies,” it would be a third layer in his dissimulation to conceal his original betrayal of her.107 I do 
not assume that Othello is that cunning and unscrupulous. Still, although at the beginning of the 
dialogue I quoted above he complains in an aside about the “hardness to dissemble” (3.4.28), he 
goes on, before he mentions the handkerchief, to accuse Desdemona of having a “liberal heart” and 
having made the marriage vow without meaning it: “The hearts of old gave hands, / But our new 
heraldry is hands, not hearts” (3.4.40f). Othello’s image evokes the unity in courtship that, he 
complains, Desdemona has misused. He attempts to reaffirm the truthfulness in such signification 
by insisting on the iconic, metonymical reading of a “hot, and moist” hand that “argues fruitfulness 
and liberal heart” (33, 32) and a similar connection between “sweating” and “rebel[lion]” (36f)—
bodily signs of emotional states which cannot be arbitrarily manipulated and the alteration in 
which108 inevitably indicates, or even entails, physiological changes in the body. He is so 
preoccupied with this that he understands Desdemona’s word “promise” (42f), meant otherwise, as 
if it belonged in the same context. After such preparation, he suddenly complains about suffering 
from “a salt a sorry rheum” (45) that only the touch of the handkerchief can alleviate. All this clearly 
indicates that Othello does not use the handkerchief to stage a jealous scene around it but that he 
desires to be “subdued” by Desdemona’s physical power of love with the help of a token that should 
secure, because of the almost forgotten magic in it, the truthfulness of the outward signs of that 
love. 
                                                     
107 According to such a scenario, Othello would act as if he was desperate to win her affection back to make 
his accusation of unfaithfulness against her look more authentic, which he faked in the first place to cover up 
his initial act of abuse of her. 
108 Such as a “sequester from liberty, fasting and prayer, / Much castigation, exercise devout” (3.4.34f). 
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While it was around him, the handkerchief was a mere “napkin,” “too little” (3.3.304) even, 
for Othello. Desdemona, however, cherished it, personified it, even before she knew about its 
history: “she so loves the token,” Emilia says in a brief soliloquy, “That she reserves it evermore 
about her / To kiss and talk to” (310, 312f). Only when he starts fantasizing about Desdemona 
becoming common property among “the general camp, / Pioneers and all” (362f), will Othello be 
ready to understand the significance of the handkerchief in somebody else’s hands. Now, after the 
fact, he seems to recognize in the familiar words of the mythological warning the way he 
disregarded it and let his own “eye / […] hold her loathed, and his spirits […] hunt / After new 
fancies” (3.4.57–59). Immediately after Desdemona, the Venetian virgin, with the power of the 
patroness of the city in her voice, “trumpet[ed] to the world” how her “heart’s subdued / Even to the 
very quality of my lord” (1.3.252f, emphasis added), he renounced her in front of the senate to 
secure their trust in his reliability as commander: 
when light-winged toys 
Of feathered Cupid seel with wanton dullness 
My speculative and officed instruments, 
That my disports corrupt and taint my business, 
he swore, 
Let huswives make a skillet of my helm, 
And all indign and base adversities 
Make head against my estimation! (1.3.270–76) 
To excuse his “eye” for “hold[ing] her loathed” then, he called it “speculative and officed 
instruments,” that is, not his own property but that of the state of Venice. “[T]hou must not trust thy 
owne eyes,” Swetnam warns, as we read above, “for they will deceiue thee” (45) in your choice of a 
woman. However, the “light-winged toys / Of feathered Cupid” suddenly assume an ominous 
significance for Othello when they might be lost and “the thing I love” alienated for “others’ use” 
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(3.3.289f) in “her stolen hours of lust” (3.3.355). They become the “fountain from the which my 
current runs / Or else dries up” (4.2.61f), and Othello begs Desdemona to guard them by making 
the handkerchief “a darling like your precious eye” (3.4.62). These are not the words of a man 
raging with jealousy, hurt in his pride and thirsting for revenge; rather, they express the anguish of 
a guilty conscience anxious for his salvation. 
Othello now unexpectedly taps into the “deep play”109 in the signifying power of the 
handkerchief in his appeal to Desdemona to make herself “amiable” (3.4.55) to him as his mother 
did to her husband by using the charm of the handkerchief on him. He emphasizes the sympathetic 
magic in the absent handkerchief when appealing to Desdemona’s power to save him from the 
consequences of their alienation. Although in his dialogues with Iago the immediate visual presence 
of the handkerchief appears to be of critical importance, a matter of life and death, in his detailed 
description of it to Desdemona Othello does not even mention its color or shape. The object 
emerges rather in the form of a story of gestures, and Othello now hangs his hope on the power of 
repetition, imitation, and metonymy that it might evoke. 
With whom does Othello’s salvation lie? With Iago, who instructs him in seeing with an 
imperial eye and judging by the mechanics of exits and entrances, the disappearance and 
reemergence of an object, and by the surface meaning of a dumb show? Or rather with Desdemona, 
who meets him in the “story” (1.3.160) of his “pilgrimage” (155) and grasps his identity “in his 
mind” (1.3.254), but whose “honor is an essence that’s not seen” (4.1.16)? Othello’s account of the 
handkerchief is an attempt to restore credibility to a way of perceiving that does not promise large 
vistas but connects one living being to another through the repetition of certain gestures in time 
and through the memory this keeps alive and passes on. 
                                                     
109 The words are from Clifford Geertz, “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight,” Daedalus 101.1 (Winter 
1972) 1–17. JSTOR. Web. 28 Feb. 2014. 
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Desdemona’s perception, on the other hand, is not literally, or even primarily, visual. It 
allows for role-play and imitation based on sympathy, without mixing up bodies of similar 
appearance. While she acts in behalf of Cassio to effect his reinstatement with Othello, Desdemona 
invents a role-play between herself and the demoted lieutenant: “When I have spoke of you 
dispraisingly,” she says to Othello, Cassio “Hath ta’en your part” (3.3.78f), thus attempting to bend 
Othello’s will through his officer’s emotional identification with him. In the visual field controlled by 
the imperial vanishing point that does not recognize differences in individual disposition or 
chronology, this substitution might strike Othello as an imminent danger of the simultaneous 
presence of his lieutenant replacing him.110 Desdemona, however, goes on to try and make her 
husband understand the life-preserving power of friendship by reassuring his sense of identity in 
terms of bodily sensations: “’Tis as I should entreat you wear your gloves, / Or feed on nourishing 
dishes, or keep you warm, / Or sue to you to do a peculiar profit / To your own person” (84–87). 
The sensations she addresses here to invoke an image in Othello of himself arise in the skin and in 
internal organs, not in the eye. 
 
5. Othello’s Victims 
Othello begins “honesting” Iago long before the Temptation Scene, at the end of the trial 
scene. While he involved Cassio, probably because he was an outsider from Florence and thus, 
without connections in Venice, would depend more on him alone, in the confidential preparations 
for the risky enterprise of eloping with the daughter of a senator, a leader of the Venetian 
aristocracy, on which his employment depends, he did not confide it to his ancient. Moreover, he 
rewarded Cassio even before the wedding with the position of lieutenancy, and, as a result, he could 
                                                     
110 Patricia Cahill sums up the function of an individual man based on the view of military science books on 
the centrally organized Elizabethan warfare as follows: “Paradoxically, even as they disseminated the notion 
that each man had a particular place that was ‘his,’ they transmitted the notion that men at war are virtually 
interchangeable.” “Tales of Iron Wars”: Martial Bodies and Manly Economies in Elizabethan Culture, Diss. 
(Columbia U, 2000) 60. 
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not fulfill Iago’s ambition and expectation to be promoted. Thus, by marrying Desdemona, Othello 
made the social status of all three characters, Desdemona, Iago, and Cassio, depend exceedingly on 
himself. However, as soon as the wedding has been in all haste administered and the adventure is 
over, Desdemona’s and Cassio’s importance for Othello’s imaginary progress toward the center of 
power begins to fade, and this allows his own unfairness in passing Iago over, who is now flattering 
his narcissism and offering himself to guide him toward a higher sense of fulfillment, to emerge in 
his conscience. 
The consummation of the marriage is not critical for Othello, since, as a result of her 
elopement to the Sagittary, Desdemona has been “corrupted” (1.3.62) in her father’s eyes; to 
Brabantio she is “dead” (61), so there is no danger that he would “divorce” (1.2.14) Othello, as Iago 
threatens, and would take her back. Brabantio refuses to accommodate Desdemona in his house 
even for the duration of Othello’s absence at the siege of Cyprus (1.3.242). Whether he is “fast 
married” (1.2.11) or not, Desdemona belongs to Othello now. Furthermore, the advantages of being 
married into the Senate, so to speak, evaporate for Othello with the emergency in Cyprus, which 
removes him instantly from Venice. We cannot consider this a punishment specifically for ruining 
the “good name” (3.3.172) of a senator’s daughter and for offending Brabantio himself, but 
commissioning the Moor “Against the general enemy Ottoman” (1.3.51) in Cyprus, in spite of the 
fact that, as the Duke remarks, “we have there a substitute of most allowed sufficiency” (225f), 
namely Montano, sounds like a convenient measure.111 
Othello knows that only Iago knows he has done something wrong and that Desdemona and 
Cassio do not. This knowledge constitutes Othello’s vulnerability to Iago and, in turn, Desdemona’s 
                                                     
111 The Duke’s decision might have recalled the removal of “[Negars] and blackamoors […] out of this her 
majesty’s realm,” as Queen Elizabeth’s warrant from 1601, three years before the first recorded performance 
of Othello at Whitehall Palace in 1604 (Hall 2) formulated. In the Duke’s estimate, “Th’affair cries haste, / And 
speed must answer it” (278f). Similarly, Elizabeth’s warrant urged for a “speedy transportation” and 
emphasized that the order served “the good and welfare of her own natural subjects.” Queen Elizabeth I, 
“Licensing Casper van Senden to Deport Negroes,” Tudor Royal Proclamations, vol. 3, ed. Paul L. Hughes and 
James Francis Larkin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964–69) 221f. Qtd. William Shakespeare, Othello, 
ed. Kim F. Hall, 194f. 
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and Cassio’s lack of such an understanding makes them vulnerable to Othello. Accordingly, Othello 
backs out of the responsibility for his other two victims and focuses his efforts to clear himself only 
in Iago’s eyes. This interpretation contradicts the often reiterated claim that the play consists of 
mere narratives, because it anchors those narratives in the non-discursive substance of guilt which 
a fiction, even if taken literally, as it happens to Othello, cannot transmute into a mere text. Washing 
Othello clean inevitably entails besmirching both Desdemona’s and Cassio’s reputation.112 This is 
what he calls “the cause” at his entry in the final scene. From the moment he appears onstage, he 
works his way in a direction where he expects the least resistance: he ingratiates himself with Iago 
and lets Desdemona and Cassio fall. 
 
5.1. Cassio’s Fall 
Cassio cooperates submissively with Othello in being upstaged until he is formally demoted. 
Although Othello admits in the Temptation Scene that Cassio not only knew of his love “from first to 
last” but even “went between us very oft” (3.3.105, 109), and so he must have also known where to 
look for Othello on his wedding night, in front of the Sagittary he dutifully pretends not to have 
heard of the arrangement. “Ancient, what makes he here?,” he asks Iago when Othello, after a chat 
with the ancient in the street, makes a call on his wife to “spend a word” with her as well. When 
Iago responds with a riddle, “he tonight hath boarded a land carack. / If it prove lawful prize, he’s 
made forever” (1.2.49–51), Cassio keeps playing the innocent: 
I do not understand. 
IAGO: He’s married. 
CASSIO: To who? (52) 
                                                     
112 A text may wash guilt away, but it will not dissolve it. Therefore, the emblem titled “The Impossible,” 
depicting two white men attempting to “wash, in vain, the Ethiopian” in Andrea Alciati’s Book of Emblems 
sums up succinctly the paradox emerging in this interpretation of the play. 
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How Iago has found out about the wedding and the place where Othello “stowed” (1.2.63) 
Desdemona, as Brabantio puts it, we cannot tell, but Othello converses with him nonchalantly in 
front of the Sagittary about it. Although Cassio enters the Senate Chamber in the Ducal Palace 
together with Iago, when the Duke orders that Desdemona be summoned for testimony, Othello 
turns to Iago, not Cassio: “Ancient, conduct them. You best know the place” (1.3.123). Apparently, 
Cassio’s role in the preparations has to remain confidential. 
Since he attained the rank of lieutenant by doing Othello personal service, Cassio’s status 
depends entirely on the general’s pleasure. Julia Genster points out perspicaciously that the 
etymology of the word “lieutenant” exposes Cassio himself as a “place holder for his commanding 
officer,”113 so that the designation excludes any outside support to his sense of identity. He is duly 
anxious about Othello’s safety, as if it was his own, while he is expecting his arrival in Cyprus: 
Great Jove, Othello guard, 
And swell his sail with thine own powerful breath, 
That he may […] 
Give renewed fire to our extincted spirits, 
And bring all Cyprus comfort! (2.1.79–81, 83f) 
His words betray a cosmic expansion of his own anxiety in his assumption that the island and the 
gods will share it with him. At the same time, Cassio accepts without complaint that Desdemona, 
who must have shared her secret thoughts and feelings with him while he acted in lieu of her 
wooer, is now “Left in the conduct of the bold Iago” (2.1.77) and not his. Cassio and the ancient have 
begun to change places in the general’s perception already in the trial scene. Soon enough, Cassio 
                                                     
113 Julia Genster, “Lieutenancy, Standing in, and Othello,” Critical Essays on Shakespeare’s Othello, ed. Anthony 
Gerard Barthelemy (New York: G. K. Hall; Toronto, New York: Maxwell Macmillan, 1994) 216–233. 217. 
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will act like the bucket “full of tears” and Iago like the “emptier ever dancing in the air” as they do in 
Richard’s image in Shakespeare’s Richard II.114 
Cassio identifies with his function as a substitute, not only for Othello but also for Iago. He 
extends a “bold show” of courteous “manners” (2.1.101, 100) to Iago’s wife while the ancient turns 
away from her in loathing. When on the night of “the revels” and “the celebration of his nuptial” 
(2.2.4f) Othello entrusts the responsibility for the guard to him, Cassio submits to Iago, who, he 
says, “hath direction what to do” (2.3.4). In spite of his awareness of his “unfortunate […] infirmity” 
(32f), he still drinks at Iago’s bidding, saying, “it dislikes me” (37). When, as a result of fighting with 
the governor of Cyprus, he loses his rank in the military, he realizes he has been stripped of all there 
was to his identity. In fact, Othello used him and then discarded him in the service of his own desire 
to receive a confirmation of his sense of who he was. “Oh, I have lost my reputation! I have lost the 
immortal part of myself, and what remains is bestial” (240f), Cassio wails in despair. While he might 
have got his rank “without merit” (245), as Iago suggests, without it as support he is “now a 
sensible man, by and by a fool, and presently a beast!” (273). At this moment, he encounters his 
own insignificance outside the military order and sums it up in an image he assembles from the 
elements of a signifying system that used to be his own but that he does not control anymore. While 
he is doing so, he appears to himself as one who would “discourse fustian with one’s own shadow” 
(253f). and recoils from it in horror: “One unperfectness shows me another, to make me frankly 
despise myself” (266f).  
To make matters worse, he holds on to Iago’s suggestion that the “punishment” might have 
been a mere gesture “in policy” (248) which can be undone by a petition: “Our general’s wife is now 
the general […]. Confess yourself freely to [Desdemona]; importune her help to put you in your 
                                                     
114 Shakespeare, Richard II, The Norton Shakespeare. Based on the Oxford Edition, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. 
(New York, London: W W Norton, 1997) 952–1012. 4.1.178, 176. 
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place again” (282f), Iago suggest, and Cassio takes this as a sign of his “love” (276). Iago’s words 
restore his belief in the discourse of power and he receives it gratefully from “honest Iago” (295). 
 
5.2. Desdemona’s Fall 
Instead of a character fashioning a persona in a narrative flow, in the struggle between 
Desdemona and Othello, we see the static rigor of a signifying regime at work that has no term to 
acknowledge not only the desire but even the existence of a sexually active, fertile woman in 
marriage, loyal to her husband—or, for that matter, a term for a husband who succumbs to her 
charms. We witnessed the effect of this meaning-making order on Othello’s words already in the 
trial scene. Since Othello has submitted to Iago’s literalist regime, a discursive legitimation for 
desire is necessary in his marriage. Therefore, his physical contact with Desdemona must not 
betray desire but has to maintain the semblance of a purgative, cleansing, and punitive act. As far as 
it allows Othello to enjoy her body but remain in control while they are in contact, “Strangl[ing] her 
in her bed” (4.1.193f) is similar to a rape that protects the rapist from being “contaminated” by the 
power of female sexuality. 
In spite of being “aware of national (or civic) differences,” Pechter writes, Cassio finds a 
“shared humanity,”115 and he is Desdemona’s “natural ally.”116 This alliance has been forged in their 
common service of Othello’s interest, who gradually withdraws his solidarity from both of them in 
the course of the plot. He eventually offers Desdemona up to “the cause” (5.2.1–3) in the final scene, 
while in his captivating tale in the first act he still remembered her saying, “I loved her” (1.3.170). 
To her profession of her “duty […] to the Moor my lord” (1.3.188), however, he responds by 
pledging allegiance to the “tyrant custom” (230) and by emphasizing his “natural and prompt 
alacrity […] in hardness” (233f) which, he implies, qualify him to serve Venice overseas. Once he has 
                                                     
115 Werner Sollors, “Ethnicity,” Critical Terms for Literary Study, ed. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas 
McLaughlin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) 288–305. Qtd. in Pechter 68. 
116 Pechter 61. 
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assured the senators of his allegiance, he requests “fit disposition” (237) for his wife, who, emerging 
from the Sagittary is, indeed, fatherless and homeless. Although she is now married, her only choice 
to avoid being abandoned in Venice is to go to the war. She sails to Cyprus with Iago, her custodian, 
as a fugitive, a woman who depends on the mercy of men to be accepted on a beleaguered island. By 
winning the Duke’s permission, Desdemona has just avoided a near call of degradation and possible 
prostitution. We can hardly accept her as “a white ewe” (1.1.91) or one half of “the beast with two 
backs” (118) in Iago’s appalling literal image, but the picture focusing on the lecherous huswife 
alone in her bed might as well represent her. 
The first thing Desdemona does in Cyprus is listen to Iago’s banter, which in itself makes Jan 
Kott see “something of an ordinary slut in her.”117 Next, she pleads persistently for a drunken man 
who was demoted for assaulting and wounding the governor in a brawl. If there is a stable 
signifying system, many critics use it to cut out a concept from “the floating realm of thought”118 and 
put her in a category. However, concepts, again, like words, “are purely differential and defined not 
by their positive content but negatively by their relations with the other terms of the system” (117). 
As a result, Desdemona might fall in the category of a “whore” as Bianca often does. According to “a 
long and continuing line of interpreters,” Pechter argues, Desdemona is “at least a bit of a whore 
after all.”119 
Desdemona herself, however, approaches other characters not according to discursive 
patterns but by adopting their point of view, as she does, for example, that of Othello and of Cassio. 
Due to her resistance to categories like that of the devilish120 woman who cunningly undermines a 
man’s position in the world or the angelic helper121 and protector that uncritically submits herself 
                                                     
117 Jan Kott, Shakespeare Our Contemporary (New York: W W Norton, 1974) 363. 
118 Saussure 112. 
119 Pechter 72. 
120 “[W]omen sprung from the Deuill,” Swetnam asserts (15). 




to his interest, her identity is hard to define. As Ernst Anselm Honigmann argues, “[j]ust about 
every character misunderstands her.”122 She asserts herself valiantly in her words in the trial scene, 
but this does not make her accepted in the discursive regime of the play in her own right. Even 
those women who act “courageously and intelligently” in terms of the Humanist ideal of “feminine 
excellence,” Jordan claims, “prove the worth of their sex by denying it.”123 Accordingly, while she 
represents herself successfully in her rhetoric, she might be perceived as relinquishing her female 
identity as a result of the assumption that “Rhetoric in all its forms—public discussion, forensic 
argument, logical fence, and the like—lies absolutely outside the province of women.”124 This might 
affect Othello’s perception of Desdemona. Once she “trumpet[s]” her “downright violence and storm 
of fortunes […] to the world” (1.3.251f), he denies her feminine desirability and presents himself as 
well as sexless, a man beyond “young affects,” not anymore driven by “heat” or seeking “proper 
satisfaction” (265f). 
This makes it possible to argue that while Othello refuses her as a woman, he embraces her 
as something else. When Brabantio buries who used to be his daughter in his perception, a “maiden 
never bold; […] so still and quiet that her motion / Blushed at herself” (1.3.96–98) but who is now 
“Dead […] to me” (61), Othello, to complement this, accepts her in “her faith” (296) the way he does 
Iago based on his “honesty and trust” (286). In fact, he pronounces the two almost in the same 
breath as he speaks to her old caregiver and turns to the new one: “My life upon her faith – Honest 
Iago, / My Desdemona must I leave to thee” (296, emphasis added). Explaining his perception of 
Desdemona’s identity this way, Othello appears to be compelled to avoid seeing her as a sexually 
attractive woman from as early as the trial scene on, “lest,” as he later says, “her body and beauty 
unprovide my mind again” (4.1.191). And, indeed, he greets her when they next meet in Cyprus as 
                                                     
122 Ernst Anselm Honigmann, “Introduction,” Shakespeare, Othello, ed. Ernst Anselm Honigmann, The Arden 
Shakespeare Ser. (Walton-on-Thames: Nelson, 1997) 1–111. 42. 
123 Jordan 252. 
124 Lionardo Bruni, De studies et litteris, transl. William Harrison Woodward, Vittorino da Feltre and other 
humanist educators (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1897) 124, 126. Qtd. in Jordan 253. 
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“my fair warrior” (2.2.177), which would be difficult to understand in any other way than as, to a 
certain extent, the obverse of the change in Oberon’s perception of Hippolyta.125 Such a denial and 
promise in Othello on his wedding night will certainly require a constant effort of suppression, 
which over time magnifies to an absolute degree the sense of danger in falling. The result of this we 
witness in the outburst of his sensuousness in an excitement of his lower senses of smell and taste 
in 5.2 before he smothers Desdemona.126 As Desdemona comments on seeing him “gnaw” his 
“nether lip” saying, “Some bloody passion shakes your very frame” (5.2.45f). Eldred Jones points 
out in this respect “Othello’s enthusiasm for Desdemona’s body which he had deliberately 
concealed from the senate.”127 The act of murder, in this light, appears sexually motivated, even 
though it is purported to be committed “all in honor” (5.2.303) as a punishment for cheating. 
“Strangl[ing] her in her bed, even the bed she hath contaminated” (4.1.193f) offers Othello a covert 
gratification in an act of alleged cleansing, which appears to him the only legitimate way of getting 
involved with the unwholesome impurity of the bodily act Iago’s literalism has emphasized and 
demonized. 
At the same time, Desdemona’s rebellion against the constraints of the asexual identity 
imposed on her at the trial might serve as a justification for punishment. In fact, witnessing a play 
directed by a sexless but constantly anxious Iago,128 some critics take the slightest hint at sexuality 
in her words as an occasion to call her a “slut” and a “whore”—“at least a bit.” Desdemona herself is 
                                                     
125 “I wooed thee with my sword, / And won thy love doing thee injuries. / But I will wed thee in another key 
– / With pomp, with triumph, and with reveling.” Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, The Norton 
Shakespeare. Based on the Oxford Edition, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York, London: W W Norton, 
1997) 814–861. 1.1.16–19. The reversed symmetry is not perfect, because Oberon’s announcement does not 
promise love. 
126 Although Honigmann might be right in claiming that Othello’s “exceptional sensuousness, though not 
necessarily ‘racial’, adds to our impression of his otherness” (21), in fact, I think that his subjection to Iago’s 
discursive regime in itself sufficiently explains this outburst. 
127 Eldred Jones, “Othello—An Interpretation,” Critical Essays on Shakespeare’s Othello, ed. Anthony Gerard 
Barthelemy (New York: G. K. Hall; Toronto, New York: Maxwell Macmillan, 1994) 39–54. 46. 
128 Above, in section 3.4, I quoted Iago’s words indicating an aversion to his wife’s body (2.1.102–104). At the 
same time, the ancient is preoccupied with fantasies of illicit sexual acts. He speculates, for example, about the 
Moor having “done my office” “’twixt my sheets” (1.3.371, 370). 
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aware of the danger in being a woman in the “castle” (2.1.199) at a military outpost, and she is 
aware of the compulsion to fit her self within a negatively defined and narrowing niche of what it 
might mean to be “not […] a strumpet” (4.2.84), “not a whore” (89). “How have I been behaved,” she 
reflects on being abused verbally and physically by Othello, “that he might stick / The small’st 
opinion on my least misuse?” (4.2.113f). She has to be careful to disguise her true self as a woman, 
but at times she is bold enough to indicate that her identity is in fact layered. “I am not merry,” she 
apologizes once she dared to ask Iago to “praise me,” “but I do beguile / The thing I am by seeming 
otherwise” (2.1.119, 124f). When Othello indulges in a grandiloquent rhetoric on the “absolute” 
“content” of his “soul” (2.1.186) upon merely seeing Desdemona in Cyprus, as if even a marital 
consummation could not afford “another comfort like to this” (187), Desdemona responds by subtly 
hinting at the fertility of her womb: “The heavens forbid,” she gainsays, “But that our loves and 
comforts should increase / Even as our days do grow” (189, emphasis added). 
In contrast to Othello’s and Emilia’s readiness to submit to Iago’s omnispective eye, 
Desdemona is the only character who chooses her viewpoint throughout the action independently 
of being seen. She decides freely to adopt Othello’s perspective in sympathy and is ready to 
reposition it even to oppose authority and represent that of Cassio, her confidant in her love for 
Othello, when Iago has insidiously ruined Cassio’s career. Similarly to Adriana’s efforts in The 
Comedy of Errors to restore a husband’s love by undoing distinctions within the family that would 
reflect established realms in a hierarchically structured social organization,129 Desdemona, too, 
promises Cassio that “My lord shall never rest. / I’ll watch him tame and talk him out of patience; / 
His bed shall seem a school, his board a shrift; / I’ll intermingle every thing he does / With Cassio’s 
suit” (3.3.22–26). Desdemona acts as a connective tissue to restore the cohesion of friendship (7), 
                                                     
129 Like “in private,” so “in assemblies too,” “reprehend[ing]” her husband for “some love that drew him oft 
from home […] was the copy of our conference,” Adriana admits. “In bed he slept not for my urging it. / At 
board he fed not for my urging it. / Alone, it was the subject of my theme. / In company I often glanced it.” 
Shakespeare, The Comedy of Errors, The Norton Shakespeare. Based on the Oxford Edition, ed. Stephen 
Greenblatt et al. (New York, London: W W Norton, 1997) 690–730. 5.1.60f, 57, 56, 63–67. 
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servitude (9), love (10), and an intimate knowledge (11) that used to bind the three of them in a 
secret alliance against what cannot be more than “a politic distance” (13) temporarily disturbing it, 
“Something, sure, of state” (3.4.136). In comparison to their unity, wounding the governor 
(2.3.142f) appears to her “not almost a fault / T’incur a private check” (3.3.72f). To add weight to 
her supplication, she attempts to restore Othello’s sense of identity in images of protecting his body. 
In this, she follows inherent values rather than one outward, dominant point of view, and 
this is why she has to undergo a transformation in Othello’s perception similar to that of the 
handkerchief: the depth in her self has to be regulated to the kind of reductive dichotomy she 
refused to accept in her approach to Othello’s identity. She accepted Othello as a “visage in his 
mind” (1.3.254) instead of a surface appearance as “the marker of a theological category” with black 
as “the color of the devil, evil, sin”130 in a “moral and religious”131 sense. In contrast, Othello 
obsessively applies binaries to her in his effort to represent her in terms of the Iagovian literalism, 
using contrasting linguistic terms like “fair paper” and “most goodly book” on the one hand and 
“whore” on the other, as he does in “Was this fair paper, this most goodly book, / Made to write 
‘whore’ upon?” (4.2.73f). In using such words, he cuts out a concept from “the floating realm of 
thought”132 that he would contrast in his understanding with another concept that he can name, 
again, in an adequate opposite word. 
Othello’s persistent demand that Desdemona produce the handkerchief foregrounds its 
sheer presence or absence at the expense of its magical qualities. Desdemona counters this 
reduction by enacting the connective function of the fabric itself. To bridge the “unkind breach” 
between Cassio and “my lord” “for the love I bear to Cassio” (4.1.212, 211, 219), she points out the 
                                                     
130 Pechter 34. Elizabethans did have a concept of “distinct and biologically determined identities,” Pechter 
elaborates on the Renaissance perception of skin color, but not a fully developed racist consciousness. They 
made a distinction between such types of identity rather in religiously defined terms. 
131 Julie Hankey, Othello, Plays in Performance Ser. (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1987) 11. Qtd. in Pechter 
34. 
132 Saussure 112. 
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“dangers” Cassio shared with Othello and that his “good fortunes” now depend on Othello’s “love” 
(3.4.91, 90). In the brothel scene, stark paradoxes like a “young and rose-lipped cherubin” looking 
“grim as hell” (4.2.65f) and “weed […] lovely fair” and smelling “sweet” (69f) structure and 
confound at once Othello’s efforts to grasp her in an image. She withdraws from the effect of these 
by presenting herself as a mere “vessel” she preserves only for the “touch” of “my lord” (86f). While 
touching her body takes the form of striking in Othello’s act in repulsion (4.1.231), Desdemona 
cannot act out her identity without conceptualizing it in the very life of her body as her gift to him. 
To “preserve” (4.2.86) her body for Othello, who cannot love it as long as it is alive but would “kill 
thee, / And love thee after” (18f), she has it shrouded in her “wedding sheets” (4.2.109) before he 
comes to her. In this, she anticipates his worship of “that whiter skin of hers than snow, / And 
smooth as monumental alabaster” (5.2.4f). 
 
6. Conclusion 
His efforts to extricate himself from the conundrum he himself has created makes Othello 
vulnerable to Iago’s scheme. Othello has committed his triple original sin before the action of the 
play starts. One of his victims, Iago, however, offers Othello a plausible reinterpretation of this past 
history in a narrative that implicates the other two victims, Cassio and Desdemona, as perpetrators, 
so that it promises to blot out Othello’s responsibility and erase his guilt. Othello’s readiness to 
respond to Iago’s story involves him in a process of reliving history on these new principles and 
thus overwriting a less attractive version of his lived experience:133 He has exchanged the positive 
values of Desdemona’s love and Cassio’s loyalty for a relational one, that is, for the improvement of 
his own position in the state, but what he ends up with is a discursive point of view in a system of 
binary terms that cannot account for Desdemona’s reality. If Othello’s “vulnerability” is a result of 
                                                     
133 Our understanding of the process of reinterpreting and rewriting lived experience and our sympathy for 
Othello, who practices it throughout to suppress his guilt accounts for the immediate effect of the play which, 
as Pechter puts it, “does not allow for the distance we normally associate with dramatic representation” (12). 
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“the uncertainty of the soldier’s and stranger’s position in the Venetian state,”134 as Moisan explains, 
the successful elopement has not diminished this vulnerability in Othello. By marrying Desdemona, 
he has not crossed a line from being an alien to the safety of the inner circles of power. He is still an 
employee of the state to replace the incumbent governor of Cyprus, Montano, to obey the “voice” of 
the Duke’s “opinion” (1.3.227, 225) and to be replaced, in turn, ironically, by Cassio. This, again, 
emphasizes the constancy of “the uncertain position of the warrior and the stranger in Venice”135 
and the illusory freedom of Iago’s narrative improvisation136 which turns out to be a discursive 
constraint for Othello. 
Although Othello’s hoped-for rise has not materialized, it still can take place in a fictional 
sense: if not in moving closer to those inside the imaginary circle of power, moving upward might 
still seem real if Othello can rise, in a moral sense, above Desdemona and Cassio, on whom so far he 
depended for the success of his effort to climb by elopement. Although upon his arrival in Cyprus 
and his reunion with Desdemona Othello expresses his emotional state in images137 that sound even 
to Desdemona138 “bombast” (1.1.14), to use Iago’s word, Iago exposes Othello to an experience of 
the two opposing poles in his characteristic mode of signification. First he sets “down the pegs that 
make this music” (1.2.196) by reducing the other two victims of Othello’s deeds that lead up to the 
action of the play, Cassio and Desdemona, to what Marjorie Garber argues is the hallmark of Cyprus, 
“the borderland” in Othello: the level of “wildness, passion, and rebellion.”139 Desdemona pleads 
persistently for a drunken man, Cassio, who has been demoted for hitting the governor of Cyprus in 
a brawl. This urges Othello to distance himself from, rather than being involved with, both of them 
to whom he is in fact indebted for their support in an undertaking that ended in his displacement 
                                                     
134 Moisan 196. 
135 Moisan 196. 
136 Greenblatt 228. 
137 “If it were now to die, / ’Twere now to be most happy; for, I fear, / My soul hath her content so absolute / 
That not another comfort like to this / Succeeds in unknown fate” (2.1.184–88). 
138 “The heavens forbid / But that our loves and comforts should increase, / Even as our days do grow!” 
(2.1.188–89). 
139 Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare After All (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004) 589. 
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away from the seat of power in Venice. Then, in the Temptation Scene, Iago offers him the “relief” of 
rising above them in a loathing (3.3.284f) that will soon congeal into a coherent fiction and then 
into a solid myth that will leave Othello no freedom in action. As Frank Kermode sums up the 
process, “Fictions can degenerate into myths whenever they are not consciously held to be 
fictive.”140 We observed a change parallel to this from a symbolic richness to a flat literal meaning 
taking place in the interpretation of the handkerchief. The Augustinian principle of “the superiority 
of reason to sense” seems to exert its power over Othello, who lets Iago’s logos, his speech as the 
ultimate reason, “determine” what of his “sensible experience is really trustworthy.”141 Finally, in 
his offering of Desdemona to “the cause,” Othello gratifies his senses on Desdemona’s body in a way 
that pays homage, although grudgingly, to the higher judgment of reason. 
I started my discussion of the play by questioning the traditional notion that Othello kills 
Desdemona for love. If he does ever love her, he does so, as he says, for “she did pity” the “dangers I 
had passed” (1.3.170, 169) in sympathy. Upon her “hint” that she would be wooed by a story like 
his, Othello says, “I spake” (168). And speaking in terms of the ongoing discourse that Iago 
dominates seems to overcome the power of Desdemona, who is reluctant to utter those terms: “I 
cannot say ‘whore.’ / It does abhor me now I speak the word” (4.2.168f). This discourse defeats 
what Boose calls the “profoundly mythic magic of sexual union,” the “sacred” and, would add, highly 
personal “human act and its promise of generation.”142 In uttering the word but refusing to act it 
she resists Iago’s literalism, the belief in the reality of the image words can conjure: “To do the act 
that might the addition earn / Not the world’s mass of vanity could make me” (4.2.168–71), she 
asserts. Simply by resisting to yield herself up to the power of the term she defies Iago’s analytical 
signifying regime.
                                                     
140 Frank Kermode, Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 
2000) 39. ebrary Reader. 11 May 2014. 
141 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989) 133. 





The chapters of this dissertation followed the evolution of a sense of identity in the main 
characters of four plays from the Tudor era and one early Stuart play that I selected on the basis of 
my interest in the manifestations of this sense in language, in perception, and in action. The 
examples show an optimistic start in a complete sense of identity that integrates self and persona 
harmoniously in one character, namely Hodge in Gammer Gurton’s Needle, and helps him to a 
triumphant comic ending. In contrast, the last example, Shakespeare’s Othello, exhibits a 
fragmentation of identity. The protagonist, Othello, represents emotional content and values that I 
associate with the unspeakable self, among others an attraction to occult practices and a sensitivity 
to personal attachment in love, while his antagonist, Iago, asserts himself successfully in discourse 
and understands the subtleties of intrigue and politics. 
Between Gammer Gurton’s Needle and Othello, there is an almost continuous line of progress 
from totality toward fragmentation. The second example, The Comedy of Errors by Shakespeare, 
begins this move with a strong sense of division along the same lines as I observed in Othello, 
between Antipholus of Syracuse and his Ephesian brother. This separation of the inner man from 
his ambitious social counterpart makes itself felt in Arden of Faversham, as well. Arden and Black 
Will complement each other almost as clearly as Arden and Mosby do. The more clearly each 
function dominates one of two or three separate characters, the more they seem to be depending on 
each other. Therefore, an understanding of motivation in them is not possible if we consider any of 
them in isolation. A division, it seems, goes along with a sense of inseparability. 
The third play in the series presents the reader with the most obscure structure of identity 
and oppresses with the keenest sense of alienation. Doctor Faustus is not a character we would 
easily identify either with an inclination to retreat into a private space or with skills to successfully 
wield the power of words in social interaction. He escapes from a unity with his self with the help of 
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the rhetorical device of self-address, but his quest for knowledge and personal fulfillment in an 
outward control of material resources are thwarted by the narrow limits of the signifying function 
of language. Therefore, Faustus strives for a personal involvement in his transcendental career with 
no success. Besides his discomfort with the discursive fixation of identity, his perception of himself 
and his world teeters on the verge of the unreal. 
Besides a tendency to the analytical representation of the components of identity, the 
differences in its manifestations also exhibit a gradual loss of the freedom of action and a 
strengthening of the power of discourse in shaping a character’s sense of who he or she is. Othello’s 
dependence on Iago’s narrative is the most pertinent example for this, while Hodge still enjoyed a 
considerable freedom in his choice of action. Characters are not free in their sense perception 
either, which is also strongly influenced by expectations created in discourse and by the language 
that endows sensory data with intelligible meaning. Here, again, Othello is the character most 
obviously misguided in his perception and the most helpless in his attempts to resist the power of 
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